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1Abstract
In conservation of culturally significant architecture (CSA), awareness
about problems of temporality and their consideration has been frequently
approached with different perspectives. However, these partial explanations
have usually focused on accounts of temporality that mainly approach the past
and the present, and more rarely the future, but do not consider the complete
spectrum of human temporality, nor explicit ontological bases. In this thesis,
architecture emerges as a manifold being in constant becoming that compels
human being to exercise permanently memory and assimilation. The main
contribution is the proposal of an existential approach towards conservation as
an intentionality grounded on the more fundamental attitudes of cultivation and
care. Through epistemological and phenomenological analysis of Brandi’s
thought – focusing on his paradigmatic Theory of Restoration – his attitude
comes forth as a particular form of conservation intentionality limited to
architecture as a work of art. Following mainly Ingarden and Ricoeur, the
results of ontological and phenomenological investigations about architecture
and temporality demonstrate conservation in its modern form as a limited
temporal intentionality. After these theoretical pre-conditions, the existential
approach applied on the previously deduced dimensions of the space and time
of Dasein – in Heidegger’s terms – proved the grounding of conservation on an
existential interpretation of the more fundamental notions of cultivation and
care.
Making an analogy with Ingarden’s notion of the architectural work of
art, CSA is ontologically analysed emerging to consciousness as a manifold
2being that can be concretized in different ways according with the attitude of
the receptor. After the phenomenological analysis of memory, architectural
conservation in its modern form is demonstrated as a partial account of human
temporality that can be overcome considering human inhabitation in a creative
way. Partially supported on the obtained cases of remembered architecture, the
hermeneutical approach concluded suggesting a solution for the impasse with
an existential account of both, the artistic grounding of architecture and its
characterisation as the place that temporally accompanies Dasein. Thus,
architecture is ontologically demonstrated to have a manifold being in constant
state of transformation that participates of an unavoidable humanised
temporality, appearing as a less ambiguous object of conservation. Hence,
architecture is existentially demonstrated as constituting the space for the
authentically concerned human, whose temporal consciousness compels to
cultivate and care about, enriching the possible approaches to conservation as a
collective endeavour.
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Glossary
Adumbration. In phenomenology, Husserl calls adumbration the
revelation of objects in consciousness not given all at once, but in successive
perspectives. These perspectives allow the discovery of the same object while
moving around it perceiving it as more of this same thing. These views are
given to consciousness as a continuum that is unveiled in contrast with
essences that are given at once.1
Aesthetics. Usually, aesthetics is understood as the area of philosophy
which studies beauty and art. In a more classic definition it is referred as the
study and philosophy of the quality and nature of sensory responses related to,
but not limited by, the concept of beauty. The term aesthetics was only recently
invented by Baumgarten in 1735, where it appears in his Meditationes
philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus.2 In the context of Kant’s
three critiques aesthetics is everything having to do with sense-perception.3
Artistic value. In general, artistic values are the characteristics that
render man made objects works of art, these characteristics have been
identifiedn through an aesthetic intentionality. For some art theories, such
characteristics are constant and belong to the object itself. “[T]here is no such
thing as the value of art. For works of art can be evaluated from many different
points of view and, corresponding to these points of view, they have many
different kinds of value: moral, political, social, historical, religious,
sentimental or therapeutic, for example. Moreover, for a particular kind of
value, whether a work possesses that value, and the degree to which it does so,
will often be a relative matter, depending on the kinds of people whose
involvement with the work is in question.”4
1 Cfr. Edmund Husserl, Ideas. General introduction to pure phenomenology, 465p vols., Ideen
zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. English (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1969).
2 Peter De Bolla, "Toward the Materiality of Aesthetic Experience," Diacritics 32, no. 1
(2002).
3 Stephen Palmquist, Glossary of Kant's Technical Terms ([cited 25 May 2009]); available
from http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1/KSPglos.html.
4 Malcolm Budd, Art, value of. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Routledge, 1998 [cited
October 10 2005]); available from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/M010SECT1.
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Aura. Benjamin used the term aura for the feeling of awe created by old
objects such as works of art or objects produced in the past.
Authenticity. Authenticity is the quality of being genuine both in
apparent origin and in content. The claim that certain works are physical
objects or are constituted by them depends on an intuitive contrast between
singular and multiple works. Among works of the former kind are paintings
and sculptures, where the object fashioned by the artist (the authentic object)
seems to have a unique status – a proper appreciation of the work requires that
the viewer sees that object rather than any copy of it, however good. It has been
suggested that every visible feature of the work is potentially relevant to the
proper appreciation of it, and so an aesthetically adequate copy of the work
would have to look exactly like the original. It is possible then to produce
copies of paintings and sculptures indistinguishable from their originals by the
modes of perceptual access appropriate for those works. If this were frequently
done, the aura of indispensability that surrounds originals would dissipate.5
Astanza. In the context of the concept of the work of art, Brandi divides
presence between presence as astanza and presence as flagrance. Astanza is a
presence that is disconnected from time while flagrance is the form of being of
the real objects that can be perceived. “[A]stanza is the proper mode of being
of the work of art, and it is defined in opposition to flagrance which is the
mode of being present of ordinary things, that Brandi calls existential reality.”6
He coined this term from the Latin words ad and stare, meaning to be there, to
be given in praesentia, to be presentified, in opposition to the flagrance of the
real existent. He explains that “The concept of astanza is founded in the being
present of something that is only because it is present.”7 See also flagrance.
5 Gregory Currie, Art works, ontology of Ibid.([cited); available from
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/M012SECT1.
6 Paolo D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia, 149 p. vols. (Macerata: Quodlibet,
2006). p. 31. (Our translation). D’Angelo observes that in Cesare Brandi, Le due vie (Bari:
Laterza, 1966)., astanza e realtà pura are almost synonyms. In Cesare Brandi, Teoria generale
della critica, Einaudi (Turin: 1974). the term astanza ousts definitely pure reality. He
highlights that Brandi even founded the concept of astanza on new philosophical basis such as
the ones of Heidegger and Derrida.
7 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 83.
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Becoming. Heidegger suggests the structure of human being is
comprised of three co-equal moments: becoming, alreadiness and presence.
This is what he calls temporality. Thus, temporality means being present by
becoming what one already is. “To be human means that one is not a static
entity just ‘there’ among other things. Rather, being human is always a process
of becoming oneself, living into possibilities, into one’s future. […] The
ultimate possibility into which one lives is the possibility to end all
possibilities: one’s death. Human beings are essentially finite and necessarily
mortal, and so one’s becoming is an anticipation of death. Thus, to know
oneself as becoming is to know oneself, at least implicitly, as mortal.”8 See also
temporality.
Bracketing. Bracketing is the first phenomenological move, the
phenomenological reduction, also called by Husserl bracketing or epoché. The
move involves distancing oneself from one’s everyday immersion in the
ordinary practical activities of life, adopting a reflective standpoint upon one’s
experience of the world. This is taken to be the necessary standpoint from
which to engage in genuine philosophical enquiry, one which
phenomenologists criticize other philosophers for failing to adopt. The
philosophical standpoint is radically different from the natural attitude of
common sense and of scientific enquiry. The crucial difference is that, in the
natural attitude, one assumes unquestioningly that the world exists. The
philosophical attitude, in contrast, puts aside – brackets – this assumption. The
philosophical standpoint after the reduction is differently characterized by
transcendental phenomenology (Husserl) and existential phenomenology
(Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty). Husserl believed that it was a
transcendental standpoint, outside the natural world. Existential
phenomenologists believed that such a standpoint is neither attainable nor
necessary. The human standpoint is essentially in the world. The reduction is
8 Thomas Sheehan, Heidegger, Martin Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Routledge,
1998, 2003 [cited May 22 2009]); available from
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DD027SECT2.
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only partial: one cannot put aside all one’s existential assumptions at the same
time.9
Care. Care is the pre-theoretical concern of human being towards its
world. The notion of care relates with Heidegger’s concept of temporality. He
first conceived care (Sorge) as “the care-taker of beyng, such a care-taking
involving an irreducible operation of creation.”10 According to him, in resolute
disclosedness Dasein does not avoid its finite existence but anticipates it,
changing its attitude in relation to its surrounding world. This phenomenon
points to his notion of care. “In contrast to theories of human being as a self-
contained theoretical ego, Heidegger understands human being as always
outside any supposed immanence, absorbed in social intercourse, practical
tasks and its own interests. Evidence for this absorption, he argues, is that
human being always finds itself caught up in a mood – that is, tuned in to a
given set of concerns. The field of such concerns and interests Heidegger calls
the world; and the engagement with those needs and purposes and the things
that might fulfil them he calls being-in-the-world (or equally care).”11
Concretization. Concretization is used in the thesis as the act of
consciousness of being addressed towards some identified whole or totality
formed by other objects either “physical or psychical, abstract or concrete,
whether given through sensation or phantasy […].”12 For the case of the
concretization of Culturally Significant Architecture there is suggested a
manifold composition of different identifiable layers.
Critical. Critical is Kant's lifelong approach to philosophy which
distinguishes between different perspectives and then uses such distinctions to
settle otherwise unresolvable disputes. The Critical approach is not primarily
negative, but is an attempt to adjudicate quarrels by showing the ways in which
both sides have a measure of validity, once their perspective is properly
9 Jane Howarth, Phenomenology, epistemic issues in Ibid.(1998 [cited October 10 2005]);
available from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P038SECT1.
10 Miguel de Beistegui, The new Heidegger, viii, 210 p. vols. (London: Continuum, 2005) p.
57.
11 Sheehan, Heidegger, Martin ([cited).
12 Cfr. Dermot. Moran, Edmund Husserl founder of phenomenology, xiii, 297 p. vols.
(Cambridge: Polity, 2005) p. 69.
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understood. Kant's system of Critical philosophy emphasizes the importance of
examining the structure and limitations of reason itself.13
Cultivation. The term is motivated by an existential approach and is
associated with Gadamer’s concept of Bildung that he relates with the concept
of Kultur. For Gadamer, “Bildung [is] keeping oneself open to what is other –
to other, more universal points of view. [...] To distance oneself from oneself
and from one’s private purposes means to look at these in the way that others
see them.”14 Consequently, the idea of cultivation is the one of looking after the
environment from the most comprehensive horizon for the benefit of the
others. Cultivation then implies that we let ourselves grow in the opening
towards the others.
Dasein. Dasein means human being within the context of Heidegger’s
existentialist philosophy. In the thesis, the term refers to the particular way in
which human beings are. Since one is within the world, one is concerned with
our being but always being-in-the-world. Heidegger used the term to talk about
human being in this intimate relation with its place in contraposition to the
theoretical explanation of its world.15 Thus, we privilege this term within
discussions related with Heidegger’s philosophy instead of talking about
human being.
Dwell. According to Heidegger, to live in a particular place and its
things means dwelling; thus to dwell is Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world.
However, this oversimplification implies that the things of the world reveal
their participation in truth. Thus dwelling is to live in particular connection
with the place and its things in which there arises as primordial the dwelling
place as a comprehensive somewhere and not as a separated something.
Epistemic, epistemological. Related to knowledge. Related to the
systematic study of knowledge.
13 Palmquist, Glossary of Kant's Technical Terms ([cited).
14 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and method, 2nd rev. ed, translation revised by Joel
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. ed., xxxviii, 594 p vols. (London: Sheed and Ward,
1989) p. 17.
15 Cfr. de Beistegui, The new Heidegger pp. 14-19.
15
Epoché. In phenomenology, epoché is “the setting aside of all historical
and natural assumptions and factual knowledge in order to be able to apprehend
more readily the phenomena and the subject's consciousness of them”.16
Existential. Existential is referred to the explanation and reflection
about the existence of beings. In particular within the thesis, the existence of
human being and its place to dwell.
Flagrance. In Brandi’s terminology, flagrance refers to the proper mode
of the existent things in their being evident to sensual perception. Brandi
divides presence between presence as astanza and presence as flagrance.
Astanza is a presence that is disconnected from time while flagrance is the form
of being of the real objects that can be perceived. “[A]stanza is the proper
mode of being of the work of art, and it is defined in opposition to flagrance
which is the mode of being present of ordinary things, that Brandi calls
existential reality.”17 See also astanza.
Foundation. For Husserl, “attitudes, like acts, are founded on one
another. [] Foundation, modification and modalization are all structural features
of our experiences, and their operations can produce new and more complex
forms of consciousness. [P]erceptual certainty [] has a privileged role as a
primal belief or protodoxa [] a kind of primitive certainty, a naïve acceptance
of the world [].”18 All subsequent attitudes would be founded on this.
Gaze. Gaze is a particular way of regarding the world, a perspective
from which one can perceive it which considers determinant relationship
between the observer and the world. In the thesis it is frequently referred to the
modern gaze, i.e. the way of Western civilization of observing the world after
the Enlightenment.
16 "epoché, n." OED Online (Addition Series 1993) OED Online, (Oxford University Press,
1989 [cited 24 May 2009]); available from
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00292498?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=epoch
e&first=1&max_to_show=10.
17 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 31. (Our translation). D’Angelo
observes that in Brandi, Le due vie., astanza e realtà pura are almost synonyms. In Brandi,
Teoria generale della critica. the term astanza ousts definitely pure reality. He highlights that
Brandi even founded the concept of astanza on new philosophical basis such as the ones of
Heidegger and Derrida.
18 Moran, Edmund Husserl founder of phenomenology p. 150-51.
16
Hermeneutics. In philosophy, hermeneutics is the discipline, art or
science of interpretation. Key exponents of this area of philosophy are: Dilthey,
Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur.
Historical value. In the categorization that Riegl articulates about
monuments in his book The modern cult of monuments, he defines the
historical one as one of the values in which he divides the analysis of them.19
“The historical value of a monument is based on the very specific yet
individual stage the monument represents in the development of human
creation in a particular field.”20 The other values he mentions are the age value,
the deliberate commemorative value, the use value and the newness value.
Idealism. In philosophy, idealism is understood as the view that the
physical world exists as produced by the mind or of mental nature.21 It is
usually the position opposed to the view of realism.
Intentionality. In Husserl’s phenomenology, intentionality is the fact
that all consciousness is consciousness of something or someone.
Intuition. In the context of phenomenology, intuition is considered as
the apprehension and content of an object by consciousness. Intuitions can be
filled or empty depending on whether perception can confirm the real presence
of the intuited object or not.
Isotopy. The term is used, consistently with Brandi’s Teoria Generale
della Critica, meaning certain level of understanding that demands determinate
keys in order to be interpreted. He suggests, for instance, the distinction
between these three levels of isotopy: existential reality (flagrancy),
conceptualization (meaning) and presentification (astanza).22 These demand,
correspondingly, sensual perception, signification and aesthetic attentiveness.
19 Cfr. Alois. Riegl and F. Choay, Le culte moderne des monuments., 122 p., in-8. vols. (Paris:
éd. du Seuil, 1984).
20 Nicholas Stanley Price, M. Kirby Talley et al., Historical and philosophical issues in the
conservation of cultural heritage., xvii, 500 p.; ill. (some col.); 1 diagram. vols. (Los Angeles;
Getty Conservation Institute: 1996). p. 75
21 T.L.S. Sprigge, Idealism Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Routledge, 1998 [cited
October 10 2005]); available from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N027.
22 Cfr. Brandi, Teoria generale della critica.
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Kunstwollen. Riegl defined Kunstwollen as the intentional artistic will
that comes through the struggle against function, raw material and technical
ability in the production of art.
Manifold. The term refers to the varied, complex and multiple
composition that constitutes objects that are founded on many other simpler
objects. These objects can be events, processes and objects enduring in time.
As an adjective manifold refers to that specific quality of being composed in
such a way.
Mimesis. In a restricted sense, mimesis means the representative or
imitative nature of visual arts. In a wider sense, this representation is projected
in this thesis to architecture as portraying a way of behaving, inhabiting or
being-in-the-world.
Mnemonic. Something that refers to memory. It is said also about
something that helps in remembering something.
Noema, noematic. Noema is the object of intentionality – any objective
correlate in the phenomenological attitude – considered as experienced. It is not
a copy, substitution, concept, or representation. It is the object itself as it is
presented to consciousness. It is “the thing being thought of the thing we are
aware of.”23 Noematic means that is referred to the noema.
Noesis, noetic. It is the intentional act of addressing things in the
phenomenological standpoint. When discussing about noesis it is assumed that
a transcendental reduction has been carried out.24 Noetic means that is referred
to the noesis.
Ontology. In philosophy, ontology is a fundamental branch of
metaphysics. It studies being or existence as well as the basic categories of it. It
aims to explain what entities and what types of entities exist.
Ornato. For Brandi, ornato is “the transitting step with architecture is
produced from the schematic form, and therefore what makes the building not
23 Robert. Sokolowski, Introduction to phenomenology, ix, 238 p. vols. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp. 60-1.
24 Ibid. p. 60.
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only tectonic, but formal appealing and in short, art.”25 It should not be taken as
ornamentation, which he considers something marginally added. Ornato is an
indissoluble quality in the constitution of the architectural object corresponding
approximately to the concept of style in painting.
Phenomenic, phenomenal, phenomenology. Phenomenic refers to a
phenomenon. Phenomenology is the study of appearances as they come into
consciousness. For Husserl the objects of experience or attitudes were
phenomena, since the thing in itself would be ungraspable by consciousness.
He considered that it is possible to know the essence of things by studying
these appearances.
Protention. Protention is the projection of the consciousness of
something that is in the present into the future.
Retention. It is the present consciousness of something that has its
origin in the past.
Scinded. In general the term scinded is defined as divided or separated.
In the thesis, the term scinded is used to describe the separation of certain
architectural attitudes in modern conservation from the integral character of
architecture in relation with Dasein.
Temporality, temporal intentionality. Temporal is the character of
something being developed in time. However, in Husserl’s phenomenology, it
refers to the character of the ego of being aware of its own streaming through
time. “[T]o speak of time consciousness as such is confusing. [] We are not
conscious of time as such, but rather of objects in time.”26 Thus because of this,
conservation in the thesis is taken as a temporal intentionality that finds in
architecture its correlative object. More fundamental attitudes such as retention
and protention constitute other forms of temporal intentionality, being memory
and imagination their manifestation in consciousness. For Heidegger’s account
on temporality see also becoming.
25 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia p. 89. (Our translation)
26 Moran, Edmund Husserl founder of phenomenology p. 139.
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Transcendental idealism. It is a form form of idealism espoused by
Kant, who called himself a transcendental idealist but also an empirical realist.
He meant, roughly, that what we experience can only be representations, not
things in themselves, of which we can know nothing except that they must exist
in order to ground the representations. The idealism is transcendental because
we are forced into it by considering that our knowledge has necessary
limitations and that we could not know things as they are, totally independent
of us.27
Uncanny. Uncanny is used to describe the feeling of insecurity,
mystery, unpleasant uncertainty, weird and uncomfortable experiences that
accompany the existential character of Dasein when reflects and is not
absorbed by the everydayness, compelling Dasein to look for the place where it
can be in peace.
Weltanschauung. In the context of epistemology in general and
German philosophy in particular Weltanschauung stands forWorld-view. It
means the way in which an individual or a particular cultural group conceives
its world and its position and role within it.
27 http://www.philosophyprofessor.com/philosophies/transcendental-idealism.php
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Chapter 1: Introduction: On the Time in the Stone
Beauty
Time cannot be seen:
born only as a jest of a mad archer
he is only cruel for those who believe in him.
A hostile intent
made Time greedy and devouring,
and on swift wings gave him his scythe.
To contest such a rigid rule,
another, lighter thought was born,
where Time is no longer Time.
Disillusion
Foolishly you deny Time, and at this very hour
he is devouring some part of your beauty.
Tell me, of your ancestors what now is left?
Only their bones remain,
hidden by a grim tomb, a cold gravestone,
of your spent years,
tell me, what remains?
Oh vain delusion! Beauty never returns,
yet the seasons of the year recur
Benedetto Pamphili, La Bellezza Ravveduta nel trionfo del Tempo e del
Disinganno, 1707.28
As suggested in the libretto for Handel’s oratorio above, from the time
of Baroque allegoric compositions to the present day, one can chose to be blind
towards time – as the character of Beauty does in its absolute vanity – or to face
it with the determination that our limited temporality demands – as does
Disillusion, another name for Truth. This twofold possibility of the human
condition of seeing time in the context of architecture as a place to conserve
frames the theoretical coordinates of this thesis. The context is founded on the
notion of architectural heritage conservation being understood as the
preservation of buildings, places, sites and cities with special cultural value
from deterioration and disappearance. This thesis discusses conservation as a
process of assimilation that allows and encourages society to accept
28 Benedetto Pamphili, La bellezza ravveduta nel trionfo del tempo e del disinganno (Rome:
Naïve, 2007), Libretto for the oratorio of Handel "Il Trionfo del Tempo e del Disinganno".
(Translation by Rinaldo Alessandrini).
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transformations in its valuable environments. Architecture thus is recognised as
the bearer of socially significant values such as utility values, economical
values, identity values, and in particular for this thesis, history and memory
values and recollection triggers. However, the way in which memory has been
considered as a determinant of heritage conservation theory nowadays seems to
reveal an incomplete account of temporality in the relation between human
beings and architectural place.
Awareness of the problems of temporality and their inclusion in
conservation has been offered by several authors with different perspectives.
However, in general, these reflections have usually focused on a temporality
that mainly considers the past and the present, but rarely the future. Some
authors have regarded the problem influenced by postmodern relativism,
misunderstanding or ignoring the manifold condition of architecture, or, with
narrow perspectives, focusing only in one aspect of the plurality that constitutes
architecture. Therefore, this thesis addresses the problem of conservation by
uncovering an intentionality of an incomplete temporality behind the
paradigmatic Theory of Restoration by Cesare Brandi (1906-1988).29 In
addition, this study looks forward to propose engaging with a more
comprehensive consideration of time in the relation between cultural place and
human existence. On one side the phenomenological ontology proposed by
Roman Ingarden in his Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the
picture, the architectural work, the film (hereafter Ontology of the work of art)
constitutes the point of departure for the proposal of an ontology of culturally
29 Cesare Brandi, Teoria del restauro (Torino: Einaudi, 1963), Cesare Brandi, Giuseppe Basile
et al., Theory of restoration, 186 p. vols. (Roma: Istituto Centrale per il Restauro, 2005).
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significant architecture (hereafter CSA).30 This proposal tries to go beyond the
mere artistic phenomena of architecture, which was the focus of Ingarden, and
to some extent consider the existential approach of Martin Heidegger. On the
other hand, the illuminating and clear treatise about memory by Paul Ricoeur,
namelyMemory, History, Forgetting, constitutes the main guide to approach
memory and the complete spectrum of temporality, embracing it from the
phenomenological perspective up to the existential hermeneutical approach.
The bases given by Edward Casey, in his Remembering, A Phenomenological
Study and his The Fate of Place are revealing as well to deduce the relevance
that memory and place have in the context of conservation intentionality.31
Philosophical proposals suggested by Heidegger, and in a more hermeneutical
key by Georg Gadamer, are taken as the basis to interpret the phenomenon of
conservation as intentionality towards architecture studied through theories. In
the context of the thesis, the distinction between the notions of memory and
history is crucial.
The fact that conservation is a modern action has been suggested by
several authors. Eugène Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc has already stated that the
concept and the attitude of restoration themselves are modern and consequently
this characterisation of conservation reveals the limitations of the Cartesian
paradigm developed since the Enlightenment. In this situation, phenomenology
arises as philosophy and as a powerful analytical tool to undertake this problem
30 Roman Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the
architectural work, the film, trans. Meyer, Raymond and Goldthwait, John T, vol. 12, Series in
continental thought (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1989).
31 Edward S. Casey, The fate of place a philosophical history, xviii, 488 p. vols. (Berkeley,
Calif.: University of California Press, 1997), Edward S. Casey, Remembering, a
phenomenological study, 2nd ed. ed., xxiv, 362 p. vols. (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2000).
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because it deals with the human consciousness. Thus, the study of conservation
as intentionality collides with the consideration of some other phenomena
related with the human being changing through time. Problems such as cultural
assimilation, collective memory, clash between tradition and innovation, and
issues about philosophy of history have been considered in order to acquire a
more complete picture of the philosophical endeavour.
Conservation theory, as the field of this thesis, is understood as the
epistemological concretization of the intentionality under investigation. The
research is centred on positive theory, that is to say openly, explicitly,
intentionally and formally expressed explanation of architectural conservation.
Brandi’s influential Theory of Restoration constitutes the critical case of this
thesis. His theoretical proposals are still current explanatory principles and
guide for practice in art conservation in general and architectural in particular.
Despite the comprehensive thought that Brandi formulates, in an attempt to
conciliate structuralistic and phenomenological perspectives, his proposals are
object of criticism in the thesis for remaining limited to the work of art as such
and remaining, for the case of architecture, detached from the complete
existential dimension of the human being.
Phenomenological and hermeneutical approaches have been selected to
conduct the research. The research has been influenced by the works of authors
such as Ingarden for some ontological perspectives; Ricoeur for the
phenomenological and hermeneutical approach to memory; and Heidegger as
an existential alternative. The aims of the research are: to offer a philosophical
explanation that suggests an ontological frame to build up architecture on; to
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disclose a more complete temporality that connects architecture and human
time that remains incomplete through modern conservation intentionality; and
to suggest an existential dimension of temporality within the context of
human’s relation with architectural place and its conservation in time as a
continuum manifold in constant becoming. To embrace this research, it seems
necessary to establish some initial definitions, developed in the next section,
that work as a point of departure to engage with such a complex problem.
1.1 Approaching Heritage
The terms that demand to be preliminarily ascertained in order to start
the enquiry are the phenomenon of memory and by extension the complete
issue of temporality, the concept of conservation differentiated from other
related terms, the notions of assimilation of change, intentionality, and theory.
These concepts are taken as given for the initial stage, but as the thesis
develops, they will be additionally clarified, completed and even partially
transformed, but always following what the phenomenological method
suggests.
Memory and Temporality
Memory as a philosophical problem has been studied since the origins
of Western culture. In the analysis of these origins by Ricoeur, he characterises
it as the present image of an absent thing but this present image is individually
inherent.32 From that individual or personal image, memory is transposed to the
collective realm, as is further explained. Whether the nature of this collective
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memory is the same as the individual is part of the concerns of the research
specifically in the context of architecture. Heritage architecture is claimed to
embody part of it.
Etymologically memory refers to the goddess Mnemosyne who was the
cause not only of recollection but of knowledge as well. The goddess could
know the past, the present and the future. Thus, Mnemosyne was the goddess
of temporality, of knowledge in time, of the being of knowledge. Memory lost
this characteristic with the emergence of Platonic philosophy and the
intentionality of recollection was directed to the past knowledge that all
humans inherently possess. With Aristotle the passivist paradigm of memory is
finally established as orthodox and this situation persisted more or less during
the Enlightenment and the Modern times, when memory was linked with the
idea of a mathematical kind of register.33 The proposal to recover a more
complete temporal dimension of memory is relatively recent. Scholars such as
Henri-Louis Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, Edmund Gustav Albrecht
Husserl, Jean-Paul Charles Aymard Sartre, Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty would propose, although with significant differences, new interpretations
of the capacity of memory. The complete aspect of temporality is not
completely taken into account so far for heritage conservation, architectural in
particular, and conservation intentionalities remain trapped within the only
consideration of the past to which its enlightened origin is linked.
Initially memory is considered in this thesis as the capacity of human
beings to remember events, processes and objects of past times, “the faculty by
32 Paul. Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) p.
7.
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which things are remembered; the capacity for retaining, perpetuating, or
reviving the thought of things past, [...] considered as residing in the awareness
or consciousness of a particular individual or group.”34 From this linguistical
definition at the level of the term, the thesis attempts to provide an explanation
that can distinguish several kinds of memories applicable to the architectural
phenomenon. Phenomenology is revealed as a valid tool of enquiry to
disentangle the relevance of memory in conservation, since memory is a
specific intentionality within the complete spectrum of temporality.
Phenomenology deals with reality from the point of view of human
intentionality towards it. The method and its main particularities were first
developed by Husserl. For the purpose of the thesis, some considerations about
temporality are taken into account in Chapter 5, based mainly on the writings of
Bergson, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Ricoeur.
Conservation and Assimilation
Two initial methodological steps need to be taken in order for
conservation to be defined in the context of this enquiry, at least as a
preliminary phase that initially allows engagement with the problem and
determination of its characteristics. The first one is to define the terminology
for the studied phenomena and the second is the definition of the determinants
of this concept itself as a processes of assimilation of the human being to adapt
itself to new conditions.
33 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study p. 15.
34 OED Online (Draft Revision June 2002) (Oxford University Press, [cited 17 October 2007]);
available from
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00305561?query_type=word&queryword=memory&first=1
&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=2&search_id=MuOy-F5deBq-
6635&hilite=00305561.
27
The concept of conservation is taken in the usual sense understood in
the Anglo-Saxon tradition, since this thesis has been academically developed in
English. Conservation as a term seems to be more comprehensive than the
comparable ones of restoration and preservation. Conservation, in the broad
sense describes the activities of protection dealing with existing cultural
resources. In a narrow sense, conservation is opposed to restoration, so this
activity refers only to maintain the actual form of the cultural resource. As a
result of the anti-restoration movement led by John Ruskin in England in the
19th century, the term restoration in English was taken as something negative
since this action was considered as acting against the historical authenticity of
buildings. Therefore, the adopted term instead was conservation.35 Some other
distinctions between conservation and restoration have been underlined, as
Urbani states:
It is essential to differentiate between conservation and restoration. [...]
Fundamentally, conservation may be defined as an operation aiming above all
to prolong the life of an object by preventing, for a more or less long period of
time, its natural or accidental deterioration. Restoration on the other hand,
may rather be considered a surgical operation comprising in particular the
elimination of later additions and their replacements with superior materials,
going on occasion as far as to reconstitute what is called –incidentally, in
somewhat incorrect manner– its original state.36
In the thought of A.P. Zorzi, there was a difference between
conservation and restoration. While the latter considered innovation according
to the needs being intended for buildings with artistic but no archaeological
importance, the former was intended to safeguard against decay, and was for
35 Jukka Jokilehto, A History of Architectural Conservation (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann,
1999). p. 174.
36 Giovanni. Urbani, "The science and art of conservation of cultural property," in Historical
and philosophical issues in the conservation of cultural heritage., ed. Price, Nicholas Stanley,
Talley, M. Kirby, et al., Readings in conservation. (Los Angeles: Getty Conservation Institute,
1996). p. 253. Cfr. P. Coremans, "The training of restorers," in Problems of conservation in
museums, ed. 8, ICOM (Paris: Editions Eyrolles, 1969).
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buildings with historical importance seen as superior to artistic
considerations.37 According to Jukka Jokilehto
[M]odern conservation is principally characterized by the fundamental change
of values in contemporary society, a paradigm based on relativity and the new
concept of historicity. [T]he modern sense of universal significance in cultural
heritage [derives] from the conception that each is a creative and unique
expression by a particular artist or community and, [...] represents the relevant
cultural context.38
It could be argued that concepts based on relativity are very easily
challenged and in consequence, they need to be contextualised before any
discussion can take place. In that sense, for example, Berducou states that it is
necessary to reconcile the word restoration with the more modern term of
conservation. She maintains that Latin countries lean more towards keeping a
term and continuing to redefine it. Restoration then, for which she cites the
case of Brandi’s theory, has been updated as a word that now includes the
modern idea of conservation. For Anglo-Saxon countries, she says,
conservation is a generic term and restoration a specific operation that leads
toward the improvement of the object as an optional moment within
conservation. She also notes the appearance of the expression conservation-
restoration with the words put together which can be translated without too
much misunderstanding, and used as a temporary tool.39 Relativist theorists
maintain that it is possible to have two basic definitions of conservation. One
narrow sense is conservation as opposed to restoration, this is as the keeping
activity (opposed to change or destroy); and the second broad sense is
conservation as the sum of restoration and other possible activities related to
37 Jokilehto, A History of Architectural Conservation. p. 199.
38 Ibid. p. 295.
39 Urbani, "The science and art of conservation of cultural property." pp. 253-255.
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this goal of protection.40 Jokilehto finally questions whether the concept of
conservation is not concluded and whether it is possible to integrate its problem
among that of environmental sustainability within a global cultural and
ecological view.41
In order to avoid confusion in the terms of conservation and restoration,
some authors have developed the composed term conservation-restoration to
imply that in the maintenance and care of cultural resources, either the keeping
or the changing activity can be adopted. Alessandra Melucco Vaccaro
comments on the rise in popularity of this combined concept of conservation-
restoration as:
[...] A process that removes the causes of deterioration, takes care of the
environment of the exhibition space or settings, respects history, and ensures
preservation worthy of an object of aesthetic and cultural significance. It then
provides for maintenance, environmental control, and so on, in a complete
and, if possible, programmed continuum of procedures. These phases of
treatment are all connected and are all indispensable; the sequence should
never be interrupted unless limited resources mean resorting to partial and
incomplete procedures.42
The controversy in England between restoration and conservation
negatively criticised the former; however, restoration constitutes an important
concept developed by Brandi that is explored by this thesis. By this same token,
the solution proposed by Melucco Vaccaro of joining the terms in
conservation-restoration is to be avoided in this study.43 Therefore, the term
restoration will be used in the sense given by Brandi and which it is: “the
methodological moment of the recognition of the work of art, in its physical
40 Salvador. Muñoz Viñas, Contemporary theory of conservation, xiii, 239 p. vols. (Oxford
Elsevier Butterworth Heinemann: 2005). p. 14.
41 Jokilehto, A History of Architectural Conservation. p. 19.
42 Urbani, "The science and art of conservation of cultural property." p. 327.
43 Price, Talley et al., Historical and philosophical issues in the conservation of cultural
heritage. pp. 326-7.
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consistency and its twofold aesthetic and historical polarity, in view of its
transmission to the future,” to be discussed at a later point.44
The meaning of restoration in English is different to that in Latin
languages. In the conservation field, restoration means in English to give back
to the cultural object its former or original state, or even to recover a precedent
known state. Instead, in Latin languages it frequently means conservation in its
broadest sense, the activities of protection dealing with existing cultural
resources. As observed by Nicholas Stanley Price, the French term restauration
and the Italian restauro are almost synonymous with the English conservation.
However, for the purposes of this thesis the term restoration will be used
according to Brandi’s definition in the context of the artistic phenomena,
including architecture, unless otherwise stated. These precisions are necessary
since nowadays the term restoration is understood, mainly in the North
American context, as reintegration of losses in style.45
In some places, such as in North America, the term restoration has even
been changed to historic preservation. Preservation though, seems more related
with the stabilisation of a process of degradation, without necessarily
performing a significant intervention. In the field of cultural conservation it is
“the activity that avoids alterations of something over time” and whose goal is
“extending the life expectancy of cultural heritage.”46 Philippot says that “[t]he
word preservation – in the broadest sense, being equivalent in some cultures to
conservation or restoration – can be considered, from this point of view, as
44 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration. p. 48.
45 Price, Talley et al., Historical and philosophical issues in the conservation of cultural
heritage. p. xiii.
46 Muñoz Viñas, Contemporary theory of conservation. p. 16.
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expressing the modern way of maintaining living contact with cultural works of
the past.”47
Conservation is initially conceived in the thesis as the intentionality
towards CSA that has the purpose of protecting architecture – that is to say
buildings, places, sites and cities – with special cultural value, from
deterioration and disappearance by means that can imply its transformation.
Conservation can be considered as one among other processes of assimilation
of change in the human being. These changes are produced by the human being
itself or by the natural decaying of the buildings through time.
Conservation has conventionally been determined by some issues.
Scholars, such as Chanfón, have included among these determinants: the idea
of culture and cultural heritage; history and its relation with memory; the
concept of identity; the monument; concepts such as restoration, conservation
and preservation; and aesthetics and the notion of art, which now is
incorporated in the cultural strand.48
Other determinants have been disregarded in this thesis in order to focus
on memory but its importance is considered as part of an interlocked system.
For example, the concept of culture and cultural heritage has been changing
through time from expressions more related with the elite’s concepts of artistry
to a more anthropological view which can be seen as a product of the
Enlightenment inheritance. However, the relation of culture with memory
cannot be disregarded. This tendency leads to the consideration of the objects
47 Urbani, "The science and art of conservation of cultural property." p. 268.
48 Cfr. Carlos Chanfón Olmos, Fundamentos teóricos de la restauración (Mexico: UNAM,
1988).
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of cultural heritage as containers of memory. Other determinants of
conservation are the concepts of history and identity. The action of
conservation is addressed towards objects or practices that have evolved in
time that are supposed to express the identity of human groups. The
problematic relation of history and memory is included in the thesis as one of
the most noteworthy to be disentangled. The importance of the differentiation
between these two concepts has already been highlighted by scholars such as
Nora who, for example, conceives them as being opposed.49 The issue of
identity, on the other hand, has been studied in relation to memory at a personal
level when one is capable of “recognition of itself,” a way of memory that is
taken for granted.50 This experience is related to the collective memory in
which a social group is able to recognise itself through the vehicle of its
recollections. Despite their inclusion within the cultural issues, the idea of
aesthetics and the notion of art in Western culture is another important
determinant of conservation. Conservation, as modern activity differentiated
from maintenance, was in its initial stage mainly, if not exclusively, addressed
to the work of art. The importance that Brandi gives to art within his concept of
restoration demands a specific and systematic approach. For Brandi restoration
is this “methodological moment of the recognition of the work of art” and
nothing else. The recovering of different objects of cultural expression can be
validly conserved but restoration is, in the context of his theory, aesthetically
defined. Without the epiphany of what he calls astanza – a topic specifically
treated – and its methodological recognition, restoration is not performed.
49 Pierre. Nora, Les lieux de mémoire, 3 v vols. ([Paris]: Gallimard, 1997). pp. 24,5 For a view
that does not consider these two terms in such an opposition, cfr. Jeffrey. Blustein, The moral
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Consideration of values in conservation, a topic that today seems very
relevant, is an included aspect to approach the determinants of conservation,
especially memory, for this thesis. Values attached to heritage are social
constructions that evolve in time, as seems to be demonstrated by Searle’s
analysis in his The construction of social reality.51 The importance of the
ontological issues of these constructions is crucial for an analysis of how
temporality is approached through conservation. Questioning the determinants
of conservation theory can disclose problems that rest at the bottom of this
activity. Controversies in the practice of conservation are provoked by different
intentionalities that determine different points of view.
The complete phenomenon of conservation is regarded as an
intentionality belonging to a complete human way of assimilation. This
assimilation is not always consciously done and it can be related with the fact
that human beings with the help of memory – especially collective memory –
are constantly changing and adapting themselves in order to explain their
situation in context. Halbwachs has suggested the existence of a rational
activity that completes collective memory; the latter functions as a framework
to anchor the reflection of the past and the former as a control of the adequate
connections of the past with the present.52 From this perspective, conservation
would be part of this rational activity that organises the idea that society has of
its own past. This slow process of assimilation has also been experienced in
demands of memory, xii, 372 p. vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
50 Cfr. Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study. pp. 136-7.
51 Cfr. John R. Searle, The construction of social reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995).
52 Maurice Halbwachs, On collective memory, ed. Coser, Lewis A., trans. Coser, Lewis A., 244
p. vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). p. 183.
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other changes in society as in religion, politics, mores, for example, and in the
thesis is correlated with conservation.
The dialectical relation between tradition and innovation is observed
within the problem of assimilation. This relation, as the correlated phenomenon
of assimilation, can be unfolded into, epistemological, but first of all
ontological, aspects. Therefore, this thesis approaches the problem of
conservation as assimilation, as an attempt to reconceptualise it as crisis in
order for it to be overcome. Conservation, as it is demonstrated, deals not only
with the change in the valuable built environment but also with changes in the
intentionality towards it. These changes can be observed in theories of
conservation as epistemological concretizations of human intentionalities. The
fact that intentionalities can be collective could be argued; however, theories as
explanations are usually a synthesis of thoughts originated from specific
perspectives within society. This makes it necessary to specify what is intended
by theory and intentionality for the purpose of this thesis.
From Theory to Intentionality
Conservation of architecture, as here suggested, is part of the vital
relation of the human being with the constant becoming of its place to dwell.
Thus, the performing of architecture is not only to think about it and build it,
but mainly to live within it. This process in history has been done in many
ways: first, it should have been an unconscious activity, but after years of trial
and error, and recorded vital situations, knowledge started to arise. Knowledge
first was related to tradition, and it founded theory as explanation but especially
as guiding principles. Normative theory had a certain pre-eminence at this
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stage. However, human beings have to experience architecture before building
it, and indeed, they did before conserving it. This experience of architecture
does not always constitute part of the consciousness that conservators or
architects have in mind when conserving. The preconceptual experience of
architecture should be capitalised in favour of a better meaningful
understanding.
Theory in Western Thought
To shed light on a pertinent relation between theory and practice, it
seems necessary to establish some definitions of what theory is. Theory is
defined as “a scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or
account of a group of facts or phenomena.”53 According to Wang, the word
theory, which comes from the Greek theoria, has never lost “its basic
characteristic as a removed and systematic accountant of an object.”54
According to him
[t]heory in general is directly related to research methodology in two ways.
First, theory in general seeks to describe, explain, and predict. [...] Second,
theory in general seeks to develop descriptions, explanations, and predictions
that hold true in all cases of a behaviour under study, and not just in this or
that specific case.55
We could see architecture in its context – echoing Heidegger – as part
of the place to dwell. From this observing of our own dwelling, we develop at
least three things: the subjective and objective description of this place where
we live, the ontological explanation of it, and the informed prediction of its
constant becoming. These three movements constitute what we can call theory.
53 OED Online ([cited).
54 Active contemplation. Linda N. Groat and David Wang, Architectural research methods,
xvii, 389 p. vols. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002). p. 74.
55 Ibid. p. 74.
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Then architectural conservation theory would be the explanation we give to the
phenomena of conservation of the human place to dwell. This viewing of
architectural conservation can be performed with different approaches that act
as filters, screens or lenses that evidence specific characteristics. These
possibilities make theory varied and always partial, being always in state of
development.
Positive vs. Normative
Theory can be additionally understood in two ways: positive and
normative. The former is based on the concept of causality and the latter is
supported by authority. Positive theory is nearer to what we conceive as
scientific theory – a theory that offers an explanation about the conditions of
reality. According to this, if there is no explanation, then there is no theory.
This is the sense of theory that this thesis is mainly addressing. Thus, positive
theory can be understood as a system of knowledge that applies in a variety of
circumstances to explain phenomena. Normative theory instead conveys a
different meaning, but one related to the positive. It is assumed that if it is
possible to have an explanation of phenomena, it is also possible to configure
correct or accepted explanations of praxis. Accordingly, normative theory
means accepting a system of values and recommending certain actions
supported on it.
It is common that positive theory becomes a guide to practice and that
normative theory was subsequently based on it. This relationship runs the risk
of turning out to be ideological, doctrinal, or dogmatic. For the purposes of this
thesis, the normative sense of theory is to be avoided since the analysis is
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guided by the phenomenological bracketing from the explained intentionality
whose expression is theoretical in the first instance. The threat is to divorce
explanation from life; to explain, and then to suggest, practices that are far
from the essence of dwelling as human beings. The pertinent connection
between theory and practice in architectural knowledge arises as an
indispensable link to improve the way we understand, live and build our place
in the world. Thus, for us, theory is approached in the positive sense described
before, to explore the way in which the human being gives account of
conservation as a specific kind of intentionality. It instead avoids entering into
the discussion of any normative aspects, so it is not presented as a guide to
praxis but as a previous element of reflection.
The Role of Phenomenology and Hermeneutics
The humanities vs. science debate is another possible dichotomy in the
theoretical realm. Hard sciences offer a different nature of explanation than
social or human sciences. The Cartesian tendency of reducing everything to
quasimathematical descriptions is today one of the problems to be overcome by
theory. Science has its place, of course, in the explanation of architectural
conservation, but it should avoid aiming at being the only explanation of the
entire phenomenon.
Thus, the approach to the problem of conservation as intentionality is
based on the assumption that architectural conservation theories represent its
epistemological concretizations. In the case of conservation it represents certain
intentionality towards the place to dwell in its relation with change through
time. In order to approach this intentionality, phenomenology is revealed as an
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authoritative method to comprehensively explore experiences of this type.
Brandi himself has used this way of approaching restoration according to the
method suggested by Husserl. However, he only dealt with the aesthetic
phenomena of the work of art of which restoration is the moment of
recognition. However for this thesis, the concept of conservation, which
includes restorations among its operations, is considered a complete genre of
intentionality towards cultural heritage in general and to the existential human
place in particular.
In addition to the pure phenomenological perspective, this thesis
suggests a hermeneutical dimension in the relation between human being’s
temporality and its place to dwell. The particular cultural heritage we are
discussing is architecture with significant importance; nevertheless, with the
progress of the thesis, the definition of the architectural place is developed up
to embrace, in a manifold structure, the complete notion of human place. In
order to be conserved, this architecture needs to bear values that can be
important for society. It is on these grounds that the term culturally significant
architecture is used. The term has been previously developed and it has been
adopted by the Burra Charter.56 From this point of view, some sort of
conjunction or clash could be presented between some architectural theories
and some other architectural conservation theories, since their ontological
points of departure are not always concurrent. This thesis then offers an outline
of a common ground for building up conservation as a holistic intentionality.
56 Cfr. Meredith. Walker, Peter. Marquis-Kyle et al., The illustrated Burra Charter good
practice for heritage places, 1st ed. ed., 115 p. vols. (Burwood, Vic.: Australia ICOMOS,
2004).
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As it can be deduced, the division of the problem in several layers is
methodologically necessary since the explanation and interpretation of
architectural conservation needs to merge at some point with an ontological
definition of architecture in particular, or human place in general. The way of
approaching architecture in time as the main problem of conservation is
described in the next section in order to problematize it.
1.2 Problematizing Architectural Conservation
If the objective of the thesis is to suggest an overcoming of the present
situation in conservation as a way of improving it, it seems necessary to set it
up in the form of a philosophical problem. This translation of the topic into a
problem has been called problematizing.57 In order to problematize the topic of
enquiry, the definition of intellectual problem according to Nozick in his The
nature of rationality establishes that,
A well-defined problem is one in which each of the following features is
explicitly specified and delimited. 1. A goal, an evaluative criterion for
judging outcomes and states; 2. An initial state, consisting of a (starting)
situation and the resources that are available to be used; 3. Admissible
operations that can be used to transform states and resources. [...]; 4.
Constraints on what intermediate states can be passed along the way, what
final states may be reached, what operations may be done when, how many
times, in what order, and so forth; 5. An outcome, a final state. A solution to
the problem is a sequence of admissible operations that transforms the initial
state into an outcome that meets the goal, without violating any constraints at
any time along the way.58
57 Patrick. Dunleavy, Authoring a PhD how to plan, draft, write and finish a doctoral thesis or
dissertation, xiii, 297 p. vols. (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). p. 23.
58 Robert. Nozick and Inc. ebrary, The nature of rationality (Princeton University Press, 1993
[cited 18 December 2007); available from http://site.ebrary.com/lib/uon/Doc?id=10035800
eBook. Link to resource. p. 164.
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Thus, it is proposed to problematize conservation of architecture
according to these elements for the purposes of the research in the present
section.
Initial State and Research Questions
In this section, the concepts or elements that define the initial state to
problematize architectural conservation are introduced, and with this, the
research questions are generated.
Architecture is initially taken within the context of this thesis in two
differentiated but related senses. Firstly architecture is ontologically defined –
taking Ingarden’s theory as initial guide – as a culturally significant object
whose concretization is found in the building but is not necessarily always
coincident with it. Secondly, the concept of architecture is extended to the
place of human being since – following Heidegger – there would not be such a
place that is not humanly relevant. What is then obtained is the manifold
condition of the architectural objects in which they are constituted by several
other objects, some of them physical and others obtained from individual and
collective concretizations, including among these the aesthetic dimension. As a
point of departure, the first level of research questions asks: How are the
meaning, structure and essence of architecture conceived in conservation
theory? What does memory mean for conservation of architecture?
Architectural conservation addresses the care of the building in its
material consistency rather than considering other parts of its manifold reality.
Restorers have emphasised the importance of the ideal forms that architecture
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has looked after to express. Another option for conservation intentionality is by
having the user or receptor of architecture as its focus; this gives more
importance to the perception of architecture than to buildings or their ideal
image.
The consciousness of time addressed towards these architectural
phenomena is evidenced in conservation intentionality, in an incomplete form
though. Temporality in conservation has conventionally been focused in the
past, in part because of the necessity of the human being to assimilate change,
and because of the permanent dialectic of memory. Conservation evidences
human intentionality towards change of the place in time. This way the second
order of research questions arises as: How memory – especially collective
memory – and conservation intentionality are correlated? How
architectural memories have projection towards the future?
Once an ontological definition for architecture is outlined as the human
place and a phenomenological description for conservation is defined as the
temporal intentionality towards change, it is possible to interpret theories of
conservation as an epistemic part of an existential enterprise present in the
Western world since ancient times. The questions that this concurrence of
considerations arises are: How is architecture perceived as changing in
time? Moreover, how is conservation founded in relation to the time and
place of human being?
The philosophical problem of the relation of the existence of the human
being in place and through time is wide to engage with in a thesis. However,
the selected architectural perspective is linked with the works of scholars in
42
phenomenology such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Gadamer and
Ricoeur. The connection with this thesis is as supportive or holistic explicative
frameworks to understand human being in place and time, which is the problem
that conservation as intentionality manifests.
Research Aims
Although there are at the moment important shifts to apparently
transform conservation concurrently with a more complete consideration of
temporality, we claim that the approach in conservation intentionality
nowadays does not consider the manifold nature of architecture. In relation
with this manifold, it does not consider the complete nature of memory –
especially collective memory –and its capacity to be transformed in a way that
includes a more comprehensive temporality. Also it does not consider the
relation that place and time have for human society engaging with and
interpreting its existence.
Thus the main aims of the thesis are:
To find the origins of the lack of existential understanding of
temporality in recent conservation theory, focusing in the interpretation of the
outstanding case of restoration intentionality proposed by Brandi;
To suggest a phenomenological ontology of CSA following Ingarden,
suggesting its structure and essence as phenomenon, as theoretical precondition
for any conservation intentionality;
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To suggest a reconnection of temporality – memory included – with
architecture and its conservation, proposing the hermeneutical dimension for
human existence within the relation of place with time.
The methodology proposed deals with these problems from a
phenomenological and hermeneutical perspective, dividing the problem in
several layers of enquiry, as it is presented in the following section.
1.3 Research Methods
This thesis could seem philosophical, however it is rather an
architectural thesis philosophically approached. The difference resides in that
for the enquiry, the analysis of an architectural phenomenon takes assumptions
that inscribe it within the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, without
necessarily suggesting novelties within this field, intending instead an original
approach to the problem of conservation as manifestation of an existential
intentionality. Nevertheless, some philosophical assumptions are evidenced in
due time, in order to understand their relation with architecture in the
discussion of human being in place and time, as part of a broader
understanding.
Logical Argumentation
The methods of research are the set of operations suggested in order to
change the initial state and the resources used to do it. The paradigm of enquiry
of the thesis is inscribed in the qualitative strand. Thus, it could seem inclined
to offer more a mythic or poetic description than a scientific one according to
Groat, who considers this kind of research as “[...] continuous, holistic,
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divergent, and generative” and by the same token, more linked to a base in the
area of arts and humanities.59 Accordingly, this kind of research tends to be
based in non-numerical data such as texts or discourses, experiences, or
objects.60 Groat calls the paradigm naturalistic, and uses phenomenological,
hermeneutic and constructive as other names for it.61 She sustains that,
The basic ontological premise of naturalistic research is that there are
multiple, socially constructed realities. The corresponding epistemological
position is that it is neither possible nor necessarily desirable for research to
establish a value-free objectivity. Rather, naturalistic researchers recognize
the value and reality of the interactive dynamics between the inquirer and the
people or setting being studied. In a similar vein, they also make sure they are
explicit in stating the theoretical position and values inherent in their work,
and acknowledge the role of interpretation and creation in reporting their
findings.62
The methodological assumptions for this paradigm of research suggest
that the process is characterised by inductive processes; and multiple and cross
referential factors.63 The reality is explored as constituted by a manifold of
several strata that is possible to be analysed from different perspectives.
Tactical Layers
The problem to be embraced has been divided in three different layers
of analysis. The first epistemological layer is formed by theoretical
explanations about architectural heritage namely architectural conservation
theory. Brandi’s theory finds its place within this layer. The second and most
direct layer is constituted by our two main topics. The first is the architectural
phenomenon with its own ontological particularities; and the second is the
phenomenology of temporality, especially of memory as consciousness of the
59 Groat and Wang, Architectural research methods p. 25.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. p. 33.
62 Ibid.
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past. They are related with the nature of architecture as a real entity and its
relation with human existence in time. The rhetorical systemic construction
frames, by analogy, on one side some similarities and differences between art
in general and architecture; and, on the other side, some equivalence between
personal and collective memory. The exploration of this layer, formed by
architecture and temporality, constitutes the core discussion of the thesis. The
cross categorisation and elaboration of the modes of being of architecture in
time, following Ingarden, and the one of these modes of being with the
characteristics of memory, help to configure the matrix of the modes of
remembered architecture. The relevance of some of the concepts of Brandi
about these two topics is considered within the discussion. The obtained
categories are elements to embrace the third layer, which is constituted by a
process of hermeneutics and critique of conservation, having as instrumental
case Brandi’s theory of restoration. This layer is the one constituted by meta-
theoretical philosophies supporting conservation as holistic explanations of the
world, in which the architectural phenomenon finds a contingent position. An
argument from meta-theoretical tradition is applied over this theory of
conservation in the way of existential phenomenology. This constitutes the key
of interpretation of the final third layer that engages with the philosophical
proposal behind the study. Additionally, by casting a new light from recent
developments the research also limits its boundaries and suggests further post-
ontological research, which goes beyond the topics discussed here.
63 Ibid. p. 28.
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Relevance of the Critical Case
Brandi’s theory of restoration constitutes the critical case in which the
proposed findings are finally applied. The reason to select it is that it can very
well be defined as a “specific, unique, bounded system” that itself proposes a
complete philosophical structure to support conservation.64 The use of this case
in the research is concerned with its context, contingency and specificity, and
for the same token it is very significant in its own right, and not only as a
means to test the theoretical proposal. Its uniqueness is based on its historical
background and the aesthetical context. The sources of data for this case is not
only Brandi’s theory itself, but also other of his seminal writings related with
aesthetics and art critique. Additionally, several interpretations of his work
have been reviewed in order to understand its influence in Italy and the world.
Brandi’s theory still is a recurring point of departure for proposals of
conservation in practice. The significance of his theories is recognised as
decisive, for instance, in the Istituto Centrale del Restauro in Rome and in the
diffusion that his ideas have in the context of heritage conservation.65 The
stance of the thesis is not to test the reliability, replicability and validity of
Brandi’s postulates but the main concern is to observe how well this theory
validates the hypothesis.
64 Stake, Robert E. in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, The handbook of qualitative
research, 2nd ed. ed., xx, 1065 , [57] p. vols. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2000). p. 436.
65 As an example of the initiatives organised about his thought, cfr.(Associazione Amici di
Cesare Brandi, 21-05-2007 2006 [cited 05-06 2008]); available from
www.cesarebrandi.org/index.htm.. The ICR is one of the most prestigious centres for the study,
conservation and restoration of cultural heritage. It offers international scientific and technical
consultancy, school of conservation and publications related with these topics. Cfr. Istituto
Centrale per il Restauro (21-01-2008 [cited 10-06 2008]); available from
http://www.icr.beniculturali.it/indexj.html.
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Cross reference with other philosophical approaches is the means by
which the study is mainly supported. Therefore, the theory of Brandi is an
intrinsic and unique case because it permits improvement of our understanding
of research concerns and provides significant opportunity to refine the
postulates.
Constraints
As the logical argument embraced in the thesis is proposed to be based
on the phenomenological tradition, the limits are defined by the tradition itself.
However, additional constrains have been established in order to unify some
criteria. The first limit is chronological in correspondence with a post-
Enlightenment era and the positivist modern view of architecture in general and
conservation in particular. The theory that has been considered is one that
results from this cultural fracture. It has been argued that this modern Cartesian
view has affected the way architecture is conceived. Even when the selected
historical time makes the logical system appear dependant on the chronological
context, this latter is really transformative and changing.
Another important limit is the cultural context. The research is focused
on the Western European tradition and considers the theoretical apparatus that
results from the evolution of continental philosophy more than the Anglo-
Saxon tradition, although this differentiation is less significant as it is usually
considered. For the same token Brandi’s theory is a valid example of a
contemporary influential approach to conservation of art in general and
architecture in particular. Accordingly, the proposed thesis could not be
completely consistent to explain temporality in conservation within a different
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cultural context. The inheritance of a particular way to embrace this
philosophical approach in conservation could be not a problem in a different
cultural context. As Wang suggests, “some logical systems are time dependent,
so that the passing of a social-cultural era may render a proposed system more
of a historical item than one having current explanatory power.”66 In this sense,
it is the contention of the thesis that nowadays the paradigm of conservation is
being reoriented in the sense that the research suggests, although without
completely engaging with this new paradigm yet.
The outcome of the research should not be misunderstood as a
theoretical “system by itself [...] instead as being a means to have a different or
evolved product [...].”67 This means that the thesis is presented as a means to
attain comprehensive theoretical bases to be applied according with specific
cases, through the analysis of an actual theory considered as manifestation of
temporal intentionality. In this sense, the research aspires to be not universal
but open to offer multiple readings.
The phenomenological approach also offers some limits to consider.
The methodology is recognised as originating in this philosophy with all its
implications, nevertheless the discussion does not intend to resolve inherent
problems at its interior, even recognising and considering some of them.
Solution to dilemmas such as the conflict of realism against idealism, the issue
of a transcendental phenomenology, and the condition of possibility of
collective intentionality, among others are out of the scope of the thesis.
However, these problems are structurally considered in one way or another
66 Groat and Wang, Architectural research methods p. 334.
67 Ibid.
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compromising with a meta-philosophical position that intends to make sense of
conservation.
Although “[i]nternal logical consistency does not guarantee accurate
explanatory power,” the thesis should provide a critical response after being
tested in theories other than the one of Brandi.68 The proposed systemic
approach is contrasted only through this chosen critical case, because it permits
very appropriate understanding of conservation as intentionality. Additionally
this unique case is singular enough to offer special interest in relation with
other philosophical links.
Outcome
The intention of the thesis is to offer a philosophical explanation,
through the examination of the theory of restoration of Brandi, that:
Suggests an ontological frame on which to build up architecture as the
human place, evidencing the deficiencies that recently past forms of
conservation intentionality have with regards to the relation of CSA and
memory;
Discloses part of the hidden dimension of time in conservation, as a
complete temporality, that connects architecture – as part of the human place –
and human time through conservation intentionality; and
Proposes an existential hermeneutical dimension for temporality within
the context of its relation with human place in time, and its conservation as a
68 Ibid. p. 334.
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continuum manifold in constant becoming, that exhibit the conditions under
which conservation is meaningful.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The thesis is divided in seven chapters. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 are
dedicated to the presentation of the theoretical framework with which the thesis
has developed its discussion. It represents an epistemological approach to
temporality in relation with architecture. Chapter 1, which constitutes the
introduction, has dealt with the definition of the domain and subject matter of
the research, presenting the intellectual paradox around which the thesis has
been developed. It develops the problematisation of conservation according to
the following five operations, namely, presentation of the initial state and
existing conditions and some literature to overcome; outline of the goal that
would overcome the actual disjunction; proposal of operations to change the
initial state and the methodological resources to do it (new data, theory and
toolkit of research methods); setting of constraints and limitations as well as
the operations that could seem unviable; and definition of the outcome that
meets the goal to improve the situation. Thus, Chapter 1 frames the research
questions, specifically focusing down on the problem of memory in
conservation theory; it offers relevant definitions developed such as the
concepts of theory, conservation, conjunction, assimilation, and restoration. It
additionally gives the description of conservation theory and its determinants in
the Western context and justifies the selection of temporality as the main
subject matter of the inquiry.
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Chapters 2 and 3 develop an epistemological approach to Brandi’s
thought, setting a context to our problem, that is to say the philosophical
background of architecture and its conservation as a form of temporal
intentionality. Chapter 2 outlines Brandi’s notion of art, and architecture as a
form of art, based on his phenomenological approach. This chapter describes
the main philosophical influences present in Brandi’s theories, emphasising
some notions considered as fundamental for the further discussion, coming
mainly from the idealism of Benedetto Croce. The significance of the Kantian
schematism and the successive phenomenological approach in Brandi’s
aesthetics are also described. Chapter 2 offers a view on the relevance of
Brandi’s thought in the juncture of the actual post modern condition. Chapter 3
focuses on Brandi’s approach to conservation as temporal intentionality in
relation with art and architecture, especially through the analysis of his Theory
of Restoration. It presents this form of intentionality as a privileged aesthetic
and historic recognition of the work of art. Chapter 3 develops relations from
that personal level of experience up to collective intentionalities in the context
of Brandi’s aesthetic thought.
Chapters 4 and 5 develop the outline of the ontological and
phenomenological definitions that configure the theoretical apparatus to
suggest new possible perspectives to conservation. In the first place, Chapter 4
develops an ontology of CSA, supported on Ingarden, in an attempt to isolate
some aspects that architecture seems to have in its essence. Chapter 5 tracks
back the concept of memory, considering ideas of Ricoeur and Casey, and
connecting them to architecture. This develops into the comprehensive concept
of temporality that conservation has largely ignored. The concept of collective
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memory is worked out considering some important insights of Halbwachs,
arriving to the description of assimilation as a cultural phenomenon. The
consideration of temporality as a whole is embraced in distinction to previous
positions.
Chapter 6 develops an existential interpretation of conservation
accordingly with the findings of Chapters 4 and 5. It connects hermeneutic
tradition with phenomenology mainly in tune with the proposals of Gadamer,
Heidegger, and Ricoeur. All this philosophical approach is contrasted with
Brandi’s theory revealing some inconsistencies and suggesting ways to
overcome the actual conservation impasse. Having Brandi’s theory as
contrasting medium, Chapter 6 reveals conservation as a temporal
intentionality grounded on fundamental existentialist notions. It reconnects
conservation with the theoretical insights previously uncovered and offers some
conclusive suggestions. In Chapter 7, the conclusions of the thesis are
presented according with the three themes of the thesis, suggesting an
alternative for conservation intentionality coherent with our time and cultural
condition and considering more comprehensive aspects of existential
temporality.
53
Chapter 1
Introduction:
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a Phenomenological Mode
Chapter 3
Conservation as
Temporal Intentionality:The
Approach of Brandi
Chapter 4
Ontology of Culturally
Significant Architecture:
A Manifold Way of Being
Chapter 5
Temporality and
Assimilation:
The Mnemonic Mode
Chapter 6
Architectural Hermeneutics:
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Layer 1
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Hermeneutics
and Critique
On Architecture On Temporality
Figure 1-1 Thesis Structure. (Own diagram)
The thesis in its structure proposes an analytic path in which it explores
alternatively topics of architecture on one side and temporality of conservation
on the other (Figure 1-1). Chapters 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the introduction
and the literature review, providing methodology and the exploration of a first
epistemological level with the selected data to be explored. Chapters 4 and 5
offer the ontological and phenomenological discussion of the thesis. They
contain half of the core of the proposal and it constitutes the theoretical
construction to consider in the final existential analysis. It works as a
confirmation and proof of the conclusions. Finally, Chapter 6 presents an
existential interpretation of conservation contrasting some of Heidegger’s
notions with Brandi’s notion of restoration, as analysis and discussion on a
concrete theory, and offers the conclusions of the thesis. Chapter 7 gathers all
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the conclusions and findings, categorising them according with the main lines
of discussion of the thesis.
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Chapter 2: Thinking Architecture as Art: Towards a
Phenomenological Mode
[...] and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And
this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his
house like to the form conceived in his mind.
Thomas Aquinas, Summma Theologicae, Prima Pars, Quaestio XV, De ideis.
1265-1272.69
The suggestion that architecture comes from divine inspiration may
certainly appear dated. Whether architecture – or for that case the artistic
image, as Brandi would call it – originates from a predetermined idea or
whether it could be invented with each new building is still a polemical
philosophical question. However, what seems less controversial is that, in
assuming as truth one theory or the other the pragmatical consequences are
different. Aware of that, Brandi dedicated great part of his theoretical
reflections to identifying the essence of the artistic image. His concern was not
only free inquisitiveness and the fact that the precious treasury of Italian art was
at risk of disappearance after the World War II may well have stimulated him.
As founder of the Istituto Centrale del Restauro, he was responsible for the
protection of the architectural heritage. Therefore, the preoccupation in finding
the most authoritative explanation of art was more than justified and
consequently the journey taken by him was one of the most consistent in the
Italian art theory scene.
When we mention architecture, we are unearthing the old problem of art
and with it the one of aesthetics. The particular problem that this art offers is its
lack of disinterest, a condition that art should supposedly have. Nevertheless, at
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the same time function gives the key to understand architecture as part of
human life. Brandi’s early detachment from idealism – inherited in Italy mainly
through Croce – was indicative of a new approach to aesthetic problems.
Even before the designation of aesthetics as a specific Western
philosophical discipline dedicated to explain art and beauty – and for the same
reason architecture – scholars developed several approaches. However, we
privilege a line for being the basis to conceive architecture and temporality in
Brandi’s theory. This line – originated in the philosophy of idealism with the
inheritance of Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Croce –
determined a way in which art had come to be considered by Brandi.
Manifestations of these sources are for instance: the Hegelian detachment of
the concept of art from time and place as expression of the zeitgeist; the
relations between art and language; and the Kantian theory of schematism.
Thus, the analysis of some issues within this epistemological layer outlines
some ways in which Western Culture has recently explained art and in
particular architecture. We choose these examined issues in order to highlight
problematic issues discussed later in the context of Brandi’s thought.
Consequently, this is not an attempt to embrace complete philosophical
interpretations of architecture. The analyses of these issues illuminate how
Brandi may have conditioned his concept of restoration as part of his aesthetic
theory.
Although Kant is chronologically before Hegel and Croce, we will
discuss his influence later, since Kantianism constitutes the point of departure
69 Thomas and of Piperno Reginald, The "Summa theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas, 22 v.
vols. (London: R. & T. Washbourne, 1912) p. 218.
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for Brandi to structure his theories. Accordingly, section 2.1 “Dealing with
Idealist Concepts” discusses two idealist notions related to specific Brandi’s
considerations, which are then evaluated through his analysis of the
architectural phenomena. The first is the formal manifestation of the spirit in
art, as revelatory of a perception of architecture constituted by more than one
ontological layer. The second is the concept of mimesis, because of the
relevance that Brandi gives to the optical giveness and the separation of the
work of art in matter and image.
Section 2.2 “The Croce’s Crux” presents an exploration of some ideas
of the aesthetics of Croce, that is to say the notions about art as language in
aesthetic theory and their relation with temporality. These notions caused in
Brandi a controversial fracture with idealism, facilitating the acceptance of
phenomenological and structuralistic approaches. Crocean influence on Brandi
was definitive, and the concept of art as expression is especially relevant, since
it was his main point of divergence. The influx of phenomenology certainly
reinforced this detachment.
Section 2.3 “Approaching Consciousness” links the previous
discussions with Brandi’s innovative phenomenological approach, and
considers the starting point of Kant’s theory of the schema. Kant established
this notion as the way to link appearance with concept. Brandi reworked that
theory in an elaborate way to distinguish language from art, from Carmine to
Teoria Generale della Critica.70 Husserl had developed Kant’s idea of a
separation between the noumenal and the phenomenal in his more complex
70 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica.
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theory. The founder of phenomenology as the science to know the things
themselves postulated that all consciousness is consciousness of something and
suggested the method of epoché to arrive to the essence of things. Brandi
founded his theory of knowing and experiencing art on these coherently
structured principles.
Brandi’s requirement to validate his theoretical approach compelled him
also to deal with the complexity of structuralistic and linguistic theories, in
order to offer a consistent explanation of art. Therefore, section 2.4 “Brandi in
the Postmodern Condition” embarks upon considerations that establish
divergences between phenomenology as his main approach and some other
postmodern approaches, and illustrates some criticism received by him. This
frames the ontological proposal that should support Brandi’s journey and ours.
Between the – at that time – alternative influences of Marxism and
existentialism, he followed the latter, defining his own way of conceptualising
art, architecture and the actions in time concerning them.71
71 The influence of other philosophers is to be highlighted, especially in the Italian scene of the
period after the World War II. One of the key figures that influenced Brandi is Luigi Pareyson,
whose aesthetics was focused in art creation more than reception. Cfr. D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi
critica d'arte e filosofia. pp. 49-71.
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2.1 Dealing with Idealist Concepts
The first of the particular arts with which, according to their fundamental
principle, we have to begin, is architecture as a fine art. Its task lies in so
manipulating external inorganic nature that it becomes cognate to mind, as an
artistic outer world. The material of architecture is matter itself in its immediate
externality as a heavy mass subject to mechanical laws, and its forms do not
depart from the forms of inorganic nature, but are merely set in order in
conformity with relations of the abstract understanding, i.e., with relations of
symmetry. In this material and in such forms the ideal as concrete spirituality
does not admit of being realised. Hence the reality which is represented in them
remains contrasted with the Idea, as something external which it has not
penetrated, or has penetrated only to establish an abstract relation.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Lectures on Aesthetics. 1820s. 72
In Brandi’s thought then, the influence of idealism is clearly there, if not
for his unconditional attachment to that philosophical system, it is instead for
being constant point of reference, representing concepts against which he
dialectically contrasts his own ideas.73 In his review to Brandi’s book Carmine
in 1946, Croce says that the spirit of that book was of idealist character, so a-
historic.74 Astanza is a presence that is disconnected from time, and Brandi
discussed about art as a presented reality in which the present that gave it origin
is reactivated ad infinitum, art as an extra-temporal present.75 Although
recognised as one of the exponents of phenomenological approach in the scene
of Italian aesthetics, Brandi has been suspected of only exchanging the
72 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Selections from Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics
[http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/], (1905 [cited 05-11 2008]).
73 A first and a second Brandi has been distinguished between the author of the dialogues about
painting, sculpture, architecture and poetry – the so called Dialogui di Elicona – and the one of
Le due vie and Teoria generale della critica, having Segno e immagine as fulcrum. Cfr. Cesare
Brandi, Elicona I. Carmine o della pittura (Roma: Scialoja, 1945), Cesare Brandi, Elicona II.
Celso o della poesia (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1957), Cesare Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o
della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura (Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore, 1956), Brandi, Le
due vie, Cesare Brandi, Segno e immagine (Palermo: Aesthetica, 2001), Brandi, Teoria
generale della critica.
60
theoretical frame in aesthetics but remaining attached to the idealistic culture.76
Although the idealist inheritance is undeniable, Brandi managed to have
original insights that allowed him to migrate to more advanced positions in the
scene of Italian aesthetics.
The concepts under analysis come from the idealist philosophy, even
when this influence is dialectically manifested in Brandi. For instance, Hegel
characterised art as the sensuous embodiment of the spirit; and beauty as the
unity of the concept and the way of being of this concept, that is to say the
adequacy of the reality to the concept.77 Following this line, two concepts
seem to have triggered Brandi’s ideas of art as response: these are the formal
manifestation of the spirit in evolution – as the Zeitgeist, the manifestation of
the spirit of the age – in the artistic phenomena; and the concept of mimesis,
the fact that architecture could represent something, what is that something and
how is represented.78
The Spirit Manifesting Itself
The crucial role that Hegel assigns to architecture as art has been
controversial. Despite having determined for architecture an inferior position
within the arts, he argued in favour of the symbolic role of architecture to be
considered legitimately as such. It seems pertinent to recall that,
74 Cfr. Cesare Brandi, 1906-1988, Carmine o della pittura (Roma: Scialoja, 1945).
75 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 39.
76 Ibid. p. 43. Cfr. Guido Morpurgo Tagliabue, L'esthétique contemporaine (Milano: Marzorati,
1960), Guido Morpurgo Tagliabue, "L'evoluzione della critica figurativa contemporanea,"
Belfagor VI (1951).
77 In Section 3.2, we discuss Brandi’s detachment from the philosophy of history of Hegel in
which the existence of the spirit makes sense.
78 For more on the early influences from Hegel and Croce in Brandi’s thought see: Maria Ida
Catalano, "Una definizione che viene da lontano. Avvio allo “smontaggio” della Teoria del
restauro di Cesare Brandi," Bollettino dell’Istituto Centrale del Restauro, no. 8-9 (2004).
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The relation between form and spirit is, for Hegel, the crux of art. [...] Hegel
uses these terms [symbolic, classical and romantic categories] to define
particular points in the dialectic: symbolic art is marked by a complete
separation between form and spirit, classical art brings form and spirit
together in discrete forms, while romantic art achieves a complete
correspondence between form and spirit and is therefore the highest level of
artistic achievement according to Hegel, architecture is symbolic, sculpture is
classical and painting, music and poetry are romantic.79
Additionally architecture as art would be in a kind of impure state by
the fact that it has a purpose. Art should ideally be only for itself, without any
practical function. This issue supposed architecture as the most primitive art.
The relevance for us is the recognition of architecture having different layers
that integrate it. For instance, for Brandi, appearance and structure constitute
two layers of conservation of art. He suggested that the idealist theory of art
neglected its material part because the importance of matter was not
recognised. He may have done this implying that idealist aesthetics focused on
the ideal and not on the actual form that embodied it.80 As we analyse further
on, Brandi conceived two instances for the restoration of works of art: the
aesthetic and the historic. For him the aesthetic instance always has preference
over the historical one. Although he suggests that in a work of art the
appearance can be in conflict with the structure, he states that usually this is not
the case. In this discussion, Brandi seems to challenge the theory of Hegel in
the realistic understanding that, it is because of the actual permanence of the
antinomy structure-appearance that is possible to preserve the work of art, and
not because of an improbable memory of the ideal.81 Could this issue evidence
a remaining inheritance of his idealist formation? We will come back to this
79 Jeremy Melvin, "Architecture and philosophy. The case of G.W.F Hegel," in Architecture
and the sites of history interpretations of buildings and cities, ed. Borden, Iain and Dunster,
David (Oxford: Butterworth Architecture, 1995). p. 191.
80 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration. p. 52.
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ambivalence between structure and appearance in the discussion of his concept
of restoration, in Section 3.1, since the ontological consequences of this are
crucial for architecture. For the moment, what is relevant is the possibility of
separation between different elements that constitute the same work of art,
namely structure and appearance.
Although Hegel’s concepts about art and history are associated with
matter, art is taken as expression of the spirit in movement along time and its
expression is the manifested human culture.82
[F]or Hegel, romantic art [...] is already the dissolution of the interpretation of
form and content which was the characteristic of classical (Greek) art. This
dissolution is caused by the discovery of autonomous subjectivity. The
principle of romantic art is the ‘elevation of the spirit itself’, which is the
result of Christianity. Spirit no longer immerses itself in the sensuous as in
classical art but returns to itself and thus posits ‘external reality as an
existence inadequate to it’. [...] For Hegel, romantic art is the product of the
dissolution of the interpretation of spirit and sensuousness (external
appearance) characteristic of classical art. But beyond that, he conceives of a
further stage where romantic art also dissolves. [...] Hegel’s aesthetic theory
thus leads logically to the idea of the end of art where art is understood to be
what Hegel meant by classicism, the perfect interpenetration of form and
content. Hegel grasps the development of art with the pair of concepts
‘subjectivity: external world’ (or spirit: sensuousness).83
The way in which Brandi seems to reinterpret this concept is by
proposing the division of flagrance and astanza. However, he may have added
the complex phenomenological analysis, eliminating the spiritual metaphysical
dimension.
While for Hegel the evidence of architecture’s function as content – as a
manifestation of the external world – defines its character; for Kant instead, the
81 Massimo Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell'arte (Rome: Editori Riuniti,
1992). p. 143.
82 Cfr. The Age of German Idealism., ed. Solomon, Robert C., vol. VI, Routledge History of
Philosophy (Florence, KY, USA: Routledge, 1993). p. 186.
83 Peter Bürger, Theory of the avant-garde, lv, 135 p. vols., Theorie der Avantgarde. English
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). pp. 92-3.
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essence of an architectural work of art is its adequacy to a certain function.84
Kant distinguished two forms of beauty in The critique of judgement, one that
is free (pulchritudo vaga) and one that is dependent (pulchritudo adherens).85
The first is connatural to the object, whilst the second is for objects that have
an end, thus the problem for architecture is that it can participate of both.86 As
an example of this influence, Brandi mentioned adherent beauty when he
challenged the works of conservation in the church of San Domenico of
Sienna. He described this conservation as something that,
[...] Involves and threatens to involve more than the architecture, that which
counts for the monument, [...] and I would want to call the adherent beauty of
the church, namely the whole furnishing of painting and sculpture that
centuries have deposited inside the monument, and in front of which the same
monument can not be considered but in its majesty as container.87
In fact for Brandi, it seemed that the historical context of facts – that
determined the actual state of the church – constituted something that, as a
whole, was bigger than the architectural work itself, namely the monument.
The relevance of these discussions is significant when assessing the
concept of monument, in Section 3.3, and the notion of conservation in Section
3.4, since it is this appearance as a manifold identity in the work of architecture
as monument that is fundamental for this thesis. For the moment, it is enough
84 Roberto Masiero, Estética de la Arquitectura, ed. Bodei, Remo, trans. Campillo, Francisco,
Léxico de Estética (Madrid: A. Machado Libros, S.A., 2003). p. 164. Kant’s dialectic between
function and form would become the dichotomy par excellence for architecture until the
overcoming of the modern movement.
85 Cfr. Immanuel Kant and James Creed. Meredith, The critique of judgement, 180 p vols.,
Kritik der Urteilskraft. English (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).
86 Cfr. Masiero, Estética de la Arquitectura. pp. 164-5.
87 Cesare Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986, Cordaro, Michele ed. (Roma:
Editori Riuniti, 2005). pp. 180-1. “[...] coinvolge e minaccia di coinvolgere ciò che, molto più
della architettura conta per il monumento, quello che, [...] verrebbe voglia di chiamare la
belezza adherente della chiesa, e cioè tutta la suppellettile pittorica e scultorea che i secoli
hanno depositato dentro il monumento, e di fronte alla quale il monumento stesso non può
essere considerato che nella sua grandiosità di recipiente.” (Emphasis in the original, our
translation).
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to highlight that Brandi, in his Theory of Restoration, considered that the
idealist aesthetics had disregarded the ontological importance of the relation
between matter and image.88 Therefore, although the fact that Brandi
recognised architecture integrated both structure and image; he was not able to
consider other elements that constitute architecture, issues that for example
determine restoration interventions.
Mimesis and Images
Mimesis was seen to be problematic for architecture since architecture
does not represent anything existent in nature. To understand this, scholars
tracked back the origins of mimesis not as representation of objects but as
representation of actions. Mimesis, for instance, can be established – as Koller
concludes – as man’s “coming-into-form.”89 Nevertheless etymologically, the
meaning of mimesis is broader. It could have designed not only representation
but also indication, imitation, suggestion, expression, or “the single notion of
doing something which resembles something else.”90 For Brandi the issue of
mimesis in art and its relation with the artistic image became crucial as the
fulcrum of his aesthetic theory. He denied the concept of art as mimesis, since
that would have implied the assumption for the work of art to have just one
88 Cesare Brandi, Teoria del restauro, 154 p. vols. (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 2000), Brandi,
Basile et al., Theory of restoration. p. 51.
89 Mari Hvattum, Gottfried Semper and the problem of historicism, xiii, 274 p. vols.
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).p. 76.
90 D.W. Lucas, "Mimesis; Appendix to Aristotle’s Poetics," in Poetics (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1972). pp. 258-9. Quoted in Ernest Mathijs and Bert Mosselmans, "Mimesis and the
Representation of Reality: A Historical World View," Foundations of Science 5, no. 1 (2000).
p. 80.
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interpretation.91 Although he was considering the reproductive sense of the
word, Brandi’s refusal of art as mimesis is constant throughout his thought.
Mimesis however seems to have in its origins a broader meta-structural
meaning. Let us review how the concept of mimesis in its characterisation as
depiction has been proposed as overcoming simple representation.
The basis for the importance of mimesis as a concept lies in the origin of art
as mimetic. Gombrich refers to this origin as a shift in the pictorial
representation of reality. Mimesis came to function as an artistic tool to make
art look like reality. An understanding of this shift is facilitated when the
meaning of the term is interpreted as ‘depiction’. Mimesis is the process of
depicting cultural realities, those things that are real according to a certain
point of view. This point of view is provided by the cultural order. [...] It
emphasizes the act of showing something of reality through formal imitation,
and it also implies an alteration of the piece of reality it is re-presenting;
mimetic depiction encompasses the act of showing an imitative alteration of
reality, according to the standards of a given cultural order. The depiction of
cultural realities through mimesis has as a central characteristic that it
assumes to be about reality, by re-presenting it. 92
With this conceptualisation, an artistic image does not re-present reality
it rather properly depicts it. This interpretation helps to understand the Hegelian
characterisation of architecture in the three proposed modes: symbolic,
classical and romantic. A separation between the ritual – or the activity –
depicted through architecture and the architectural object as such, and the
further coming into presence of that depiction, would define architecture in
Hegelian terms. When the depicted activity is more evident, architecture is
symbolic; when form dominates it is romantic, and when there is equilibrium,
classical. Depiction then emerges as an alternative way to consider mimesis in
the artistic context; it could help to bring into the ontological constitution of
architecture additional elements belonging to its manifold.
91 Teresa De Lauretis, "The Discreet Charm of Semiotics, or Esthetics in the Emperor's New
Clothes," Diacritics 5, no. 3 (1975). p. 20.
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Although formed under the idealist influence, Brandi challenged as well
his understanding of mimesis. Even though for different reasons, for Brandi as
for Hegel mimesis is not the final intention of art. Brandi instead considered
that in the mimetic concept of art
we care only about the concluding part of the artistic process, and we assume
the work as a given from the same experience in which our knowledge
finishes, art is imitation, is illusion, pleasure, naturalness fixed and deprived
of becoming.93
This would demonstrate that Brandi understands mimesis as
reproduction and not as depiction. By taking mimesis as depiction, architecture
performs a reality that could be integrated into Brandi’s conservation theory.
However, this would not be within the artistic part of its manifold, which
would specifically correspond to the notion of restoration. We come back to
this argument in Chapter 3.
More recently, some authors have again related mimesis to action, in the
context of authenticity in heritage conservation, highlighting the importance
given to how humans creatively generate culture rather than to aspects of image
perception.94 In this sense, the approach to a wider meaning of mimesis seems
viable, although falling under the area that Brandi defines as flagrance. It has
been observed that,
The theory of mimesis can also be seen to imply, not a simple copy, but the
representation and creative interpretation of a particular idea or theme. In the
late 19th century, Friedrich Nietzsche saw that the only way for humans to
92 Mathijs and Mosselmans, "Mimesis and the Representation of Reality: A Historical World
View." p. 81. Italics in the original.
93 Cesare Brandi, Carmine o della pittura (Torino: Einaudi, 1962). p. 127. “ci si attiene solo al
momento conclusivo del processo artistico, e si assume l’opera come un dato della stessa
esperienza in cui si esaurisce il nostro conoscere, l’arte è imitazione, è illusione, piacere,
naturalità fissata e sotratta al divenire.” (Our translation).
94 Paul Ricoeur has raised the question: “Can the relation to the past be only a variety of
mimesis?” He doubts about that option discussing the historical narrative representation as
standing for or taking the place of. Cfr. Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting. p. 13.
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generate truth and values was through a creative process, guided by the ‘will
to power’. This idea would not only be referred to works of art but to all
human activity, where one takes his/her full responsibility in setting forth a
creative contribution.95
Consequently, there is a relation between the concept of mimesis and
the one of representation and re-presentation of ideas and themes. Mimesis
would encompass creative interpretation of new cultural forms and an
enlargement of the concept of heritage to other practices, rather than limit itself
to its objectual manifestations.96 Brandi seems to have embraced mimesis in
the reproductive sense. His aesthetic theories, specially the one of restoration,
seem too focused on the part of the artistic manifold embodied by the image.
Although these considerations may be debatable depending on the
expression to which conservation is applied, today’s broadening of the concept
of heritage uncovers a positive evolution in conservation attitudes that deserves
further analysis. We will come back to this issue in the analysis of collective
memory as creative act in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. Brandi’s critical position,
refusing certain concepts and implicitly accepting others revealed an idealist
influence. The awareness of a manifold identity in architecture as a work of art
– whether real or ideal entities constitute this manifold is subject to further
analysis – and the significance of mimesis and image are concepts that already
had in nuce some of the notions developed here. How he was able to overcome
idealism and make these concepts evolve more or less successfully according
with an existential approach is for us to interpret further in Chapter 6. Although
95 Jukka Jokilehto, Considerations on authenticity and integrity in World Heritage context
[Online], (2006 [cited 03-10 2006]); available from http://www.ct.ceci-
br.org/novo/revista/rst/viewarticle.php?id=44. p. 8.
96 This could seem consistent with the ancient Greek conception of mimesis that some scholars
have suggested, before the shift from re-enactment to re-presentation. Cfr. Mathijs and
Mosselmans, "Mimesis and the Representation of Reality: A Historical World View." p. 84.
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Brandi absorbed the idealist aesthetics mainly from Croce, very early he
demonstrated independence of thought and was influenced by other sources.
The scission between depiction of activity and architectural form is an
important precedent for the ontological outline of architecture in the context of
conservation, and most particularly in Brandi’s specific concept of restoration.
2.2 The Croce’s Crux
Knowledge takes two forms: it is either intuitive knowledge or logical
knowledge; knowledge obtained by means of our power to create mental
representations, or knowledge obtained by means of the intellect; knowledge of
individuals, or knowledge of universals; of particular things, or of the
relationships between them; it is in short, either that which produces
representations or that which produces concepts.
Benedetto Croce. The aesthetic as the science of expression and of the
linguistic in general. 1902. 97
It seems pertinent at this point to review some of the main issues in the
Crocean association of intuition and expression that synthesise art as language,
so to contrast later on with the opposite theory that Brandi started to formulate,
in which art and language are separated as the result of a different path after the
constitution of the object. Croce synthesised his aesthetics in his The aesthetic
as the science of expression and of the linguistic in general, which intended to
be an introduction to a complete “philosophy of the spirit.”98 It is there that we
find the opening epigram of this section, presenting the Crocean dialectics
between intuitive and logical knowledge. In a sense, Croce is relating logics
with abstract conceptualisation and intuition with representation, including
signification within this representation. In doing this, he was able to link
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linguistic expression and aesthetics. Consequently, according to his view, every
human would be able to become an artist, to express itself through art.99
What he is implying is that expression always contains elements that are
not evident. Only in that way is it possible to categorise together for instance a
trivial exclamation and a complex work of architecture. As already observed,
Brandi criticised this assimilation of art and expression under the same
category. In his Celso he writes: “The aesthetic synthesis? The aesthetic
synthesis to call a taxi?”100 It was not clear in Croce, which surplus art would
need, in order to overcome the apparently simpler status of a practical
expression. Let us follow the rationale behind this identification and establish
precedents to some of the attitudes towards temporality in this system, which
influenced for decades the evolution of aesthetic ideas in Italy.
Art as Expression
Brandi shares Croce’s detachment of art from any scientific, practical
and moral commitment, considering it an autonomous entity. It seems pertinent
to recall that the Crocean system divided the mental activity into theoretical
and practical; the theoretical was itself separated into aesthetic and logic whilst
the practical one was separated into economic and moral. Art is then an
aesthetic form independent from any usefulness. Art for Croce is expression or
97 Benedetto Croce, The aesthetic as the science of expression and of the linguistic in general,
trans. Lyas, Colin, xxxiv, 172 p. vols., Estetica come scienza dell'espressione e linguistica
generale. Parte 1. English (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 90. p. 1.
98 Ibid.
99 For him there are not words in themselves except as abstractions. Ibid. p. 159.
100 Brandi, Elicona II. Celso o della poesia. p. 27. “La sintesi estetica? La sintesi estetica per
chiamare un taxi?” Quoted in D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 18. (Our
translation).
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otherwise it is not at all.101 This is problematic for architecture for two reasons;
the architectural functional value is singled out as alien to the artistic nature;
and architecture does not communicate as language does. However, in the
aesthetic activity Croce assimilated intuition and expression. He did not
express clearly what the difference between any expression and a work of art is,
except by saying that the latter has something extra, a kind of higher pitch of
intensity.102
[...] intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge. Independent from and
autonomous with respect to the intellectual; indifferent to any distinctions we
subsequently make between the real and the unreal, and to subsequently
awareness of space and time; – an intuition or representation is to be
distinguished from that which feels and endures, from the flood and flux of
sensation, from psychic material, as form; and this form, this taking
possession, is expression. To intuit is to express; and nothing else (nothing
more, but nothing less) than to express.103
Croce indeed connects intuition and expression, but additionally he
introduces the differentiation between intuition and “that which feels and
endures.” However for him “the two forms of knowledge, the aesthetic and the
intellectual or conceptual, are certainly different but not entirely detached from
each other, like two forces, each pulling in its own direction.”104 He considered
them this way because aesthetics and logic divided his theoretical
understanding. He recognised art as the highest level of expression and its
creators as artists.105 A necessary connection between intuition and expression
manifests itself in its highest quality and intensity through the work of art.
101 Croce, The aesthetic as the science of expression and of the linguistic in general. p. 59.
102 Ibid. p. 12.
103 Ibid. p. 11. (Our emphasis).
104 Ibid. p. 24.
105 Ibid. p. 11. Cfr. also Gary Kemp, " The Croce-Collingwood Theory as Theory," The Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61, no. 2 ( Spring, 2003).
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Art’s Interiority and Art as a Whole
Art has an interior and an exterior manifestation within the
philosophical system of Croce; this offers the possibility of confusion between
the material embodiment of the work of art, its vehicle; and the work of art as
an interior intentionality. There are then, two forms of knowledge: the intuitive
and the conceptual, based on an idealist understanding of the world.106 Brandi’s
realist approach could not be more opposed to Croce’s idealist ideas. By
offering to architecture the possibility of having manifestations that are interior
and exterior to the human being, it is possible to assume a broader ontological
structure.
Since for Croce the artistic beautiful is equal to expression, he
concludes that if the expression is not successful it is not expression at all.107
As a significant issue for us, Croce discusses the importance of memory in the
context of art, but he extends this importance to the life of the spirit itself. In a
way that recalls Bergson’s Matter and Memory and his concept of temporality,
Croce states that,
[e]xpressions or representations follow one another one by one, each
banishing its forerunner. [...] nothing that is born dies, [...] even if everything
passes, nothing can die. Even representations that have been forgotten persist
in some way in our spirits [...]. But other representations are still causal
elements in the actual processes of our spirits; and we must not forget them or
must be able to recall them as and when we need to. And the will is constantly
vigilant in this work of conservation, which aims to preserve (one could say)
the greatest and most fundamental of all our riches.108
The relevance of this we will prove crucial in the evaluation of the
reification of memory, as when common talk infers that the matter of
106 Croce, The aesthetic as the science of expression and of the linguistic in general pp. 35, 57.
107 Ibid. p. 87.
108 Ibid. p. 107.
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monuments keep the memory of the past. We will come back to this discussion
in Chapters 3 and 5. Croce seems to suggest that if a reality triggers an
expression, then the same real conditions can re-trigger again similar
expressions and intuitions.109 He refers here to works of art, and he adds that
“[t]he spiritual power of memory, subsidised by the physical things which are
provided, makes possible the conservation and reproduction of the intuitions
man continually produces.”110 Temporality is then, in Croce’s system,
approached from the past towards the present. Brandi instead fixed
temporality’s gravity centre in the present where the recognition of the work of
art takes place.
Architecture
Croce’s specific ideas about architecture did not seem to have much
influence on Brandi. When Croce discusses architecture, he does it in the
context of freedom in artistic activity. He states that architecture is not
completely free, since it has to deal with practical ends.111 Croce seems to
propose that to make architecture as a work of art the main knowledge that is
necessary is the aesthetic one. Thus, he describes architecture treatises as
collections of good intentions.112 Brandi instead appealed to a
phenomenological approach to reach the formulation of the image and the
constitution of the work from a phenomenological perspective, discussing
architecture aesthetically in terms of optical giveness.113 He found that
particular forms in plan or elevation were conditioned by the functional
109 Ibid. p. 108.
110 Ibid. p. 108.
111 Ibid. p. 112.
112 Ibid. p. 126.
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requirements of the building – cultural context included – “but the freedom of
choice of the structure with which the internal-external interaction will be
realised remains a fact.”114 Accordingly for Brandi, in architectural creation
freedom is not limited by the need to fulfil a function; however, the significant
distinction between architecture and the other arts of optical giveness is the
presence of space and the relationship of interior and exterior.
Croce’s aesthetics relates art to expression. Therefore, art’s origin is
found in human mind’s capacity of communication. The actual matter of the
work of art was only a vehicle for this expression. In contrast for Brandi art did
not communicate. He founded art as astanza, an immaterial presence;
something that was there but did not exist. This opens up an interesting debate.
The fact that for Croce the work of art is a complete and effective expression
allowed him to approach the present from the standpoint of the past. The origin
of the artistic expression was in that past and as such, it was there that any
correct interpretation had to be found. Brandi worked on a theory that
demonstrated that some of these Crocean notions were not tenable. However,
he did not deduce his theory having as object this opposition. It was because of
his method that new influential ways of approaching reality drove his
philosophy to evolve.
Genesis of Brandi’s Path
During the 1950s the reference to neo-idealism in Italy – the connection
with a philosophy of the Spirit: the systems of Croce and Gentile – was
113 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 304.
114 Ibid. p. 307. “Ma ciò non toglie la libertà di scelta della struttura con cui sarà realizata
l’interazione d’interno esterno.” (Our translation).
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somehow systematic.115 At the time, there was complete scepticism about any
definition of art because of the attacks from phenomenological positions.116 As
early as 1952 an article published after the death of Croce described those
considered to be the most representative scholars in Italian aesthetics and stated
that after the war, Italian philosophical thought tried to achieve independence
from the dominance of Croce’s idealist influence.117 Brandi had been
associated to the group of scholars that mixed idealism, formalism and Sartre’s
existentialism.118 Accordingly
Brandi also stems from Croce, but he breaks in two the double term ‘intuition-
expression’. For ‘intuition’ he substitutes two terms: ‘the constitution of the
object’ (which includes the knowable substance) and the ‘formulation of the
image’ (the latter being without existential status, entirely pure and formal).
However, by so doing, Brandi does not separate himself very much from the
idealistic formulas, which he shades with existentialist coloring.119
By doing this scission, Brandi entered a new field of exploration at the
time, that is to say the issue of artistic creation rather than reception of the work
of art. In his writings, he approached phenomenologically the constitution of
the object and the formulation of the image as a sort of epoché, from which the
artist extracts and synthesises the image. The relevant fact is that Brandi took a
different approach to specific core elements in the concept of art, this despite
the early claim that Brandi was a Crocean idealist in disguise – an occurrence
which proved to be frequent.120 The path of development followed by Brandi
115 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 27.
116 Ibid. p. 28.
117 Gillo Dorfles, "New currents in Italian aesthetics," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 12, no. 2 (1953). pp. 184-8. Cfr. also Frederic S. Simoni, " Benedetto Croce: A Case
of International Misunderstanding," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 11, no. 1
( Sep., 1952).
118 Dorfles, "New currents in Italian aesthetics." p. 193.
119 Ibid. p. 194.
120 A scholar has illustrated this misunderstanding, cfr. Paolo D'Angelo, "Realtà e immagine in
Cesare Brandi," in Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare Brandi, ed. Russo, Luigi
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broke in a characteristic way with some of the dogmas of the great philosopher,
and an idealistic language conditioned it, although the situation of aesthetics in
Italy during the 1950s was of gradual detachment from the strong Crocean
influence.121 The influences on Brandi were not common in Italy at the time;
his references to authors such as Sartre, Husserl, Heidegger and Kant give an
indication of his originality.122
The consideration of architectural creation is set in contrast with
Croce’s aesthetics, which focused on the work of art as a final product. It is
again the dialectical and sometimes even opposite way of approaching the
phenomena of art that separates Brandi from Croce. For Croce, the process of
creation – in the form of preparatory drawings, sketches, and so forth – is
irrelevant to the final work, because for him “the work of art possesses ‘a
genesis hardly ideal, which derives from its very presence’.”123 Therefore,
Croce’s phenomenon of art is something that happens as an event, which is not
part of a larger process of creation. This is something that Brandi tried to
disentangle by investigating what a scholar has called the dynamics of the
artistic process.124
(Palermo: Aesthetica Preprint, Universita degli Studi di Palermo, Centro Internazionale Studi di
Estetica, 2006). p. 14. Cfr. also D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia.
121 Cfr, Dorfles, "New currents in Italian aesthetics." p. 196. On his side Croce suffered the
same kind of stigmatisation in relation with Hegelianism. Cfr. Simoni, " Benedetto Croce: A
Case of International Misunderstanding."
122 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia pp. 15, 36. Croce made a review of
Brandi’s Carmine where he praised the general spirit of the work and the theoretical content.
However, in portraying Brandi as a continuator, the philosopher tried to tie Brandi’s ideas to
his own thought, highlighting more the confirmations to his philosophical system than the
original insights of the novel writer. Cfr. Benedetto Croce, "Review: Carmine o della pittura, by
Cesare Brandi," Quaderni della Critica 4 (1946).
123 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 59.
124 Brandi sustains that, “[...] one phase, a state of consciousness, prior to the formulation,
which, if it is fully known only by the artist, not because of this is untraceable in the work of art
once it is formulated. This early but indispensable stage for the work is what I have called
constitution of the object.” Brandi, Elicona II. Celso o della poesia. p. 155. “Uno stadio, uno
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From his point of view, the repercussions of an ontological conception
of architecture are considerable since, in Crocean theory, the work of art would
need to be frozen at a certain point, at least for its consideration as possible
work of art. Our further analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 aim to demonstrate that
theories such as the Crocean are not tenable. For Brandi:
[with the constitution of the object] the artist separates the object from the
reality in which it is immersed, breaking the links with the existentiality
through a sort of phenomenological reduction. By this means, there is not a
duplicate of the object, but rather a selection of some traits to be subject to
symbolic attribution. The artist works on them and gives expression and
external consistency to the image, fixing it in the second stage of the
formulation.125
For our thesis, there are two problems associated with this theory. One
is to attribute the moment of the constitution of the object to the case of
architecture, and the other is the usefulness that architecture needs, which
seems to hinder its constitution as pure figurativeness.126 However, with this
analysis there implicitly is an alternative interpretation of the concept of
mimesis. This attribution of symbolism to architecture constitutes a return to
the original concept of mimesis as expression of cultural practices. Brandi’s
introduction of the Kantian theory of the schema would be part of the solution
to overcome these theoretical problems, since it involved considering the
function as part of the original epoché that the architect does from his or her
memory of precedents.127 A sort of library of successful resolutions.
stato di coscienza, anteriore alla formulazione, che, se è cognito integralmente solo dall’artista,
non per questo è irreperibile nell’opera d’arte una volta formulata. Questo stadio, antelucano
dell’opera ma indispensabile all’opera, è quanto io ho chiamato costituzione d’oggetto.” (Our
translation). For more on Brandi’s relation with the aesthetics of formativeness, cfr. D'Angelo,
Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. Chapter IV.
125 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 86. (Our translation).
126 Cfr. Ibid, Paolo D'Angelo, "Realtà e immagine in Cesare Brandi," Aesthetica Preprint
Suplementa, Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare Brandi (2006). p. 16.
127 We discuss this argument more in detail in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
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Croce’s influence proved to be significant for Brandi at the beginning of
his intellectual journey. Nevertheless, later on, Brandi left behind most of his
idealistic formation, developing theories in which he incorporated new sources.
His attitude towards the great Italian philosopher was always respectful and
objective. However, it did not prevent the subtle criticism to Crocean theories
through works such as the dialogues of Elicona; the opposition to certain
dogmas such as the identity of intuition and expression; and the consideration
of the hermeneutical dimension in restoration – although with new criteria –
among others. He inherited from Croce certain concepts such as, the distance
from accepting abstract classifications within the arts; the refusal of positivistic
and scientific determinism; and the concepts of autonomy, individuality, and a-
temporality of the work of art. Brandi may have found inspiration for his two
forms of consciousness – intuitive knowledge and logical knowledge – in the
Crocean division between intuition and understanding.128 Thus new approaches
marked a big difference between Crocean and Brandian aesthetics. The
incorporation of phenomenology, structuralism and semiotics were significant,
despite the challenges received by Brandi’s theories. The distinction of the
process of creation of the work of art from its reception, characterised
important detachments from previous and contemporary approaches, all of
them fuelled in Italy by the need to overcome an age dominated by the
philosophical influence of Croce.
128 Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell'arte. p. 12. For more on the early
influence of Croce on Brandi’s thought cfr, Catalano, "Una definizione che viene da lontano.
Avvio allo “smontaggio” della Teoria del restauro di Cesare Brandi."
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2.3 Approaching Consciousness
The phenomenological vision is closely analogous to the aesthetic vision in
'pure' art [...]. The artist – that ‘observes’ to draw ‘knowledge’ of nature and
human from the world for his own purposes – behaves towards that world in a
similar way to the phenomenologist’s [...]. For him the world – while he
observes it – becomes phenomenon, his experience is irrelevant, just as
happens to the philosopher.
Edmund Husserl. Letter to Hofmannsthal of 12-01-1907. 129
By making phenomenological epoché comparable to aesthetic vision,
Husserl was opening the door to new ways of interpreting artistic phenomena.
On one hand, the creative act could be interpreted as the result of a
phenomenological reduction of the world, from which a re-presentation of it
was offered by the artist according to the isolated aspects. On the other hand,
the reception of the work of art needed to emulate that process again by
isolating the work of art from the world in which the receptor experienced it.
Brandi needed an adequate theoretical structure to support this
phenomenological approach.130 First, he looked for it in the Kantian theory of
the schema, and then in developing his theory of the distinction between
astanza and flagrance.
Not only researchers in art and architecture but also philosophers, such
as Heidegger, Sartre, Otto Friedrich Bollnow or Gaston Bachelard, have
approached the artistic and architectural phenomena from phenomenological
and existentialist points of view. Their approaches considered, in one way or
another, Husserl’s principle that all consciousness was consciousness of
129 G. Scaramuzza, Estetica Monacense (Milano: Cuem, 1996). pp. 11-4. Quoted in D'Angelo,
Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 44. (Our translation).
130 Brandi has described aesthetic attitudes in terms of epoché, reduction and bracketing, in
similar fashion to the way Husserl had already done it, as it is now evident in some then
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something. Brandi was not to remain alien to these tendencies and to the Italian
interest in such a theory.131 This approach defined what art was and,
consequently, his theory of restoration reflected it, in that he suggested it to be
“[...] the first time one tries to reach the concept of restoration from the
rigorous deduction of the very concept of art.”132
The distinction that Brandi found between sign and image was always
fundamental. For him the preconceptual schema – as he started to call it –
could concretize images, as in art; or signs, as in language.133 Brandi attempted
to offer an explanation of the essence and existence of the work of art with his
phenomenological approach. The need to configure this system compelled him
to explore, and then to overcome, the philosophical trends of the time
proposing an aesthetics from which his theory of restoration could be later
deduced. In this move towards phenomenology, we highlight here two issues as
significant precedents for our further analysis of the ontology and, therefore,
conservation of architecture in the context of Brandi’s ideas. One is the so-
called Kantian schema and the other is the notion of the antinomy of astanza
and flagrance. With the former, Brandi explained the emergence of the work of
unpublished writings. Cfr. D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. pp. 43-4. Cfr.
Brandi, Carmine o della pittura. pp. 47-48.
131 Among the figures mentioned as influential Antonio Banfi is one of the leading figures. Cfr.
D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 41.
132 Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986. p. 7. “[...] la prima volta che si cerca di
giungere al concetto del restauro per rigorosa deduzione dal concetto stesso dell’arte.” (Our
translation).
133 Brandi meant by “[c]onstituting the object to perform an epoché: ‘the reality or, if preferred,
the existence of the object is as put between brackets.’ Moreover, the two terms, ‘reality’ and
‘existence’, stop being exchangeable, and are used to design both polarities of the
consciousness: ‘reality is given in the intuition, the existence in the intellect’.” Cfr. Brandi,
Carmine o della pittura. p. 23. quoted in D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p.
17. “Costituire l’oggetto significa sottoporlo a un’epoché: ‘la realtà o, se preferisci, l’esistenza
dell’oggetto è come messa fra parentesi.’ Più precisamente, i due termini, ‘realtà’ ed
‘esistenza’ , cessano di essere intercambiabili, e vengono utilizzati per designare le due polarità
della coscienza: nell’intuizione si dà la realtà, nell intelletto l’esistenza.” (Our translation).
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art from the creative mind of the artist; whilst with the latter, he resolved the
phenomenological characteristics of a work of art in contrast with the flagrance
of reality, supporting the complete detachment of art from language with this
theory.
The Kantian/Brandian Schema
Kant’s doctrine of schematism constitutes an important and complex
part of his Critique of the pure reason. Kant’s epistemology distinguishes two
kinds of mental representations: immediate representations, which are called
intuitions; and mediated representations, which are called concepts.134 The
schema, helping imagination, connects: concepts with the correlative
experience, understanding with sensibility, subjectivity with objectivity, sign
with image.135 Thus the schema takes hold of the different sensible features that
later constitute the concept and the image; however, the image keeps some
traces of the conceptual understanding and the sign keeps some figurativeness
of the image.136 Brandi bases his theory in a reworking of this Kantian doctrine
of schematism taking the schema as the origin of both: the cognitive substance
– that becomes concept or language – and the image – that originates the image
and the work of art.137
134 For Kant: “The schema is the rule for subsuming under the concept items that are
empirically given; it is what we have to know if we are to understand how to apply the concept
in our experience. Every concept must therefore have a schema if it is to be applicable to
experience at all. In the case of empirical (and mathematical) concepts he says that the schema
is a rule for producing images; more generally, it is what one knows when one knows what an
instance of the concept would look like, feel like, etc.”Ralph Charles Sutherland. Walker and
Inc. ebrary, Kant, xii, 201 p. vols. (London: Routledge, 1999). p. 88.
135 Cfr, Chapter 3 in Sarah L. Gibbons, Kant's theory of imagination bridging gaps in
judgement and experience, viii, 205 p. vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
136 Cfr. D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 88.
137 Ibid. pp. 18-9.
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Sartre’s ideas developed in The psychology of imagination have been
mentioned as another important influence, in which he proposes a similar
mechanism for the relation between model and image.138 The revealing role of
reflective consciousness in order to appreciate image as representation is
noticeable within Sartre’s thesis. However, for the moment two issues are
important for our analysis of Brandi’s thought: first, the rational constructions
on prelogical foundations that Sartre mentions seem analogous to Kant’s
schema and therefore to Brandi’s interpretation; and second, the distinction
made between sign and image, which comes to support Brandi’s idea of art as
distinct from language.139 The relevance of the relation between image and
preconceptual schema in Brandi has been recently highlighted as a sort of
“anthropological bing-bang” able to constitute cultural forms.140 It has been
noticed as well that “Brandi was able to actually discern with lucidity and
indicate with absolute precision the link between the problem of schematism
and the problem of language.”141 This has allowed Brandi to discuss his
138 Cfr. Jean-Paul Sartre, The psychology of imagination (New York: Philosophical Library,
1948). pp. 32-3.
139 Brandi was one of the first to relate the Kantian doctrine of schematism with the twofold
relation with language and image, being the root and the mediation between them. Cfr.
D'Angelo, "Realtà e immagine in Cesare Brandi." p. 16.
140 Luigi Russo, "Brandi-re l’immagine," in Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare
Brandi, ed. Russo, Luigi (Palermo: Aesthetica Preprint, Universita degli Studi di Palermo,
Centro Internazionale Studi di Estetica, 2006). p. 10. Brandi considered the schema as origin of
both the linguistical sign and the artistic image relating this with the Heideggerian concept of
Bild-scheme of the word. Cfr. Giovanni Matteucci, "Osservazioni sulla natura para-semiotica
dell’immagine," in Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare Brandi, ed. Russo, Luigi
(Palermo: Aesthetica Preprint, Universita degli Studi di Palermo, Centro Internazionale Studi di
Estetica, 2006). p. 43. Cfr. Cesare Brandi, Segno e immagine (Palermo: Aesthetica, 1986).
141 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 116. (Our translation). For an
exploration on the relation of schema, consciousness and image cfr. Roberto Diodato, "Sul
rapporto opera-coscienza-immagine," in Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare Brandi,
ed. Russo, Luigi (Palermo: Aesthetica Preprint, Universita degli Studi di Palermo, Centro
Internazionale Studi di Estetica, 2006).
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concept of art regarding the semiotic tendencies in theories during the 1960s
and 1970s.142
The theory of schematism constitutes in Brandi’s thought a significant
part of the explanation of the creation and reception of the work of art. Brandi
explains that,
The schema [...] is a monogram of the pure imagination. [...] the schema is the
first selection obtained from the referent and as such, it is preconceptual.
However, if the referent does not have an existential matrix [...] the gathered
features within the schema will promote the referent [...]. One schema without
referent is obliged to return to a referent, being a geometric figure, an abstract
formula, visible though, somehow expectable from the senses. [...] Corrected
this way the theory of the preconceptual schema does not determine at all the
dissolution of the schema within the empirical concept.143
Whilst the connection of schematism seems more evident for the
figurative arts, for architecture Brandi presents variations to the theory of the
schema in order to explain it. Accordingly, he correlated tectonics to
conformation. Let us analyse how Brandi applies the theory of schematism to
conceive architecture. If in the case of painting the schema preceded the
constitution of the form to constitute the figurativeness, in the case of
architecture Brandi – in the role of Eftimio, one of the characters in his Eliante
o della architettura (hereafter Eliante) – suggests:
[...] When you start from a particular need to which no external object
corresponds yet, and for instance you look for satisfaction to that primordial
need of protection of the primitive humans – although there was not a
condensed concept form of the house yet – then you have a schema in that
need – of which you are conscious about. The schema is not an image yet.
The cognitive substance’s core tries first to become figurativeness. The first
142 Cfr. D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. pp. 118-9.
143 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 91. “Lo schema [...] è un monogramma
dell’imaginazione pura. [...] lo schema è la prima selezione tratta dal referente, e proprio come
tale è preconcettuale. Ma se il referente non ha una matrice esistenziale [...] saranno i tratti
accozzati insieme nello schema a fomentare il referente [...]. Uno schema senza referente è
ineluttabilmente portato a risalire ad un referente, sia esso una figura geometrica, o una formula
astratta, eppure visibile, eppure in qualche modo esigibile ai sensi. [...] Corretta così la teoria
dello schema preconcettuale, non determina affatto una disolvenza dello schema in seno al
concetto empirico.” (Our translation).
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primitive humans identified this figurativeness with the cave and transferred it
later into the hut. But in fact, before the hut raised there was neither concept
nor image, there was only an imprecise intentionality within human
consciousness, that need of protection from the whether, the dangers of the
beasts and other humans, and so for.144
For Brandi accordingly, architecture does not have its origin in an
object, but in the schema, which keeps record of the practical need. In this
context, art also can develop into knowledge and not only into intuition.145 For
the moment, what seems important is the possibility for the schema to connect
empirical intuition with conceptual knowledge.
Brandi has argued that architecture does not have an object as painting
does. Architecture is born from a need.146 He discusses in Eliante how the
preconceptual schema works for architecture; he returned to this idea in Teoria
Generale della Critica stating that the schema is connected both with the
concept and with the image. In architecture, the schema is of a solution to a
need, which is not yet a concept or an image. It separates itself from the instinct
and it finds the figurativeness of the prehistoric cave and later the primitive hut
and – we argue – later on the memory of all kinds of buildings. Brandi
sustained that the spatiality of a work of art is not only the existential space, but
rather that the work of art creates its own space.
144 Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura. pp. 122-3.
“[...] quando ti parti da un bisogno a cui non corrisponde ancora nessun oggetto esterno, e, ad
esempio, da quel bisogno primordiale di riparo che dovetettero sentire i primi ominidi e che
ancora non si condensava nel concetto e nella figura della casa, tu, in quel bisogno a cui, nel
prenderne coscienza, cerchi una sodisfazione, hai né più né meno che uno schema, il quale non
è ancora immagine. È il nucleo della sostanza conoscitiva la quale cerca prima di tutto di
convertirsi in figuratività: la figuratività che i primi rozzi uomini identificarono nella caverna e
trasferirono poi alla capanna. Ma appunto, avanti che la capanna sorgesse, non esisteva né
concetto né immagine, esisteva solo, interiormente alla coscienza vitale dell’uomo, una
imprecisa intenzionalità, quel bisogno di riparo dalle intemperie, dai pericoli delle belve e degli
altri uomini e che so io.” (Our translation).
145 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 88.
146 Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura. p. 119.
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In his theory of schematism, Brandi considered mainly the figurative
arts. The case of architecture presented him with a different kind of connection
between sensible experience and intuitive image. Brandi’s theory demanded an
equivalent to the constitution of the object and the formulation of the image.
We have seen that for Brandi architecture was image. Therefore, the architect
first takes into consideration the functional needs. They stimulate the
recollection of schemata that can solve those needs. Then, the constitution of
the object comes, reworking on the schemata available to the architect. At that
moment, the mind suggests a solution and the formulation of the image is
effected. This connection needs to be done through the combination of
tectonics and ornate whose balanced combination will evidence the distinction
between plain tectonics and architecture as a work of art. (Figure 2-1)
Tectonics
Ornato
Schema
Need
Architecture
as Art
Figure 2-1 Creation of architecture as art deduced from Brandi's theory of schematism.
(Own diagram)
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Flagrance vs. Astanza
In order to distinguish the mode of being of the image from that of the
sign Brandi defines two notions: flagrance and astanza. Flagrance is the proper
mode of the existent things in their being evident to sensual perception. For
Brandi “astanza is the proper mode of being of the work of art, and it is defined
in opposition to flagrance which is the mode of being present of ordinary
things, that Brandi calls existential reality.”147 For Brandi,
[...] art presupposes an act of the consciousness irreducible to any other, an
unmistakable ‘intentionality’. Art is knowledge ‘just as it becomes
consciousness of an object that experiences that suspension. When
consciousness with an intentionality addresses an object’.148
Presence is, for Brandi, divided into presence as flagrance of the
existent and presence as astanza. He coined this term from the Latin words ad
and stare, meaning to be there, to be given in praesentia, to be presentified, in
opposition to the flagrance of the real existent. In one of the chapters of Teoria
Generale della Critica, Brandi explains that,
The concept of astanza is founded in the being present of something that is
only because it is present; that is only as long as it is the same difference that
opposes it to the existent, to what has with it the difference between being and
existing.149
He describes how the Derridean concept of trace or difference
introduces appearing and significance as the dislocation of these two kinds of
presence. It seems worth remembering that he developed his semiotic
147 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 31. (Our translation). D’Angelo
observes that in Due vie, of 1966, astanza e realtà pura are almost synonyms. In Teoria
generale della critica, of 1974, the term astanza ousts definitely pure reality. He highlights that
Brandi even founded the concept of astanza on new philosophical basis such as the ones of
Heidegger and Derrida.
148 Ibid. p. 43. (Our translation). Cfr. Brandi, Carmine o della pittura. p. 238.
149 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 83. “Nel presentificarsi di qualcosa che solo è in
quanto è presente, che solo è in quanto è la differenza stessa che lo contrapone all’essistente, a
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reflections as a theory of art to reveal the difference between language and art.
Art manifests itself through astanza and – in analogous manner to flagrance
that becomes sign through the establishment of arbitrary codes – it is subject to
codes as well.150 The structure of the so-called code of astanza is different from
the language code, and the experience would be the organiser of that code.
Consequently, sometimes it is possible to associate astanza with language, and
other times not.151
Brandi’s aesthetics is about the constitution of the object, about how the
artist selects, modifies and attributes to the object symbolic values that isolate
it; performing a phenomenological reduction. The artist puts in evidence some
aspects of the object and hides others. Constitution of the object is the
precondition of the form and is inseparable from formulation of the image; they
are stages on the way towards the form. For Brandi, the Sartrean idea that the
work of art is the image and not the matter that supports it seems
fundamental.152
Brandi considers astanza as having a structure invariable in time. When
something transforms astanza then either it is weakened, or it disappears, or it
is transformed into a new one. We correlate these characteristics with the
ciò che vela in se la differenza fra l’essere e l’esistente: in questo si fonda il concetto (e la
presenza) dell’astanza.” (Our translation).
150 Ibid. p. 87.
151 Ibid.
152 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. pp. 54-9, 133. It is worth recalling that
for Croce variants and different versions of a work during its production did not document its
process. Croce discussed about them as a false genesis of the work of art, interesting for the
psychologist but not for the critic. Brandi seemed then more sympathetic with Ingarden’s
ontological considerations of the work of art, in which the final work is the result of multiple
stratification and conjunction of different moments. For instance, in reference to some of these
stages according to Brandi Cfr. D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia p. 70.,
Brandi, Elicona II. Celso o della poesia pp. 155-56. and Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art:
the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film p. 291.
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analysis of Ingarden’s ontology of the work of art in Section 4.2, especially for
the constitution of architecture’s core, to be disclosed in Chapter 6.153 The final
essence of astanza – and its material substrate – is part of a core that if
destroyed is transformed or disappeared. So any transformation, he says, in the
system or structure of the astanza affects the rest of it.154 He concludes that
astanza is deduced from the structure of the consciousness and adds,
significantly for our study, that art is the epiphany of astanza.155
For the consideration of architecture as art, the interplay between
flagrance and astanza is given through the “dialectic of the interior and
exterior.”156 For Brandi, this dialectic is the way of giveness of architecture in
contrast to any other space. There is the requisite that at any moment:
[...] the form of architecture is both external and internal to itself. We can not
penetrate into the form, but the form sets itself as a penetrable-form [;]
accordingly to set itself as a penetrable-form, architecture cannot be only an
interior or an exterior, but the exterior should participate of a spatiality that
renders it interior to itself, and the interior reciprocally exterior.157
153 Brandi bases the understanding of astanza as being in the same isotopic level. He explains
that a determined isotopic level does not necessarily correspond with the reality, using as an
example Euclidian geometry, which does not invalidate the non Euclidean geometry, but it is
still real. Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 89, 91. This means that one looks at a
painting assuming it as real but knowing it unreal. What he calls isotopic levels would be the
particular context in which certain schemata can be applied. It is worth recalling that Brandi
related his discussion in semiotical terms at the time of writing Teoria generale della critica.
The reduction of art to linguistic system of significant and signifier was for him out of the
question. Therefore, he explained that the code of astanza could be extensional and intentional.
By extensional he meant the truth-value of an expression, while by intentional is the proposition
itself. He underlines the importance of this difference in the field of art criticism since
sometimes the code of astanza, according to its position against the flagrance could be
extensional or intentional. He explains with this the trends in the history of art as more or less
realist or symbolic.
154 Ibid. p. 99.
155 Ibid. pp. 102-4.
156 Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell'arte. p. 116. “dialettica di interno ed
esterno.” (Outr translation).
157 Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura. p. 191. “[...] la
forma dell’architettura sia al tempo stesso esterna ed interna a se stessa, e che non si possa
penetrare nella forma, ma proprio la forma si ponga come forma-che-si-penetra [...]
conseguentemente per porsi come forma-che-si-penetra, l’architettura non potrà essere soltanto
un interno o un esterno, ma l’esterno dovrà godere di una spazialità che lo renda interno a se
stesso, e l’interno reciprocamente esterno.” (Our translation).
88
Thus, Brandi mentions the inherent spatiality as specific to architecture,
but in a way opposite to other visual arts. Whilst, for instance in painting, the
interplay between inherent spatiality and phenomenic spatiality is characterised
by a discontinuity, in architecture these two spaces are continuous.158 Brandi
finds astanza – that makes architecture an art – in the evidence of the dialectic
interior-exterior of the work of architecture.159
Brandi deduced a phenomenological system that, as the Husserlian
method, implies a necessary reduction. Then, he arrived to suggest an essence
of the artistic phenomena, sacrificing other of its relationships. Brandi performs
the phenomenological approach to architecture within the schematism system
of Kant and identified flagrance and astanza for architecture as two ways of
constituting a presence. Flagrance and astanza reveal two dimensions of
architecture. If astanza was the main preoccupation of Brandi for being the
necessary condition of its artistic nature, within flagrance it might be possible
to identify other elements. Although these elements do not belong to the artistic
part of the manifold of architecture, they are not less important because of that.
The possibility to attach other than the aesthetics values to architecture is
fundamental for this thesis. Astanza, it seems true, has an extemporal way of
being, however human life evolves in time. How we approach astanza in time
is part of our further exploration.
158 Cfr. Brandi, Teoria generale della critica pp. 278, 99.
159 For more on the experience of architecture as art in the context of Brandi’s ideas cfr,
Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell'arte. Chapter 3.
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2.4 Brandi in the Postmodern Condition
With the structure, inevitably one comes to [a] threshold, whether one asserts
its ontological reality or not. Having present that, the noematic direction
concerns the intentional object and the noetic one the mode of the cogito itself
– namely the one of consciousness – if then one approaches Husserl’s
distinction of two basic directions of the description: noematic and noetic, one
cannot say that the structure is a ‘real’ determination of the intentional object.
Its giveness does not include it. It belongs to the modalities of the cogito
therefore it is noetic.
Cesare Brandi, Teoria Generale della Critica. 1974. 160
Up to here, we have discussed Brandi’s ideas in the context of what was
probably one of his most relevant roles: the art critic. He was a very prepared
and philosophically informed art critic. The depth of his philosophical insight is
what stimulates this thesis. However, we cannot ignore that conservation is a
social activity. Brandi wanted to base restoration as part of this activity on firm
philosophical bases. However, how did Brandi connect these two issues? It
appears that his interest did not focus on the systemic aspects of society in
relation to art; whether they are structural or not is out of the reach of this
thesis.
Thus, if we consider some aspects of his theory, it seems that his
theoretical proposals are philosophical, and the correspondent implications that
had in practice, should not merit consideration within the multifaceted
expressions of what is in a broad sense called Critical Theory. Many works
about architectural criticism published in the last century have focused on
160 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 97. “Con la struttura inevitabilmente si approda a
[una ] soglia, sia che se ne affermi o no la realtà ontologica. [...] Se poi si accede alla
distinzione di Husserl di due direzioni fondamentali della descrizione, quella noematica e
quella noetica, e si tenga presente che la direzione noematica riguarda l’oggetto intenzionale e
quella noetica la modalità del cogito in se, ossia della coscienza, la struttura, non si potrà
affermare come una determinazione ‘reale’ dell’oggetto intenzionale, non rientra nella sua
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examination under postulates and proposals arrived from Critical Theory.161
These views anticipated innovative tools to dissect architectural ideas and
additionally they came to a perfect field of application when the crisis of
modern architecture became evident. However, Brandi was not investigating
the structural problem of the social context that surrounded architecture but its
inherent ontology. In a sense, he was working in an opposed sense to the
“meta-assumptions of critical theory.”162 Brandi did not accept as tenable
teleological final causes out of subjectivity.163 His premise was that, the
pertinent practice of conservation should emerge from an ontological project
whose importance has diminished considerably in the age of postmodernism.
He connected instead with society through the encouragement of a
positive attitude towards heritage. One instance of that supportive action is his
role in the creation and direction of the Istituto Centrale del Restauro, a role
that he performed from 1939 to 1959.164 Another example of his active
engaging in theory of restoration as good practice in conservation is the role
that his theoretical proposals played as precedent of the configuration of the
Italian Carta del Restauro of 1972. The inheritance of his constant activity as
critic of art, director of conservation projects and specially the significance of
‘datità’, appartiene alla modalità del cogito, è cioè noetica.” (Our translation, emphasis in the
original).
161 We take here the broad sense of critical theory suggested by Bohman, although the theories
of Brandi did not have as much direction on social emancipation as in eliminating the sophism
of his time. However, they did not aspire to be “descriptive and normative bases for social
inquiry aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom in all their forms.” Cfr. James
F. Bohman, Critical Theory Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (The Metaphysics Research
Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, Spring 2005
[cited 01-06 2008]); available from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/critical-
theory/.
162 Robert J. Antonio, "The Origin, Development, and Contemporary Status of Critical Theory,"
The Sociological Quarterly 24, no. 3 (Summer, 1983). pp. 343-4.
163 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 27.
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his still tenable Theory of Restoration has recently started to be revaluated.165 A
reworking of his theory emerges as a relevant issue within the present juncture
of conservation.
An Ontological Project
As we have mentioned before, Brandi in Teoria Generale della Critica
takes history as the paradigm of knowledge. However, history is not the only
kind of knowledge; science can be another. Brandi conceives then two strands:
in the first one history is dedicated to the study of semiosis, meaning the
relation between significant and signified. On the second strand he identifies
the study of flagrance that is subdivided into flagrance of the real and astanza;
the former is the object of the sciences and the latter the study of the essence of
art. This is the sense of the study that gives the name to Teoria Generale della
Critica, that is to say the criticism of art.166 Brandi sustains that there is an
epistemological shift, which shares different kinds of research in modern times.
He suggests the existence of structures that the historian should reveal. For
him, the historian needs to escape the limitations to which it was subject, such
as the notion of a historical teleology or certain relations of causality that
suggested a holistic structural system.167
Brandi could not ignore the criticism made after Marx since the arise of
Critical Theory, and accordingly – as can be noticed in Teoria Generale della
164 Cesare Brandi, Il restauro, teoria e prattica 1939-1986, ed. Cordaro, Michele (Rome:
Editori Riuniti, 1995). p. XI.
165 During 2006 and 2007, the celebrations of the 100th anniversary of Cesare Brandi’s birth
date implied the organisation of eight national conferences, a touring exhibition, the publication
of a Brandi’s dictionary in several languages and the translation of his Theory of Restoration to
Spanish, English, Rumanian, Czech, French, Greek, Portuguese and Japanese, and the German
one in progress. Cfr. ([cited).
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Critica – he took his own stance. During the first half of the 20th century,
varied trends existed after the downfall of idealism: neo-Kantianism; Marxist
interpretation; Critical Theory; and from the 1960s onwards, postmodern
criticism. Among the available perspectives, Brandi empathised rather with
phenomenology and existentialism than with the interdisciplinarity of critical
theories as a sort of combination of philosophy and social science.
He made an indirect criticism to Karl Marx through the discussion of
some epistemological changes that he finds in Foucault’s approach to history.
He questioned Marxism as shifting towards an objectification of the human
being by focusing on relations of production.168 According to his view, the
dialectical materialism “represents a rigid centralization and levelling of history
for which a single key is given.”169 Thus, as we have seen, Brandi accepts
different levels of isotopy in order to understand different structures, however
he discards any attempt to give to history a fixed structure, making an analogy
with science in which the principle of indetermination and the principle of
complementary have not limited its evolution.170
At the beginning of this chapter, we framed a line of thought that later
on made him to endorse phenomenological existentialism. This line constituted
an important influence in Brandi’s thought. Although he was conscious about
other currents in philosophy, Brandi was concerned by the one that took history
as part of the given conditions, as a phenomena to be analysed. The other
166 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 14.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid. p. 15.
169 Ibid. p. 21. “rappresenta invece un rigido accentramento e livellamento della storia per cui
viene data un’unica chiave.” (Our translation).
170 Ibid. p. 14.
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current took the path of Marxism and from there it evolved into critical theories
and postmodern criticism.
Although being in the middle of polemics about the crisis of the
Modern Movement, Brandi as a critic of architecture did not fall into one of the
two sides then defined namely the organicist and the functionalist.
Its discussion, expressed mainly in Eliante and Struttura e architettura was
based on a latent awareness that architecture was a phenomenon composed of
organic and rational aspects at the same time. Brandi then rejects the
opposition functionalism-organicism and declares for architecture the
impossibility to be only functional without denying itself as architecture and
being reduced to a constructive passivity.171
Hence, the consideration of architecture as a manifold is present in the
notions of Brandi. The lack of more relevance of these theories about
architecture is probably due to a decline of the phenomenological ontological
project during most of the 20th century. The arrival of postmodern criticism
with its load of indeterminacy and relativism – not always philosophically
tenable – occluded the eventual progress on this area.
Brandi was sceptical about interpretations of art criticism that –
analysing artistic, architectural and urban phenomena – were derivative of
Marxism. A series of theories have inherited some of these conceptions. For
instance the studies developed by Manfredo Tafuri – who accused Brandi of
being a metaphysical mystical neo-idealist – about architecture and the city’s
development relate them to the productive processes and the ideology of
consumption.172 In Proggetto e Utopia, Tafuri analysed architecture and city as
171 Michele Sbacchi, "Realtà e immagine in Cesare Brandi," Aesthetica Preprint Suplementa,
Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare Brandi (2006). p. 153. Cfr. Brandi, Elicona. III-IV.
Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura. p. 165.
172 Luigi Prestinenza Puglisi, Brandi - Teoria generale della critica (1998 [cited 30-10 2006]);
available from http://www.prestinenza.it/scrittibrevi/articoliDomus/Brandi.htm.
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the result of ideological transformations in society. He conceived them as the
place of technological production and a resultant of it. Architecture accepted its
condition of commodity abandoning the utopias and getting into realism.173
The ideology of consumption becomes in this century the ideology of the
correct use of the city.174
In Tafuri’s analysis, he evidenced the critique to society as user more
than the critique to architecture. Tafuri elaborated a discourse from the
architectural phenomena towards the exterior. Without losing contact with the
discipline of architecture, as an architectural historian he saw architecture more
as a mediation between the human being and the society in which it was
rooted.175 What Brandi was trying to do instead was a phenomenological
approach to ontology in architecture. He was investigating architecture as a
point of departure towards an eventual internal, inherent, structure, and
therefore towards the consciousness of architecture itself. He seemed to
respond to the words of Jameson when he says that without
normative conception of architecture space of radical difference from this
one, the criticism of buildings tends to be conflated with the criticism of the
ideology of such buildings; the history and criticism of architecture thus tend
to fold back into the history and criticism of the various ideologies of
architecture, the manifestos and the verbal expressions of the great architects
themselves.176
Brandi in that sense was encouraging certain kinds of actions in order to
conserve CSA founding the normative of the praxis on firm ontological bases.
The performing of criticism in the context of the artistic phenomenon does not
173 Manfredo. Tafuri, Progetto e utopia (Roma: Laterza, 1973). p. 47
174 Ibid. p. 78.
175 Cfr. Ibid. and Manfredo. Tafuri, Teorie e storia dell'architettura, 358 p. vols. (Rome:
Laterza, 1973).
176 Joan. Ockman, Architecture, criticism, ideology, 191 p vols. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton
Architectural Press, 1985). pp. 52-55, 57.
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preclude the possibility to link that criticism towards other aspects of human
life in order to put in contact art and society.
If the analysis and criticism of his considerations are to be valuable it is
because we can consider that an overcoming and improvement of his theory is
possible. Brandi’s ontological attempt to define art, and architecture as art,
requires to be enriched; merging into his theory aspects that go beyond the
artistic condition that he may have left out. Tafuri’s systematic view is but an
example. The historical instance in his theory of restoration may encompass a
more comprehensive perspective. We consider this in more detail in Chapters
3, 5 and 6.
Criticism and Revaluations
Although being a respectable figure in Italy and abroad, Brandi was not
exempt of criticism. We have mentioned several times the suspicion of which
he was a victim, of being just a follower of Croce’s idealist philosophy. We
have discussed as well the contrast with approaches such as Tafuri’s, who even
censured Brandi as neo-idealist. The case of the so-called controversy
published in The Burlington Magazine about the cleaning of paintings in
relation to patina, varnish and glazes is but one of the most well-known
examples of polemical discussion. The debate was about “the unfortunate
cleaning, performed at the National Gallery of London” of some works against
his theoretical principles.177 He supported his argument not only arguing
177 Cfr. Cesare Brandi, "The Cleaning of Pictures in Relation to Patina, Varnish, and Glazes,"
The Burlington Magazine 91, no. 556 (1949), Cesare Brandi, "Some factual observations on
varnishes and glazes," Bolletino dell'Istituto Centrale del Restauro, no. 3-4 (1950), Cesare
Brandi and E. H. Gombrich, "The Cleaning of Pictures in Relation to Patina, Varnish and
Glazes," The Burlington Magazine 92, no. 571 (1950).
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theoretically, but philologically, demonstrating the origin of the terms and
procedures in discussion.
Some other critiques that Brandi received were instead in the context of
that conflictive relation of art with semiotics. For instance, in a review of
Teoria Generale della Critica, a scholar, then committed to the study of
language and structuralism, criticised the book on the grounds of considering it
as a rework of previously studied theories, put together only in an attempt to
explain the nature of art criticism. 178 According to her, Brandi took the
structuralistic standpoint accepting history as method and not as object.
However, history is but a backup of demonstrations for Brandi. Therefore, that
argument was weak, since the method is evidently phenomenological and not
historical. She argued that Brandi’s conclusion was that “the primary
manifestation of the thing occurs in two cases only: in existential flagrancy and
in art.”179 Brandi instead seemed to suggest that astanza found its peak in art
without explaining other eventual manifestation. She remarked that according
to Brandi
[the] [f]ailure to maintain the distinction between different planes of isotopy
leads to the confusion between existential reality (flagrancy) one the one
hand, and conceptualization (meaning) or presentification (astanza) on the
other. [...] the first isotopy of intellection is judgement [.] for astanza [...] the
first isotopy is the recognition of non-existence, of difference.180
Therefore, Teresa De Lauretis suggests Brandi contradicts his own
theory when he says that “the superimposition of new semantic strata on the
artistic structure does not bear directly on the structure which remains
178 De Lauretis, "The Discreet Charm of Semiotics, or Esthetics in the Emperor's New Clothes."
pp. 16-7
179 Ibid. pp. 16-7.
180 Ibid. p. 20.
97
unchanged.” 181 Her criticism seems tenable since as she argues, the work of art
can enter in the process of semiosis and social signification. However, here one
could doubt if the suggestion would not be an abstraction of a different order or
level, a different isotopy. We take this critique as evidence of the possibility to
attach different significance or value to architecture. These values would define
additional elements to consider when performing conservation. We come back
to this issue in Chapter 5.
Another scholar criticised Brandi’s Teoria Generale della Critica
noticing that
Art is not language: to clarify and deepen the truth of that proposition is the
primary aim of Brandi’s book. But given the meaning Brandi accepts for
‘language’, neither thinking nor criticism is language either, and Brandi’s
unawareness of this truth concerning his own mental activity weakens his
book so that its main connections are ambiguous to the point of confusion.182
According to this reviewer, Brandi’s development of an own
terminology was limited except for the introduction of the terms flagrancy and
astanza, considering his language a combination of Husserl, Heidegger, Louis
Hjelmslev and Umberto Eco. Again, this critic felt that for Brandi, Croce’s
early aesthetics and Brandi’s own work as critic were the main forces.183 He
even related the “bipolar” consciousness of Brandi with Croce’s distinction
between conoscenza intuitiva and conoscenza logica and thus he tried “to
establish a qualitative difference between astanza and semiosis, or art and
language, much like Croce’s distinction between intuition and concept.”184 In
substance, according to him, Brandi seemed to fight against opponents that are
181 Ibid. p. 21.
182 Merle Brown, "Teoria generale della critica," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
35, no. 2 (1976). p. 231.
183 Ibid. p. 231.
184 Ibid. pp. 231-2.
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not interested in his main conflict: to demonstrate that language does not engulf
art.185
Brandi was very pessimistic at the time regarding modern architecture.
He wrote his Eliante as a dialog emulating the form of the classical writings to
discuss his ideas about architecture as art. He situates the scenes in Italy after
the World War II where a group of friends meet to discuss about how
architecture had been affected after the conflict by the new tendencies. The
discussion regarded mainly the validity of the modern movement in its different
expressions.186 He rejected both Rationalism and Organic Architecture as art
because in them the architect could not arrive to formulate the image and in
organicism not even arrive to constitute the object.187 It has been observed that,
The Eliante o della architettura concluded with [...] the impossibility that
modern buildings were inserted in urban context of other times, because of
their specific spatiality, absolutely different from that of any other epoch and
so, incapable in any case to harmonise with them.188
According to Brandi, there was a rejection of the figurative tradition
making the discipline of rational architecture become theory and praxis at the
same time, concept and act.189 On the other hand, the problem for organic
architecture was that it put in evidence the issue of conformation of architecture
and not architecture itself.190 A scholar has observed that he did not trust in
ideology supporting art creativity which seems a very tenable argument
185 Ibid. p. 234.
186 Cfr. Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell'arte.
187 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia p. 78.
188 Ibid.
189 Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura. p. 105
190 Ibid. p. 115.
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nowadays.191 This evidences Brandi’s critical capacity of diagnosis in reference
to the artistic phenomena.
The previous analyses have been discussed also recently by scholars in
Italy with the reborn interest in Brandi’s thought. Several symposiums and
conferences have been organised, not only as commemoration of his work but
also as deepening and development of his theoretical explanations. Examples
of these studies are the works such as: Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia
by Paolo D’Angelo; Cesare Brandi. Teoria e esperienza dell'arte by Carboni;
or Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare Brandi, edited by Luigi Russo
because of a seminar organised to commemorate the 100 years of Brandi’s
birth, among several other publications.192
More recently in an article, a scholar recalls Brandi’s declaration of the
significance of art during the presentation of Teoria Generale della Critica
done by Giulio Carlo Argan, Emilio Garroni and Roland Barthes.193 According
to him, astanza presupposed a structure of relations and reciprocal differences.
For him Brandi’s merit is to have opposed a theory to the “banal researches
pertaining the content, historicist and scientific-realistic done contemporarily
with his research.”194 Another merit that he underlines is “to expose the
inconsistencies of many theories that [...] looked to reduce art, in particular
architecture, to a language similar to the verbal one, [...] without the mediation
191 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia p. 81.
192 Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell'arte, D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica
d'arte e filosofia, Luigi Russo, Paolo D'Angelo et al., Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di
Cesare Brandi, ed. Russo, Luigi (Palermo: Aesthetica Preprint, Universita degli Studi di
Palermo, Centro Internazionale Studi di Estetica, 2006).
193 Prestinenza Puglisi, Brandi - Teoria generale della critica ([cited).
194 Ibid.([cited). (Our translation).
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of linguistics and structuralism.”195 According to him, it may be the moment to
re-evaluate Brandi’s research under the light of the advances of linguistics and
phenomenology.
Brandi belonged to the strand of criticism committed to philosophy as
the dilucidating reflective power of human being. Supported on that knowledge
his theory and practice were always consistent. Between the existentialist and
the Marxist approaches, he chose the first as one that offered the open
possibility that art supposes. His philosophy did not lack inconsistencies and
criticism; however, it still proposes possibilities of reflection and, probably
more importantly today, resulting actions. He incorporated the
phenomenological exploration of being for theorising art and architecture.
Thus, one of the consequences of this choice is his theory of restoration with its
particular attitude on temporality in relation with the work of art. His approach
was characterised by going from the object to the consciousness of it, rather
than one directed towards exteriorisation with its structural consequences.
Retaking the quote that opens this particular section, he was more interested in
deducing the noetic from the noematic, leaving their structural consequences to
the study of history.
Conclusions
We have mapped Brandi’s journey in his approach to the knowledge of
art in general and architecture in particular. We have emphasised two
significant consequences from idealist notions present in Brandi. One is the
195 Ibid.([cited). (Our translation).
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awareness of architecture as being constituted by a manifold identity, one of
whose elements is its being art. Brandi seemed to discard the duality of spirit
and sensuousness of the idealism and reinterpret their presence distinguishing
them in flagrance and astanza. The importance he gave to the issue of mimesis
was the second legacy from idealism. If the image was for him a constant
object of theoretical reflection, the concept of mimesis instead somehow
remained fixed in the notion of reproduction or copy. The possibilities to
develop the notion of mimesis, to encompass cultural practices, within the
theory that he established could have been promising of a positive evolution in
the paradigm of conservation. As other of his generation, the advanced
theoretical corpus that Brandi developed overcame the Crocean idealism that
preceded him. Brandi’s attitude towards the Italian philosopher did not lack a
critical reaction. The opposition to the identity of intuition and expression was
constant during his life – not only as reaction to Crocean concepts – arguing
against the semiotical trends of the age. Thus, the incorporation of new
approaches to study art – and architecture as art – characterised the overcoming
of idealism. Through a phenomenological epoché, Brandi deduced the essence
of the artistic phenomena sacrificing other realities that the artistic phenomenon
affects. He approached architecture phenomenologically within the frame of
Kantian schematism. Flagrance and astanza revealed two dimensions of
architecture as in the other arts, although implying for the case of architecture
some consequences in relation to human temporality. We have suggested the
significance of architectural values beyond the characteristics of architecture’s
presence in order to update Brandi’s theoretical frame. Brandi’s choice to
continue towards the construction of an understanding of the ontological
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structure of architecture, and in a wider sense the human world, is significant
for this thesis. As we have suggested the approach of Brandi was
phenomenological in method and ontological in goals. This seemed to detach
his philosophy from the trends of critical theory and link it more to the neo-
Kantian and phenomenological philosophical enquiry, despite the criticism
received from structuralistic and semiotic commentators.
However, the ontological project was relevant for other strands of
scholars investigating human existence. The fact that architecture is the
conformation of the human place – and its artistic condition – triggered the
question of what this human place is. Art, according to Brandi’s theories, is the
privileged manifestation of astanza. However, Brandi defines astanza as an
intemporal form of presence. Thus, architecture lingers in the middle, between
the role of the dynamic and changing place of human dwelling and the one of
support of the intemporal work of art. To deal with its conservation means to
deal with human temporality, and this makes us shift our investigation towards
conservation as a form of temporal intentionality.
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Chapter 3: Conservation as Temporal
Intentionality: The Approach of Brandi
The work of art is the maximum effort that may make man transcend its
transient existence, detaching from time and conforming within the
immutability of eternity. [...] The work opposes the concrete standing reality –
in which the present that gave it origin is reactivated – to an expired existential
reality.
Cesare Brandi, Carmine o della pittura, 1945.196
Social life develops in architectural place, that is to say an environment
formed by a combination of a natural pre-existence and human intervention.
However, this place evolves and changes in time acquiring cultural
significance. There have always been reasons to keep changing this cultural
context and reasons to keep it stable. Modern conservation, understood as a
scientific attitude of preservation of the cultural heritage, was born after the
impulse of Enlightenment. There are, of course, precedents to this attitude,
each one of them with different notions. Their conceptual differences reside in
the particular concretization that they produce in consciousness, since they
imply particular attitudes towards the endurance of architecture in time.
Brandi distinguished his particular emphasis from modern conservation
by restricting it to the aesthetic phenomena. When one recognises art within the
object to conserve, then it is a subject of restoration according to his theory;
otherwise, the object belongs to the field of study of the social sciences, such as
history or archaeology, or it is more generally subject to repair.197 While
196 Brandi, Carmine o della pittura p. 64. “L’opera d’arte è il massimo sforzo che possa
compiere l’uomo per trascendere la propria transeunte essistenza, togliendosi al tempo e
conformandosi nell’immutabile dell’etermità. [...] L’opera ad una realtà esistenziale perenta
oppone la concretezza di una realtà astante, in cui si riattiva all’infinito quel presente, che le
dette vita.” (Our translation).
197 Cfr. Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration. p. 47. This point of view is analogous with
the approach of Chanfón, who says that restoration is an instrument of history. He sustains that
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modern scientific conservation emphasises objectivity and historical
authenticity, restoration focuses on the recovery of the image of the work of art.
The deduction of Brandi’s theory was a phenomenological endeavour, based on
an account about how art is presented to consciousness.
Brandi’s theory has a phenomenological point of departure, assuming
the concept of intentionality as the fact that all consciousness addresses
something – or some other.198 He defines restoration as “[...] the
methodological moment in which the work of art is recognised, in its physical
being, and in its dual aesthetic and historic nature, in view of its transmission to
the future.”199 Therefore, restoration implies an aesthetic intentionality directed
towards the artistic object. For this approach, the issue of appearance is
fundamental because of the explored notion of astanza. Thus, we
phenomenologically label restoration as intentionality, as a specific case within
the wider conservation genus. For Brandi, this intentionality has the artistic
object – the work of art – as correlative, and within this category, we focus on
the architectural object. We contrast the emphasis he puts on the artistic nature,
with other elements of the manifold that constitutes architecture that he may
have not considered because of the pre-eminence that he gave to art.
if the architectural object, the monument, is not in need of restoration then is matter of interest
of the social sciences. Cfr Chanfón Olmos, Fundamentos teóricos de la restauración p. 266.
Chanfón did not seem to understand that the theory of Brandi has this specificity and therefore
he assimilates it to the more general concept of conservation, which in Spanish language is
frequently called restoration. Chanfón supports his judgement about Brandi’s theory on the
misleading commentary of Conti, who considered Brandi an idealist. Cfr. Alessandro. Conti,
"Vicende e Cultura del Restauro," in Storia Dell'Arte Italiana (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1981).
p. 43.
198 Cfr. Moran, Edmund Husserl founder of phenomenology p. 54.
199 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration. p. 48. Cfr. also, Catalano, "Una definizione che
viene da lontano. Avvio allo “smontaggio” della Teoria del restauro di Cesare Brandi," pp.
103-4.
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How aesthetic intentionality merges with the consciousness of time is
the result, again, of Husserlian deductions. It has been said that “[t]o speak of
time-consciousness as such is confusing. Strictly speaking, for the early Husserl
at least, time appears only in conjunction with an appearing object. We are not
conscious of time as such, but rather of objects in time.”200 This establishes a
first connection between objects and time. The second is human awareness
about its relation with those objects and consequently with its own
temporality.201
Therefore, awareness of time comes from identifying a unity whose
endurance in time is apparent to consciousness.202 Temporality is usually
understood as the interplay between consciousness of past, present and future
and it is distinguished in three levels: world time level, internal time level and
consciousness of internal time level. These levels of temporality refer to
intentionality and the experience of time as the time lived in the real world, the
time as awareness of sequence within the mind, and the consciousness about
this awareness. Brandi instead, identifies three instances of time in his Theory
of Restoration: the time of the creation of the work of art, the time between the
end of the creative process and the awareness of it by a consciousness, and the
time of recognition of the work of art as such.203 In relation to architectural
monuments, Brandi emphasises the transformation of their surroundings
bringing him to consider architecture as an element within a more extended
monument, namely the environment. Temporality in this case arises as a
200 Moran, Edmund Husserl founder of phenomenology p. 139.
201 Ibid. p. 140. Cfr. Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis,
trans. J., Steinbock Anthony, vol. 9, Collected Works (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001) p. 107.
202 This is possible through retention or primary memory as it is called. Cfr. Moran, Edmund
Husserl founder of phenomenology pp. 141-2. We explore this issue further in Chapter 5.
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problem whose time scale depends on the speed of transformation of the city,
the awareness of which is usually collective.204
What we call conservation intentionality is then a combined
attentiveness in which one is conscious of an object and additionally of its
endurance in time.205 The correlative object of these intentionalities is the
architectural object. From Chapter 4, however, we can deduce from the
architectural object the object as such and the object as intended; this may
suggest a path to what and why to conserve.206 Husserl considered all attitudes
as being grounded in the natural attitude since they presuppose it, and the
characteristics of this first naive epoché have determined subsequent
attitudes.207 For his theory, Brandi was assuming an aesthetic attitude for the
appreciation of art; an attitude that could be characterised as individual,
subjective and intemporal.208 From that crucial attitude in his theory, we move
towards a conservation intentionality that gradually allows the possibility of
being collective and grounded in architecture as the human place to live.
In this chapter, we explore this progression of concepts from individual
to collective conservation intentionalities, up to the idea of cultural heritage in
relation to Brandi’s theories. We call these concepts determinants of
conservation. Accordingly, section 3.1 “The Supremacy of Art as Individual
Experience” embraces the exploration of the individual aesthetic experience. It
explains the characteristic conservation attitude of Brandi – the notions of his
203 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 61.
204 Ibid. pp. 94-5.
205 Even better, it is the result of these two intentionalities that, for Brandi, are judged, and then
expressed as a kind of duty. Cfr. Ibid. p. 49.
206 This differentiation is the one that Husserl finds between the noetic and the noematic. Cfr.
Moran, Edmund Husserl founder of phenomenology pp. 133-9.
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theory of restoration – and details temporality from that perspective. He
conceived architecture as art, and by doing so, he was privileging some
elements to receive conservation in the architectural manifold, establishing
supremacy for art in any restoration intervention.
The way in which Western culture has determined its decisions about
what and how to conserve, derive from the way in which it has conceived these
concepts. Therefore, the section 3.2 “From Personal Experience to Shared
Knowledge” explores memory and history as determinants. Memory implies a
dynamic concept, whilst history has suggested a subject-object relationship.
The understanding of the difference between these two ideas is fundamental for
the thesis and is analysed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Section 3.3 “Monuments and Identities” explores the issues of
monument and identity, in which the correlative objects of conservation and
restoration start to imply collectiveness. With this collective intentionality
based on memory, the concept of monument finds its origin and development;
and has influence on another determinant for exploration, that of identity.
Brandi’s theory of restoration has importantly influenced the
foundations of conservation of cultural heritage in an institutionalised form.
Hence, section 3.4 “Conservation and Society” examines the concept of
cultural heritage and the distinguishable attitudes of conservation and
restoration. An historical description of these two attitudes is outlined with the
result of the current practice of heritage conservation emphasising relevant
links to Brandi’s theory.
207 Ibid. p. 55.
108
3.1 The Supremacy of Art as Individual Experience
[a] work of art is such because of a particular and conscious recognition. This
recognition [...] must be performed again and again by each individual, and [...]
can be validated only by such personal acts. [...] a work of art [...] is not
considered as such in relation to its essence or to the creative process that
produced it , but in relation to the way it enters into the world, into each
individual’s particular way of being in the world.
Cesare Brandi, Theory of Restoration, 1963.209
Brandi would acknowledge conservation of buildings of the Industrial
Revolution such as railway stations, vernacular architecture of small villages,
or even some of the – for him controversial – creations of the architecture of
the Modern Movement. However, he might not have considered these
architectural monuments as a work of art, and therefore not as objects for
restoration. The instance to conserve them would be historical and not
aesthetic. Brandi’s aesthetic theory was consistent throughout his life, being
subject to changes more of perspective and terminology than modifications to
core principles. Brandi has been described as representing “[...] the type of
critic-philosopher who founds his judgement and his own interpretative
structure on a coherent theory of art, on an aesthetics.”210 Crucial in
understanding his theory of restoration is the consideration of its exclusive
application for the work of art.
Architecture – and its conservation – is problematic for Brandi, not only
for the inclusion of function within its manifold: arts, or at least arts other than
architecture, do not involve practical use, but also for the concurrence of three
208 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 47.
209 Ibid.
210 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. pp. 13-4. The other option to be a critic
was based in the so called connoisseurship.
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temporalities: the temporality of creation; the interval between creation and
reception; and the recognition of architecture as work of art. In his theory,
architecture manifests astanza through the presentation of an exterior that
implies an interior and an interior that implies an exterior, supported by a
structure that for Brandi does not have artistic value. It is on the aesthetic value
that Brandi centres the emphasis of his theory because of his particular
phenomenological perspective.
Art in time
For Brandi, art is the epiphany of astanza that is manifested through the
spatiality offered in the image. Let us recall that for him architecture is always
image.211 For the case of architecture, he does not consider the existential space
as the one constituting the artistic spatiality.212 He says:
What I deny immediately [...] is [...] the claim to establish architecture as an
art that would be entitled to a qualification, through space, more than painting
or sculpture. [...] Detaching architecture from space [...] takes it back to the
field of the image, where it can ascend to form: to that reality that does not
transcend the existential reality, but stands as the only reality that the
consciousness can provoke within it without transcendence.213
211 Cfr. Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 51.
212 He disqualifies the definition of Le Corbusier when he says that “architecture is the
representation of space [...] is certainly the most formalist definition of architecture that could
be given, more unilateral than the one – abstractly phenomenological – which sees in
architecture a combination of spaces, masses and lines that is revealed through a play of light
and shadows.” Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura p.
174. “l’architettura è rapresentazione dello spazio [...] è certo la definizione più formalistica
che possa darsi dell’architettura, non meno unilaterale di quella, astrattamente fenomenologica,
che vede nell’architettura una combinazione di spazi, di masse e di linee che si rivela attraverso
un gioco di luce e d’ombra.” (Our translation).
213 Ibid. pp. 174-5. “Quello che negherò subito [...] è [...] la pretesa di istituire l’architettura
come un’arte che avrebbe diritto ad una qualificazione, atraverso lo spazio, più della pittura o
della scultura. [...] Staccando allora l’architettura dallo spazio [...] vale riportarla subito nel
campo dell’immagine, dove, o in nessun altro, potrà ascendere alla forma: a quella realtà, che
non trascende la realtà esistenziale, ma si pone come l’unica, che la coscienza riesca a suscitare
a se stessa senza trascendenza [...]” (Our translation).
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This perception of architecture as work of art is individually
experienced. In his Eliante, Brandi approached phenomenologically the
creation of architecture as a work of art, where he described it as being
supported on Kantian schematism. However, in his Theory of Restoration he
approaches the work of art from the point of view of reception. In this text, he
seems to suggest that art occurs when it is perceived and it is then recreated,
suggesting a complementary temporality of the work that closes the cycle of
creation-reception.214 Whilst the implied temporality for architectural creation
has ontological implications – that we explore further subsequently – the
concept of restoration focuses on a hermeneutical endeavour. Architecture as
work of art – and for that case any other art – creates an intemporal interval
between its creation (Figure 3-1 Architecture as Art t1) and reception
(Architecture as Art t2), in which it potentially subsists but does not exist.215
214 He agrees with John Dewey pointing out this characteristic Cfr. Brandi, Basile et al., Theory
of restoration p. 48. Cfr. John Dewey, Art as experience (New York: Minton Balch, 1934).
215 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 48.
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Figure 3-1 Architecture in time deduced from Brandi's theories. (Own diagram)
Architecture’s reception in consciousness is, Brandi sustains, given in a
double instance: the aesthetic and the historic. He discards usefulness as a
significant instance in the work of art for restoration; usefulness is only
important for the origin of the physical form and for maintenance.216 For
Brandi, the time of the work of art ends with the loss of its aesthetic instance,
that once lost originates a ruin. The time between creation and reception leaves
only traces on the work.217 Matter represents the time and the place of
restoration.218
216 Ibid. pp. 47-8.
217 Ibid. pp. 49-50.
218 Ibid. p. 51. For him the marble of a sculpture – for instance – is only illusory, the same as
recent extracted marble; he calls it illusion of immanence. Human intervention has historicised
the former marble by making it vehicle of the image and that marble belongs to the present.
Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 51. According to him, idealistic and positivistic
conceptions of the work of art have disregarded the importance of matter in its double aspect of
appearance and structure. He for example criticises Semper and Taine for assuming that the
material determines the stile, and also the idealist aesthetics as conceiving the matter as
dissolved. Cfr. Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration pp. 51-3.
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Brandi says that in the work of art, time is found in three different
moments:
First there is the duration of the externalising of the work of art, while it is
being formed by the artist; second, we have the interval between the end of
the creative process and the moment when our consciousness becomes aware
of the work of art; third, is the instant when the work of art strikes
consciousness like a bolt of lightning.219
He seems to focus on the temporality that concerns the work of art. The
time he is discussing in his Theory of Restoration is the transcendent time of
the object and not the internal time of the observer. Therefore, we can identify:
the temporality of the creation of the work of art, according to what he
develops in Carmine – and Eliante for the case of architecture; the time that he
calls the interval between creation and reception, according to what he
develops in his Teoria Generale della Critica; and the time of reception in an
instant of recognition, that he implies in the Theory of Restoration. If by
hypothesis, we consider architecture as a temporal object within the times that
Brandi suggested, Husserl would describe a particular running-off phenomena
for each one of them. Yet, it is worth considering that,
Every temporal being ‘appears’ in one or another continually changing mode
of running-off, and the ‘Object in the mode of running-off’ is in this change
always something other, even though we still say that the Object and every
point of its time and this time itself are one and the same. The ‘Object in the
mode of running-off’ we cannot term a form of consciousness (any more than
we can call a spatial phenomenon, a body in its appearance from one side or
the other, far or near, a form of consciousness).220
Consciousness has to repeat this constitution of the object individually
for each one of the times that Brandi proposes, unless the complete history of
the object through different ages was considered as a single phenomenon.
219 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 61.
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According to Husserl’s theory, it is worthy noticing that in any case,
architecture as spatial object is a temporal object as well. One perceives
architecture through time, while one moves through it.221
Brandi calls attention to the fact that the three temporalities he suggests
are frequently confused with the historical time of the work of art; the
transcendent time in Husserl’s terms. With this, Brandi denied any kind of
zeitgeist expressed through the work of art.
[...] the artist decides whether to incorporate the sacrosanct tastes and
concerns, theories and ideologies, desires and schemes that he might have in
common with his epoch. [...] of these concomitant outside factors that come
together in the final object, nothing will remain, or will remain only as an
insect trapped in amber. The time in which the artist lives might or might not
be recognisable in his work, and the validity of the work neither will be
increased nor diminished an iota.222
For him, these inclusions are objects of suggestive interpretation, matter
of chronological history but not art history.223 On the other hand, Brandi
underlines the fact that the time of the interval between conclusion and
reception of the work of art “slides over the reality of the work,” ignoring its
physical consistency.224
In Brandi’s view, art is immaterial and intemporal. Nevertheless, it is
supported by and manifested through the matter of the work of art that endures
in time. Structure and appearance, then, belong together. He looked in his
theory for the proper moment in which the work of art access into historical
220 Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, ed. Heidegger,
Martin, 188p vols., Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. English.
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964) p. 47.
221 Husserl says that “It is tempting to draw a parallel between [the] modes of the consciousness
and appearance of temporal Objects and the modes in which a spatial thing appears and is
known with changing orientation, to pursue the ‘temporal orientations’ in which spatial things
(which are also temporal objects) appear.” Ibid. pp. 46-7.
222 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration pp. 61-2.
223 Ibid. p. 62.
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time, determining as legitimate only the “actual moment of conscious
awareness of the work of art.”225 Once the when of art’s manifestation and the
what of its epiphany has been defined, then it is time to phenomenologically
understand how Brandi conceives the recognition of art in consciousness. That
recognition defines the how, but, importantly for us, it opens additional
dimensions in which art is involved, that are not necessarily dependent on its
being art.
Restoration Attitude
Humans could be blind to art, since art apprehension depends on the
attitude of human consciousness; the scientific and the aesthetic are but some
instances of this consciousness. Brandi founds his theory of restoration mainly
on an aesthetic attitude, bracketing out the elements of the work that are not the
manifestation of astanza. However, restoration is an operation in which two
intentionalities are involved: an intentionality that finds its correlative object in
an intemporal work of art; and a temporal intentionality that finds its
correlative object in a temporal object. This merging of intentionalities makes
restoration problematic. The distinguishing attribute then is that restoration
aims to preserve or recover the artistic image. Brandi defines restoration as
“[...] the methodological moment in which the work of art is recognised, in its
physical being, and in its dual aesthetic and historic nature, in view of its
transmission to the future.”226 Restoration therefore constitutes a double
intentionality of an artistic object in time.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid. pp. 62-4.
226 Ibid.
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Brandi seems to suggest that while the historical instance involves
consideration of the aspects determined by the flagrance of the existential
reality of the work of art, or more properly its material substratum, the aesthetic
instance instead focuses on the aspects of astanza determining the image. We
are correlating, then, the instances of Brandi’s theory of restoration with
pertinent intentionalities. As mentioned before, Brandi privileges the aesthetic
instance because it is the artistic quality more than the temporal testimony that
brings uniqueness and value. However, the historical instance determines an
attitude in terms of temporality, since he considers the artistic condition to be
out of existential time. Therefore, for restoration to be pertinent, time has to be
always recognised and presented in the flagrance of the work. An intervention
that pretends the abolition of time is to be avoided.227
For the aesthetic instance, the aim is the re-integration of the potential
unity of the work of art. Brandi states that, “if a work of art, which is not a sum
of parts, is physically fragmented, it will continue to exist as a potential whole
in each of its fragments.”228 What Brandi intended here is that even when the
matter of the work of art has traversed in time losing integrity, its parts contain
by implication the complete work that can be recovered via restoration through
interpretation. Time is in consequence a destructive or at least a dissipative
power. In a similar fashion, Brandi presents the conflict of the patina, as
evidence of time passing, with the aesthetic unity, by stating that
227 Brandi criticised the Italian motto “as it was, where it was” arguing that this attitude negated
the principles of restoration. Ibid. p. 75. The people of Venice when considering the
reconstruction of the Campanile in St. Mark Square on the 17th July of 1902 coined the
famous motto “com’era dove’era.” For a synthesis of this historical case, cfr. Jukka Jokilehto,
"A history of architectural conservation. The contribution of English, French, German and
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[...] given that the transmission of the formed image occurs through the
material, and that the material’s role is as transmitter, the material must never
take precedence over the image, in the sense that it should become unseen as
material, and act only as image.229
Matter is significant then, because it supports the image and not because
it is important as such material. Brandi saw patina as the evidence of the
historicizing of matter, so it is viewed as the same matter transformed in time
rather than adhered matter to the original.
Brandi does not discuss astanza in his theory of restoration, that he still
calls pure reality; he instead gives examples of how aesthetic issues determine
certain conservation and restoration interventions. It is worth recalling that,
although having already conceived the role of astanza in the process of creation
and reception of art, Brandi had not completely incorporated it in his
vocabulary.230 Astanza, or pure reality, deserves additional explanation in the
context of restoration as conservation intentionality. An analysis of the theory
in light of the considerations of his Teoria Generale della Critica could be a
way to update his theory. Let us, for instance, consider the example of the
optical giveness in architecture. Brandi starts by considering that visual
perception is always perception of something.231 However, in opposition to the
other arts, in architecture the inherent space presented in the image is
continuous or co-existent with the phenomenic space.
Italian thought towards an international approach to the conservation of cultural property"
(PhD, The University of York, 1986) pp. 344-5.
228 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 57. (Emphasis in the original).
229 Ibid. p. 74.
230 For a description of the development of the concept of pure reality that became then
condensed in the neologism astanza, cfr. Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza
dell'arte pp. 11-78.
231 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 277.
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Brandi differentiates the giveness of astanza in architecture from that in
painting and sculpture, due to architecture’s opposition inherent spatiality-
phenomenic space; namely between the space that the work develops in the
image and the phenomenic space in which the material work and human
being’s existence is immersed.232 Yet, the interior reveals the exterior and the
exterior the interior. Each one of both manifestations can be thematic, and
consequently, their recovery can be the main purpose of restoration.
Restoration for architecture, according to Brandi’s theory, would imply the
recovery of the interplay of exterior and interior revealing themselves mutually.
The essential formal characteristics of architecture, tectonics and ornato, in
Brandi’s terms, are to be deduced through phenomenological analysis in order
to proceed to critical restoration. Consequently, an adumbration of these
features should start the filling of restoration intentionality. Whilst the external-
internal relation is guaranteed by the conservation of the interior, only the
internal-external relationship needs the involvement of the conservation of the
urban or natural continent environment.233
There is an additional dimension to highlight in Brandi’s restoration
intentionality.
[...] although recognition must occur in time and time again in the individual
consciousness, the very moment it does occur, it also belongs to universal
consciousness. The individual who enjoys that instant revelation feels
immediately an imperative – as absolute as a moral imperative – for
conservation.234
Brandi sustains that conservation would be a category with which
human consciousness recognises a monument. This category would impel
232 Ibid. p. 300.
233 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 94.
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humans to conserve what seems to have value, especially in view of time as
phenomenologically intended. Thus, this aspect of Brandi’s theory merges with
the temporal intentionality in the moral imperative, “in view of [art’s]
transmission to the future”, namely the art that human beings have in the
present.235 For Brandi, the centre of gravity of this temporality is located in the
present and the filling object of intentionality is the work of art as such.
Nevertheless, one could argue whether this transmission to the future is already
an existential position that can join the present interpretation of architecture as
art and the future apprehensions of those others to come or not. We reconnect
these three issues – moral dimension, temporality and intersubjetivity – again
in Section 6.4. Despite the temptation to consider this universal consciousness
part of an idealist inheritance in Brandi, more probably he was implying Jung’s
notions of collective unconscious, although he was sceptical about applying
psychology as a key to interpret art and its significant dimension.236
There are some other important features in conservation analysed as
temporal intentionality. However, some of them are examined in Chapter 4 and
5, since they constitute ontological moments developed in time, such as the
issue of spatiality. The way in which Brandi framed temporal intentionality in
his theory specifying what and when humans restore has been the key issue
here. Art is the specific object of restoration intentionality, and the present
moment of recognition is its specific time. Restoration according to Brandi is
then, for our purposes, about architecture as a work of art; and it is directed
234 Ibid. p. 49.
235 Ibid. p. 48.
236 Actually he mentions Jung in Teoria generale della critica in relation to the deviated trend
of psychoanalysis to enlarge the concept of the unconscious. He strongly criticised these
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towards its specific artistic qualities. It is also an attitude to the present, in view
of the future of others to come. Restoration so understood is a step on the path
towards an interpretation of architecture. According to Brandi, human
consciousness takes this first step individually. However, a mnemonic
operation achieves the retention of the traces that permits this connection
between art and future human consciousness; it is interpretation as a collective
necessity.
3.2 From Personal Experience to Shared Knowledge
If matter does not remember the past, it is because it repeats the past
unceasingly, because subject to necessity, it unfolds a series of moments of
which each is the equivalent of the preceding moment and may be deduced
from it: thus its past is truly given in its present. But a being which evolves
more or less freely creates something new every moment: in vain, then, should
we seek to read its past in its present unless its past were deposited within it in
the form of memory. Thus [...] it is necessary, and for similar reasons, that the
past should be acted by matter, imagined by mind.
Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 1896.237
[...] since, by hypothesis, the historical fact consists in what really has
happened; but where ever did something happen? Every episode of a revolution
or war is resolved in a myriad of psychic and individual movements; each one
of these expresses unconscious evolutions; and these latter are resolved in
cerebral, hormonal or nervous phenomena, which refer at their time to physical
or chemical orders. In consequence, the historical fact is not a data of the
others; it is the historian, or the agent of the historical becoming, who
constitutes it as abstraction and as under the threat of an infinite regression.
Lévi-Strauss, La pensée sauvage, 1962.238
Memory is for restoration a temporal intentionality, which has been
essentially characterised by Plato as, “the present representation of an absent
theories as an attempt to make of them a first cause. Brandi, Teoria generale della critica pp.
30-1.
237 Henri Bergson, Matter and memory, 284 p. vols. (New York: Zone, 1988). p. 222.
238 Quoted by Cesare Brandi in Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 11. (Our translation).
Cfr. Claude Lévi-Strauss, La pensée sauvage (Paris: 1962) p. 270.
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thing.”239 Despite the fact that this quality of absence presupposes a having
been, in contrast to imagination, whose image is about the possible, memory is
always present as Bergson’s epigram suggests. The opposition is between
retention and protention. If for Brandi restoration is about art and art is about
image, then the role of this image as the object to fill mnemonic intentionalities
becomes crucial, bearing symbols and signs, but importantly for Brandi,
becoming the place of manifestation of astanza.
History on its side has suffered epistemological revolutions and some
reflection about the philosophy of history seems necessary in order to
understand it both as a fact – the past – and as a discipline. Brandi’s thought
about history emerges mainly in Teoria Generale della Critica. We have
mentioned that he proposed history as a sort of paradigm of conceptual
knowledge. Echoing Lévi-Strauss, however, Brandi dissolved the category of
event to constitute an object to observe. In freezing the actual moment as a
present object of analysis, Brandi highlighted flagrance as the main point of
contrast between history – that can be analysed as sign or as science – and the
manifestation of astanza that is out of its reach. The intention here is not to
outline his complete approach to history, but to pinpoint the relevant
connections with his restoration intentionality.
Memory
The identification of memory with image is intrinsic to Brandi. In
philosophy, this emphasis on memory as representation or image has been
239 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 7.
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common.240 Henri Bergson suggested in Matter and Memory that “[...] memory
is just the intersection of mind and matter.” What seems relevant for the
discussion of Brandi’s notion of art as image is the deduction from Bergson’s
epigram: the impossible recognition of the past just through the presence of
matter. The past comes with the spiritual work of memory. This notion of
embodied memory correlated to architecture brings again the question of
mimesis. Human beings have always remembered architecture – the apparent
main point of conservation – but also significantly remembered by means of
architecture.241 We discuss in more detail this issue of architecture embodying
memory in the form of culture in Chapter 5. Brandi concedes the dependability
of embodied memory to matter when he says, “Only the material of a work of
art is restored. […] Some of the physical structure will be acting as supports for
the parts that are actually transmitting the message […]”242
Memory in its personal and collective dimensions can have architecture
not only as the object of intentionality, but also as its trigger. This arises in two
different ways, as affection and as an active search: memory and
240 Discussing Sartre’s ideas in The psychology of imagination, Ricoeur calls the attention to
the fact that “[t]here must be an irreducible feature in the living experience of memory that
explains the persistence of the confusion conveyed by the expression memory-image.” He does
a plea to redefine whether memory manifests itself always in the form of an image within
consciousness. Ibid. Cfr. Sartre, The psychology of imagination.
241 The ontological system in Bergson’s Matter and memory has many paradoxes. We used it
here to illustrate the fixation of precedent manifestations of existence in present matter. In
reality, Bergson suggests that “past and present are no longer located on the same line, but
constitute different planes of being, related and articulated in coexistence. This coexistence
offers a continuity of a different sort than that found in linear succession – a continuity that
holds within itself the seeds of its own discontinuity and differentiation. This will mean that the
present already includes the past (in principle and not merely in fact), that presence implies
memory and cannot be conceived without it.”Alia Al-Saji, "The memory of another past:
Bergson, Deleuze and a new theory of time," Continental Philosophy Review 37, no. 2 (2004):
pp. 6-9. Bergson then resolves this way the controversy realism-idealism via an imaginism in
whose different levels of contractions or expansions consciousness travels with the only
instrument of freedom. Cfr. Bergson, Matter and memory p. 54.
242 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 49.
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recollection.243 Although with Bergson matter embodies a sort of revealing
memory, restoration in Brandi’s theory aims to unveil astanza, whose main
quality is its intemporal condition. Here we can establish a first distinction
between architecture as memory and as recollection. For memory, architecture
emerges from an image of an experienced architectural place. For recollection,
instead one has to incorporate it within the search to remember, or the moving
in time within the architectural space. In the first case, architecture becomes a
sort of monument, something that assists remembering; in the second case, its
supports existence, constituting the life within architectural place. We describe
some of these cases in Chapter 5.
Brandi did not explicitly include memory in his explanations as an
abstract notion.244 Nevertheless, memory is frequently implied in his
discussions about image. For instance, in his Eliante, Brandi considers previous
typologies of buildings. Making an analogy, he says that, for example, a church
is a church even if its use changed, in the same way a sculpture of Jupiter is
always a Jupiter even if nobody believes in such a god.245 Thus, he meant that
architectural form recalls a way of being; mimesis in the meaning of re-
enactment is at play.
243 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 4.
244 However, he refers to memory discussing the renowned description of the Proustian
madeleine. Marcel Proust, Jean-Yves Tadié et al., À la recherche du temps perdu, [Nouvelle
éd.] ed., 4 v. vols. ([Paris]: Gallimard, 1987). Brandi claims that that image belongs to Proust
and nobody else, however it has become universal thanks, not to the denotation – the biscuit –
that is not important, but to the connotation, that has merited the writing of the novel. Brandi,
Teoria generale della critica p. 41. He does this in the context of his distinction, in semiotic
terms, between the existential substratum of subjective intentionalities in the form of mental
images. Thus, Brandi links again image with the preconceptual schema. Brandi, Teoria
generale della critica pp. 42-3. For us, this is particularly significant for our further adoption of
the concept of culturally significant architecture in Chapter 4, and the possibility of one same
object filling different intentionalities.
245 Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura. p. 127.
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Figure 3-2 Jupiter, after a model attributed to Jean Raon, model about 1670; probably
cast about 1680 - 1700. Getty Images
(http://www.getty.edu/art/collections/images/l/00145001.jpg)
Figure 3-3 Haghia Sophia will always be a byzantine church. Istambul, Turkey.
(http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3061/2739834043_d102d19895_b.jpg)
Another concept related with memory is the one of trace that Brandi
examined in one of the shorter but more significant chapters of Teoria
Generale della Critica. The existentialist thread comes forth but limited by the
nature of the semiotic discussion when he says:
Presence, as the very manifestation of reality at phenomenic level, is also the
point of insertion of the transcendental search of being: here, however, it is
limited in the first place to the presence in that consciousness is so immediate
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and original, as the irreversible moment of temporality in which
consciousness is aware of itself.246
Thus, discussing the twofold manifestation of presence in flagrance and
astanza, he indicates that the distinction between the two is inscribed in
astanza, as an assumption of existence, in the form of a difference; difference
that he assimilates to this notion of trace. In this trace, there is a constant return
to the origins. He mentions that the notion of trace has been investigated by
Heidegger uncovering it in the difference between being and existence.247 The
trace though remains as evidence of origin in the phenomenic level of the
Kantian schema, important for us as a way to trace back cultural practices.
Brandi mentions a trace of a different nature though. “[I]n the body of the work
[of art], traces might remain of the place of its creation, or for which it was
intended, and of the place it is when received anew into consciousness.”248 The
nature of this trace is historical and is constituted by the flagrant evidence of
the passing of time, place of origin, changes of use, and so forth, whilst the
nature of the first kind of trace belongs to astanza.
Memory is also included in concepts that are more complex, as the
schema that we have correlated before to the Greek concept of mimesis. Brandi
may have included ornato in his interpretation of the schema that selects
characteristics of previous models and performs a sort of preconceptual
epoché.249 We can relate this conceptual emergence of previous models with
246 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 81. “Presenza, come il manifestarsi stesso della
realtà a livello fenomenico, è anche il punto d’innesto dell’indagine trascendentale sull’essere:
qui tuttavia, si astringe in primo luogo la presenza in quanto si costituisce alla coscienza in
modo immediato e originario, come momento irreversibile della temporalità in cui la coscienza
prende atto di se stessa.” (Our translation).
247 Ibid. p. 81-2.
248 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 50.
249 The sign keeps traces of the form and the image keeps traces of knowledge. D'Angelo,
Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia p. 88.
125
memory as affection. Architecture manifests in its form a memory of the
original need, in the species of traces to interpret. In the concept of ornato
instead, the relation with memory seems more directly related with cultural
practice.
Architecture for Brandi can have indexes from the past, but not
messages with linguistic validity. If architecture could have a message, then, in
the context of art criticism, Brandi would have suggested a sort of “figurative
history of the image.”250 Within this history by way of critical judgement –
identifying specific ways of giveness – it is possible to find a connection with
traces of cultural forms, other than the intemporal nature of astanza.251
Brandi considered, as part of the critical judgement, not only the
recognition of the work of art but also,
[…] all the procedures that ensure and keep the work without tampering and
without additions, for the culture of the future. Thus even restoration is
critique, even the placement of a work [...] will be exposed to public culture
and thus warranted to the future.252
This contribution to general culture connects individual recognition of
art by just one person with the collective activity of remembering together. The
250 Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell'arte p. 138. Brandi declared, “[i]f the
essence of language lies within communication, the essence of architecture does not emerge
from communication. The house does not communicate to be a house, more than the rose
communicates to be a rose. [...] Any semiotic system draw up a code to send a message, and
architecture does not transmit this message: the information that you can deduce or draw from it
is not the message that should guarantee its semiotic nature.” Cesare Brandi, Struttura e
architettura (Turin: 1975. first edition 1967) p. 37. “Se l’essenza del linguaggio sta nella
comunicazione, l’esenza dell’architettura non si rivela nella comunicazione. La casa non
comunica di essere una casa, più di quanto la rosa comunichi di essere una rosa. [...] Qualsiasi
sistema semiotico elabora un codice per trasmettere un messaggio, e l’architettura questo
messaggio non lo trasmette: le informazioni, che se ne possono dedurre o ricavare, non sono il
messaggio che dovrebbe garantire la sua natura semiotica.” (Our translation). Quoted in
D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia p. 93.
251 Cfr. Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell'arte p. 138.
252 Brandi, Elicona I. Carmine o della pittura p. 164. “tutti i procedimenti che assicurino e
conservino l’opera, senza manomissioni e senza aggiunte, alla cultura del futuro. Quindi anche
il restauro è critica, anche la collocazione di un’opera [...] verrà esposta alla pubblica cultura e
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remembrance is about an artistic figurativeness but indirectly relates to other
indexes that human collective existence contains. Brandi’s theory of restoration
implies this established link. His theory is already suggesting a temporal
intentionality, namely a way of conceiving time – of being conscious about it –
in which the privileged time of the present protects the traces left by the past in
order to transmit them to the future. As we have mentioned before, this
transmission is presupposing the otherness of intersubjective relations. In this
juncture, the leap from individual memory to collective history implies another
dimension for restoration intentionality. Brandi did not contemplate this
possibility of collective intentionalities concerning the recognition of art. In
that sense, the introduction of an historical dimension to restoration links the
individual experience of astanza with the experience of flagrance that can more
easily be shared.
History
In conservation intentionality, memory participates in the personal
temporal involvement with art. When this memory is shared, transmitted, fixed,
codified, archived, institutionalised, and so forth, it becomes objectified in
history. Brandi’s historical instance of restoration can be discerned from his
concept of history, outlined in Teoria Generale della Critica. Brandi seems to
merge the two ways of understanding the philosophy of history, both analytic
and speculative, in one notion. He questions:
[...] does the object [of history] exist outside of the way in which it is studied?
The dichotomy between chronicle and history corresponds to the basic
ambiguity: chronicle as slavish collection of facts in a first agnostic
perciò assicurata al futuro.” (Our translation) . Quoted in Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed
esperienza dell'arte p. 138.
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verbalization; history as a superior investigation on those facts. But, what is
this superiority about? Is it about investigating the facts looking for a causal
sequence or about their disposition for a second intention? Moreover, will it
be possible to maintain this investigation with absolute objectivity, or is this
objectivity an illusion, even constitutionally unreachable? In the same first
verbalization of the chronicle, if only for the selection made, will there not be
an involuntary intromission of the subject?253
Brandi understands history in the twofold manner that portraits two
intentionalities of consciousness. On one hand, history is in the form of
chronicle and corresponds to the perception of the flagrance of reality. On the
other hand, history becomes the interrogation produced by that reality, its
meaning. History in the analytic sense is the record of perceived or as-
perceived facts, correlated with his idea of chronicle; history in the speculative
sense is the attempt to understand reality offering a meta-structural
explanation.254 Therefore, history – as record of flagrance – is the first one and
philosophy of history – as the search for significance – the second one.255
Brandi belonged to the class of thinker sceptical about historic tradition
as source of objective knowledge.256 This condition places him half way
towards postmodern scepticism in which the search for objectivity took him
away from interpretations that considered for history any explanation supported
253 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 7. “[...] essiste l’oggetto [of history] al di fuori del
modo con cui è tratatto? All’ambiguità di base corrisponde la dicotomia fra cronaca e storia:
cronaca come silloge pedissequa di fatti, in una prima agnostica verbalizzazione; storia come
indagine superiore portata su quei fatti. Ma la superiorità in che cosa consisterà: nel indagarli
ricercando una concatenazione causale o nel disporli secondo un fine? E sarà possibile
mantenere a questa indagine una oggetività assoluta, oppure questa oggetività è una illusione,
anzi è costituzionalmente irraggiungibile? Nella stessa prima verbalizzazione cronachistica non
si produrrà all’insaputa dell’estensore, non fosse che per la selezione operata, un intrusione del
soggetto?” (Our translation).
254 M. C. Lemon, Philosophy of history a guide for students, xvi, 461 p. vols. (London:
Routledge, 2003) pp. 282, 84.
255 Cfr. Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 8.
256 We can understand this with Gadamer’s discussion about historicity. He describes how from
the Enlightenment onwards the prejudice started to be attacked and discredited, and with it the
authority of tradition, specially written tradition. Cfr. Gadamer, Truth and method pp. 271-74,
76-7.
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on final causes, ends, theology or teleology.257 Consequently, Brandi
abandoned conceptions of history such as: Vico’s discovery of the master key,
“derived from reinterpreting ancient writings by locating the meaning of the
language they used in terms of the cultures from which they emerged;” Hegel’s
idea that supports historic evolution on the Spirit; or Marx’s history of relations
of production, class struggle and economic determination.258 Brandi conceives
history in a way that seems to anticipate proposals such as the following:
[...] critical historical consciousness is born of an awareness of a gap between
historical events and the language used to represent them [...] Awareness of
the disparity between language and historical reality is the basis of history’s
prime auxiliary discipline, source criticism [...].259
For Brandi, the fact that history as collection of facts could have
manifestation before becoming sign was clear. He noted that Husserl had
distinguished between predicative evidence and ante-predicative evidence. He
stated that the ante-predicative evidence is what he called flagrance: “the
presentific intentionality, opposed to the significant intentionality that is the
semiosis.”260 Consequently, he proposes the analysis of art not in its currents,
schools, influences, authors, etc, but in the peculiar structure of the work of
art.261
257 Munslow proposed an alternative to postmodern attitude to history, which consists in the
self-reflexivity position when doing history. Cfr. Lemon, Philosophy of history a guide for
students pp. 371-5, 85.; Alun Munslow, Deconstructing history, 226 p. vols. (London:
Routledge, 1997). and Alun Munslow and Robert A. Rosenstone, Experiments in rethinking
history, xiii, 245 p. vols. (New York: Routledge, 2004). D’Angelo considers Brandi more anti-
modern than postmodern in relation with architectural criticism; however, we are setting him
half way towards postmodernism by his diffidence regarding modernism. Cfr. D'Angelo,
Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia p. 82.
258 Lemon, Philosophy of history a guide for students p. 129.
259 Reinhart. Koselleck and Todd Samuel. Presner, The practice of conceptual history timing
history, spacing concepts, xiv, 363 p. vols. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002)
p. xiii. From the foreword by Hayden White.
260 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 19. “l’intenzionalità presentificante, contrapposta a
quella significante (meinede) che è la semiosi.” (Our translation).
261 Ibid. p. 21.
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On one hand, history studies the structure of presence, in its two modes
of perceptive fact and signification. History becomes science when it
approaches the perceptive fact in the flagrance of the real, and art criticism
when it approaches the astanza of the work of art. History par excellence has
always privileged the research of signification. According to Brandi, in Croce’s
thought, “the need for semanticising history, refused in the philosophy of
history, is reborn in philosophy as methodological moment of
historiography.”262 Actually, he paraphrases Croce when he says that
restoration would be the methodological moment of the recognition of the work
of art. The analogy that he seemingly suggests is that restoration is the result of
a process of reflection about astanza, as philosophy might be the
methodological moment in which history is approached by understanding,
philosophy as such.
We have seen how Brandi considered matter as the vehicle of astanza
through history. That matter becomes historicised as flagrance, and astanza
instead remains detached from time. Brandi suggests two historicities within
the work of art.
[The] fluctuations [of praise and rejections of works of art] are certainly not
beneath the notice of history; indeed, they are history and history of culture,
when understood as the purposes and ideas involved as viewed in the light of
the current taste and chosen interests. Such history is undeniably legitimate
and undoubtedly useful. For the purposes of reading the form, it can be
valuable field of study, but it will never be history of art. History of art is the
history that addresses – albeit through the chronological succession of artistic
expressions – the extra-chronological moment of the time that is enclosed in
262 Ibid. p. 8. “l’esigenza di una ‘semantizzazione’ della storia, rifiutata nella filosofia della
storia, rinasceva nella ‘filosofia come momento metodologico della storiografia’.” (Our
translation). Cfr. Catalano, "Una definizione che viene da lontano. Avvio allo “smontaggio”
della Teoria del restauro di Cesare Brandi."
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the rhythmic consonance. The history of taste is the history of chronological
time, which gathers the finished and immutable work of art into its flow.263
Thus, the historical instance of restoration is restoration at the limit,
since it only dominates over the aesthetic instance when the aesthetic qualities
of the work of art have almost disappeared, as in the case of ruins. There is in
this juncture an ontological issue, namely the definition of, “when a work of art
ceases to be a work of art and becomes a ruin.”264 What Brandi suggested is
that when the work of art is not manifesting astanza it becomes matter of the
historical instance; restoration then focuses on the preservation of the flagrance
of the ruin and its historical message. Within the historical instance, Brandi
considers the inclusion of the natural environment when it involves an aesthetic
aspiration to form. Moreover, he suggested cultural values established in
relation to the way in which human life establishes a relation with the place, in
a primordial way as essential as the one of art. We mention this weak
suggestion of Brandi in Section 3.4.
Brandi argued that the only legitimate moment for restoration is the
present of recognition. Restoration is fundamentally a form of temporal
intentionality concerning the work of art. For the case of architecture though,
restoration seems needing additional considerations because, artistic or not, it
constitutes the common human place to dwell. Memory and history are bound
together in the matter that constitutes its support, within the work of
architecture as art. Memory is manifested in the concretization of a solution to
the original need, initially recorded and infused within the flagrance of the
form. Moreover, there is also memory in the trace as difference, established
263 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 62.
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between being and existence, and manifested in the astanza of art. However,
Brandi balanced his emphasis on the pre-eminence of the aesthetic instance
with the importance given to matter in the work of art, “recovering a complete
intrinsicalness of matter compressively understood as transmitted memory of
cultural, contextual, social and political values.”265 As observed, for Brandi, the
historicity of the work of art is given only in the moment of its recognition,
when the present of creation and the present of reception merge. The historicity
of the interval between creation and reception instead is a historicity that
concerns only the flagrance of its existential reality.266 This flagrance can be
analytically disengaged from the aesthetic phenomena to conform to the
concept of monument, in which the mnemonic importance is the essential
characteristic not necessarily linked to aesthetic qualities.
3.3 Monuments and Identities
[...] the house has nothing in common with art and is architecture not to be
included among the arts? That is so. Only a very small part of architecture
belongs to art: the tomb and the monument. Everything else that fulfills a
function is to be excluded from the domain of art
Adolf Loos, Architecture, 1910.267
The word monument is usually associated with objects whose main
purpose is to assist social collectiveness to remember. Once personal and
familiar architecture started to focus on broader social aims, architecture to
remember became monument. The simple tomb becomes something that
264 Ibid. p. 66.
265 Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell'arte p. 146. (Our translation).
266 D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia pp. 138-9.
267 Adolf Loos, "Architecture," in Architecture of Adolf Loos, ed. Safran, Yehuda and Wang ,
Wilfried (London: Arts Council, 1987), p. 108.
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aspires to have an artistic form. This aesthetic will is detached from its function
as a reminder for the future. Loos’ quote suggested that artistic quality was not
compatible with constructions with functional performance. This separation of
function in daily life from both aesthetics ambition and remembrance stimulus
is characteristic of the modern approach in conservation. The memorial aim,
however, was assimilated to the scientific historical interest, merging two
things that are distinct. A comprehensive journey of the notion of monument in
Western culture escapes the aims of this thesis. However, previous ideas to
Brandi’s theory illustrate the dissociation of intentionalities that architecture
can fulfil. Some evidence of this is found already within the ideas of Antoine
Chrysostôme Quatremère de Quincy and Alois Riegl, who separated the
architectural object according to different attitudes of valuation.
When the monument becomes of collective interest, if either it is to
facilitate remembrance or as an artistic treasure, it belongs to a manifold larger
than its own. Society attributes significance and recognises common values,
assisting in the development of a sense of identity. This social construction so
obtained in the Western world recognises art as an important element of its
culture. The objective here is not to favour any specific concept of identity,
since it is a debatable field. The intention looks instead to discuss the concept
of restoration as a temporal intentionality in association with a collective sense
of identification based on architecture.
Frozen Sources of Memory and Beauty
Prior to the focus on knowledge or aesthetic delight of the notion of
monuments though, the original meaning for the word monument relates to the
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intentionality of remembering. For our analysis, the focus is on intentionalities
addressed towards monuments after the modern concept of conservation. The
modern idea of monument has precedents that revealed an interest for the
architectural object as such. For instance, Quatremère put a particular emphasis
on the notion of the architectural object as antiquity among other old objects;
the antique needs to have additional qualities.268
The attribution of aesthetic value to antiques is not only understandable
but also evident in the history of conservation; after all, the architectural
monument usually has aesthetic distinctiveness. However, Quatremère in his
definition of ruins unveils a second kind of value that can be endorsed to
architectural monuments:
The ruins of ancient monuments have become the object of special research
and imitation in architecture [...]. One must say, however, that the knowledge
of ancient art, studied in ruins, was initially very incomplete; [...] additional
fields of ruins must be opened for the exploration and comparison that benefit
the history and the theory of art.269
Thus, appreciation for ancient monuments has as stimulus not only the
aesthetic appeal, but also the will of historical and philosophical knowledge.
This interest characterises the modern approach in conservation with an
increasable component of anthropological issues.270
Riegl is a crucial figure within the modern intentionality towards the
notion of monument. He defined that, “[...] a monument is a work of man
erected for the specific purpose of keeping particular human deeds or destinies
(or a complex accumulation thereof) alive and present in the consciousness of
268 Cfr. Antoine Chrysostôme Quatremère de Quincy and Samir Younés, The true, the fictive,
and the real. The historical dictionary of architecture of Quatremere de Quincy (London:
Andreas Papadakis, 1999) p. 62.
269 Ibid. pp. 220-21.
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future generations.”271 These are, as a first category, the deliberate monuments,
since he distinguished between the intended and the unintended monument.272
A second category is the one of the monuments of art and history, considered
as monuments only when their historical value is acquired with time.273 He
contrasted age value against historical value, revealing age value as a
fascination for ruins.274 In contrast with this emotive view, the historical value
“is far more concerned with preserving the most genuine document possible for
future restoration and art historical research.”275 This again suggests an
increasing interest in the monument as a source of knowledge for history.
A characteristic in Riegl’s thought is that he conceives significance as
rooted in consciousness; thus, the commemorative value is not inherent to the
monument but rather assigned.276 However, he underscores that the modern
meaning of the term monument includes two kinds of values: artistic and
historic. This established a significant precedent to Brandi’s aesthetic and
historical instances.277 Nevertheless, Brandi conceived artistic value as being
embedded in historical value. Riegl focused on the materiality of the
monument, and in that sense, his approach is consistent with Brandi’s
270 Chanfón Olmos, Fundamentos teóricos de la restauración pp. 172-9.
271 Price, Talley et al., Historical and philosophical issues in the conservation of cultural
heritage. p. 69.
272 Riegl speaks of gewolte und ungewolte Denkmal, intended and unintended sign for thinking.
273 Jokilehto, A History of Architectural Conservation. pp. 215, 216.
274 Cfr. Price, Talley et al., Historical and philosophical issues in the conservation of cultural
heritage. pp. 73, 74.
275 Ibid. p. 75.
276 Ibid. pp. 70, 71. Cfr. Riegl and Choay, Le culte moderne des monuments. Riegl considered
that the values of the monuments were: the memorial values – age value, historical value and
intended memorial value – and present day values – use value, artistic value, newness value and
relative artistic value. Thus, he related the concept of value with the temporality in which value
has its origin.
277 However, for Riegl the characteristic of being historic is primordial, since everything is
given within the chain of history. Price, Talley et al., Historical and philosophical issues in the
conservation of cultural heritage. pp. 70, 71.
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explanation of the historical instance, where matter has pre-eminence as bearer
of artistic image. Where Brandi’s proposal instead finds differences is in
reference to the artistic value, given that for Riegl the fulfilment of a work of
art is the result of the requirements of the contemporary Kunstwollen that is
changeable from moment to moment.278 Artistic values, Riegl said, cease being
commemorative values and should not be included in the notion of
monument.279 Against Brandi’s idea of art as intemporal, Riegl seemed to
suggest that there are no universal values; artistic values could only be
appreciated according to the present Kunstwollen and so could be considered as
contemporary values only.280
Evidencing the influence of Sartre, for Brandi, the monument would be
the historicised material supporting an artistic image, and not the work of art as
such.281
Any privilege of matter over the human activity that has shaped it cannot be
allowed by means of the historical consciousness [...]. From an historical
point of view [...] the conservation of patina, as conservation of that particular
haziness that the novelty of matter receives through time and is therefore
testimony of time passing is not only desirable but absolutely required.282
278 Ibid. The Kunstwollen, has been correlated with Nietzsche’s will of power or with Bergson’s
concept elan vital (or vital impulse).
279 Ibid. p. 72.
280 Jokilehto, A History of Architectural Conservation. p. 216. Riegl stated that “[a]ll human
will is directed toward a satisfactory shaping of man’s relationship to the world, within and
beyond the individual. The plastic Kunstwollen regulates man’s relationship to the sensibly
perceptible appearance of things. Art expresses the way man wants to see things shaped or
colored, just as the poetic Kunstwollen expresses the way man wants to imagine them. Man is
not only a passive, sensory recipient, but also a desiring, active being who wishes to interpret
the world [...]. The character of this will is contained in what we call the worldview
[...].”Christopher S. Wood, The Vienna School reader politics and art historical method in the
1930s, 485 p. vols. (New York: Zone Books, 2003) pp. 94-5.
281 Cfr. Sartre, The psychology of imagination. For the case of architecture, Brandi exemplifies
with the foundations, but he really should say any material that is part of the structure. Brandi,
Il restauro, teoria e prattica 1939-1986 p. 17.
282 Brandi, Il restauro, teoria e prattica 1939-1986 p. 29. “Un qualsiasi privilegio della materia
sull’attività dell’uomo che l’ha foggiata non può essere ammesso dalla coscienza storica [...].
Dal punto di vista storico [...] la conservazione della patina, come conservazione di quel
particolare offuscamento che la novità della materia riceve attraverso il tempo ed è quindi
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Thus seen, the passage of time leaves a trace that should only be
contended if the artistic image is at risk. Moreover, the first axiom of his theory
of restoration states that, “[o]nly the material of a work of art is restored.”283
However, the case is different for Brandi in the layering effect of additions on
monuments of different ages. He argued that the insertion of the new in the old
has two ways of being approached: as critic conservator and as artist. In the
first case, the monument, as unit or as a complex, is considered other than a
work of art, as part of history; in the second, as a becoming entity, that is
possible to develop and make evolve.284 He stated that the latter case intends to
make history and give new artistic significance to the complex.285 He
privileged the first solution since the monument gives access to the only
instrument of transmission of the original. Therefore, his argument finds its
basis on a temporal intentionality in which the value is located in the past as
past, and not in the present of the constant becoming of architecture.
Paradoxically, and against the existential imprint with which Brandi
considers the work of art, he describes how,
[...] the attitude of looking at the past rather than as source of inspiration as
source of science arose [a]t the same time in which the vital momentum of the
Renaissance finished in the neoclassical mortuary. [...] This end of a
figurative civilization as high as that of the Renaissance [...] with the onset of
testimonianza del tempo trascorso, non solo è auspicabile, ma tassativamente richiesta.” (Our
translation).
283 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 49.
284 In the context of the insertion of the new within the old, Brandi stated that he intended by
monument “any figurative expression, architectural, pictorial, sculptural, and also any
environment which is particularly characterised by individual monuments, although not in
relation to a single age.” There is a shift from restoration of art – with all the features that allow
astanza – to a more comprehensive notion, which includes the concept of environment. Brandi,
Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 35. “qualsiasi espressione figurativa, sia
architettonica, pittorica, scultorea, ed anche qualsiasi complesso ambientale che sia
particolarmente caratterizzato da monumenti singoli, anche se non in relazione ad una sola
epoca.” (Our translation).
285 Cfr. Brandi, Il restauro, teoria e prattica 1939-1986 p. 38.
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a rigorous science of the past that examined sources and verified everything,
brought a radical change in the way we approach a monument. 286
This seems controversial, since he recognised a problem for architecture
as an entity in a constant state of making, but at the same time, he endorsed the
scientific attitude with the view of the architectural monument as an object
within which historicity should be frozen. It is true that he criticised the
emphasis of modern historical science on the attainment of knowledge from the
monument; however, he could not attribute to new architects and artists the
capacity to intervene within architecture, as a legitimate expression of their
own time.287 These issues are further considered in Chapters 5 and 6.
Placing Cultural Practices
The monument in the modern sense does not only support memory,
artistic image and history, but is also a depositary of values that the collectivity
attributes to it. Architecture is a unity formed by a manifold; the idealist model
had already adumbrated this notion, but architecture also belongs to broader
manifolds. When monuments, with all the burden of artistic and historic values,
go beyond the simple condition of valuable objects, they start their
transformation into something else; an identity that enters in the value system
of societies constituting feelings of belonging. We can phenomenologically
define identity as
286 Ibid. p. 39. “Allo stesso momento in cui il vitale slancio dell’arte rinascimentale si esauriva
nell’obitorio neoclassico, sorgeva l’attitudine a guardare al passato non più come fonte di
ispirazione ma di scienza. [...] la coincidenza dell’esurirsi di una civiltà figurativa altissima
come era stata quella del Rinascimento [...] con l’insorgere di una rigorosa scienza del passato
che vagliava le fonti e tutto sottoponeva a verifica, determinò un cambiamento radicale nel
modo di porsi in situazione verso un monumento.” (Our translation).
287 The example about the re-insertion in the religious consciousness of the Pantheon in Rome
as Sancta Maria ad Martyres that Brandi offers is significant in this regard. The, so called by
him, historical consciousness is as out the historical life of the present days. Cfr. Ibid. p. 40.
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An empirical consciousness of a self-same thing that looks ‘all-round’ its
object, and in so doing is continually confirming the unity of its own nature,
essentially and necessarily possesses a manifold system of continuous
patterns of appearances and perspective variations, in and through which all
objective phases of the bodily self-given which appear in perception manifest
themselves perspectively in definite continua.288
We analogically extrapolate this notion to collective intentionalities to
determine how human groups perceive their belonging. We do this as a
phenomenological point of departure and not as a conclusive notion. We
explore this further in Chapter 5. What is relevant here is the consideration of a
collectively constituted identity, which is perceived collectively and
individually. Identity is characterised by the recognition of a human group with
common values that tradition ascribed, for instance, to CSA. This sense of
belonging develops concentrically with other manifold elements in which not
only architecture participates. In that sense, when Brandi insists that a work of
restoration has to be justified to the “universal consciousness,” we can interpret
that he is appealing to the most comprehensive of the human identities, the one
that distinguishes humans from other beings.289
Brandi would have accepted that the artistic image had different
meanings according to the collective identities that recognise it. As evidence of
this, Brandi exemplified the modifications that Bernini made to the Pantheon,
because he did not consider it as a monument closed by historical
consciousness.290 This reveals how the collectivity identified a renewed
manifold with attributes in the species of a Christian temple, and it implies that
288 Husserl, Ideas. General introduction to pure phenomenology p. 131.
289 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 49.
290 Cfr. Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 pp. 40-1.
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Brandi justified the closure of the monument, its scission from the collective
life, on the grounds of historical consciousness.291
We need, then, to distinguish between the significance attributed to the
architectural work of art as support of collective identities, and the manifested
astanza as architectural work of art. While, in the first case architecture
supports collective concretizations, perceived as common values in societies; in
the second, the work of art offers a place to manifest astanza. In general,
Western culture considers artistic appreciation as contained within cultural
identity; however, collective values are not always concurrent with aesthetic
values in architectural works of art.292
Brandi suggested that the predominance of meaningful elements over
expression images is characteristic of cultures that, according to him, have an
unbalanced historical situation.293 Within the meaningful features contained in
the sign, there is what Brandi called symbolic investments.294 Rituals,
commemorations, historical moments, events, and so forth, participate in the
symbolic investments that monuments are bearing. For Brandi, art, in its
evolution, has to be distanced from language. However, it becomes a secondary
instrument of knowledge of social practices revealing a cultural context in the
291 We have already noticed how this modern historic consciousness is result of the
Enlightenment. Brandi considers the historic consciousness regarding monuments a “conquest
merit of the great historicism of the nineteenth century” Ibid. p. 39. “[...] è conquista che si
deve al grande storicismo ottocentesco.” (Our translation).
292 If the monument has meaning it is as an additional ascription as symbol out of its
manifestation of astanza. Cfr. Elio Franzini, "Segno, simbolo e immagine," Aesthetica Preprint
Suplementa, Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare Brandi (2006): p. 26.
293 He says that “[h]owever and wherever the paths of image and sign merged, overlapped or
intersected, this will evidence a deterioration of the civilization’s development of the being of
consciousness and symptom of a historical situation of imbalance.” Brandi, Segno e immagine
p. 15. Quoted in D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia p. 119. “Comunque e
dovunque le vie dell’immagine e del segno si fondano, si acavllino o si intersechino, ciò
costituirà sintomo di una alterazione della civiltà nel suo sviluppo dall’essere della coscienza, e
sintomo di una situazione storica di disequilibrio.” (Our translation).
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form of expression of taste and interests. Brandi denied that this knowledge is
art history, because it is not the history of the pure reality of art with its rhythms
and inherent elements, according with its giveness; it is instead history of
culture.295 Nonetheless, art and its way of being within the cultural context
configure an identity to which human beings feel a belonging.
All the burden of historical knowledge and collective memory is
manifest in the form of cultural identity, which – ideologically instrumentalised
or not – can thus create, reinforce or resist feelings of identity and belonging.296
Brandi protected cultural heritage supported on his theory of restoration. The
appeal to a universal consciousness does not take into account cultural
differences. However, he portrayed an Italian way of seeing art restoration with
a characteristic intentionality, contrasting the inheritance of Italian idealism
with English empiricism.297 Thus, he identified different ways to approach
artistic phenomena as part of cultural identities, revealing that a universal
consciousness is less universal than we may think.
In the zeal of his theoretical grounds, Brandi was reluctant to accept
completely, for instance, unorthodox works of conservation in the name of
cultural identities.298 We mentioned that Brandi suggested a link between art
294 Cfr. Franzini, "Segno, simbolo e immagine," p. 27.
295 Cfr. Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 62.
296 Brandi, for instance implies aesthetic manoeuvres of this ideological kind. Cfr. Brandi, Il
restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 242. Discussing the attempted recovery of the
Imperial Rome during the fascist period, he celebrated that fortunately “Rome had been
stronger than Mussolini.” Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 146.
297 Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 7. Brandi mentions that, for instance,
there is a way of conserving with more affinity with Italian culture than with other trends in
Europe and America in the discourse of the opening of the Regio Istituto Centrale del
Restauro. He emphasised “a completely autonomous and Italian vision of the problem of
restoration.” Cfr. Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 70. “[...] una visione del
tutto autonoma e italiana del problema del restauro.” (Our translation).
298 His comments on the cases of the reconstruction of the Venice’s Campanile, the Athens’
Parthenon and the Stoa of Attalos, the Trani’s Campanile, are but examples of this criticism.
141
and knowledge, without this knowledge being the main aim of the work of art,
which actually should not have practical use. Nevertheless, Brandi does not
discard the way in which art can lead to cultural knowledge and thus to the
reinforcement of determinate identities. What seems evident is that in theory,
Brandi was oriented towards reflection on the intrinsic aspects of art more than
to its connections with larger structures, as in the social and cultural context; at
least not in the implications that his theory had regarding restoration as a
particular operation of conservation intentionalities.
The fact that Brandi was conscious about the existence of cultural
identities – and the relations between these identities and the attitudes towards
the monuments that represented them – is out of the question. What is
significant for us is that in his theory of restoration, the connection between
architectural places – as works of art – and their dwellers, there is a privileged
connection of the restorer as the one who recognises the epiphany of astanza.
Out of the aesthetic or historic ones, values attributed to the monument by
society are not considered. The survival of the architectural work of art seems
to depend on a privilege attributed to the work of art as work of art, and not as
an eventual architecture where people dwell. Feelings of identity acquire
significance not only through historical or aesthetic instances, but also through
collective intentionalities grounded in ways of being in the world. It is also true
that, phenomena such as the, “pictorialization of space and time” and the
musealisation of the contemporary city present challenges to theories of
Cfr. Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986. He implied a strong criticism against the
reconstruction of the Stoa of Attalos financed by the Rockefeller family as an idea “coming
from another world”, referring to the United States in contrast to Greece and Italy. Cfr. Brandi,
Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 170. “[...] questa idea veramente non poteva venire
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conservation.299 However, the possibilities to revaluate, complete and improve
Brandi’s theory of restoration appear open and feasible. Moreover, since his
theory seems phenomenologically pertinent when applied to other figurative
arts, although not without theoretically founded criticisms.300
We have explored the concepts of monument and identity in relation to
conservation of architectural works of art, as defined by Brandi, representing
the connection between an individual relation, human being, CSA and the
collective intentionality that approaches the conservation of that architecture
through time. Not always all the stakeholders understand the activity of
conservation in society in the same way, despite the best intentions to educate
in the fields of art and cultural awareness. Conservation of architecture needs to
justify its actions not only towards universal consciousness, as Brandi
suggested, but also to real human beings that inhabit architecture, even in the
ignorance that it may constitute a work of art. In this context, the words in the
epigram of Loos demand a choice: either we include the dwelling spaces within
conservation intentionality as part of cultural identities or we excise specific
monuments as being out of the social life and as mere objects of study and
contemplation. Society is then impelled to structure notions that allow it to act
regarding the survival of its place to live as a reinforcement of its way of being
in the world. If monuments and identities are the causes of the collective
che da un altro mondo, non dalla Grecia, e per quanti strazi archeologici si siano fatti noi
italiani, neanche dall’Italia.”
299 Cfr. M. Christine. Boyer, The city of collective memory its historical imagery and
architectural entertainments, x, 560 p vols. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994) pp. 19, 192.
300 Kobau, for instance questions whether the recognition of the restorer is really assimilated to
the one of the epiphany of art; or whether the recognition of value does not contain additional
intentionalities such as the economical. Cfr. Pietro Kobau, "Cesare Brandi e i problemi dell’arte
contemporanea," Aesthetica Preprint Suplementa, Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare
Brandi (2006).
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intentionality to conserve, the rise of institutionalised conservation and the
shared idea of cultural heritage are some of its consequences.301
3.4 Conservation and Society
[...] Unesco’s cultural program added to its successful conservation projects for
cultural heritage a new focus on living cultures. [...] emphasis was placed on
the enthusiasm of young people everywhere to create new meanings – their own
cultural heritage, so to speak – so they can adapt to the unprecedented
situations they are destined to live in.
Lourdes Arizpe, Cultural Heritage and Globalization, 2000.302
The long path from an initial concept of monument to the
institutionalisation of conservation of cultural heritage in Western culture has
received many influences. The intention here is to sample milestones to
contrast with Brandi’s specific conservation intentionality, evidencing the shift
from simple maintenance of architecture towards an intentionality characterised
by a critical approach to the monument in the form of theory. Some authors
locate this change since the 17th century with several precedents that announced
the arrival of the modern paradigm.303 The existence of the attitude to conserve
301 Recent trends have shown a more open approach towards monuments and cultural heritage
in the context of the respect for the cultural identity and diversity. Cfr. "Mexico City
Declaration of Cultural Policies," (Mexico City: World Conference on Cultural Policies-
UNESCO, 1982). and "Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity," (Paris: General
Conference-UNESCO, 2001).
302 David Lowenthal, David Throsby et al., "Values and Heritage Conservation. Research
Report," ed. Avrami, Erica and Mason, Randall (Los Angeles: The Getty Conservation
Institute, 2000), p. 35.
303 The precedents of Alberti’s comments about restoration in his book X of his Della
Architettura; Leonardo’s pragmatic emphasis on the merging of the old and the new; Filarete’s
linking the structure of the city to the design of the city; Raphael’s highlighting the importance
of the history of the city and the technical understanding of architecture in order to restore it; or
Serlio’s lamenting about the cosmetic reuse of buildings instead of building new ones, are but
examples of attitudes that anticipated the arrival of modern conservation. Cfr. Gaetana Cantone,
La Citta di marmo, da Alberti a Serlio, La Storia tra progettazione e restauro (Rome: Edizioni
Officina, 1978). Some other authors establish the Capitolato of Pietro Edwards as one of the
first codifications for restoration. Cfr. Chanfón Olmos, Fundamentos teóricos de la
restauración p. 232, Muñoz Viñas, Contemporary theory of conservation p. 2. The salient
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since ancient times is acknowledged; nevertheless, we need to define some
nuances within that genre of intentionalities. The perception of an object is not
the same for someone who is giving maintenance to some building – even a
valuable one – than for someone who is dealing with an artistic architectural
object.
Conservation as collective intentionality assimilates conservation as an
institution within. However, conservation needs to be considered as a social
construction, and therefore there should be a negotiation between traditions,
individual and collective worldviews. Brandi’s theory has found acceptance as
a structure of support in the organization of cultural protection. His influence
has been important in the writing of several charters of conservation, especially
in Italy, and in having an input in what constitutes the present conservation
intentionalities at collective level in the Western world. Despite his insistence
on the individuality of restoration cases, his particular view – emphasising
aesthetics – ran the risk of being misunderstood worldwide without contextual
considerations. Nowadays, and not without debate, pluralistic trends with more
nuanced stress on aesthetic values constitute a positive shift that is welcome
with the present awareness of cultural diversity, assimilating also the
significant contribution of Brandi.
The Conservation-Restoration Dialectic
Phenomenologically, the intentional object that fills conservation
intentionalities has varied historically according to what was expected from the
characteristic of Edwards’ codification is the evolution of the activity of the restorer from one
that completes the work of the artist in favour of one that preserves the artistic object.
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transformation of one state of an architectural object to another. Quatremère,
for instance has distinguished between the actions of restoration and restitution.
He says that,
One restores a dilapidated or partially destroyed work of art, based on the
surviving remains that allow, more or less, the repetition of what is missing;
one restitutes a work or a monument that has entirely disappeared based on
the authority of descriptions, or sometimes based on indications furnished by
other works of the same kind.304
His distinction reveals a different concretization of the original
architectural work of art according to the remaining material. For Brandi’s
theory, in the first case, it would require a restoration done in a recognisable
manner. The reprehensible second case constitutes an instance of the
restoration of fantasy, “the most serious heresy of restoration.”305 For
restoration, Quatremère implied the artistic ability to reproduce the missing
parts of a work of art, even if for architecture he stated that is not so much of a
problem, given its mediated production.306 His idea, then, does not correspond
with the one of Brandi who refuses the idea of the restorer repeating the act of
creation, in other words acting in that past temporality, which does not belong
with the present moment of the restorer.307
Viollet-le-Duc had already stated that the concept and the attitude of
restoration were modern. In his Dictionnaire raisonné, to restore a building is
defined not as to preserve, to repair, or rebuild it but “to re-establish it in a
304 Quatremère de Quincy and Younés, The true, the fictive, and the real. The historical
dictionary of architecture of Quatremere de Quincy p. 217.
305 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration pp. 57, 64.
306 Quatremère de Quincy and Younés, The true, the fictive, and the real. The historical
dictionary of architecture of Quatremere de Quincy p. 219. The lack of what Brandi calls
historical consciousness makes Quatremère consider as ridiculous prejudice the preference to
see ruins than complete buildings. It is possible to observe the arising conflict between
historicist and aesthetic notions, moreover contrasting his suggestions with Brandi’s postulates.
307 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 63.
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complete state that could have not existed at a given time.”308 Therefore, he put
the emphasis on the possibility of the work of restoration being wrong even
based on a serious hypothesis that, however, improved historical studies could
rectify. The intended object sought after restoration differs from the one at
which Brandi’s theory aims for. Viollet-le-Duc trusted in the development of
historic scientific knowledge to rectify possible wrong decisions in the work of
restoration. Brandi was very critical of Viollet-le-Duc’s attempted restorations,
attributing them to the Romantic Gothic revival and the scientific aspirations of
classic archaeology. He sustained that the success of Viollet-le-Duc’s theory
was due to his apparent scientificism and the analogous conception of the
monument with genetic characteristics, obeying the dominant positivism.309
Brandi denounced in these discussions an intentionality that regards science as
the possessor of a true knowledge to restore. Nevertheless, regarding the
objectivity or subjectivity of the restorer’s action, Viollet-le-Duc said that,
“[the architect restorer] is always under the obligation to reconcile his role as a
restorer with his duty as an artist to deal creatively with unforeseen
circumstances and necessities.”310 Moreover, he emphatically stated that, “the
adoption of absolute principles for restoration could quickly lead to the
absurd.”311
308 Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc, Dictionnaire raisonné de l'architecture française du XIe
au XVIe siècle, 10 v vols. (Paris: Bance, 1854). vol. 8, 14-34. “le rétablir dans un état complet
qui peut n’avoir jamais existé a un moment donné.” (Our translation).
309 Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 183.
310 Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc, The Foundations of Architecture. Selections from the
Dictionnaire raisonné (New York: George Braziller). p. 222.
311 Ibid. p. 212. Cfr. Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc and M. F. Hearn, The architectural
theory of Viollet-le-Duc readings and commentary, xvii, 290 p. vols., Selections. English. 1990
([Cambridge, Mass.]: MIT Press, 1990).
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After several controversies, too long to enumerate here, the 20th century
saw the arrival of more mature theoretical models regarding conservation in the
Western world. Nevertheless, Brandi did not see progress in restoration until
the arrival of Camillo Boito, who influenced the Restoration Charter of
1931.312 Italian scholars represented one of the avant-gardes in theoretical
proposals, not only offering advice and proposals, but also explaining the
phenomena of restoration. Figures such as Luca Beltrami, Giacomo Boni, and
Gaetano Moretti, gave contributions to conservation theory under the influence
of previous trends. It was within the theoretical proposals of Gustavo
Giovannoni – who assisted in the edition of the Athens Charter of 1932 – that
the emphasis on a scientific restoration was encouraged, despite his
sometimes-paradoxical opinions regarding several restoration projects.313
Significantly, Brandi wrote his Eliante with the destructions of World
War II in Europe as background. He stated, for instance, through the character
of Diodato, that “[they were] after [an] unfortunate tabula rasa that Europe had
become. And eager of desire to rebuild it more European than ever, they were
waiting, feeling the duty of beginning from ideas.”314 With this burden, that
already revealed consideration of identity, Brandi consolidated the thoughts
about restoration that would constitute his later theory, evolving dialectically
with the practice.315 Despite the influence of Croce on the theory of restoration
312 Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 185.
313 Cfr. Jokilehto, "A history of architectural conservation. The contribution of English, French,
German and Italian thought towards an international approach to the conservation of cultural
property" p. 329-56.
314 Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura p. 118. “ci
troviamo di fronte a questa disgraziata tabula rasa che è divennuta l’Europa, e che ardiamo dal
desiderio di ricostruirla più europea che mai, nell’attesa sentiamo di dovere incominciare dalle
idee.” (Our translation and adaptation).
315 Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 pp. XI-XVIII.
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in Italy, and especially on Argan, Pane, and Bonelli, the influence on Brandi is
more evident on the form than the approach.316 In parallel with his strict
phenomenological aesthetic considerations regarding architecture, Brandi
expressed timid approaches towards a more inclusive notion of conservation,
considering the environment as a larger element within the manifold of the
object to restore.317 However, he did not consolidate his theory on the
consideration of architecture – before being that object of aesthetic delight and
source of historical knowledge – as the legitimate human place to live.
Moreover, referring in his writings to existentialist philosophers such as Sartre
or Heidegger, one would expect some concern regarding the merging of
architecture, the city and human dwelling.
As it is evidenced in the exploration of Chapter 5, recently, the receptor
has started to be considered the fulcrum of conservation; and the restorer “an
operator intended as hermeneut and as mediator of an exegesis for a wider
public.”318 Brandi’s methodological moment has bonded historiographical
methods and philosophy of history. The aesthetic conception would command
the intervention and it is to it that the work will refer. Therefore, the
intervention can be creative, but it must respect the work and respect itself, the
philological process, the composition and avoid simulations.319 Brandi
considered some analogous creative and hermeneutic involvements of the
restorer, such as the consideration of exhibition of the works of art, or the role
316 Jokilehto, "A history of architectural conservation. The contribution of English, French,
German and Italian thought towards an international approach to the conservation of cultural
property" pp. 412-3.
317 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 67.
318 Paolo Fancelli, Il restauro dei monumenti (Fiesole: Nardini, 1998). p. 169. (Our translation).
319 Ibid. pp. 169-176.
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of the conservation of frames in paintings.320 However, more crucially, it has
been questioned whether it is possible to restore values, and if it is possible to
conceive separately values and meaning from the work that bares them.321 All
these recent debates reveal a shift concerning the object to fill conservation
intentionalities. When human beings have consciousness of architectural
theories of conservation, the content of that activity becomes focused with
more emphasis on the human being than on the work of art. We endorse this
change in the values of cultural heritage; however, it does imply some risks as
well, since theory can be relativized, hindering its capacity to assist in the
interpretation of the human place to live.
Cultural Heritage
Brandi was always very aware of the significance in society of
conserving the cultural heritage as testimony of human history.322 The
importance of his participation within institutions such as the Instituto Centrale
del Restauro and his academic activities prove his preoccupation with the
protection of the cultural heritage. What is less evident is the inclusion of the
human existential dimension within the context of architectural conservation.
In this context, he distinguished between the notion of monument as a work of
art and a monumental complex. The first is grounded on the whole of his
aesthetical theory, whilst the second seems sometimes vaguely defined as a
work of art, but understood more as an environment with values anchored to
the culture of the place. Discussing the insertion of the new in the old Brandi
320 Cfr. Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration.
321 Fancelli, Il restauro dei monumenti. pp. 202-205.
322 Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 14.
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incorporates a sense of culture as the way in which society dwells in a place.
He suggests,
Do make new monuments, but retain those ancient in the way the genuine
historical tradition has handed them to us: and this is not the imperative of
conservators, but the imperative that is both respectful of the autonomy of our
time and of the historical tradition to which we owe being what we are.323
Thus, on one hand Brandi considered the aesthetic dimension of
architecture, according to his theory, in order to restore it as a work of art; let us
recall that he links restoration to a concept of the work of art. On the other
hand, when he considered architecture as a complex where human society
develops its life, although somewhat vaguely, he took a more comprehensive
standpoint, where issues of tradition and identity were significant factors. The
emphasis on the analogous treatment of the image of the city to a work of art is
characteristic of his theory. The presence of human life is bracketed out from
his architectural conservation intentionality.
The sense of historicity, romantic nostalgia, the qualities of past
achievements and the supposed lessons from the past, and the shock by the
destruction of monuments and works of art, have been mentioned as motives
for interest in heritage. Accordingly, the western Weltanschauung, a
worldview, proposes a new approach to the past propitiated by new concepts of
historicity and aesthetics, and relations with culture, religion, nature and
environment renewing the concept of time and values.324 The question seems to
be whether the concept of conservation is even dated and its problem should be
integrated within environmental sustainability awareness from a global cultural
323 Ibid. p. 42. “Si facciano monumenti nuovi, ma si conservino quelli antichi come la
tradizione storica genuina ce li ha tramandati: ed è questo non già l’imperativo dei conservatori,
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and ecological view.325 Although this perspective seems a move toward the
consciousness of the totality of the human place to live, the architectural place
comprises specific features that need reflection when being approached with
temporal intentionality. From this perspective, Brandi has been often depicted
as elitist and a long way removed from considering the historical fabric and
minor expressions of culture as part of the restoration endeavour.
Consistent with his view, Brandi approached conservation as a
contributor within the cultural system of institutions, such as museums,
research institutes, and governmental organisations, in a concerted activity.326
This culture of critical and scientific activity found its bases in an historical and
artistic consciousness, in which the role of education was fundamental with, for
instance, the diffusion of his theory of restoration as part of the courses within
the Istituto Centrale del Restauro, guaranteeing the formation of a discipline
that constituted a tradition to follow. In the Italian context, this offered a
precedent that was later followed by other universities and institutions.
Nowadays two main trends in Italian conservation philosophies have been
identified: the first called pure conservation and the second called restoration.
They present two contrasting views in which the former seems to include the
change as part of its approach, respecting the old consolidation without
ma l’imperativo che è rispettoso tanto dell’autonomia del nostro tempo quanto della tradizione
storica a cui dobbiamo d’essere quello che siamo.” (Our translation).
324 Jokilehto, A History of Architectural Conservation. p. 6.
325 Ibid. p. 19.
326 Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 15.
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intervening and incorporating contemporary elements that collaborate with the
new functions and life of the buildings.327
As an occurrence of misunderstanding of conservation intentionality, it
has been argued that in contemporary approaches, “[i]t is the subjects who are
served through conservation” and that,
[t]he authority that people have on heritage objects therefore derives from,
and is proportional to, two closely related factors: their contribution to the
overall significance of the object and their being affected by the object’s
alteration.328
Although suggesting that, “contemporary theory stresses that artistic
merit, style colour, shape, material, etc. are the meaning-bearing features; they
are valued for what they mean to people, not for their relation to truth,” the
confusion, we suggest, is located in the relation between collective meaning
and truth. While the concept of meaning for people is an existential subjective
reality, the flagrance, to say it in Brandian terms, of the scientific truth is an
objective, historical fact.
The present state of the consciousness about cultural heritage reveals
paradoxes in the encounter of new and old and of restoration as hermeneutics.
This is shown not only in the phenomenon of simple architectural forms, but
also in the significance of architecture as a cultural fact. It has been observed
that,
[...] if the traditional hermeneutics that sought to account for the mediative
structure passed, not accidentally, into history at the same time as Rhetoric,
we presently find ourselves caught up in the infinite relations of the demands
of praxis and their possible outcomes. We give the impression of being
disinclined or unable to either appropriately renew the tradition or to
327 Cfr. Elena Charola and Fernando Henriques, "Jukka Jokilehto, a history of architectural
conservation," Journal of the American Institute for Conservation 40, no. 2 (2001).
328 Muñoz Viñas, Contemporary theory of conservation pp. 158, 61.
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reformulate our situation in terms equivalent to, or better than, those which
we have abandoned.329
The dialectic between tradition and innovation unavoidably traps
cultural heritage between stasis and movement, permanence and change, past
and future. Nowadays, newness in the architectural place creates a state of
expectation that promises fundamental change but ends being only stylistic
variation, instead of a demonstration of the significance of renewing.330 When,
exceptionally, the manifestation of newness is authentic, it constitutes an
opening to a hermeneutic operation through architecture, becoming the
interface between different stages of space and time.331 The consideration of
the architectural place seems existentially pertinent in view of the globalised
but diverse world. The collective agreement towards a renewed temporal
intentionality is necessary. Conservation and assimilation are revealed as
dialectical forces that oscillate in society. To negotiate the how and the when
presupposes the previous understanding of the what, that is no longer an
epistemological exploration but an ontological proposal.
Conclusions
Conservation is a temporal intentionality. Art was for Brandi the
fundamental category of his approach to conservation and therefore the peak of
culture. He privileged it from two main points of view: the aesthetical and the
historic. The consideration to astanza granted this privilege to art of being the
superior form of human creation. The existentialist influence seems to play an
329 Peter Carl, "Renovatio and the Howling Void. The Matteson Library," in Delayed space
work of Homa Fardjada and Mohsen Mostafavi., ed. Fardjada, Homa. and Mostafavi, Mohsen.
(New York, N. Y.: Princeton Architectural Press, 1994), p. 19.
330 Ibid., p. 21.
331 Ibid.
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important role in his more evolved aesthetic thought. However, his theory does
not propose paths of interpretation other than criticism and restoration, as
distinct from that privileged epiphany of art. Architecture, other than being art,
should be the human place to live that demands additional paths of
interpretation. Brandi already had implied a moral dimension for restoration.
This suggests that other dimensions of the understanding of architecture would
be possible, merging the factual reality with the intemporal presence of
astanza. Conservation intentionality, as analysed here, merges these two
attitudes: the temporal and intemporal. For conservation in Brandi’s thought,
memory as temporal intentionality is supported through the object to restore.
Architecture keeps the record and the traces of past human ways to live,
evidenced in the form and charged of meaning in both astanza and flagrance,
although in a different sense. However, the centre of gravity of his temporal
intentionality is situated in the present, to where the rest of the worldview
confluences. If cultural memory is relevant, it is so because of the permanence
of matter. Matter is for Brandi the vehicle of memory, constituting not only the
artistic, but also the historical and cultural, monuments. Architectural
monuments, then, are valuable not only as works of art but also as portraits of
ways to be, to see, and to imagine the world. This mimetic dimension of the
monument finds relevance in the historical transmission of culture in two ways:
in the flagrance of reality and in the astanza of art. The monument thus is the
link between an individual perception of particular architectural experiences
and the summation of collective intentionalities that constitutes cultural
identities. Architecture as cultural monument finds a problematic juncture,
though. Either, it is considered as an object with exclusive aesthetic, historic
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and significant values, isolated from real life by a musealisation or it enters in
the dynamic of the human dwelling in the dialectic of stasis and assimilation.
The social institutions that protect monuments need to balance the views of the
stakeholders. Architectural place as cultural heritage would thus need to be
approached as a separable object of analysis for history, art history and the
social sciences, or be assimilated within the flux of the collective life. The
organisations that deal at international level with the protection of cultural
heritage have started to shift towards wider understanding of the significance of
this heritage for those most involved.
Although the aesthetic dimension is fundamental for architecture, for
the focus of this thesis, architecture needs to be situated with these reflections,
considering better its conflation as cultural heritage and as the architectural
place to live. This opens possible interpretations of conservation
intentionalities – restoration in the particular case of Brandi – as ways to situate
human existence within a place that evolves in time. Brandi’s view of
conservation implied a way to see the world as coming from the past, with
significance in the present and potential evolutions towards the future.
Nowadays, the varieties of conservation depend on the intentionalities with
which architecture as the place to live is approached. Society has options to
consider it as an object to protect separated from daily life, or as the meaningful
place that evolves along with time. The significance of the consequences of
such a hermeneutical endeavour demands, even if only as point of departure, an
ontological outline that considers the architectural phenomena in its constant
becoming. We proceed now to that attempt.
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Chapter 4: Ontology of Culturally Significant
Architecture: A Manifold Way of Being
“Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.”
Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit 1927.332
Jean Nouvel has said, “I would not only die for architecture, I would kill
for it.”333 This may seem exaggerated but, the concretizations that architecture
produces as embodied values can lead to actions that would be unthinkable
justified only by its physical nature. If architecture arouses emotions, it is not
only because of its aesthetic form, but because it embodies other cultural
representations; it symbolises taking the place of something else. The
concretizations of architecture vary with human attitudes. In the encounter with
architecture, humans can be naïf believers or sophisticated critics; members of
a sharing community or alien explorers; everyday dwellers or architectural
scholars.
After the epistemological examination of Brandi’s theories of art and
architectural restoration, we shift into a phenomenological ontology following
the method and terminology of Ingarden to understand these phenomena. This
chapter then explores a second layer of analysis, that is to say the one
constituted by CSA. In this context, the theories of Ingarden, in his Ontology of
the Work of Art; and the structure of being in his phenomenological ontology of
Time and Modes of Being, are illuminating to the scope of the ontological
332 Martin Heidegger, Being and time, trans. Macquarrie, John and Robinson, Edward, 589 p.
vols., Sein und Zeit. English (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967) p. 60.
333 Quoted in Martin Pawley, Terminal architecture, 223 p. vols. (London: Reaktion, 1998) p.
145.
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assembly of this notion.334Consequently, a correlation between the
architectural work of art and CSA is herewith proposed, with some discernment
to modes and moments of being regarding the latter. This chapter suggests that
CSA can be considered as a manifold of moments that does not always
correspond necessarily to aesthetic architecture or its recognition as a work of
art, as it is discussed subsequently.
Ingarden studied mathematics and philosophy, and later for some time
under Husserl in Göttingen, becoming his friend. Although one of Husserl’s
best disciples, he could not agree with the turn towards transcendental idealism,
against which he concentrated all his studies trying to demonstrate that error.335
He worked lecturing philosophy in Lvóv in Poland where he secretly taught
during the World War II. He moved to the Jagellonian University in Kraków
after the war where he was banned from teaching during the Stalinisation,
paradoxically due to his supposed empathy with idealist philosophy.
Reappointed in 1957 he published his most celebrated works on aesthetics. His
theories – the lack of diffusion of which is mainly due to language barriers and
a discontinuity during the cold war period – have significant influence on
contemporary literary studies.336 They remain as a “middle path between the
reductive physicalist realisms popular among analytic philosophers, and the
transcendental idealism adopted by Husserl, rejecting the simplistic bifurcation
334 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film, Roman Ingarden, Time and modes of being (Springfield, Illinois: Thomas, 1964).
335 Max Rieser, "Roman Ingarden and His Time," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Vol. 29, no. 4 (1971): p. 444.
336 His importance has been more recognised lately in the context of aesthetic ontological
theories than during his life. Cfr. Ingvar Johansson, "Roman Ingarden and the Problem of
Universals" (paper presented at the Logic, Ontology, Aesthetics. The Golden Age of Polish
Philosophy, Montreal, September 23-26 2004), p. 1. Cfr. also, Amie L. Thomasson, Roman
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between entities that are mind-independent and those that are merely
subjective,’” offering a more diverse variety of ontological structures to explain
different entities such as architecture.337
The terminology of culturally significant has been chosen for being
more neutral in character than historic. A definition that privileges the
historical character could mislead towards features of positive science,
objectivism, or historicist standpoints. Historicity in architecture can become
problematic if analysed in terms of existential ontology because of the need to
objectify memory that history apparently already covers. History as notion has
necessary links with the past, but can also be considered inauthentic depending
on its distance to the present. Therefore, the description culturally significant
connects the object more with its contemporaries and the values that society
assigns to it. This does not necessarily mean that conservation cannot be
misled; however, when it is misled, a false condition arises responding more to
the hitherto society than to its historical origins. Moreover, cultural
significance is also an accepted concept in conservation, well defined by the
Burra Charter as a flexible notion.338 It identifies cultural phenomena with the
present community and the values found in architecture.
Ingarden (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008 [cited 19 July 2008]); available
from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2008/entries/ingarden/.
337 Rieser, "Roman Ingarden and His Time," p. 446.
338 http://www.icomos.org/australia/burra.html. “Cultural significance means aesthetic, historic,
scientific, social or spiritual value for past, present or future generations. Cultural significance
is embodied in the place itself, its fabric, setting, use, associations, meanings, records, related
places and related objects. Places may have a range of values for different individuals or
groups. The term cultural significance is synonymous with heritage significance and cultural
heritage value. Cultural significance may change as a result of the continuing history of the
place. Understanding of cultural significance may change as a result of new information.” Cfr.
Lowenthal, Throsby et al., "Values and Heritage Conservation. Research Report," pp. 7-10.
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Section 4.1 “Primordial Modes of Being” explains how the model of
Ingarden has been adapted in order to undertake an ontological outline of CSA.
It explains the conditions of possibility of being as phenomenologically
deduced, not as an empirical fact. Thus, some basic forms of being are
delineated within the possible modes of being deduced by Ingarden. With this
first approach, architecture starts to be considered in two ways of being: the
event and the process. These two ways evidence certain features that have been
problematized by conservation.
Since these previous modes of being suggest some limited ontological
landscape for architecture to exist, the third way of being – the object enduring
in time – proposed by Ingarden is considered. Thus, section 4.2 “The
Architectural Object” explores the ontological structure and the main
phenomenological features that CSA as an intentional object might reveal.
Since the possible concretizations of architecture are more varied in this way of
being, the issues of an identity and a core for CSA emerge.
Section 4.3 “To Be or Not to Be Architecture” explores some pertinent
similarities and differences between the work of art, architecture as art, and
CSA, according to the proposed ontological structure. This phenomenological
assessment concludes with an ontological epoché that seizes essential
characteristics of CSA, which stimulate a wide variety of concretizations in the
form of collective values.
Based in phenomenological analysis, section 4.4 “Architecture as
Noema” approaches the illustration of the formal structures that CSA presents
as phenomenon. The manifestation of architecture as a whole integrated by
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parts and moments; the possibility of having a constant identity grasped in
manifold appearances; and the possibility of being present and absent from the
perception of the subject, reveal CSA as an object with multifarious
possibilities. CSA’s variable and flexible essence – founded in collective
intentionalities – poses significant challenges for temporal attitudes that
concern it.
4.1 Primordial Modes of Being
Being or a mode of being is always the existence or the mode of existence of
something, never something separate in itself. The ‘idea of existence,’
therefore, or the ‘idea of a certain mode of being’ likewise cannot be
understood to mean that only a single element appears in the contents of these
ideas, namely, ‘existence’ (or ‘mode of existence’). There is only the idea of the
existence of something (in one way or another) – in particular, the idea of
something really existing.
Roman Ingarden, The Controversy over the Existence of the World, 1946.339
Recent debates about the ontology of art continue with the challenging
task of finding a definition that conveys its identity, whilst some scholars argue
the impossibility of such an endeavour.340 Moreover, in our post-ontological
age, things are defined by highly developed and complex theories reaching a
peak in proposals where reality is epistemologically described in terms of
differences and not of identities.341 However, for two methodological reasons
we have selected the ontology of the work of art suggested by Ingarden as our
point of departure. The first is that Ingarden followed the Husserlian
phenomenology to support and deduce his proposal, which is attuned with
339 Ingarden, Time and modes of being p. 26.
340 For instance, cfr. Amie L. Thomasson, "Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are We
Doing Here?," Philosophy Compass 1/3 (2006).
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Brandi’s theories, and that we further contrast with existential phenomenology
in our hermeneutical approach in Chapter 6.342 The second is that Ingarden
offered within his theory a complete proposal for architecture as a work of art,
something that is rarely found in more recent ontological research about
architecture.
According to the categories of Ingarden, CSA could belong to two
modes of being: that of real entities and that of intentional objects in the social-
cultural strand. The analysis has to start with the argument of establishing what
kind of object conservation is protecting. Some existential moments – moments
of dependence – are established for architecture in this context. The problem
embraced here is to define ontological characteristics of the architectural object
and the assimilation of its transformations in society. This definition needs to
be constructed bearing in mind that CSA is a special case within architecture in
general, since we deal with structures whose values have been collectively
celebrated. While it can be argued that all architecture is in some way
assimilation of new into the existent, this process is all the more apparent when
the threat to the socially established cultural environment seems immediate.
Adapting Ingarden’s Existential-Ontological Model
Ingarden deduced his aesthetic theory in an attempt to understand “the
structure and the mode of being of works of art as determinately constituted,
341 An interesting description of some of these options for analysis is offered in Niels Lehmann,
"On Different Uses of Difference. Post-ontological Thought in Derrida, Deleuze, Luhmann, and
Rorty," Cybernetics And Human Knowing 11, no. 3 (2004).
342 In fact, Ingarden declares that what he calls “existential-ontological research [...] does not
have anything in common with M. Heidegger’s ‘existential philosophy’ [and] have nothing in
common with French ‘Existentialism,’ with which I was to become acquainted only after I had
written this book.” Ingarden, Time and modes of being p. 22. We have not found evidence of
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purely intentional objectivities.”343 We use the method of Ingarden as point of
departure to suggest an ontology of CSA, taking his existential-ontological
considerations as the conditions of possibility of existence of architecture in its
different possible modes of being. Ingarden states that there are three groups of
ontological questions: existential, formal and material.344 He assumes among
the mental experiments the phenomenological epoché, as a way to explore the
ontological modes of being and moments of existence. Consequently, he
establishes the following:
Whenever we deal with objects that exist in one way or another, we have to
deal also with their existence. [...] Yet existence is not something separate
from an existing object. When I deal with an object, by that fact its existence
is within the frame of my experience. Therefore, in order to realize clearly
what the mode of being of an object is (existing in one way or another), it
would seem sufficient simply to intend it carefully. [...] An existing object can
never be given to us in experience without its mode of being, nor a mode of
being without a corresponding existing object.345
In order to do this epoché, he establishes the concepts of modes of being
(modus existentiae) and moments of existence (momentum existentiale). The
way he presents the difference between them is determined by the nature of the
abstraction and separability from the object. He assumes that “every object can
exist in only one mode, and [...] everything whatever which can be
distinguished in it exists in the same mode as it does.”346 This means that,
modes of being contain existential moments within and existential moments are
only manifested through modes of being. Several moments of existence can
Brandi being acquainted of Ingarden’s philosophical writings although the consonance between
their notions.
343 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film p. x. Although, he did this in order to unravel the problem of realism vs. idealism. We
share his conviction that ontology needs to be considered in order to investigate the attribution
of values to – in our case – architectural objects.
344 Ingarden, Time and modes of being p. 22.
345 Ibid. pp. 32-3.
346 Ibid. p. 37. (Emphasis in the original).
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share a unique mode of being; however, a mode of being of an object is
exclusive from any other mode for that object.
Ingarden then proceeded to distinguish and describe pairs of opposite
existential moments: Autonomy vs. Heteronomy; Originality vs. Derivation;
Separateness vs. Inseparateness; and Self-Dependence vs. Contingency.347 He
deduces that these moments do not imply that they can really be given in real
existence, since he considers this a metaphysical question, but only that they
are ontologically feasible.348 The same can be said of the concepts of being
absolute and being relative.349 We cannot possibly describe all the feasible
oppositions of moments of existence Ingarden deduces; however, we can start
mapping within this ontology the possible location of architecture. He
establishes the categories of moments of existence that are not self-exclusive as
the base of analysis, before going into the argument of being in time. (Figure
4-1).
347 Ibid. pp. 43, 52, 82, 89.
348 Ibid. p. 93.
349 Ibid. p. 92.
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A. Absolute Being
I
Autonomy
Originality
Separateness
Self-dependence
B. Relative Being
III
Autonomy
Originality
Inseparateness
II
Autonomy
Derivation
Separateness
Self-dependence
IV
Autonomy
Originality
Separateness
Contingency
V
Autonomy
Derivation
Separateness
Contingency
VI
Autonomy
Derivation
Inseparateness
VII
Heteronomy
Derivation
Separateness
Contingency
VIII
Heteronomy
Derivation
Inseparateness
Existential
possibilities
for
architecture
Figure 4-1 Admissible concepts of being and their moments of existence according to
Ingarden and the suggested location of architecture within the ontological system. (Table
adapted from, Ingarden, Time and Modes of Being p. 93.) 350
The preliminary proposed location of architecture is deduced according
to the possibilities of considering it as an autonomous or heteronomous entity;
always derivative; either separated or inseparate; and either self-dependent or
contingent. It is worth noticing that we suggest this situation before the
disentangling of the manifold that can constitute architecture and the
consideration of the significant deductions of Ingarden with reference to the
work of art and other cultural objects.351 Once a basic ontological situation of
architecture is preliminary mapped, the dimension of time needs to give more
precision to the possibilities of a being that is in or out of time.
350 Ibid. p. 93.
351 Cfr. Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural
work, the film.
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Architecture as Event
Because the existence of the real world is ontologically related with
time, Ingarden develops his analysis with preliminary clarifications about the
kind of time he is discussing. He defines this time as concrete, in opposition to
both abstract time – as mathematically or physically deduced – and ordinary
time. To him “[c]oncrete time is likewise filled time [...] [t]hat is, concrete time
is filled with what happens, takes effect, or endures in it.”352 This notion is
correlated with the one of Objective time in Husserlian sense, that is to say not
sensed temporal datum but perceived temporal datum.353 To define the
existence of a thing, Ingarden needs to relate the abstraction of the modes of
being and their moments of existence with time. Although this could seem
abstract at this point, the relevance of locating architecture within Ingarden’s
system is that a coherent ontology should emerge in order to qualify different
apprehensions of architecture – as memory, object, or project of architecture, or
the combination of more than one of these instances – in consciousness.
Thus, we categorise architecture according to its existential relation
with time and its determination on it. Ingarden’s first division is between
objects that are determined in time and extra-temporal objects.354 He proposes
three kinds of beings in time that we consider for architecture according to the
determination of time: events, processes and objects enduring in time. For the
mode of being of events, he defines that,
The occurrence of something, its coming into being, the actualization of a
certain state of affairs: this is what constitutes an event. [...] according to one
352 Ingarden, Time and modes of being pp. 100-1.
353 Cfr. Husserl, The Phenomenology of internal time-consciousness pp. 21-7.
354 Ingarden, Time and modes of being pp. 99-101.
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experience of time, everything that exists temporally is limited to only one
‘now,’ conceived as nondimensional, and beyond which there are, as it were,
two abysses of absolute nonbeing. According to [a] second experience,
however, the past exists in its own way, as does the future. Time is not a force
that destroys being.355
Consequently, intending architecture as event implies its perception in
consciousness as a state of affairs. This perception of architecture is the now of
its experience. Time for this kind of existence of architecture is not significant
since events by definition cannot endure.
This architectural apprehension is, for example, the one to be conserved
following the principles paradigmatically attributed to Viollet-le-Duc.356 He
stated that to restore a building is “to re-establish it in a complete state that
could have never existed at a given moment.”357 The instantaneous image that
the conservator pursues is conceived as a privileged instant. Brandi attributes
many mistaken restorations to Viollet-le-Duc and to conservators that followed
the approach of restoring by fantasy or by reperfecting.358 Brandi blames as
aberrant the Romantic trend that took other figurative traditions but “was not a
new way to relive and shape it in an autonomous figurative culture, but to
synchronise it with a chosen and prefigured age, or put it in a second-hand
figurative culture, as [...] was the case of the architecture of the nineteenth
355 Ibid. pp. 102, 4. (Emphasis in the original).
356 We say the criticism to Viollet-le-Duc is paradigmatical despite he said that “[...] there is as
much danger in restoring a structure simply by reproducing an exact facsimile of everything
found in as there is in substituting later forms for those originally existing in the structure.”
Viollet-le-Duc, The Foundations of Architecture. Selections from the Dictionnaire raisonné p.
197.
357 Viollet-le-Duc, Dictionnaire raisonné de l'architecture française du XIe au XVIe siècle. vol.
8, 14-34. “[l]e rétablir dans un état complet qui peut n’avoir jamais existé a un moment donné.”
(Our translation and emphasis).
358 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 64. Restoration by reperfecting is the
translation of the Italian ripristino used in the English version.
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century.”359 (Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3 illustrate how the image intended by
Viollet-le-Duc in his project resulted in a state presented as event).
Figure 4-2 Narbonne Gate, Carcassone, France, Viollet-le-Duc. Project.
(http://www.carcassonne.culture.fr/en/rt403.htm)
359 Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 41. “[...] non era un modo nuovo di
riviverli e plasmarli in una cultura figurativa autonoma, ma o di sincronizzarli ad’una epoca
prescelta e prefigurata, o di inserirli in una cultura figurativa d’accatto, come [...] fu d’accatto
tutta l’architettura dell’Ottocento.” (Our translation and emphasis) Brandi even calls Viollet-le-
Duc’s trend as a “miserable theory” that looked after the first conformation of the monument.
Cfr. Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 pp. 183-4.
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Figure 4-3 Narbonne Gate, Carcassone, France. After restoration by Viollet-le-Duc.
(http://flickr.com/photos/edmonton15/442613825/sizes/o/)
The noematic content of this perception of architecture is as frozen in
time under the illusion of constant and timeless sameness. The fascination with
this kind of image is significant because of the relation between aesthetic image
and memory.360 A conservator with this approach can concretize an
architectural object, which is absent but whose concretization reveals formal
characteristics of the object to receive conservation action. Ingarden says that
this mode of being presupposes the existence of a world to whose history the
event belongs. This world persists longer than the event itself and it is where
events happen – connected with processes, with objects and between them –
enduring in time only “through their after-effects.”361 Therefore, the event
survives only as memory.
Architecture as Process
Ingarden establishes the mode of being of processes, distinguishing
within it a manifold of phases and an object that is subject to that process; both
the manifold and the object are two sides of the same entity.362
The general constituent property of a process as an object is that it is a
temporally extensive aggregate of phases. This means that (1) phase after
phase, from the initial one to the final one, takes place in continually new
periods of time, and (2) the aggregation of phases constantly increases until
the process comes to an end, and in its essence – in contrast with an event –
cannot be contained in one instant, in one ‘now’. [...] every determinate
process being constituted in the succession of phases as a subject of properties
360 Ricoeur has already stated that the paradigm of the noema of memory is the memory-event.
“Things and people do not simply appear, they reappear as being the same, and it is in
accordance with this sameness of reappearing that we remember them.” Ricoeur, Memory,
history, forgetting p. 23.
361 Ingarden, Time and modes of being p. 104.
362 Ibid. p. 107.
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has this property essential to it, that the phases of which it is composed are
continuously transient.363
As examples of processes, Ingarden mentions movements of bodies,
developments of organisms, lives of people, or all acts and activities.364 The
characterisation of this mode of being for architecture is the succession of
phases. This implies the consideration, at least theoretically, of an origin and an
end of architecture. These phases that increase until they reach an end, even if
distinguishable, are not necessarily discrete entities. They constitute a
continuum where an independent image of architecture is not distinguished in
architecture’s actuality. This mode of being of architecture is for instance the
one in the stereotyped view attributed to John Ruskin’s intentionality, where
the building’s ruin is expected to dissolve someday into nature. For this
apprehension, Ruskin attacks the notion of restoration.
You may make a model of a building as you may of a corpse, and your model
may have the shell of the old walls within it as your cast might have the
skeleton [...]: but the old building is destroyed [...] Take proper care of your
monuments, and you will not need to restore them. [...] Watch an old building
with an anxious care; [...] better a crutch than a lost limb; and do this tenderly,
and reverently, and continually, and many a generation will still be born and
pass away beneath its shadow. Its evil day must come at last; but let it come
declaredly and openly, and let no dishonouring and false substitute deprive it
of the funeral offices of memory.365
Architecture is thus a being in evolution: originated in the project, as in
drawings, then developed in its building process, its finishing, its conservation,
alteration, and eventual destruction. Ruskin criticised the picturesque taste for
ruins and decay, similar to Riegl’s old value.366 Once the building is in decay or
destroyed, there is no much else to do in order to gain a renewed life for it – “as
363 Ibid. pp. 107-9. (Emphasis in the original).
364 Ibid. p. 107.
365 John Ruskin and Inc. ebrary, The Seven lamps of architecture, 303 p. vols. (London:
Electric Book Co., 2001) pp. 254-5. (Our emphasis).
366 Ibid. p. 245.
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impossible as to raise the dead” – but delaying and waiting for its final
dissolution.367
The noematic content of this architectural perception can be varied and
changeable. It maintains an identity experiencing the passing of time, from the
beginning to an end, even when transformed from a piece of paper, to technical
drawings, construction site, building in use, or ruin; a building, like for instance
the ruined seminary of St. Peter College in Cardross, which can be considered
the same process.368 (Figure 4-4, Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 illustrate different
phases of this architectural process).
Figure 4-4 St. Peter College, Cardross, UK, Gillespie, Kidd and Coia. (Drawing of the
project phase)
367 Ibid. p. 252.
368 St Peter's College, Cardross, Dunbartonshire, UK. Although credited to the firm Gillespie,
Kidd and Coia, the project was leaded by architects Isi Metzstein and Andy Macmillan. Date of
completion: 1966. It was closed as seminary in 1980, later it was used as drug rehabilitation
centre from 1983 until building finally abandoned in 1987, now derelict. Kilmahew House
(John Burnet 1865-8) around which the seminar scheme was built, was demolished after a fire
in 1995. In June 2007 St Peter's was placed on the World Monument Fund list of the World's
100 Most Endangered Sites for 2008. RIBA Bronze Regional Award 1967, Listed Category 'A'
1992.The Lighthouse, The Glasgow School of Art et al., Gillespie Kidd and Coia:
Architecture1956-1987 (2008 [cited 09 August 2008]); available from
http://www.gillespiekiddandcoia.com/home.html.
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Figure 4-5 St. Peter College, Cardross, UK, Gillespie, Kidd and Coia. Phase of living
building. (http://flickr.com/photos/25385051@N04/2392674928/sizes/o/in/photostream/)
Figure 4-6 St. Peter College, Cardross, UK, Gillespie, Kidd and Coia. Phase of ruin.
(http://flickr.com/photos/scottishchris/1893300135/sizes/l/)
Certain combinations of moments of existence prove to be
contradictory, therefore ontologically unfeasible. Other combinations instead
determine the possibility of beings that are absolutely in opposition to relative
objects. Architecture is included in this latter group. According to Ingarden’s
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ontological structure, the possible combinations of the basic moments of
existence determine the modes of being when time is taken into account.
Events and processes establish basic modes of being that can participate
in the understanding of architecture; these ways of being of architecture have
been concretized in the past, motivating different varieties of conservation
actions. Conservation of an event or a process demand different actions from
this point of view. Brandi was opposed to the consideration of architecture as
an event frozen in the past time, such as the kind of Viollet-le-Duc’s proposals.
Although, Brandi concretized a specific event in the being of the work of art as
“[...] the instant when the work of art strikes consciousness like a bolt of
lightning,” he also concretized two processes involved with the work of art.369
The first is “[...] the duration of the externalising of the work of art, while it is
being formed by the artist; second, [...] the interval between the end of the
creative process and the instant when our consciousness becomes aware of the
work of art.”370 He criticised restoration actions where these three modes of
being are confused. Despite the apparent limitation that these possible ways of
being architecture expose, they are important also as elements in the
concretization of the third kind of being suggested for architecture: the object
enduring in time.
4.2 The Architectural Object
If we succeeded in grasping moments of existence or modes of being in direct
perception, this alone would be an inadequate result of scientific research; in
order to communicate it to others, it would be further necessary to express the
result of our intuitive examination in appropriately formulated statements.
However, if many modes of being actually should be differentiated [...] then all
369 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 61. (Emphasis in the original).
370 Ibid. (Emphasis in the original).
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the verbs and all such words as ‘is,’ ‘exists,’ etc., in particular, acquire many
meanings when we use them as predicates.
Roman Ingarden, The Controversy over the Existence of the World, 1946.371
Oh my goodness! Shut me down! Machines making machines? Huh! How
perverse!
C3PO, Star Wars, Episode II, The Attack of the Clones, 22 BBY.372
A future depending on machine-originated creations seems not as
impossible as it could have been before. However, the character called C3PO
saw that kind of creation as an inexplicable distortion of reality. In a parallel
manner, Ingarden deduced ontologically how certain beings originated other
beings as purely intentional objects. Actually, C3PO is one of them, among
other characters of literary works, mythological creatures, works of art in
Brandi’s sense and arguably architectural objects, as we shall see. When it is
stated that tourists have recently visited the Barcelona Pavilion, what is it
exactly that fills consciousness within its apprehension of that object? A lost
historical building? A physical visited building? An architectural idea? A fake
construction inspired in a destroyed work? A restored monument? The answers
of these questions depend on the kind of intentionality with which
consciousness addresses this architectural object.
The notions of architecture as an event and as a process seem limited
and somehow incomplete when evaluated vis-à-vis the complex object that
human being is. Ingarden deduces in his ontological structure a third mode of
being in which time is taken into account, that is to say the mode of the object
371 Ingarden, Time and modes of being p. 30.
372 George Lucas, "Star Wars: Episode II - Attack of the Clones," (United States: 20th Century
Fox, 2002). Being C3PO a purely intentional object according to Ingarden’s categories of
being, the date of this quotation could less arguably be cited as 2002, which is not a purely
intentional chronology.
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enduring in time. Thus, architecture as event and as process participates in this
more intricate mode of being that can include other varieties of concretizations,
such as events, processes and other objects. Moreover, Ingarden includes
human consciousness within this kind of objects with its capacity to be aware
of time and then somehow transcend it. The intertwined existence of objects
such as human consciousness – with its capacity to direct its intentionality
towards something else – originates the possibility of still another mode of
being to emerge in the form of purely intentional objects.
An Object Enduring in Time
The third mode of being Ingarden describes, is the one of objects
enduring in time, which
[...] differ from events in that they are capable of lasting beyond the
individual instants in which events, in a way, are locked, and they therefore
endure longer than events. [...]Yet it is just in the way in which an enduring
object outlasts individual instants that is shown its profound dissimilarity to
processes. [...] an enduring object remains identically the same through the
constantly new instants in which it exists.373
Thus when architecture is intended as an enduring object its mode of
being is distinguished from processes in which it appears constituted by strata,
maintaining from the beginning to an eventual end, its same identity. This
makes architecture outlast individual phases. Architecture therefore is
conceived as a manifold of layers, with a particular character for each one of
them. The view of architecture as an object enduring in time is compatible with
the approach to the work of art in Ingarden’s and Brandi’s theories. Brandi
would have recognised, for instance, structure and appearance, or interior and
373 Ingarden, Time and modes of being p. 125. (Emphasis in the original).
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exterior, as parts of the architectural manifold.374 Within this perception of
architecture, the noematic content can be diverse according to the attitude of
the subject who can recognise even other events, processes or objects
constituting parts of this architecture as a whole. The memory of this mode of
being of architecture is analogous to the memory of a person – a face – in
which the subject identifies the same individual, but directs to him or her
different intentionalities.
The fact of being fully constituted since the beginning makes them
different from processes that emerge with time; furthermore, their being is
support for other processes to occur. This notion is significant for the case of
architecture during successive phases of existence. Consequently, the
intentionality of the same architectural core subsists a whole series of phases,
from conception, design, building, use, destruction, memory, and eventual
reconstruction of the object. For instance one same cathedral, no matter what
changes and transformations have taken place, may fill the intentionality of
apprehensions during its existence. In Brandi’s restoration theory, the identified
work of art in the moment of its methodological recognition is the same one at
the moment of its creation. Some theoretical problems could arise when
attempts to define until what moment in time an architectural work continues to
be such an object, and when it becomes only a heap of material. Nevertheless,
for this aim the consideration of Ingarden’s Ontology of the Work of Art is
fundamental.
374 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 310, Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p.
51.
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A significant issue at this point is the argument of whether objects
enduring in time are really such objects and not a manifold of events and
processes that constitute this apparent object. To this issue Ingarden explains
that,
[...] it may be that only combinations of events or systems or processes exist
and that, as something different from them, enduring objects do not exist at
all. [...] A multiplicity of successive events or of whole combinations of them
does not produce anything but a certain manifold, and does not constitute one
simple object that remains identical in time. Obviously, every manifold is also
a certain kind of object, but [...] it is an object of a higher order, the totality of
whose properties cannot, it is true, be identified with the totality of the
elements of that manifold, but does imply the existence of those elements. [...]
such elements [...] in themselves, are no longer manifolds, but take the form
of ultimate elements – objects that are primordially individual.375
This consideration of objects resulting from a manifold of primordial
objects is one of the most significant accounts to formulate our understanding
of Ingarden’s ontology applied to CSA. With this notion, architecture is not
considered a single event or process, but its mode of being is more assimilable
to that of an object enduring in time. The recognition of a manifold mode of
being was already apparent in the analysis of social objects discussed in Section
3.3, when architecture constitutes monuments, heritage or cultural identities.
A layered structure for objects enduring in time is suggested here.
Although Ingarden is concerned in this discussion with humans as objects
enduring in time, for this thesis, the analogous extrapolation of the theory to
architectural objects represents a way to reveal the ontology of CSA.
Noteworthy in this context, Ingarden considers the problem of a retentive
essential core of objects. This would be the ultimate essential component of an
object. Over this core, other characteristics and variations could occur, but as
375 Ingarden, Time and modes of being pp. 135-6.
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long as this core is not changed or destroyed, its identity is guaranteed.376
Sometimes buildings or fragments of buildings conserve this core. Ruins, for
example the Western Wall in Jerusalem, keep that core which is significant for
the continuity of concretizations of remembrance and sacrality. Some of these
remaining parts are not complete buildings anymore, but they constitute, in
some way or another, concretizations of CSA. (Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8).
Figure 4-7 The destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans, David Roberts (1796-
1864). An instance of artistic concretization of the Second Temple in Jerusalem.
(http://www.preteristarchive.com/JewishWars/images/churban/1850_roberts_jerusalem/d
oj_roberts_01.jpg)
376 Ibid. p. 138.
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Figure 4-8 Western Wall, Jerusalem, Israel. An instance of religious concretization of the
Second Temple. (Christopher Chan 2007
http://www.flickr.com/photos/chanc/2174807223/sizes/o/)
The core persists in time during the existence of the entity. In the
moment of the destruction of this essential core, the connection with the notion
of memory, and arguably with history, emerges, since for Ingarden:
In the instant when [the consistency of the object-core itself] is disrupted, and
when, therefore, this absolutely immutable core is drawn in its entirety into a
process of change, the destruction of the object is effected. It loses the
actuality of its being and its last present changes into the past. The final phase
of its actual existence then also belongs to its history, but everything in it is
already transformed; its very identity has been breached, broken off – insofar
as we relate it to some later actual entity. If it leaves any traces or after-
effects of its existence in subsequent presents, these maintain it or its history
in retrogressively derivative being.377
In any case, these traces or after-effects of the existence of the object
are a variety of memory. Ingarden calls to this maintaining it or history of it,
but more properly it is memory. The character of this memory obtained as
result of reception of CSA, depends on the observer – as subject or as
collectivity – and its capacity to assimilate the new state of affairs resulted from
its alteration.
377 Ibid. p. 139. (Our emphasis for the last sentence).
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Possible Architectures
The ontology suggested by Ingarden opens the possibility to locate
architecture according to multiple concretizations. These instances of
architecture do not necessarily contradict each other, since they might address
different aspects of its manifold layers. This does not mean that the notion of
architecture can be filled with any intentional content, since restricted
categories of moments, events, processes and objects can determine
architecture’s ontological core and its possible layers. Moreover, the
ontological constitution of architecture is variable in time in consonance with
the physical and cultural context originating multiple variations. In this context,
Ingarden discusses identities and the possible transformations – and eventual
annihilation – of objects. Concerning the likely incorrect confusion between
processes and objects enduring in time, Ingarden suggests a process of
differentiation:
The static identity appears in a certain objective moment whose qualitative
determination is perfectly immutable and is constantly apparent in the object.
[and] On the other hand, the dynamic identity [which] appears in the
qualitative determination of a certain objective moment that is subject, it is
true, to change, but this change affects only the mode and degree of the
consummation of its existential and phenomenal aspects, or, if one prefers,
the incarnation of this moment in its entirety.378
Although the existence of this core is controversial, from our
perspective – as long as a core becomes apparent for humans as an object
enduring in time – it could be the case that architecture inherits this quality as
part of its humanised condition.379 Nevertheless, extrapolating his theory to
378 Ibid. p. 145.
379 A definite answer is offered with our further existential interpretation of Chapter 6. The
conception of the core as emptiness is a controversial point between the ontological theory of
Ingarden and the one of other existentialist philosophers. Heidegger and Sartre, according to
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architecture, the difference between an identity that remains constant and
another that is qualitatively determined is significant. As might be inferred, the
ambition of conservation to be truthful, objective, authentic, scientific, and so
forth, depends on the objective moment with which CSA is noematically
identified. The consideration of objects resulting from the manifold of other
primordial objects is also related to the analysis of social objects, through
consideration of CSA as monument, vis-à-vis the notions of heritage and
cultural identity. Architecture can be concretized for instance by the collective
memories of society, by the artistic quality that the building conveys, or as an
engineering marvel where its value is a technical achievement. (Figure 4-9,
Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11).
Figure 4-9 Holocaust Memorial, Berlin, Germany. Peter Eisenman. (Own picture)
Ingarden, suggest that human lacks a core and is formed from a basic emptiness that is filled
during life following its potentiality. Ibid. p. 144.
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Figure 4-10 Cathedral of Pisa, Italy. Interior. (Own picture)
Figure 4-11 Eiffel Tower, Paris, France, Gustave Eiffel. (Own picture)
Ingarden explores the ontology of being in time starting from the event,
then the process, and finally the intricacy of the object enduring in time. This
latter shows more complexities in the case of living entities, and especially
human consciousness. It seems relevant to correlate these cases to architecture
as an object endowed with humanised qualities. For instance, when Ingarden
discusses the characteristics of living objects he says that,
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[...] in a living individuum, the residue from the past constitutes a meaningful
whole, which can be understood in itself, in its ‘organic’ structure (as we
say), without regard for the fact that the living entity carries traces of actions
effected on it during its existence by various factors unconnected with each
other and accidental for it, which counteracted its meaningful unity and thus
threatened its existence.380
Although referring to living beings, this also seems valid for
architecture and in general for most of the cultural objects, which by being
embedded in human existence acquire certain organic meaningfulness. If we
relate this aspect with the core, we could infer one core for architecture as
object enduring in time that remains identical during its existence.381
As another instance, we can establish this relationship between
inanimated objects – such as architecture – and living beings, regarding
Ingarden’s discussion of the fragility of living beings. This fragility, which he
characterises as the defect of being susceptible to organic decay, and self-
dissolution, or death,
[...] proves to be the frangibility of something which is in itself autonomous,
the basis and the source of active resistance, and the center of strength from
which it constructively struggles against being overcome by externally
conditioned disturbances of its existence and the threat to that existence from
time itself.382
According to him, inanimated objects unresistingly submit to change in
the form of passive opposition. However, architecture does not seem simply
passive, but especially prepared by human beings to endure. Protection and
assistance in the continued existence of the human itself is its purpose; it
380 Ibid. p. 152. (Emphasis in the original).
381 He discusses more on this aspect in his ontological analysis of architecture, when he
describes how something like the consecration of a church is possible. This being of a church
as a church is possible with that core that paradoxically seems existentially empty, as Heidegger
and Sartre seemed to suggest. Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the
picture, the architectural work, the film p. 259.
382 Ingarden, Time and modes of being p. 154.
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appears as an autonomous centre of strength.383 Whether this appearance
reveals something like a core, or instead it is produced by an illusion, is
furtherly deduced from the exploration developed in Chapter 6.
Ingarden approaches living conscious subjects as entities whose
temporal fissuration seems to be surmounted. He calls fissuration the “actuality
of their existence,” in contrast with “the retrogressively derivative existence of
their past, and [...] their future existence that is only foreshadowed.”384 Human
beings are able to prepare a place that helps them to endure thanks to its
capacity to see time. This quality of fissuration, a sort of window that allows us
to look through time, is given, as ontological legacy, to architecture by its
condition of being an accompanying element of human beings. This is
presented more evidently in Chapter 6.
Ingarden’s next movement is the crossing of the three modes of being
with the applicable moments of existence according to their relation with time,
obtaining the following categorisations. First, he presents the absolute and
extratemporal modes of being. (Figure 4-12).
383 Ibid.
384 Cfr. Ibid. p. 155.
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A.I Absolute, Timeless Being
Ia
Self-existence
Originality
Actuality
Fissuration
Persistence
Separateness
Self-dependence
B. Extratemporal Being, Ideal
IIb
Autonomy
Originality
Nonactuality
(Potentiality?)
Separateness
Contingency
IIa
Autonomy
Originality
Nonactuality
(Potentiality?)
Separateness
Self-dependence
III
Autonomy
Originality
Nonactuality
(Potentiality?)
Inseparateness
Figure 4-12 Non-temporal beings according to Ingarden. (Table adapted from, Ingarden,
Time and Modes of Being, pp. 157, 59)385
In contrast with the categorisation of temporal objects, these modes of
being are not relevant for this thesis since architecture is not an original being
but it is always derivate. Ingarden obtained these categories of temporal objects
analysing the possibility of existence for any existential moment according to
time. Thus, secondly, he deduces the different varieties of temporal objects.
(Figure 4-13).
385 Ibid. pp. 157, 59.
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C. Temporal Being, Real?,
in Three Mutually Appurtenant Varieties
Vb
Autonomy
Derivation
Postactuality
(Retrogressive
derivation)
Separateness
Contingency
IVb
Autonomy
Derivation
Postactuality
(Retrogressive
derivation)
Separateness
Self-dependence
VIb
Autonomy
Derivation
Postactuality
(Retrogressive
derivation)
Inseparateness
VIIc
Heteronomy
Derivation
Empirical possibility
Separateness
Contingency
VIIIc
Heteronomy
Derivation
Empirical possibility
Inseparateness
Va
Autonomy
Derivation
Actuality
Fissuration
Fragility
Separateness
Contingency
IVa
Autonomy
Derivation
Actuality
Fissuration
Fragility
Separateness
Self-dependence
VIa
Autonomy
Derivation
Actuality
Fissuration
Fragility
Inseparateness(a)
Pr
e
se
n
t
(b)
Pa
st
(c)
Fu
tu
re
Architecture
as event
Architecture
as process
Architecture
as object
enduring in time
Figure 4-13 Temporal beings according to Ingarden and locations of possible architecture
within the ontological system. (Table adapted from, Ingarden, Time and Modes of Being,
p. 161)386
He sustained that everything that is temporal, so that it exists in time,
“must pass through these three different modes of being,” that is to say future,
present and past, and he adds significantly that that passage is what is called
reality.387 Finally, he suggests the most relevant mode of being for his aesthetic
theory, namely the purely intentional mode of being (Figure 4-14). In the same
way as Don Quixote, the symphonies of Beethoven, and C3PO, architecture as
a work of art belongs to this mode of being and it is possible thanks to a
particular kind of intentionality.
386 Ibid. p. 161.
387 Ibid. pp. 161-2.
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D. Purely Intentional Being
VII
Heteronomy
Derivation
Nonactuality
Separateness
Contingency
VIII
Heteronomy
Derivation
Nonactuality
Inseparateness
Architecture
as a work of art
Figure 4-14 Purely Intentional Beings according to Ingarden and locations of possible
architecture within the ontological system. (Table adapted from, Ingarden, Time and
Modes of Being, p. 162)
With an ontological mapping of the possibilities for architecture to
exist, we suggest the location of their possible notions as temporal being and as
purely intentional being. This latter suggestion corresponds to Ingarden’s
concept of architecture as a work of art, which presents significant
correspondences with the aesthetic concept of Brandi, as we have seen in
Chapter 2. Within Ingarden’s ontology that suggests all possible kinds of
objects, we locate possible instantiations of architecture; however, for desirable
conservation praxis it would still be necessary to define precisely which
qualities correspond to what concretizations of architecture. Since Ingarden
considers the work of art as a purely intentional object, it seems crucial at this
point to consider his concepts developed within his Ontology of the Work of
Art, especially concerning architecture, in order to suggest an ontological
structure for CSA, taking into account Brandi’s input.388
388 Ingarden explains in his Ontology of the Work of Art that he was during its writing
“unravelling the problem of reality.” Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work,
the picture, the architectural work, the film p. x.
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4.3 To Be or Not to Be Architecture
And when the builders laid the foundation of the temple of the Lord, they set
the priests in their apparel with trumpets, and the Levites the sons of Asaph
with cymbals, to praise the Lord, after the ordinance of David king of Israel.
And they sang together by course in praising and giving thanks unto the Lord;
because he is good, for his mercy endureth for ever toward Israel. And all the
people shouted with a great shout, when they praised the Lord, because the
foundation of the house of the Lord was laid. But many of the priests and
Levites and chief of the fathers, who were ancient men, that had seen the first
house, when the foundation of this house was laid before their eyes, wept with a
loud voice; and many shouted aloud for joy: So that the people could not
discern the noise of the shout of joy from the noise of the weeping of the
people: for the people shouted with a loud shout, and the noise was heard afar
off.
Ezra 3. 389
And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my
church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.
Matthew 16:19.390
God has promised the believers, men and women, gardens underneath which
rivers flow, forever therein to dwell, and goodly dwelling-places in the Gardens
of Eden; and greater, God’s good pleasure; that is the mighty triumph..
The Qur’an - Repentance, IX.72.391
What did Jewish people see as the Salomon’s temple that was so
important to be reconstructed? What kind of church could one found upon a
rock that is a person? What kind of dwelling-place could God have promised?
What architecture are we talking about in all these cases? Houses of god,
churches with no buildings, dwellings in paradise, these are instances of purely
intentional objects. This is, according to Ingarden, the mode of being of
architecture as a work of art. However, it is also the way of being of CSA as a
389 The Holy Bible, containing the Old and New Testaments (1800 [cited 22 October 2008]);
available from http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/.
390 Ibid.([cited).
391 The Koran. Interpreted, trans. Arberry, Arthur J., The World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1964) p. 187.
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cultural object. Architecture in general is as one of the several possibilities of
being; however, as cultural object it shares some of the ontological
characteristics of the work of art. The examination of the way of being of the
work of art in Ingarden’s ontology illuminates these features, not from the
aesthetic or artistic perspective, but as bearer of different collective attributes.
Architecture as concept, as it is the case in the above given examples, has as
the object of its intentionality a sort of building, but its real existence in space
and time is not necessarily always the case. Intended architecture could be
either The Old House of Christian Andersen or the house of the Proustian
character of In Search of Lost Time. Nevertheless, CSA needs support on real
buildings.
Ingarden developed his aesthetic theory deducing for literature, music
and painting the mode of being of purely intentional entities. It could seem to
be challenged by the consideration of buildings such as Notre Dame or St.
Peter’s Basilica, as purely intentional formations.392 Nevertheless, with some
specific nuances, architecture as a work of art is deduced by him as pure
intentional object as well. The correlation of this particular kind of object with
CSA reveals the phenomenological mechanisms with which a real architectural
object presents to consciousness a quite discernible architectural object as
existent.
392 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film p. 255.
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The Analogy of the Work of Art
Ingarden’s arguments to define the ontology of the work of art are
pertinent to analyse CSA, since some phenomenical characteristics are shared
between these two objects. The artistic and aesthetic values in the case of the
work of art, find a correspondence with the values that constitute an
instantiation of CSA. For example, when Ingarden discusses the constructional
roles of the elements in a picture, he distinguishes three different qualities
present in a picture as a work of art: aesthetically neutral qualities,
aesthetically valuable qualities, and aesthetic value qualities.393 All these
qualities determine the aesthetic object appearing with the work of art as its
background.394 For the case of painting, Ingarden makes the distinction
between the picture and the painting. Thus, whilst the picture is the
objectification supported physically by the painting but not constituted by it,
the building is the material support of CSA. Therefore, the building can support
the instantiation of the work of art – privileged by Brandi – or any other, for
example: sacred place, memorial or monument, symbol of authority, place of
value, and so forth.
Ingarden presents the close relation between picture and the
corresponding painting, stating that they are not the same. The painting is a real
physical thing to which the picture is anchored as a coexistent intentional
being. However, the picture could not exist without the painting having existed
before. Copies of the painting are, in appearance, possible supports of the same
picture. The picture as a work of art is an historical object, notwithstanding
393 Ibid. pp. 162-3.
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being merely intentional, so it has a beginning and an end.395 He founds the
difference between picture and painting on their corresponding modes of
giveness, saying that,
The painting is given to us in simple, primarily visual perception, in the
course of which it appears in a multiplicity of concretely experienced aspects.
In the viewing of the picture, on the other hand, a relatively complex train of
acts of consciousness is executed [...].396
Therefore, Ingarden distinguishes three objectivities: the painting, the
picture, and its possible concretizations. According to him, an observer who is
not aesthetically prepared to see the work of art: “[...] is not aware of the
distinction between the picture and the concretization constituted by himself.
He takes the concretization he has constituted for the picture itself, or vice
versa.”397 These concretizations as personally, collectively and historically
conditioned can be variable along time, but the work of art as such remains
ontically unaltered. In similar fashion, CSA needs for its apprehension certain
intentionalities that – in contrast to the artistic object – are changeable in time,
since they do not depend on individual’s original concepts. Brandi called to
these original concepts the constitution of image, as already mentioned in
Section 2.3. CSA as intentional object is contextually multifaceted, being
constituted by progressive sense-giving phases, as we describe in Chapter 5,
from the immediate bodily experience to the constitution of the architectural
place.398
394 Ibid. pp. 165, 6.
395 Ibid. pp. 197-8, 201.
396 Ibid. pp. 201-2.
397 Ibid. pp. 224, 9.
398 We refer here to the fact that “[...] the noetic side of intentional experience does not consist
exclusively of the strict ‘sense-giving’ phase to which ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ specifically belongs
as correlate. [...] the full noema consists in a nexus of noematic phases, and [...] the specific
sense-phase supplies only a kind of necessary nucleatic layer in which further phases are
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Coincidently with the aesthetic theory of Brandi, Ingarden argues that,
[...] the picture, as a particular kind of intentional object, has its ontic
foundation, on the one hand, in the painting, and on the other hand, in an ideal
viewer, who does not merely have an overview of different possibilities of the
picture’s concretisation, but who is also able, through his own critical
evaluation of all those elements of the concretisations that go beyond the
original picture, to penetrate to the picture in its schematic structure, and who
opposes it to all possible concretisations as their common source.399
In the Brandian notion of restoration, as an exclusive artistic
methodological moment, this precision is important. For Ingarden as for
Brandi, the picture has part of its ontic foundation in the observer.400 At this
point, the problem of the relativity or subjectivity of the aesthetic value arises.
The solution proposed by Ingarden considers the distinction between artistic
and aesthetic values. The former are relative because they occur in the work of
art as a medium towards the concretization of the work of art itself by an
aesthetically prepared observer. The latter is absolute in the sense that it is an
end; it corresponds to the final aesthetic experience proposed by the artist.401
He sustains that, only persons with “a natural taste and sensitivity, but also a
certain degree of practice and experience, or, better, aesthetic culture,” are able
to concretize the work of art.402 The case of CSA is different, since the problem
of an original artistic constitution is not necessarily given. The object
concretized in CSA might not have an original artistic schema but a mythical,
historical, symbolic, and so forth, explanation or origin.
essentially grounded [...].” Husserl, Ideas. General introduction to pure phenomenology p.
262.
399 Although Brandi does not explicitly mention this connection, the discussions about the
concept of restoration and time in relation to it reveal this link. Cfr. Ingarden, Ontology of the
work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film. pp. 229, 30.
400 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration pp. 47, 49, 64.
401 Cfr. Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural
work, the film pp. 231-2.
402 Ibid. pp. 237, 8.
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This ontology is valid for the conservation of CSA and the theories to
be applied to this aim. From this perspective, it is possible to consider not only
the artistic and the aesthetic objects to conserve, but also other possible objects
depending on the intentionality that is directed to the building. Further analysis
might determine to what degree this could be done and what would the
implications of these operations be. For Brandi, for instance, the main objective
of architectural restoration is the conservation of the artistic image. However,
that is not the case for CSA in which the possible valuation of architecture to
be conserved is supported by different features other than the aesthetic ones.
After this analogy of the work of art, we follow Ingarden in his
definition of the architectural work of art to correlate it with CSA. However,
for us it is pertinent to identify not only the artistic work of art, whose
relevance we recognise, but also the particular concretizations that constitute
CSA. In the same way that Ingarden suggests that art asks from the viewer
some aesthetic preparation to be appreciated, CSA needs from the observer a
somehow learned attitude in order to be concretized. For instance, after
defining an ontology for other works of art, Ingarden distinguishes architecture
from the things of nature by
being product of human work, and by possessing certain properties that are
not indispensable to it for the fulfilling of its religio-social functions, but
which confer on it certain aesthetically qualitative characteristics, by virtue of
which it is treasured as a work of ‘great art.’403
He notices that a building is for humans not only a real object, but goes
beyond this reality. He adds that, “[m]oreover, this reality (the being-real) itself
plays no particular role in our attending to the building as a work of art, so that
403 Ibid. p. 255, 6.
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it appears to lose meaning for us.”404 As we shall see, this is observed as well
in CSA where the object that fills this intentionality transcends the material
reality of the building, if there is still any.
The Architecture Human Being Cares For
At this point, we proceed with a reduction of significant features that
CSA appears to have in its essence. This sort of epoché attempts to be attuned
in order to illustrate issues for the discussion on temporality. Our departure is
the consciousness of the generic built environment. It is built because it is not
natural but manmade; and it is environment because it is usually the part of the
universe that surrounds human beings. It could be argued that nature is also
part of the environment; thus, the built environment is the part of the
environment that participates of human constructions and in addition, it may
participate of nature as well.
The built environment is composed – among other probable parts – by
discrete units called buildings; these are categorised according to different
characteristics, such as use, materials, forms, hierarchy, colours, and so forth.
Buildings are usually – although not necessarily – constructions elevated above
the horizon’s level, that define the space in a different way than when they were
absent. As a result, they transform the environment; with their gradual
emergence they change the status quo, and with it, the objects that can be
404 Ibid. p. 256.
194
concretized and supported on that environment change too. They bring into
existence at least two things, namely a new state and the memory of the
previous state.
In order to build, society takes materials from the natural environment,
but also from pre-existent constructions. Humanity improves its building
techniques with the technological development. One of the purposes of this
improvement is to produce more long-lasting buildings. This allows people to
apply their efforts to construct new buildings instead of maintaining or
reconstructing the existent ones. Nevertheless, in opposition, there is a
tendency of reality to entropy as a constant resistance to be overcome.
Weathering, gravity force, fatigue of materials, and so forth, are examples of
phenomena linked to this continuous process.
After some fundamental buildings were erected, or maybe from the first
moment humankind had spare time, humanity started to embellish not only the
buildings, but also the environment with buildings. Significantly, this
additional aesthetic care was not a uniformly distributed quality, but it was
prescribed for particular distinguished buildings. Society witnessed in
succession buildings that were new, remade completely again because new
needs arose, and old buildings needed to be replaced or that had been
destroyed. They saw buildings that decayed because they were abandoned, for
being in disuse or insecure, or by lack of workers or resources to maintain
them. They also had buildings that were renewed, adapted, or reconstructed
probably when it was cost-effective, or easier to do so than to substitute them
with new structures. Finally, they saw buildings that were destroyed; they were
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replaced or reconstructed when there was the necessity of radically changing
characteristics of an existing building or, on the contrary, when a destroyed one
needed to be rebuilt. The relation between society and each one of these cases
of buildings determined different intentionalities.
After generations, society established singular historical relations with
buildings, and concretized values supported on them depending on numerous
reasons. These buildings, for instance, had become temples, government seats,
royal residences, museums, theatres and so forth. Society keeps transforming
them according to the necessities of the time, but in general, it tends to
conserve them. Different viewers concretize diverse kinds of social objects
through them.405 For example, they concretize through buildings sacred places,
sites of remembrance, seats of authority, national monuments, works of art, and
so forth. These objects acquire value, and for that reason, their physical support
– the building – is protected. This manifold of concretized objects that the
material building supports is what we identify as CSA. In contrast to Brandi’s
and Ingarden’s notions, architecture here is not conceived only from its artistic
quality – which originates the privileged artistic epiphany, consequently
architecture as a work of art – but it is also source of a varied manifold of
concretizations. Even aesthetically banal or ugly buildings might eventually be
valued for countless reasons. This seems relevant since CSA is not necessarily
architecture as a work of art, although architecture as a work of art should be in
general culturally significant.
405 The concept of social object is supported on the social ontology discussed in Section 5.4.
Cfr. Searle, The construction of social reality.
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As Ingarden observes, attitudes toward the same building can be
different depending on the viewer. These changes of attitude do not change the
identity of the real thing, which remains receded in the background, but a new
objectivity comes forth with every new attitude.406 He adds that
[i]t would undoubtedly be an error – an error that was, by the way, often
committed in the second half of the nineteenth century – to regard such
changeable intuitive traits of the building, that are ontically dependent on the
way we attend to them, as something ‘mental’, as our ‘mental images’, or the
like. But it would be just as wrong to regard them as something ontically
autonomous in the same sense as real objectivities.407
We establish thus a correlation between this phenomenon and CSA,
distinguishing it among the objects that arise after diverse intentionalities are
directed to the building.408 Brandi, for instance, distinguished valuation of the
image from valuation of the structure; a frequent prejudice that, according to
him, is the result of considering historical intentionality of the structural value
at the expense of the aesthetic value of the artistic concretization of the
image.409 Ingarden instead, uses the consecration of a church as an analogous
example to demonstrate the necessity of a certain attitude, in order to concretize
the aesthetic object. However, significantly, this analogy is also applicable to
cultural objects, as other scholars have also observed.410 The building does not
only support aesthetic attitudes. For example, attitudes of technical awareness,
achievement, remembrance or commemoration can also be recognised in
relation to it.
406 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film. p. 256.
407 Ibid. p. 257.
408 Ingarden offers as an example of this kind of phenomena the consecration of a church. Cfr.
Ibid. p. 259.
409 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 98.
410 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film. p. 260. Cfr. Amie L. Thomasson, "Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects," in
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Having outlined some general features of the ontology of CSA, we find
that the values on which this object is concretized can vary considerably. The
notion of architecture as a work of art has helped us to understand how this
happens. Brandi considered as supreme the condition of being a work of art;
however, that exceptional quality, despite its importance, is not the only one
and in fact, it is not always the most appreciated. In its dwelling within the
architectural place, society approaches architecture with different temporal
intentionalities. If architecture can be given to human apprehension in so
different manifestations, how could this indeterminacy be reduced when
determining the purpose of conservation of CSA? Phenomenological analysis
should assist in order to disentangle this problem.
4.4 Architecture as Noema
What is the ‘perceived as such’? what essential phases does it harbour in itself
in its capacity as noema? We win the reply to our question as we wait, in pure
surrender, on what is essentially given. We can describe ‘that which appears as
such’ faithfully and in the light of perfect self-evidence. As just one other
expression for this we have, ‘the describing of perception in its noematic
aspect.’
Edmund Husserl, Ideen, 1913.411
[...] if a work of art, which is not a sum of parts, is physically fragmented, it
will continue to exist as a potential whole in each of its fragments. This
potential will be achieved in direct proportion to what has survived of the
original artistic features on each fragment of the material that has disintegrated.
[...] if the ‘form’ of each work of art is indivisible, where the work has been
physically broken up, one will have to attempt to develop the original potential
of oneness held within each fragment.
Cesare Brandi, Theory of Restoration, 1963.412
Understanding that, whilst the immediate visualisation of architecture as
phenomenon will give the exterior as exterior and the interior as interior, a split
will occur in the flagrancy of the phenomenon, as when in a mixture of oil and
Existence, Culture, and Persons: The Ontology of Roman Ingarden, ed. Chrudzimski, Arkadius
(Frankfurt: Ontos, 2005). And Searle, The construction of social reality.
411 Husserl, Ideas. General introduction to pure phenomenology p. 260.
412 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 57.
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vinegar the oil comes afloat; thus the interior will be revealed in the exterior of
the phenomenon, and the will exterior be revealed in the interior, and this, and
nothing else, will be the structure of the form in the expression of architecture.
Cesare Brandi, Teoria Generale della Critica, 1974413
Brandi’s words above illustrate two different attitudes concerning
architecture. No one is to be privileged over the other; no one is stating
something that makes the other invalid. The difference between them derivates
from the way in which consciousness surrenders, as Husserl puts it, to
architecture; the way in which architecture is given. Since, according to
phenomenology, it is not possible to know the thing-in-itself, it is necessary to
know it through its presentation to consciousness. If human intentionality has
CSA as this object given to consciousness, different possibilities of being
concretized emerge depending on varied attitudes; its constitution in noema
demands an epoché of the intended object. For our particular case, it is
important to underline the main features that constitute CSA. The case of
cherished ruins venerated since long time ago is paradigmatic, since heaps of
stones or fragments of walls are enough elements to constitute it. However,
tradition and old value are not necessary conditions for CSA to upsurge. The
coincidence of concretizations of many individuals individuating similar – or in
any case compatible – moments and manifolds, certainties, memories and
hopes, anchored in the same building or complex of buildings constitute cases
of CSA. The work of art in Ingarden and Brandi’s theories is self-identical
through all its possible concretizations, but CSA is not. Apprehension of CSA
413 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 304. “fermo restando che se la visualizzazione
immediata dell'architettura come fenomeno darà l’esterno come esterno e l’interno come
interno, nella flagranza del fenomeno averrà una scisione, come quando in una miscela d’olio e
di aceto l’olio sale a galla; nell’esterno del fenomeno si rivelarà l’interno, nell’interno l’esterno,
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as such is always referring to previous apprehensions. To perceive cultural
significance one needs to be grounded on the world that originates, maintains,
and develops that meaningfulness.
The fact that CSA does not find its origin in any building, but in that
that contains the capacity to generate cultural appreciation, is a relevant
distinction in conservation. Buildings can – as also can architecture as art –
support intentionalities other than the aesthetic or the scientific; these values
may, for instance, be associated with collective memories and social values.
The building is a real material thing, but it is not formed by the concretization
of architecture as cultural object. On the other hand, the building is the physical
foundation of this CSA and the latter is certainly dependent on the former. The
difference between building and architecture is determined by their mode of
givenness; the experience of a building does not demand the same as the
experience of CSA.414 This ontological theory distinguishes three objectivities:
the building, CSA, and its concretizations, whose possibilities of presentation
depend on the formal structures with which architecture is presented to
consciousness, that is to say parts and moments, identities and manifolds, and
presence and absence. These formal structures, in which CSA is given to
consciousness, are in constant interplay and do not interfere between each
other. They blend constantly and it is by changes in the focus of intentionality
that we are aware of them.
e sarà questa e non altra la struttura della forma sul piano dell’espressione architettonica.” (Our
translation).
414 Cfr. Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural
work, the film. pp. 197-8 and working analogically the building corresponds to the physical part
of which giveness demands only the perception senses. Architecture as such, and by extension
CSA, demands a consciousness contextualised in time and cultural space.
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Parts and Wholes
The whole of an architectural object can be given as composed by two
different kinds of parts. The first is the kind of pieces, that are independent
objects having existence by themselves, for example floor, walls, columns,
windows, roof, and so forth. They can be integrated by sub-orders of parts and
analogously buildings may constitute parts of complexes of buildings. The
second kind is the one of moments, already discussed as conceived by Ingarden
in Section 4.1. They do not have independent existence and consequently could
not be presented separately. Colours, function, form, textures, dimensions,
backgrounds, and so forth are instances of moments. The pair form-function is
an example of a moment within architectural objects. Function is not a thing
that can be detached from the object and the form is not separable from the
matter of the object. Moments are phenomenologically analysable and some of
them can be the foundation of some others. As Brandi suggests, even the light
and the air around a work of architecture are part of the materials with which it
is composed.415
From the standpoint of the work of art, Ingarden sustains that the
building that bears the architectural work needs to satisfy principles
independent from the functional considerations. For him, the term principle,
[...] can be understood [as] conformity to law, that can be formulated in words
and applied as a rule of structuring, or that can be drawn from the finished
work. On the other hand, it can be understood as a concrete regularity which
obtains or is realized in the finished works between the moments belonging to
the work, and which at least in some cases, also finds its concrete expression
or its full-blown form in an immediately apprehensible Gestalt quality.416
415 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 53.
416 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film. p. 279.
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The reference to Gestalt qualities is significant for its coincidence with
Brandi’s discussion on the potential oneness of the work of art.417 This
perception of the architectural object as a whole constituted by parts is a
significant problem in architectural conservation. Within these principles
mentioned by Ingarden, some moments can be distinguished. Proportions,
symmetry, distributions, hierarchies, and the like, are founded on other
moments such as the occurrence of static and mechanics laws, functional
needs, or meaningful orientations. Thus, there is an order of foundation in the
determination of the real building. Without that order, the building could be
imagined but not always realised, so not arriving then to the constitution of
CSA.
Despite the immediate apprehension of the architectural work as a
whole, Ingarden refuses the analogy between living organism and architectural
work, among other reasons because, “the spatial forms of the masses that occur
in the architectural work of art [...] are always [...] concretisations of certain
idealizations of abstract geometric formations.”418 He states that organic forms
tend to irregularity. On the other hand, he observes how nature occupies a
special place in determining architectural form, but for completely different
reasons. He states that,
[...] since every architectural work of art must be realized on the basis of a
real building consisting of heavy masses, they conform to the laws of the
statics of heavy, rigid bodies, so that the whole work made up of them can
stand in the earth’s gravitational field, rather than unavoidably collapsing.419
417 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration pp. 55-9.
418 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film. p. 285.
419 Ibid. p. 285.
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He states that geometry does not dominate in organic bodies and it tends
to deviate from them. For instance, he compares structures made by animals
with those made by humans, deducing that architecture is possible because
humankind has discovered Euclidean geometry, “rationally constructed but
nevertheless [...] ultimately based on a peculiar immediate apprehension of
spatial forms.”420 This seems consistent with Brandi’s ideas about architecture
and art restoration.421 Brandi conceives the work of art as having an entire unity
and not a whole unity. What he means is that the independent separate parts
“retain no memory of the wholeness that, through the action of the artist, they
once formed part.”422 These phenomenological considerations are relevant for
an understanding of CSA. Thus, the concept of fragment, ruin and unity is of
capital importance given that CSA can be of considerable dimensions,
composed by other works of art as parts, or formed by different buildings,
spaces, or structures. Certainly, these same criteria can be extrapolated to the
city considered as CSA.423
Other moments which constitute parts of CSA, are the interior and
exterior spatialities that Brandi mentions for architecture as a work of art.424 He
seems to refer here to the implied spatiality of the astanza of the work of art,
and not to the actual physical spatiality. To be clearer he adds that,
420 Ibid. p. 287.
421 Cfr. Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 55.
422 Ibid.
423 Brandi seems to have confusion between work of art and CSA – in the form of monuments
– when he shifts from the work of art to the city considering them as objects of conservation.
Cfr. Ibid. pp. 94-5.
424 In an obscure way, when discussing the spatiality Brandi states that it is “[...] not the
examination of the singular structure of the consciousness that reveals the work of art to the
individual self that is now the concern. Rather [...] we must look at the spatiality of the work of
art, in order to see what spatial aspects must be protected by restoration: here, it must be
stressed – not only in restoration but by restoration.” Ibid. pp. 77-8. (Emphasis in the original).
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A work of art, given its figurative nature, exists in a spatial autonomy that is
the prerequisite of pure reality. Its spatial essence then inserts itself into
physical space, the very space in which we live, and even intrudes into this
space, without truly belonging there. This effect is not unlike that of the
absolute chronology the work produces, [...] while representing an extra-
chronological present [...].425
This may seem clear for the case of painting, but, then the case of
architecture needs additional discussion. The spatiality Brandi considered is the
one belonging to the constitution of the image in the act of artistic creation. In
order to distinguish different spatial moments for the CSA we can categorise
them as existential spatiality, aesthetic spatiality and artistic spatiality, as seems
to be suggested by Ingarden. The artistic spatiality would correspond to what
Ingarden calls schematic formation, which is the one intended by the creator as
artist and to which all the other aesthetic concretizations tend.426 However,
among the much possible indeterminacies in the work of architecture, the
completion of the work by the observer leads to varied values, be they aesthetic
or of any other kind.
Identities in Manifolds
Thus conceived, the identity of CSA transcends the manifold of
presentations in which it can be perceived, especially in view of the
intersubjetivity of the world in which architecture is essentially embedded;
architecture is a public issue even when it is private. These manifolds are
different manifestations of the same architectural object that CSA offers to
consciousness in different ways of giveness. For instance, architecture can be
intended as remembered, perceived, projected, designed, represented,
425 Ibid. p. 78. Chronology is temporality and extra-chronological is extra-temporality in the
Italian original. Emphasis in the original.
426 Cfr. Thomasson, Roman Ingarden ([cited).
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imagined, enjoyed, suffered, and so forth. An example of this is the description
Ingarden gives of the structure of the architectural work as two-layered; he
stated that “the architectural work consists principally in its objectual stratum,
in the spatial shape of the work’s body and the aesthetically valuable qualities
attaining to appearance on the basis of that shape.”427 Therefore, he is intending
a layer of physical presence and another of moments in the form of appreciated
qualities. An analogous instance is Brandi’s account that physical medium and
image coexist, being the former support of the latter.428 Medium and image are
part of the same architectural object intended in dissimilar ways. An assumed
real material building – whose existence is either perceived in the present,
remembered in the past, or projected in the future – equally supports different
concretizations of CSA.
A group of similar manifolds that reiteratively is manifested through
certain buildings constitute a type. However, oppositely to the architectural
work of art, the identity of CSA can be variable in time, being in constant
becoming. According to Ingarden, certain types of buildings are culturally
427 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film. p. 269.
428 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 49. In 1963 in the word Restauro of the
Enciclopedia Universale dell’Arte, Brandi mentions again that “the matter is understood as that
‘that facilitates the epiphany of the image’. Brought again and limited to the epiphany of the
image, it represents the splitting in structure and appearance.” Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e
pratica. 1939-1986. p. 18. “[...] la materia si intende come ‘quanto serve all’epifania
dell’immagine’. Riportata e circoscritta all’epifania dell’immagine, esplicita lo sdoppiamento
fra struttura e aspetto.” (Our translation). Cfr. Enciclopedia Universale dell'Arte, vol. XI
(Venezia-Roma: 1963). pp. 322-32. According to Brandi, tectonics in architecture conditions
the spatiality in the construction manifold but not in the aesthetic manifold. He denies that the
architectural form pure and without ornament could have dignity as form, as in the case of
architecture of the Modern Movement. Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura.
Eliante o dell'Architettura. p. 191. Brandi seems to suggest that, as long as tectonics can
guarantee the building structure without reinforcements on sight, it is fulfilling its function.
Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura p. 239.
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established and therefore they suffer transformations.429 In the English
language for instance, the word church reveals the evolution of a cultural term,
sometimes referring to a building and sometimes to an institution. Moreover,
the term is differentiated from other related terms such as chapel, oratory,
cathedral, parish, and so forth, depending on characteristics such as history,
use, adscription, hierarchy, and the like.430 These types of buildings configure
cultural memory evidencing cultural practices, recalling the mentioned Greek
notion of mimesis. Another example is the basilica, originally a public
commercial and then administrative building, and later transformed into the
temple to which it has remained linked as a type of CSA. (Figure 4-15, Figure
3-3and Figure 4-17)
Figure 4-15 Ruins of the basilica in Pompeii, Italy.
(http://flickr.com/photos/72213316@N00/345660545/sizes/l/)
429 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film p. 261.
430 OED Online ([cited).
206
Figure 4-16 Basilica of San Paolo fuori le mura, Rome.
(http://flickr.com/photos/cuppini/2490820026/sizes/l/)
Figure 4-17 Old and new Basilica of Guadalupe, Mexico City, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez
(New Basilica). Two different buildings attached to the same term.
(http://www.flickr.com/photos/teseum/1933857868/sizes/l/)
As an example, the complete reconstruction of areas of Warsaw after
their destruction during WWII demonstrates recovering of CSA as a valid
operation, founded not on an aesthetic intentionality, but on the rescue of
cultural identity. The character of these concretizations is not the exclusive
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result of an aesthetic attitude, but the distinction of different manifolds of more
or less stable identities participating in the constitution of CSA. (Figure 4-18
and Figure 4-19).
4-18 Warsaw's Old Market Square, Poland, 1945. (Scan from 8 × 5 cm print fromMarek
TuszyĔski's collection of WWII prints)
Figure 4-19 Warsaw's Old Market Square in its present state.
(http://flickr.com/photos/hampshiregirl/300410855/sizes/l/)
Operating analogically with the case of the consecration of a church,
Ingarden discusses the apprehension of the architectural work of art as
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objectivity. Considering the example of a reconstructed building that had been
previously destroyed, he states that the
[...] destroyed building no longer exists today and can never be resurrected.
On the other hand, on the basis of the new building we can see identically the
same architectural work of art just as it was formerly [...] as a work of art, [...]
In point of fact, the newly constructed building is different from the destroyed
one in some details, so that the work of art attaining to appearance on the
basis of this building is different in some respects from that which formerly
came to appearance. [...] to be sure, all of these differences need not be,
although they certainly can be, of essential significance for the work of art
arising on the basis of the new building.431
This discussion illustrates the issue of authenticity as part of a manifold,
which for Brandi is fundamental. Because of the historical instance, a
reconstruction of architecture does not consider authenticity a value and
therefore it is “not belonging to the field of restoration.”432 Therefore, for
Ingarden, the architectural object is defined as an ontically relative object,
whose double relativity connects creator and viewer through its physical shape
and spatiality.433 In an ideal situation, the physical building allows both creator
and aesthetically-prepared observer to intend the same part of the manifold –
the work of art whose identity remains unchanged. The difference with CSA is
that the intended concretization can be changeable and variable according to
the individual and the context. It does not depend on an individually conceived
object but on collective notions that, despite sometimes having uncertain
beginnings, society constructs and develops in the form of shared values.
Despite its changeability, the identity of CSA transcends through all the
manifolds as the same thing.
431 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film. p. 262. (Our emphasis highlights the significance of authenticity).
432 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 69.
433 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural
work, the film. p. 263, 4.
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The manifold proposed by this thesis follows the model of the
categories deduced by David Smith Capon in his Architectural Theory, in
which he suggested two sets – primary and secondary – of three interlinked
categories. The primary ones are form, function and meaning; the secondary
ones are construction, context and will.434 The manifold suggested here rests on
an interpretation of that categorical distribution, considering each one of these
categories as manifold aspects of architecture, which reveal distinct sides,
aspects or profiles of the object. The phenomenological bracketing or
thematization of each one of these elements would present differentiated views
of the architectural work to the consciousness. (Figure 4-20)
Form
Function
Meaning
TectonicsWill
Context
Figure 4-20 The manifold of architecture interpreted from the categories of Smith Capon.
(Own diagram, adapted from, Smith Capon, David. Architectural theory. 2 v. vols. New
York: John Wiley, 1999. p. 4)
The examples offered in Section 4.2 reveal certain elements of the
manifold as more apparent than others, according to the suggested
intentionalities with which consciousness approaches them. (Figure 4-21)
434 David Smith Capon, Architectural theory, 2 v. vols. (New York: John Wiley, 1999) p. 14.
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Holocaust Memorial
as place for
collective memory
Cathedral of Pisa
as monument of art
Eiffel Tower
as technical achievement
Figure 4-21 Different elements of the architectural manifold depending on hypothetical
attitudes. (Own diagram)
The emerging of these elements of the manifold does not necessarily
mean that other elements are absent, but only that they are less apparent to
consciousness. The relevant notion to consider is that architecture is not only
form, not only function or not only meaning; it is composed of different
manifold elements that come forward according to the attitude of the observer.
In order for CSA to exist, having a shared view of architecture as something
valuable within the social group is necessary.
Presence and Absence
For our particular issue, the interplay of presence and absence is
relevant to intend architecture. It is given depending on the filling of the
intentions that present CSA. If the intentionality with which consciousness
approaches CSA finds its content confirmed in presence simultaneously with
its perception, then the intention is filled and the intuition of the architectural
object occurs; if instead it is not confirmed, the intention is empty. Time and
space might be related in one way or another with the generation of empty
intentions. For instance, looking for a building that cannot not be found,
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produces its empty intention related with space, distance or location;
remembering a building already destroyed, produces a different kind of empty
intention related with the former existence of a building. If people emigrate,
and after a long period return to their original home, the intuition of that known
architectural place is unfolded as a filled intention whose determination has to
do with time and place. Examples of these intentions are anticipation and
protention, (unfilled); intuition (bringing an object to presence), perception and
primal impression (filled) or memory and retention (unfilled).
For the architectural work of art, Ingarden and Brandi emphasised the
optical giveness for the unfolding of its intuitions. Brandi defines the optical
givenness, saying that “the optical givenness is summarised in the recognition
that the visual perception is always perception of something.”435 He sustains
that there is an indivisibility of the object from the space, and consequently the
irreflexive experience finds the space as discontinuous. This is originated by
the fact that the part of architecture that is seen is perceived as present, whilst
the part of the spatiality that is unseen is given as absent. The observer then is
compelled to reconstruct the complete work moving through it, remembering it,
imagining it, and so forth, in a constant flux of actualisations. Brandi states that
the cultural evolution can be conceived as the transformation of the relations
between discontinuous spatialities. This way he recognises two spaces: the
inherent and the environmental.436 He bases on this possibility the different
435 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 277. “La datità ottica fondamentale si riassume
fenomenologicamente nel riconoscimento che la percezione visiva è sempre percezione di
qualche cosa.” (Our translation).
436 Ibid. pp. 278-9.
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modalities of the optical astanza. However, the space of the work of art is not
always coincident with the space pertinent to concretizations of CSA.
Brandi maintains that, the basic distinction between the opposition
spatiality-space of painting and sculpture and the one of architecture, is the
characteristic of architecture of not being an impenetrable block, of having an
interior and an exterior in an indissoluble way, and belonging to the level of the
expression, the level of the form.437 For Brandi, the first phenomenic
characteristic of architecture is its being a transformation of the space in which
it is inscribed, but remaining perfectly distinguishable from any natural object.
The relationship of presences and absences concerning interiority and
exteriority of architecture highlights the necessity to distinguish phenomenic
interior from architecturally artistic interior. The architectural interior is the one
that is afferent to the architectural form, not as part of the structure, but as a
complete system in which interior and exterior is required. He gives the
example of the interstitial space of the dome of St. Peter in Rome, which being
a phenomenic space, is not an architectural space. He sustains that – even when
the internal is visualised as internal and the external as external – it is the
revealing of the external in the internal and the internal in the external that
structure the form at the level of architectural expression.438 Thus in his
definition of the artistic characteristic of architectural astanza, as presented in
Section 2.3, Brandi gives extreme importance to the interplay of presence and
absence of these two spatialities.
437 Ibid. p. 300.
438 Ibid. pp. 301-4.
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However, the interaction of presence and absence is, for CSA, not only
important from the visual point of view. Presence and absence can be
combined in the same consciousness of CSA. Other senses can have an
important role in distinguishing presences and absences of the manifold of
which architecture is constituted. Many other elements contribute to the
constitution of CSA, such as materials conferring particular smells, the texture
and hardness of floors revealed while the building is explored, the temperature
that changes with the shades, the sensed flows of breeze within and around the
building, the echo of steps that reveals the breadth of the space, the evidence of
attendance of other users in the form of murmurs, prayers and so on.
Differently to Brandi and Ingarden, whose interest is in defining
precisely the notion of the architectural work of art, for CSA all these
phenomenological sides are significant. CSA is given in particular ways that
distinguish it from the pure architectural work of art, despite being the artistic
one of its possible presentations. However, the noematic content of CSA may
be sometimes richer in sensual variety and possibilities than architecture as a
work of art, depending on the attitude of the receptors. It remains more open to
the multifarious ways in which collectivity approaches its existential place, not
being confined in its origin to the finding of an original schema. Moreover, the
noematic identity of CSA is characterised by its collective nature, resulting in a
sort of average temporal perception of architecture, whose identity is
progressively and continuously constructed.
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Conclusions
The ontological bases suggested by Ingarden seem consistent with
Brandi’s notion of architecture as work of art. The different possibilities of
being reveal ways in which architecture can be delivered to consciousness.
Whether architecture is conceived as event, process or enduring object depends
on particular ways of setting consciousness in order to apprehend it. These
ways of being of architecture are more or less dense in noematic nuances. The
way of being as object enduring in time gives a richer field of possibilities
given its affinity with the human being and offers to consciousness different
profiles that depend on the attitudes with which architecture is intended. For
instance, CSA can be seen, with scientific curiosity revealing certain features
that an aesthetic intentionality conceals, and vice versa. The building then, as
the paradigmatic architectural object, acts as a support of possible
concretizations of architecture configuring for CSA an identity that is flexible,
despite having an intimate core, whose definition is tackled in Chapter 6. The
formal structures of CSA reveal an architecture that is not only meaning, not
only function and not only form. CSA has a rich manifold existence that is
revealed according to attuned attitudes of groups of observers, depending on
degrees and nuances of this collective cultural interpretation, within which the
conservator is a rooted agent.439 The “mode of scientifically setting the
439 Before concluding, we should not ignore some criticism expressed to the ontology proposed
by Ingarden. Concretely about the nature of cultural objects, it has been argued that, the
dichotomy between the physical and the mental is problematic to define the status of cultural
objects. Thomasson, "Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects." p. 129. Her argument
seems not taking into account the distinction between cultural object as a material entity and the
supported cultural concretisation.
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consciousness towards the monument” is but an option among the many
possible, and it should not be necessarily prevalent.440
Significant effects for conservation can be deduced from the suggested
ontological structure. Their implications affect not only architecture as work of
art but also the construction of cultural and social objectivities. The first one is
that instances of CSA are temporal and thus significant for a conservation that
develops in time, in contrast with Ingarden’s deduction about the architectural
work of art as paradoxically extra-temporal.441 The second is that the work of
art is a third order of concretization; therefore it is not only the result of an
aesthetic intentionality in relation to the building, but also a special connection
between creator and observer. As stated before, Brandi saw this phenomena as
well as a connection with what he called universal consciousness.442 The third
consequence is that the work of art being extra-temporal – consistently with
Brandi’s aesthetics – cannot constitute a form of memory as other socio-
cultural concretizations can. This is because it is revealing in its pure reality –
astanza in Brandi’s terms – an existence out of time: parousia without ousia.443
Instead if memory, or in a wider sense temporality, is in some way embedded
in architecture, it is because of its manifestation as CSA and not as a work of
art, according to the proposed ontology. These conclusions are relevant to
conceive CSA as a manifold of moments of existence, which finds its origins in
the building. Ingarden has said that architecture is:
440 “[...] un modo di porsi scientifico della coscienza verso il monumento” Brandi, Il restauro.
Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 41. (Our translation).
441 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film. p. 282.
442 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 49.
443 “parousia senza ousia” Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 133. (Our translation).
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[c]reative because it is based on the invention (on a kind of artistic
discovering) and realization or embodiment of new ‘forms’ – that is, shapes –
and new qualitative harmonies, of shapes and harmonies that are new both in
relation to the spatial form of rigid bodies found in nature, and in relation to
the already invented forms of finished architectural works of art of earlier
ages. Limited and made difficult by the laws governing heavy rigid bodies,
architecture is also an expression and a result of humanity’s living together
with the world of matter, one of humanity’s ways of making a home for itself
in the world that makes human life easier, and that at the same time is a
manifestation of humanity’s victory over matter, a sign of its mastery over
matter and of matter’s subjugation to humanity’s ability to impose on lifeless
matter forms that correspond in the highest degree to the human being’s
intellectual life and emotional needs by satisfying his yearning after beauty
and aesthetic magic.444
Architecture – as building, as work of art, and as CSA – finds in these
words a synthesis that amalgamate together elements of its manifold. It is part
of the real world inhabited by humans, created by them, by their techniques and
against laws of nature, and perceived by them as representation of its time.
These invented forms of finished architectural works of art can be conceived,
for the purposes of conservation, as culturally significant forms constituting
also a fundamental part of the cultural memory of society. The endeavour now
is to apply this ontology of CSA to problematize the reception of change and
the new within the existent, which largely is the essential concern of
conservation, considering no less the fate of art – as paradoxical intemporal
pure reality – in the context of this temporal attitude.
444 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film pp. 294, 5.
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Chapter 5: Temporality and Assimilation: The
Mnemonic Mode
The big-name architects can be very dangerous if they are not humble. Any
architect makes a mess when he intervenes where there is no need for him to
intervene. Where there is definite harmony, there is no need to add anything.
Architects need to intervene in situations where there is damage, where there is
the need to do something, where there is necessity. Not to do something for the
sake of doing something.
Vittorio Sgarbi, 2004.445
The project for the exit of the Uffizi Museum in Florence by Arata
Isozaki (Figure 5-1) has provoked controversy since it won the competition
back in 1998. The public opinion and cultural officers – such as Sgarbi, quoted
above – rejected the proposal of the huge pergola covering most of Piazza del
Grano. Later in 2004, the project was suspended allegedly by the findings of
medieval archaeological remains. After the social and political commotion, the
architect was given time to make amends. However, without any changes to the
project, a second go-ahead is given in 2006. Recently in August of 2008, the
Minister of Culture Sandro Bondi disapproved it arguing that the pergola could
not have a harmonic relation with the historical context.446 Similar cases to this
are not uncommon in the practice of architecture, when society perceives a
445 Cfr. Peter Popham, The great Sgarbi (The Independent on Sunday, 2004 [cited 16 August
2008]); available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-great-sgarbi-
565354.html.
446 At the moment the status of the project still remains uncertain. Cfr. Paul Bennett, Italian
Government Cancels Isozaki's Uffizi Addition (The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2005 [cited
16 August 2008]); available from
http://archrecord.construction.com/news/daily/archives/050316italy.asp, Marta Falconi,
Medieval finds block new exit from Uffizi (Guardian News and Media Limited, 24 February
2005 [cited 16 August 2008]); available from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/feb/24/arts.italy, I nuovi Uffizi (Associazione Limen,
[cited 16 August 2008]); available from
http://www.limen.org/BBCC/pagina%20nuovi%20uffizi/nuoviuffizi.htm#conforti, Isozaki's
Uffizi loggia in doubt (Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata - Società Cooperativa, 08 August
2008 2008 [cited 16 August 2008]); available from
http://www.ansa.it/site/notizie/awnplus/english/news/2008-08-08_108243179.html, "The Uffizi
- Not 'Grandi' but 'Nuovi'," The Burlington Magazine 137, no. 1104 (Mar., 1995).
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conflict in the inclusion of new architecture in sites of CSA. This situation can
be observed even with projects that may affect recent CSA, as for instance it is
the case of transformations to architecture of the Modern Movement.
Conservators frequently protect architectural heritage arguing concepts such as
truth, objectivity, authenticity, scientific evidence, protection of the sources,
landscape integrity and so forth. On the other hand, contemporary architects
support their novel projects claiming artistic freedom, technological innovation,
expression of the zeitgeist, reinterpretation of history, among others. In this
context, what is the role that social memory plays as determinant of
conservation theories? Is memory’s social expression evolving to receive
changes to CSA in a better way? It is our contention that there are existential
stands that would more easily support architectural assimilation. The role that
contemporary postmodern conditions have in the change of Western culture is
definitive and although the thesis is focused in this context, architectural
conservation seems to be today a global attitude.
Figure 5-1 Winner project for the New Gate for the Uffizi Museum. Limited competition,
Florence, Italy. Arata Isozaki. (http://www.isozaki.co.jp/plans/)
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Architecture is practiced today by some of its leading figures as a
postmodern avant-gardist art and by others in a very conservative way. The
formers confront easily the status quo and the tradition as some scholars have
suggested.447 Their projects demand from the public new modes of receiving
architecture in the existent context. The architect is considered an artist
interpreter of the spirit of the age, an individual able to express it through
buildings almost as with language. There are several cases of this phenomenon,
some more successful than others.448 On the other side of the spectrum, other
architects emulate classical architecture in conservative fashion as the only one
that recognises the values of Western society.449 Both tendencies represent in
different manners contemporary attitudes in architecture that clash with some
of the concepts that theories of conservation claim as their essential
principles.450
This chapter discusses memory as an attitude of assimilation to engage
with architectural temporality. The point of departure is memory, but the arrival
point is the description of collective human being conserving CSA.
Assimilation is the selected term for this conflict that thrusts society – and
conservators in particular – to admit the pertinent transformation of the
valuable environment. While it could be argued if architecture is not always
somehow assimilation of new into the existent, this problem is more evident
when society is compelled to accept a sudden challenge in a determinate state.
447 Cfr. David. Kolb, Postmodern sophistications philosophy, architecture, and tradition, xi,
216 p., [13] p. of plates vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). pp. 91, 92.
448 The pyramid of the Louvre by Pei; the roof of the central space of the British Museum, and
the reuse of the new Reichstag of Berlin by Foster; are examples of successful assimilations.
449 Some projects of Quinlan Terry, Terry Farrel, and Michael Graves are examples of this.
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As already stated in Chapter 3, it is possible to address more than one kind of
intentionality towards CSA, nevertheless there are some essential attitudes that
configure it. Thus, this chapter focuses on memory as a privileged determinant
intentionality within the manifold of CSA. The discussion about memory in
relation with architecture should reveal why some conflicts between
conservation of CSA and contemporary architectural practice exist.
Section 5.1 “Memory as Temporal Intentionality” offers a
phenomenological exploration of memory at individual level focusing on its
capacity to assist the understanding of human temporality. The discussion tries
to relate memory with the particularities of the architectural place. It is mainly
indebted to a critical correlation of the work of Bergson, Ricoeur and Casey
with the architectural phenomenon, concerning the characteristics of
embeddedness and autonomy as characteristics of memory.
Section 5.2 “Memory and the Architectural Place” sets the elements that
constitute the material context of memory, the place in which this is given.
Consequently, the layer of the architectural place is added to the personal level.
This implies that architecture be recognised by the receptor as bearer of
relevant values – memories and recollection triggers in particular. The
phenomenon of CSA is constituted by historical assimilation of places and
times in a continuous overlapping of architectural strata, which seems the main
focus of heritage conservation. Five ways in which architecture can be
remembered and through which we can remember are suggested, according to
the ontological premises of the previous chapter.
450 It has been proposed also that architecture is able to represent or manifest national truths.
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Since the architectural place in isolation is somehow limited to
influence the multi-determined attitude of conservation, the phenomenological
concern towards the others is needed. Thus, section 5.3 “Collective
Architectural Memory” deals with the concepts of collective memory in the
context of architectural assimilation of change. It is suggested that there are
contradictions between some conservation theories and the concept of social
reality, in particular with reference to its ability of assimilating the new.
Section 5.4 “Temporality as Creative Attitude” incorporates the
findings from the correlation between memory and conservation as
assimilation, suggesting possibilities of dealing in a creative manner with CSA
in order to take care for existent valuable architecture and simultaneously not to
hinder the constant becoming of the human architectural place. It establishes
whether memory can still be considered as determinant of conservation of CSA
given the postmodern condition or not.
5.1 Memory as Temporal Intentionality
But if the will of God has been from eternity that the creature should be, why
was not the creature also from eternity? Who speak thus, do not yet understand
Thee, O Wisdom of God, Light of souls, understand not yet how the things be
made, which by Thee, and in Thee are made: yet they strive to comprehend
things eternal, whilst their heart fluttereth between the motions of things past
and to come, and is still unstable. Who shall hold it, and fix it, that it be settled
awhile, and awhile catch the glory of that everfixed Eternity, and compare it
with the times which are never fixed, and see that it cannot be compared; and
that a long time cannot become long, but out of many motions passing by,
which cannot be prolonged altogether; but that in the Eternal nothing passeth,
but the whole is present; whereas no time is all at once present: and that all time
past, is driven on by time to come, and all to come followeth upon the past; and
all past and to come, is created, and flows out of that which is ever present?
Who shall hold the heart of man, that it may stand still, and see how eternity
ever still-standing, neither past nor to come, uttereth the times past and to
come? Can my hand do this, or the hand of my mouth by speech bring about a
thing so great?
Cfr. Kenneth. Frampton, Modern architecture a critical history, 3rd ed. ed., 376 p. vols.
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1992). pp. 314-15.
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Augustine, Confessions, Book XI, 398. 451
What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is no
more, nor even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future
anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming.
Jacques Lacan, Écrits, 1977.452
Temporality as problem for phenomenological research is one of the
most challenging for this discipline. In his The Phenomenology of internal
time-consciousness, Husserl already referred to Augustine as the first “thinker
to be deeply sensitive to the immense difficulties to be found” concerning
this.453 The difficulties for human temporal understanding are reflected in the
angst of addressing the contrast between both a supposedly eternal divine
temporality and a transitory human one, in Augustine’s words above. However,
for Husserl the problem was to investigate the character of objects of
perception, memory and expectation in Objective time first, to explore later
“the conditions of the possibility of an intuition of time and a true knowledge
of time.”454 Although we are aware of the importance of perception and
expectation for a complete sense of temporality, we focus the exploration on
memory as a way to argue that conservation has been so far a non-
comprehensive form of temporal intentionality. In fact, there is research that
suggests that the muddle of memory, the sharp distinction between past and
present is but a confusing fallacy.455
451 Augustine, E. B. Pusey et al., The confessions of St. Augustine, 1999 Modern Library ed.
ed., xiii, 338 p. vols., Confessiones. English (New York: Modern Library, 1999) p. 251.
452 Jacques Lacan, Écrits a selection, trans. Sheridan, Alan (New York: Norton, 1977) p. 86.
453 Husserl, The Phenomenology of internal time-consciousness p. 21.
454 Ibid. p. 23. We use Object as the translation of the German term Objekt and object for the
term Gegenstand, consistently with the criteria of the translator.
455 Cfr. James Jerome Gibson, Reasons for Realism, ed. Reed, Edward and Jones, Rebecca
(Hillsdale, New Jersey, London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publsihers, 1986) pp. 173-9.
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Although, in philosophy it has been suggested that the most important
issue in the problem of memory is the conjunction between external stimulation
and internal resemblance. This makes memory significant for its opposition to
imagination as the paradigm of the unreal, fictional or possible.456 This
paradoxes, it is assumed, originate inconsistencies in the assimilation of the
new into the existent because the new comes supported on fantasy to confront
the security of the supposed truthful memory. Some theoretical disjunctions
between conservation, memory and the rest of temporal consciousness are
located in this other than simple process. The arrival of the new breaks the
stable structure of the known present, compelling to reconfigure past and
present in dialectic fashion. Merleau-Ponty describes memory as a continuous
and never ending process of construction of the present through recollection of
the past.457 A similar phenomenon might occur in the case of collective
memory at a social level. The objective of this section is not to offer a complete
outline of temporality and memory, but to look at some of its features as
relevant to suggest better ways to take care of CSA.
The Embeddedness of the Internal Time-Consciousness
It appears that, the elements in the manifold of identity for the human
being is constantly actualised and updated with the continuous movement
between consciousness of the present and consciousness of the past. The past is
accepted as gone, its knowledge may be constructed from within
456 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting. p. 21.
457 Cfr. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, xxi, 466 p. vols.,
Phénoménologie de la perception. English (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962) p. 346.
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conscioussness in the present only by memory.458 Merleau-Ponty sustains that
more than the perception of time as such, what human being experiences is
organised in consciousness in terms of before and after.459 Thus, he claims that
perception of inner time is related with experiences that are necessarily
perceived by one self. However he says, consciousness is not only a series of
experiences nor an eternal being. Thus, human consciousness is embedded in a
body being trapped in a span of time whose limits – beginning and end – are an
empirical reality. Consequently, he deduces that at least part of time – Husserl’s
inner time – is subject-dependent.460 It has been argued that what Merleau-
Ponty explains with his approach to temporality is objective time and not
Objective time as a whole.461 He seems to focus on the categories of past,
present and future, which are related to a subject and not in the sense of
succession of events related by the categories of before, simultaneous and after,
which are independent of consciousness awareness. The former categories are
subjective since they are related to consciousness addressing time; the latter are
not necessarily related with consciousness.
Bergson’s intuitions about temporality in his work Matter and Memory
develop the theory that “[...] memory is just the intersection of mind and
matter.”462 His hypothesis is based on the premise that the universe is
constituted by images. All human awareness of reality depends on the images
458 Cfr. Ibid. p. 413.
459 Stephen Priest, Merleau-Ponty, xi, 308 p. vols. (London: Routledge, 1998) p. 121.
460 Ibid. p. 129. Merleau-Ponty is against the Husserlian notion of the subject receiving the
present. He seems to suggest that if there is consciousness of time, it is always addressed by the
subject, without any passivist attitude in it. Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 136. What appears to be
behind this argument is an opposition to the acceptance of “an ultimate non-temporal ground of
time.” That would be absolute consciousness, a temporal apprehension that is usually attributed
to God.
461 Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 137.
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that the body can convey to consciousness.463 Therefore, he suggests that
memory performs a sort of phenomenological reduction of the perception of the
world from which consciousness selects and discriminates what is of its interest
and what is not.464 Although, what is relevant for us is that the representation of
the material universe – consciousness about reality – is not supposed to have a
different nature than reality itself. Consciousness is as emerged from that
reality. In conservation, this is translated into the awareness that the
architectural object and consciousness are parts of the same whole.
Consciousness is embedded in the same world that it is addressing in order to
conserve. The temporal abilities of consciousness move through time recalling
and perceiving without always a sharp distinction.
Bergson explains how the interior self-awareness of our self, of our
body, constitutes part of those affections we call – in Husserl terms –
perception, memory and expectation.465 Perception then moves with the body
in order to grasp the images that constitute reality.466 In this system, he finds
memory playing a significant role in the interplay between space and time,
between extension and duration, since
Pure perception [...] however rapid we suppose it to be, occupies a certain
depth of duration, so that our successive perceptions are never the real
moments of things, as we have hitherto supposed, but are moments of our
consciousness. [...] the part played by consciousness in external perception
would be to join together, by the continuous thread of memory, instantaneous
visions of the real.467
462 Bergson, Matter and memory. p. 13.
463 Ibid. p. 18.
464 Ibid. p. 38.
465 Ibid. p. 58.
466 Ibid. p. 69.
467 Ibid.
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Thus, memory would be an independent power that is not in the body
but in a sort of spiritual agency. Bergson suggests that spirit is an entirely
distinct reality than matter since according to him: “matter is [...] the vehicle of
an action and not the substratum of a knowledge.”468 Thus, knowledge of time
is not the result of a separation of consciousness from the object enduring, but
the perceived image by the body – understood as an interface of consciousness
– of the spiritual movement through time. Consequently, CSA stops emerging
as object to become temporal environment, an architectural place.
Bergson defines the present time as a moment with at least a minimum
duration. He questions
What is, for me, the present moment? The essence of time is that it goes by;
time already gone by is the past, and we can tell the present the instant in
which it goes by. But there is an ideal present – a pure conception, the
indivisible limit which separates past from future. But the real, concrete, live
present – that of which I speak when I speak of my present perception – that
present necessarily occupies a duration.469
His conception of the reality of time and space offered solutions for the
doubt of the existence of that that cannot be perceived or recalled. The idea of
468 Ibid. p. 74. Bergson recognised to human being the power to renounce to some parts of
reality in order to achieve through memory other past parts of it. However, memory cannot be
performed with the same strength all the time and this fact makes it fugitive. Cfr. Bergson,
Matter and memory pp. 82-3. There is always the tendency to bring the intentionality back to
the present in the expectancy of the future that existence implies.
469 Bergson, Matter and memory p. 137. This seems consistent with the observations of Husserl
about the perception of internal time consciousness. Cfr. Husserl, The Phenomenology of
internal time-consciousness. Especially Section One. This intuitions seem also confirmed in
environmental psychology where the term specious is taken from. Gibson said, “The stream of
experience does not consist of an instantaneous present and a linear past receding into the
distance [...] There are attempts to talk about a ‘conscious’ present, or a ‘specious’ present, or a
‘span’ of present perception, or a span of ‘immediate memory,’ but they all founder on the
simple fact that there is no dividing line between the present and the past, between perceiving
and remembering. A special sense impression clearly ceases when the sensory excitation ends,
but a perception does not. It does not become a memory after a certain lenght of time. A
perception in fact, dos not have an end. Perceiving goes on. Perhaps the force of the dichotomy
between present and past experience comes from language, where we are not allowed to say
anything intermediate between ‘I see you’ and ‘I saw you’ [...] Verbs can take the present tense
or the past tense. We have no words to describe my continuing awareness of you, whether you
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Bergson confers time with certain thickness or speciousness in which no mater
whether it goes by it will not stop existing, as matter does not stop existing
when it is not being perceived. He suggests that “[...] the brain, insofar as it is
an image extended in space, never occupies more than the present moment: it
constitutes, with all the rest of the material universe, an ever-renewed section
of universal becoming.”470 This means for him that “[...] every perception is
already memory. Practically, we perceive only the past, the pure present being
the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future.”471 This seems
confirmed by studies of environmental psychology that suggest that the
difference between past and present may come from the impossibility of
language to express continuing awareness.472 The identification of the
borderline between perception and memory is explained in similar terms by
Merleau-Ponty.473
The recognition of the past through the presence of matter is impossible,
for Bergson, in beings that evolve with certain freedom, the past is only
obtained through the spiritual work of memory.474 From Bergson’s point of
view, matter cannot remember the past, cannot become memory, since its
are in sight or out of sight.” James Jerome Gibson, The ecological approach to visual
perception, xiv, 332 p. vols. (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986) pp. 253-4.
470 Bergson, Matter and memory. p. 149.
471 Ibid. p. 150. According to Bergson, all this discussion reveals a metaphysical problem.
“This problem is no less than that of the union of soul and body. It comes before us clearly and
with urgency because we make a profound distinction between matter and spirit.” Bergson,
Matter and memory p. 180.
472 Gibson, The ecological approach to visual perception p. 254.
473 Merleau-Ponty states that, “To remember is not to bring into focus of consciousness a self-
subsistent picture of the past; it is to thrust deeply into the horizon of the past and take apart
step by step the interlocked perspectives until the experiences which it epitomizes are as if
relieved in their temporal setting. To perceive is not to remember.” Merleau-Ponty,
Phenomenology of perception p. 22. (Our emphasis).
474 Cfr. epigraph in Section 3.2.
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vocation is to be always present.475 Architecture from this perspective inherits
certain humanised or spiritualised characteristics that make it, in its physical
embodiment, deposit of re-enacting memory. This discussion can again be
conflated with the one of mimesis as memory of past cultural practices, in
which architecture demands constant interpretation through inhabitation.
The Transformable Relation Noesis-Noema
Greek philosophy distinguished two main kinds of memory, namely
memory and recollection.476 Ricoeur has arisen the issue of memory as a form
of true knowledge stating that “when the affection is present but the thing is
absent, what is not present is ever remembered.”477 In conservation of CSA,
this can turn into a paradox since even when architecture is not present but it is
remembered, the remembered can be merged with the imagined. Purely
intentional objects concretized from an existing building can amalgamate the
remembered with the imagined. Architecture should be conserved elucidating
which parts of its manifold belong to memory and which ones to imagination.
For Ricoeur the relevant issue in the problem of memory is the conjunction
between external stimulation and internal resemblance. Although in
architectural conservation intentionality, this refers to the kind of intentionality
that is addressed towards architecture. It becomes even more relevant whether
the conservator has actually known the architectural object or only a memory of
475 Bergson, Matter and memory p. 249.
476 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting pp. 26-7. Ricoeur locates in the capacity of
consciousness of addressing itself towards a recent past, and intend its sinking back without
being conscious about it as something different from the now. In this way, he detaches the idea
of present with the identification of presence. Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 33. We
will come back to this in Chapter 6. For the moment, it seems that consciousness has a double
mechanism in which retention stores memories and reproduction delivers them.
477 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting pp. 15-7.
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it. For that purpose, a further phenomenological analysis is suggested in
Section 5.2.
Conservation is not given as an affection of memory – as pathos; it
looks more like the model of recollection, as an active search.478 Conservation
in this sense attempts to keep the authenticity of the past in the content of its
intention. A noematic analysis of memory would describe characteristics of the
intentional content. This for CSA implies not only its particular mode of being
but the environmental memories of the context that surrounds the architectural
object, the time of the remembrance, the occasion, and importantly all the
aspects that define the world of the rememberer; her bodily presence,
sensations, movements and moods. Memory is conceived as an image from the
past whose true evidence should emerge without recurring to fantasy. Casey
divides the noematic part of memory in two: the mnemonic presentation, or
what is remembered (specific content, memory-frame and aura); and the modes
of givenness, or how the mnemonic presentation is given (clarity, density,
texturality and directness).479 For the memory of architecture, we can think in
the first group as the memory of parts of architecture, according to the
phenomenological description developed in Section 4.4, whilst the second
correspond not only to the qualities of the object remembered, but also to
qualities of the intentional act itself.
478 The context of conservation as temporal intentionality and its ambition to be truthful arises
the problem of the conservator considering herself giving testimony of the past when in reality
she is interpreting the past. Her noesis is moved by certain purpose that is scientifically,
historically, aesthetically and existentially determined. However, the fact that the distinction
exists between the two kinds of memory means also that conservation is not a primordial level
of temporal intentionality, but that it includes other components. This theoretical distinction has
a significance that will point to the foundation of conservation in Chapter 6. In any case
according to Ricoeur “[t]o memory is tied an ambition, a claim – that of being faithful to the
past.” Ibid. p. 21.
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In architectural memories, the gradient of temporal distantiation relates
again to the concept of mimesis as the calling to inhabit the architectural place
in specific ways. As suggested before, in the mimesis that CSA demands to be
inhabited, this becomes crucial because the more temporal distance from the
present architecture there is, the more filtered the interpretation of the way of
inhabitation will be. Commemorative monuments represent a special case in
the establishment of social rituals, traditions and cultural practices. Monuments
from this point of view include for instance temples, museums, royal palaces,
seats of power, and so forth.
In the context of CSA, the pair persistence/pastness becomes
significant, since memory is the consciousness of an architectural object
originated in the past but which persists in the present, and this means that the
distance between past and present is discernible in the present moment. A
relevant connection with this is the aspect of the couple actuality/virtuality.
Casey has said
It is but a short step from pastness to actuality. For the past is populated with
actualities – with what has actually been the case. We remember just this:
former (and sometimes still surviving) actualities. [...] What we recall is
finished to the point of possessing a certain minimal coherence or
intelligibility; otherwise, it is not identifiable as a memory, a memory of
something in particular that has happened. [...] This presence is first-person
presence, the only kind of presence in which actuality is experienceable and
hence rememberable. 480
In this sense, the actuality of memory calls for self-presence. In Section
5.2, we outline a phenomenological scheme to locate some possible cases.
Virtuality instead is understood as the aspect of memory that lets the
479 Cfr. Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study. Chapter 4.
480 Ibid. pp. 41-2.
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rememberer intuit “a readiness of former experiences to be reactivated.”481 In
the apprehension of CSA, this involves the sense of missing something that did
not survive time. Conservation of CSA is differently approached, not only
depending on the theoretical frame that guides the intervention, but also on the
temporal relationship between conservator and architecture.
Memory implies, as we have seen, not only the remembered but also the
rememberer, namely the relation between noema and the noesis. If for the case
of CSA, the architectural object constitutes the remembered, the rememberer
instead is always the first person who recalls or is affected by the memory.
Memory is not given in abstract isolation, it is always embedded in the world of
who remembers. The ways in which memory can be performed or given, as
search and as affection is very varied. The features discussed here are a
selection that singles out the capacity of memory to transform the apprehension
of the past. Since time keeps flowing, we remember each time from a different
temporal position so to say. This locates the present – as in the comet’s image
of Husserl’s explanation – in the head of a comet that may constantly see a
different image of the past.482 The illusion is that the past changes; however the
past has to remain past, what does change is its concretization.
If this appearance of the past always changing is the case for memory as
intentionality of time, it seems necessary a revaluation of its role within
conservation of CSA. Theories of conservation in its modern form seem to
consider material architecture as deposit of memory. However, the paradigm of
the event, appearing as fixed image in its non-endurance, seems too limited to
481 Ibid. p. 42.
482 Husserl, The Phenomenology of internal time-consciousness p. 52.
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be considered the object of conservation of CSA. The concretization of
architecture in the mode of process, although being a more complex mode of
being, presents a flattened surface in which just one thread can be identified as
the architectural aim of conservation. It changes form in every stage without
sense of sameness. The last considered possibility is the object enduring in
time, in which we have assumed not only a single core of identity preserved
during all its existence, but a manifold of layers to be constituted around this
core according with the intentionality. Although this has defined for
architecture a more complete ontological structure, in which we have
recognised even humanised qualities, its noematic expression in memory is still
a relation between a subject and an object. We develop this notion of a
humanised object further in Chapter 6.
Casey describes what he calls the thickness of remembering as the
involvement of memory in “the very thick of things.” This involves the
embeddedness we mentioned before as “the interpenetration of remembering
into the world around us and of this world itself into our remembering.”483
Moreover, the awareness of a world that includes CSA begins with a body that
is rooted within the architectural place. The collection of memories and
recollections starts since childhood and from the spaces that we inhabit.484 If
we are able to recognise CSA, it is because a long chain of temporal
experiences entrenched in architectural place have been accumulated within
consciousness. We learn or not to appreciate it, we are taught or not to identify
it, and we are cultivated or not to take care of it. The question arises, how could
483 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study p. 264.
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we transform the past? The past depends on our position on the present. It is
true, we cannot change the past, but if we are at the comet’s head, we may have
certain autonomy to influence its movement, changing the past that we are
leaving behind. It seems that we can change the past and the present is always a
definite given.
5.2 Memory and the Architectural Place
Just as imagination takes us forward into the realm of the purely possible – into
what might be – so memory brings us back into the domain of the actual and the
already elapsed: to what has been. Place ushers us into what already is: namely,
the environing subsoil of our embodiment, the bedrock of our being-in-the-
world. If imagination projects us out beyond ourselves while memory takes us
back behind ourselves, place subtends and enfolds us, lying perpetually under
and around us. In imagining and remembering, we got into the ethereal and the
thick respectively. By being in place, we find ourselves in what is subsistent
and enveloping.
Edward Casey, Getting back into place. Toward a renewed understanding of the
place-world, 1998.485
One definition of the term nostalgia describe it as the “sentimental
longing for or regretful memory of a period of the past, especially one in an
individual's own lifetime” and also “sentimental imagining or evocation of a
period of the past.” Although, what the description hides and the etymology
reveals is that the term was formed with the Greek words ȞȩıĲȠȢ, meaning the
returning to home, and ĮȜȖȓĮ, which means pain.486 The also called
homesickness – considered sometimes as a medical condition – reveals the
dominant link between human memory and architectural place. It could be
484 Ricoeur highlights the importance of construction for inhabitation. Cfr. Ricoeur, Memory,
history, forgetting p. 150.
485 Edward S. Casey, Getting back into place. Toward a renewed understanding of the place-
world, xx, 403 p. vols. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) p. xvii.
486 "nostalgia". The Oxford English Dictionary (Draft Revision June) OED Online, (Oxford
University Press, 2008 [cited 20 August 2007]); available from
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suggested that when a supposed memory lacks this specific location,
intentionality might belong more to the region of imagination than to that of
memory. Less arguably we can say with Casey that “memory is naturally place-
oriented or at least place-supported.”487 If that is the case then, the
characteristics of the inhabited place to which memory is always anchored
acquire particular significance.
The noetic and the noematic characteristics of memory that we have
selected cannot be understood as abstract qualities without an adequate context
surrounding the movement of consciousness. Just as consciousness is always
consciousness of something and remembering is always remembering
something, the memory of that something is always anchored to somewhere.
The philosophical survey of Casey about the significance of place seems to
offer this conclusion. However, the characteristics of this place can be further
investigated. Already in Chapter 4, we mentioned the connection between
natural environment and manmade environment. What we did not emphasise
enough is that – rewording the motto of Terentius – architecture is human, so
nothing human is strange to it. Within the manifold of which architecture is
constituted, the simplicity or complexity of its different elements is always
configuring the human place. Human can inhabit in the most basic or primitive
conditions, however there is always an interaction with the environment in the
forms of intervention, permanence and care. This configures what Casey calls
place, and we are consequently referring as the architectural place. Thus seen,
the architectural place is not a different sort of place than that where human
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00327373?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=nostal
gia&first=1&max_to_show=10.
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being inhabits, but a different concretization of it, from which CSA emerge and
on which conservation is nowadays performed. The analysis of this
architectural place vis-à-vis temporal intentionality should reveal the more or
less pertinence of conservation as memory in its present form.
Memory Places
Ricoeur considers that place memory and commemoration, which we
discuss in Section 5.3, are not out of the sphere of conscious intentionality “but
reveal its nonreflexive dimension.” He states that “[i]t is indeed at this
primordial level that the phenomenon of lieux de mémoire – places of memory
– is constituted before they become reference for historical knowledge.”488
Place memory is a concept with particular importance to further structure
collective memory. It is possible to consider it as the scenery of the social
memory, the story to which it is tied. Nevertheless, it has been observed that
place has been continuously overlooked from the studies of memory due to the
preponderance of temporality as a more essential aspect of memory.489 Despite
this omission, its significance has not been completely ignored, since
Pythagorean and Aristotelian traditions recognise the importance of place.The
Cartesian concept of site – “place as levelled down to metrically determinate
dimensions” – has a lot to do with the demotion of place and its substitution for
487 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study pp. 186-7.
488 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 41. The concept of lieux de mémoire has been
developed and studied by Pierre Nora and will be maintained in French to distinguish it from
places of memory in any other sense. Cfr. Nora, Les lieux de mémoire, Pierre. Nora, Les lieux
de mémoire, 3 v. in 7 vols. ([Paris]: Gallimard, 1984), Pierre. Nora and Lawrence D. Kritzman,
Realms of memory rethinking the French past, 3 v. vols. (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996).
489 Cfr. Casey, The fate of place a philosophical history.
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the concept of site.490 With thinkers such as Issac Newton, René Descartes, and
Daniel Bernoulli – Casey argues – “space was conceived as continuous
extension in length, breadth and width and, thus, as mappable by the three-
dimensional coordinate system of rational geometry.”491 On the other hand, it
has been suggested that each memory looks for its particular place to be linked
to. Accordingly, it seems that individuality is what allows reinforcing the
memorability of place.
It is the stabilizing persistence of place as a container of experiences that
contributes so powerfully to its intrinsic memorability. An alert and alive
memory connects spontaneously with place, finding in it features that favor
and parallel its own activities. We might even say that memory is naturally
place-oriented or at least place-supported. Moreover, it is itself a place
wherein the past can revive and survive; it is a place for places, meeting them
midway in its own preservative powers, its ‘reservative’ role. Unlike site and
time, memory does not thrive on the indifferently dispersed. It thrives, rather,
on the persistent particularities of what is properly in place: held fast there
and made one’s own.492
Since ancient times tradition has endowed place with distinct potencies:
genius loci, Lar of the home or spirit of a place. These myths reveal the
importance given to the place as bearer of significance. Although as result of
Enlightenment, the concept of place space suffered a simplification through
rationalisation that took away any metaphysical attribute from it.493 The
question arises; could the shift from collective memory to historical knowledge
be deduced from the connection between, on the one side rational geometrical
space and chronological time, with, on the other side, lived time and lived
space? Is it possible that conservation of CSA is entrapped in the middle of this
impasse? Conservation of CSA has attempted since Enlightenment onwards to
490 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study p. 184.
491 Ibid. pp. 184-5, 89.
492 Ibid. pp. 186-7.
493 Ibid. pp. 184-5, 189.
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be only scientifically truthful, but at the same time, it still may invoke values
that go beyond the simple determination of exact time and precise space. The
aim of conservation applied to CSA demands to reveal what is its essential
nature and which values has embedded within, in order to perform actions to
take care of it. The significance of place for the concept of memory can be
inferred from the description of lieu de mémoire offered by Nora
Because, if it is true that the fundamental raison d'être of a ‘lieu de mémoire’
is to stop time, to block the effort of oblivion, to fix a state of affaires, to
immortalise death, to materialise the immaterial [...] enclosing the maximum
of sense in the minimum of signs, it is clear then –and this is what renders
them fascinating – that the ‘lieux de mémoire’ do not live but because of their
capacity to metamorphose, in the incessant reprocess of their significations
and the unpredictable splitting of their ramifications.494
This view could be supported with the argument that the perceptual
power of the body and its need to seek orientation, anchors experience in place,
and help to anchor this memory.495 The long path, from the primordial body
memory to the symbolic complexity of the lieux de mémoire, implicitly bears
inhabitation.496 All possible memory is phenomenologically intended dwelling
somewhere, about somewhere, or about something situated somewhere.497
Memory and place have also been compared as symmetrical.
Accordingly, a modern function ascribed to memory is the containing
494 Nora, Les lieux de mémoire p. 38. “Car s’il est vrai que la raison d’être fondamentale d’un
lieu de mémoire est d’arrêter le temps, de bloquer le travail de l’oubli, de fixer un état des
choses, d’immortaliser la mort, de matérialiser l’immatériel pour [...] enfermer le maximum de
sens dans le minimum de signes, il est clair, et c’est ce qui les rend passionnants, que les lieux
de mémoire ne vivent que de leur aptitude à la métamorphose, dans l’incessant rebondissement
de leurs significations et le buissonnement imprévisible de leurs ramifications.” (Our
translation).
495 Cfr. Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 41.
496 In reference with the significance of body memory in relation to inhabitation, cfr. Ibid. pp.
147-53.
497 A significant aspect is that of the expressiveness of the memorability of place. Casey
underlines the idea of nostalgia in relation to place. Cfr. Casey, Remembering, a
phenomenological study. p. 201.
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function.498 Casey affirms that “[t]he place/memory parallel assumes still
further forms which we can designate under the headings of horizon, pathway,
and constituent things.”499 However, he warns against trivialising time in the
concreteness of place reducing it to the mere expression of objective time. He
comments Bachelard’s observations about the pre-eminence in memory of
location over time
If Bachelard is [...] correct about the nature of memory, not only is narratizing
of secondary interest but the idea of remembering as re-experiencing the past
is rendered moot, including Husserl’s claim that ‘we can relive the present
[even if] it cannot be given again.’ Also contested is Heidegger’s view in
Being and Time that Dasein achieves authenticity only in a resolute repetition
or its past. Could it be that authenticity lies instead in the very spatiality
which Heidegger makes into a mere function of temporality?500
Three threads seem derivative of this argument. One that at this point
should be clear for us is that, as it also can be deduced from Ricoeur, the
importance of the link between Cartesian space and Objective time with
memory and place is a relevant connection for historic knowledge. We have
sustained that conservation of CSA, as it has been conceived until very
recently, belongs to an attitude that aims to objectify architectural place.
Conservation has been approaching architecture as alien to the existential
human condition considering it as event, process or object enduring in time.
We discuss more about this connection in Section 5.3. Conservation has taken
CSA as container of memory in its matter, when matter would only be the
support for memory to emerge, embedded in the inhabitation of the familiarity
of the city and the intimacy of the house.
498 Ibid. p. 202.
499 Ibid. p. 203.
500 Ibid. p. 214. Cfr. Gaston. Bachelard, La poétique de l’espace, 6e éd. ed., 214 p vols. (Paris:
Presses universitaires de France, 1970).
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The second refers to the emphasis on the intimate relation for
consciousness between memory and place. The sterile determination of
Objective time shows – in contrast with the location of time-consciousness that
memory involves – an almost complete lack of existential significance for
human experience, except for the scientific attitude and its consequent values.
However, conservation of CSA, as practiced nowadays, is especially difficult
when it needs to deal with human inhabitation and the human perception of its
architectural place. The parts and the qualities of architecture are not merely
matter in time. They offer sense of origin, belonging, destiny and structure of
activity to the human being, at not only individual level but also especially in
collective life. We discuss this dimension in the next Section 5.3. The third
thread is the possibility of other interpretation of the human condition in its
juncture of architectural place and existential time. We postpone such an
endeavour until Chapter 6.
The Cases of Remembered Architecture
Temporal intentionality needs to be addressed by consciousness towards
something, it is not passively received. This implies effort and movement that
in conservation becomes work of interpretation of architecture.
Phenomenologically, architecture, and specifically CSA, can be considered for
memory in a twofold sense. First in the noetic sense, architecture participates of
the consciousness’ process of intentionality. It supports, facilitates, triggers and
eventually keeps memories. In the noematic sense, architecture belongs to the
object of remembrance. CSA as noema is the aim for conservation to recover,
protect and preserve. The object of modern conservation has been CSA in its
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noematic presentation, therefore as content of consciousness. However, this
content of conservation as temporal intentionality can be varied according to
the relative temporal relationship between conservator’s consciousness and
CSA to conserve.
Consciousness remembering architecture is situated in the present. In
correspondence with its flowing experience of time, it has three cones that
define the possible horizons of experience. These horizons as we have seen do
not have sharp limits but a blurry overlapping. One looks in expectation
towards the future, another narrowly addresses the present of perception, and
the third looks towards the past in recollection. They define the possible
temporal experience of consciousness in relation to architecture in different
ways. Accordingly, it is possible to individuate at least five temporal cases of
remembered architecture.
The first case is when consciousness remembers architecture that was
both built and destroyed in the past, beyond its horizon of experience. The
support to concretize this noematic content is by reference, never a relived
perception. This mode is usually amalgamated with imagination. It is not pure
memory in the strict sense of the term. Because of its temporal distance in the
past, the appearance in memory can be similar to the event, or a part of a
process. The noesis of this memory is analogous to the concretization of purely
intentional objects, in which similarly to the Brandian astanza it calls into pure
existence something that is absent.501 Consequently, the possibility to conserve
this architecture in its material form is by reconstructing it, constituting a new
501 Sometimes the effectiveness of this memory – the happy memory in Ricoeur terms – rests in
belief.
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building that can merge with the past one. The manifold of this architecture
necessarily brings new elements and abandons others.
In the second case, the building began its existence beyond the horizon
of the past but finished its existence within the cone of the present-past
experience. This case supposes an observer remembering architecture because
she experienced it, and she may have witnessed the building’s destruction. In
this case, the definition of the noematic content of architecture depends on the
temporal distance between the end of the building’s existence and the present
of the experience of remembering; if it is short, the memories can be very rich;
but if the distance is long, architecture start to lose many dimensions and
appears mnemonically flattened as an event. Conservation of this case is also
by the means of reconstruction. However, its reconstruction can rescue parts of
the old building in order to bring some elements of its constitutive manifold to
life again.
The third case is the one of architecture that having the beginning of its
existence in the past and beyond the horizon of experience of consciousness,
accompanies the existence of the rememberer’s consciousness until the present
perception. The content of this remembered architecture may merge easily with
the environment given its pervasiveness in the experienced time. Even if the
building is transformed in time in drastic forms, its memory may seem wrapped
in the familiarity of the everyday. This case of remembered architecture is
similar to remembering a person in which one recalls certain features –
expressions, gestures, voice, attitudes, and so forth – according to the occasion
of the memory. The memory of this architecture can be very familiar as well,
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since in general terms this is most of the architecture that accompanies the
existence bringing sense of place, belonging, identity and stability. If this case
of remembered architecture is CSA, its conservation may deal with the interests
of several stakeholders. The manifold constituting this CSA can be very
complex, since it may embrace the coincident cone of existence of many people
and its conservation demands the complete evaluation of its existent manifold
considering its evolution in time.
The memory of a building whose existence starts within the cone of
experience of the observer and that continues to exist in the present is the
fourth case. As in the previous one, its noematic content is embedded in the
present existence of the observer; however, depending on the temporal distance
of its coming into existence, it can be experienced either as something new that
collides with the status quo, or as architecture that has started to be assimilated.
The collection of memories of this case establishes a sort of middling that
usually facilitates assimilation. The interplay of the noetic processes of this
case and the previous one constitutes the main part of the dialectics between
existent and new, tradition and innovation, standard and revolutionary,
conservative and progressist, and so on. This memory of architecture is easily
related with the one of building as activity, in which the processes of creation,
construction, and inhabitation may be distinguished. Conservation of this case
of CSA is similar to the previous case depending on the distance of its creation.
The reconstruction of architecture that does not exist anymore constitutes with
its coming into existence a new instance of this fourth case, since it is a new
building, although supported on the memory of a previous one.
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The fifth case of remembered architecture is the one of a building
whose existence started and finished within the cone of experience of
consciousness. Always depending on the temporal distances between its start,
its end and the present of consciousness, the content of this memory can be
either precise and sharp because of a short existence, or similar to the cases
two, three and four. If architecture in this case constitutes CSA, its
conservation implies reconstruction. The cases previously described are
illustrated in Figure 5-2.
(4)
(4)
1
2
3
4
5 (4)
PresentPast
horizon of
experience
Future
horizon of
experience
[Death]
Reconstruction
Objects enduring in time
Event Event Event
Process
Time line
Present
observer
Future
observer
Figure 5-2 The five cases of remembered architecture. (Own diagram)
This phenomenological schematisation makes a reduction only of the
time dimension, thus analysing only the temporal relationship between
consciousness and architecture within a cone of existence. The analysis can be
helpful to describe the real possibilities of encounter with architecture and the
ways to remember it, knowing that in any case none can experience all the
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existent architecture. Additionally to the cases of architecture as an object
enduring in time, some possible memories of architecture as a process or as an
event can be described as synchronic or diachronic noemata. The physical and
temporal existence of a work of architecture, moreover CSA, is rarely sharply
outlined. The mnemonic cases analysed here offer a phenomenological schema
in which consciousness approaches architecture in isolation. However,
conservation is a social activity that should never be performed in individual
form, so the implications of memory from a collective point of view demand
additional reflection.
5.3 Collective Architectural Memory
[w]hen society becomes too different from what it had been in the past and
from the conditions in which [determinate] traditions had arisen, it will no
longer find within itself the elements necessary to reconstruct, consolidate, and
repair these traditions. Society will then be obligated to adopt new values, that
is, to rely on other traditions that are more closely in tune with present-day
needs and tendencies. But it is within the framework of these old notions and
under the pretext of traditional ideas, that a new order of values would become
slowly elaborated.
Maurice Halbwachs, On collective memory, 1950.502
One of the most relevant issues in phenomenology nowadays is not only
the concerns for analysis of intersubjectivity, but also the actual existence of
collective intentionalities. Whether we talk about collective memory as an
existing entity or as a useful linguistic metaphor is matter of discussion.503 The
assumption of the existence of collective architectural memories demands to
take a provisional stand on this regard. Within the theories that consider the
notion of a group mind, two main strands of conception of collective memory
502 Halbwachs, On collective memory. pp. 159-60.
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have been distinguished. One considers collective psychology and the other the
notion of the superorganism. Congenial with the theories of Halbwachs –
author of the seminal work On collective memory, and who developed
importantly this notion – are the theories within the first group. One of these
theories is the social manifestation thesis, “[...] a thesis about how some
psychological capacities are manifested only in certain kind of social
circumstances.”504 Architecture and its ways of being remembered and
incorporated within the collective memory play a significant role in the
construction of the world-view of human groups. In discussing collective
memory then, it is important to precise who and how remember in the phrase:
we remember.
Ricoeur has explored relevant issues in the manipulation of memory in
search of identity, individual and collective, as well as the level of ethico-
political level.505 However, our endeavour cannot provide the comprehensive
view that all the nuances that architectural memories have in the configuration
of the complete social exercise of memory. Instead, this section presents the
links that join the individual architectural mnemonic intentionality with the
collective intentionality that constructs CSA. Ricoeur emphasised the paradox
of the obligated memory questioning
[...] how can it be permissible to say: ‘you must remember,’ hence to speak of
memory in the imperative mood, although it is characteristic of memory to
emerge as a spontaneus evocation, hence as pathos, according to Aristotle’s
De memoria?506
503 Cfr. Robert A. Wilson, "Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis,"
Cognitive Processing Volume 6, no. 4 (2005).
504 Ibid.: p. 229.
505 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting pp. 80-6.
506 Ibid. p. 87.
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He connected the possibility of direct memory and the notion of
heritage to the ethical aspects of justice and debt in “[t]he duty of memory [as]
the duty to do justice, through memories, to an other than the self. [...] We are
indebted to those who have gone before us for part of what we are.”507 Despite
the relevance of these ethical concerns, this thesis argues that the construction
of CSA begins even before than the possibility of directing or manipulating
memory, that is to say in the sources of our tacit knowledge. In a similar way as
the architectural place establishes a definite connection with consciousness’
memories, apprehension of CSA results from the social construction that is
partly founded on the temporality of collective inhabitation.
From the Ego to the We
A crowd of tourists visits a temple in function to appreciate its artistic
and cultural treasures. As they enter in the architectural place, they may notice
not only a building but also a particular environment, an ambience.
Architecture conditions the air, quality of light, level of noises and echoes,
textures, materials, colours and decoration, creating an atmosphere. There may
be other people within, maybe believers performing rituals. Suddenly the
tourists do behave in a certain manner, and if not, they may notice their
transgression of an order. How do people know that, in presence of certain
conditions in the architectural place, one – for instance – must keep silence, not
shout, walk slowly? This knowledge seems acquired by gradual social exposure
to the life in commonality; nevertheless, the process to accumulate the
memories that construct this is a complex one. In Section 5.2, we mentioned a
507 Ibid. p. 89.
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sort of middling that was produced within consciousness in which memories of
the inhabited places are accumulated. Something analogous may occur for the
concretization of collective memories of CSA, producing the gradual
acceptance of cultural significance of certain buildings or architecture with
particular characteristics.
The link between individual memory place and collective memory
about CSA seems ordered by the performance of modes of memory that imply
some progressive inclusion of social interaction. For instance, the mnemonic
mode of reminding that induces the remindee to something that he could
otherwise forget includes both, the individuality of the practical use and the
possibility of a collective dimension. In the individual dimension
[t]o remember a future commitment is to presume, but not necessarily to
recall, a past event of committal. [...] The reminder is thus a point of
connection between past and future, a Janus bifrons which is apprehended in
a present moment situated between the past of engagement and the future of
enactment.508
In its collective variety, this mnemonic mode is the one asked by
monuments, in which society is admonished to remember. This connects with
the ethical and political aspects highlighted by Ricoeur lines above.
Monuments establish a link between a presupposed past – that can even be
unknown by the rememberer – and a future moment of remembrance. Since
much of CSA is constituted by intended monuments, this mnemonic mode in
its collective form already suggests the existence of social memory’s
performance in the form of a commitment to remember.
508 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study p. 93.
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Ricoeur has located the primary link between individual and collective
memory in language, to be precise in narrative.509 This seems related to the
mode of memory of reminiscing, which is remembering with others. The
passivity of reminding has been contrasted with the activity of reminiscing; the
subject remembers or recollects something, but reminisces about something.
Some of the characteristics of reminiscing are significant in the context of CSA
as process or content of memory. For instance, the presence of reminiscentia, –
or objects that in some way survive from the time of the memory being
reminisced about – is fundamental for triggering recollection of architecture.510
Casey has developed the communal-discursive aspect of reminiscing
suggesting that the company of others somehow favours it. This is of particular
importance in the path from individual architectural memories towards their
collective dimension. It has been stated that
Whether those present be relatives or friends, or mere acquaintances or even
strangers, they must all share to some degree the experiences being
reminisced about. For what evokes and sustains reminiscence is the
possessing of certain common or like experiences. [...] the reminiscer and
those who are co-present with him or her need not have had literally the same
experiences.511
From his analysis, he extracts two corollaries: the first is that
reminiscing is mainly addressed to others; and the second is that reminiscing is
most fully realized in language.512 The relevant fact for the concretization of
memories of CSA is the connective role of reminiscing between the intimacy of
the individual and familiar architectural place, and the public life that other
modes of architectural memories imply. The sense of place, identity and
509 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 97.
510 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study pp. 110-12.
511 Ibid. pp. 113-5. Cfr. also Blustein, The moral demands of memory, David. Middleton and
Derek. Edwards, Collective remembering, ix, 230 p. vols. (London: Sage, 1990).
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belonging or their later evolutions and transformations seem necessarily
originated at this primordial stage.
Commemoration is defined as remembering with others through the
mediating role of something else and in a special social occasion. This
something else can be texts, traditions, rituals, special visits to historic places,
and so forth in which the explicit or implicit existence of CSA is at play.
Because of this social involvement, it is at this stage of the collectivisation of
memory that the architectural place starts to be perceived as CSA. If
architectural place shall be considered the scenery of collective memory,
commemoration should then constitute the script. Casey underlines the
importance of the others in this form of remembering when one feels that we
remember instead of I remember. One leaves the privacy of the private
architectural place to access the public space in the solemnity of this kind of
recollection. The individual mnemonic place is abandoned and instead
consciousness recalls through the mediation of ritual, words and the presence
of others. Casey calls commemorabilia to the elements whose role is as a
mediating vehicle to remember people or events – the participant may have not
known them – but through which it is possible to participate.513 Architecture in
this context sometimes has the role of commemoration’s container and
sometimes as part of commemorabilia itself. Monuments, temples, tombs are
examples of this.
For ritual in commemoration to take place the following constituents
have been suggested: “[...] an act of reflection or an occasion for such an act
512 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study. p. 116.
513 Ibid. pp. 218-9.
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[...]; an allusion to the commemorated event or person [...] that precedes or
sanctions the ritual itself [...]; bodily action [...]; and collective participation in
the ritualistic action [...].”514 Additionally, solemnisation, memorialisation, and
perdurance are found within the significant factors in commemoration
rituals.515 The most relevant element to consider in this form of memory is
perdurance, not only as part of commemoration, but also as a concept at the
core of conservation of CSA. The possibility to intuit perdurance in CSA is
fundamental in the support of adequate environments for commemoration. As
it has been observed, this is a concept that Western thought has ignored in
some measure.
The reason for this neglect doubtless lies in the fact that reflection on time has
focused on the extremities of ‘time’ and ‘eternity.’ Eternity connotes an
intelligible, wholly fulfilled order of being, while time in contrast, signifies
something degenerate, fleeting, and opaque to intelligence. Indeed time may
come to be regarded as the mere ‘image’ of eternity, its ‘moving likeness
(eikon)’ in Plato’s phrase.516
The importance of commemoration is crucial for the construction of
collective memory and the creation of identity as cultural patterns of
inhabitation, and not as still images of the past. It constitutes a gathering of
uses that enter in the constitution of the mores in society. Commemoration
constitutes an important ingredient in the structure of social values implicit in
architectural conservation, which are independent from history but run parallel
to it.517
514 Ibid. p. 223.
515 Ibid. pp. 223-9
516 Ibid. p. 228. (Our emphasis).
517 Ibid. p. 251 Ricoeur has said that, although Husserl egological transcendental consciousness,
“[t]he final paragraphs of the famous Fifth Cartesian Meditation do indeed propose the theme
of the ‘communalization’ of experience at all levels of meaning, from the foundation of a
common ground in physical nature (§ 55, 120-28) to the celebrated constitution of ‘higher
intersubjective communities’ (still called ‘personalities of a higher order’), a constitution
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Collective Memory as Mechanism of Assimilation
Halbwachs has presented collective memory as a flexible interpretation
of the past. It could be argued that there are some experiences whose memories
are independent of society even when “it is in society that people normally
acquire memories”518. The primordiality of individual architectural memories
to which we referred in the previous section is sometimes given, by necessity in
a social environment, but without the social involvement of the rememberer.
One of the noteworthy issues that Halbwachs arises in his account of the notion
of collective memory is the idealisation of the past in the sense that society
seems to consider it as a better age to live than the present.519 This idealisation
and the fact that humans feel more connected with people of similar age
sharing perspectives and interests happen in society in general but in special
manner within the family.520 Significance and meaning of family thoughts are
achieved by finding cohesive elements.521
He presents family’s collective memories as flexible interpretations of
the past. These interpretations imply changes and incorporation of new parts
constructed with the intention of making them understandable to the novice
members.522 Nevertheless, the phenomenon is also observable in society.523
This correlation explicates the gradual shift that conservation is experiencing
resulting from a process of ‘social communalization’ (§58, 132) We certainly do not encounter
the word ‘common memory’ in this broadened context of transcendental phenomenology, but it
would be perfectly in harmony with the concept of ‘worlds of culture,’ understood in the sense
of ‘concrete life-worlds in which the relatively or absolutely separate communities live their
passive and active lives.” (§ 58, 133).” Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 118.
518 Halbwachs, On collective memory p. 38.
519 Ibid. p. 48.
520 Ibid. p. 52.
521 Ibid. p. 54.
522 Ibid. p. 75.
523 Ibid. pp. 86-7.
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through a new conception of it that would allow its legitimisation in the present
world.524 Halbwachs also observes the phenomena of social integration of new
values into old structures of social classes with a practical objective. The
epigraph of this section explains this phenomenon. This happens in the
development of conservation theories to support the reconstruction of the past
in order to have integrity within society’s view. This is a fundamental part of
the equilibrium in human society to function as a place that fulfils aspirations
to its members, even when the cost can be the falsification of the past.525 He
suggests the existence of a rational activity that completes collective memory.
This collective memory functions as a framework to anchor the reflection of
the past and the rational activity controls the adequate connections of past with
present.526 Conservation in this scheme is part of this mechanism that organises
the idea that society has of its past. Conservation would even influence the idea
of what to consider CSA in the collective memory accordingly to its changing
values.527
This means that the manifold of concretizations that architecture
produces can be gradually adapted and transformed creatively to generate
coherence in the complete socio-cultural environment. The double relativity of
memory that refers to the viewer and the material support, allows the
possibility of social participation in the construction of the collective memory
leading to its assimilation. This suggests that in the ontological foundation of
524 Ibid. p. 156.
525 Ibid. pp. 182-3.
526 Ibid. p. 183.
527 This interpretation could make clear the gradual shift that conservation is experiencing
through a new conception of it that would allow its legitimate performance in the present world.
Ibid. p. 156.
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CSA exists a constant field of action in which architects, conservators, users,
viewers, and the like, can act and operate.
The concept of collective memory has been evolving and nowadays it is
being revaluated because of the apparent compression of the interval between
past and present.528 It seems that the epistemological shift from memory to
history – already mentioned in Chapter 3 – is analogous to the transition from
personal to collective memory.529 Collective memory and history are not
similar things as could mistakenly be supposed.
Memory is life, always taken by living groups and by this reason it is in
constant evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and amnesia,
unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to every use and
manipulation, susceptible to long expectations and sudden revitalisations.
History is the reconstruction always problematic and incomplete of that that is
no more. Memory is an always actual phenomenon, a lived link to the eternal
present; history, a representation of the past.530
This position may seem extreme to some scholars, however the
mechanisms to have memories and recollections through architecture at
collective level is what is relevant for this thesis.531 It seems apparent that CSA
bears a manifold of values and among them collective memories and
recollection triggers. How collectivity establishes what memories are to be
preserved and forgotten is less obvious, because of the fear of annihilation of
the physical references for collective identities. Actually, Ingarden described as
528 Cfr. Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 297.
529 This seems to be the conclusion that can be inferred from the phenomenological approach
that Ricoeur does concerning memory. Cfr. Ibid. pp. 21-55.
530 Nora, Les lieux de mémoire. pp. 24,5. “Mémoire, histoire : loin d’être synonymes, nous
prenons conscience que tout les oppose. La mémoire est la vie, toujours portée par des groupes
vivants et à ce titre, elle est en évolution permanente, ouverte à la dialectique du souvenir et de
l’amnésie, inconsciente de ses déformations successives, vulnérable à toutes les utilisations et
manipulations, susceptible de longes latences et de soudaines revitalisations. L’histoire est la
reconstruction toujours problématique et incomplète de ce qui n’est plus. La mémoire est un
phénomène toujours actuel, un lien vécu au présent éternel ; l’histoire, une représentation du
passé.” (Our translation).
531 Cfr. Blustein, The moral demands of memory p. 202.
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incomprehensible the transition from being to non-being.532 This explains why,
in the assimilation process, it is more difficult for society to admit the cessation
of the existence of CSA than to accept its transformation into something
changed or new. In the context of this apprehension towards the end of the
existence, conservation should emerge as a form of caring for the environment
that confers a stable architectural place to society, a temporal intentionality that
aimed to make apparent the elements of the manifold of CSA that require
actions of preservation.
The discussion about the autonomy conceded to memory is conflated
with that of the truth that is sought in it and as consequence in proposals of
conservation of CSA. Casey has argued that
Despite our propensity for subjecting recollection to the passivist paradigm of
the photograph, recollecting itself is hardly an unactive affair. It models the
past rather than merely remodelling it, and to be able to do this is to be
autonomous [...]. Recollecting [...] deals with past actualities, which it
transforms rather than simply transmits. The transformative work of
recollection belongs to a complex circumstance in which effort and resistance,
recasting and re-viewing, are all in play. [...] The delaying power points
instead to a model in which the past provides the very depth of memory, yet is
continually reshaped in the present. Rather than being a simple stockpile of
dead actualities [...] the past ‘begins now and is always becoming.’ In short,
the past develops, thanks to the delaying action of remembering.533
If memory is then accepted as a determinant of conservation, attitudes
regarding assimilation of the new should evolve in order to learn how and
when to receive it. Consciousness about the constitutive manifold of
architecture can increase the ability of society to configure past concretizations
in healthy and creative ways. For all this, our contention is that memory has to
remain as an integral part of conservation intentionality. However, conclusive
532 According to him, humans are leaned to see this more as transformation than as cessation of
being. Cfr. Ingarden, Time and modes of being pp. 34-5.
533 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study p. 275. (Emphasis in the original).
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methods would depend on the conception of architecture as a manifold of
architectural objects. As seen in Chapter 4, CSA is a manifold of entities, some
of them anchored in the same physical and material whole, but others
constructed from the individual and collective consciousness. Among these,
there are memories, aesthetic values, symbols, and so forth. If conservation
intends to deal with them it needs to understand their essential nature. As
spectators with a life limited between birth and death, the decaying of CSA
shows us the passing of time. It works as a constant memory of the past, but
also a reminder of our future: a naturally limited human future.
5.4 Temporality as Creative Attitude
[...] whenever we remember and in whatever way we remember we get a
different past every time. [...] remembering makes a very considerable
difference in how we relate to the past. [...] We regain the past as different each
time.
Edward Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study, 1987. 534
The Templo Mayor in Mexico City was reconstructed at least seven
times over the previous version every 52 years approximately. It could be
suggested that the concretization of the temple was the same but in a renewed
mythical cycle.535 Certain Japanese Shinto shrines, such as Ise Jingu, are done
having in mind that they need to be rebuilt every regular period of years in an
534 Ibid. pp. 285-6.(Emphasis in the original).
535 We do not attempt here to suggest that an equivalent concretisation in Aztec civilization
could be understood as Western’s concretisation of the same temple, but that consciousness had
as their filling the same temple and not a different one. Temporal intentionality varies from
culture to culture and in relation with Aztec temporality is interesting to note that “[t]he idea
that one can understand the actions of people from another culture in their own ideological
terms arises from the undeniable fact that values infuse everything and, in that sense at least, we
do not have an objective understanding of the world but a conceptually constructed one that is
best explained from the vantage point of that culture.” Ross Hassig, Time, History, and Belief
in Aztec and Colonial Mexico (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2001) p. 48.
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immediate next site reserved for that purpose. The shrine keeps its identity in
this constant renewed being the same.536 These buildings not only were but also
they became all the time. Given these examples of concretization of CSA in
relation with temporality and change, and if there has always been insertion of
new buildings in contexts of CSA, the question arises, how is the attitude
toward architectural transformations in the Western world after the arrival of
the Modern Era? Moreover, how could insertions be considered in the
postmodern conditions nowadays? Until recent times, these renewing
interventions were cases of the former activity of maintenance and adaptation
of the architectural place. As suggested in Chapter 3 after the impulse of the
Enlightenment, the inclusion of the new in the old acquired different
importance because of the changes in the historical consciousness and its meant
objectivity. Modern conservation as temporal intentionality was originated with
the purpose to protect this objectivity.
Nevertheless, as Voegelin has said “[i]n the illuminative dimensions of
past and future, one becomes aware not of empty spaces but of the structures of
a finite process between birth and death.”537 Beyond these two points, we
cannot have experience. Thus, to explain that beyond we have to recur to
symbols, myths, philosophies or rational and scientific explanations. From that
point – he argues – a bad philosopher would try to reduce the plurality of the
process to a single one; a good philosopher would try to rationalise the myth as
a tool to speculate.538 Voegelin states that when the symbolical language has
536 Cfr. Dominic Mciver Lopes, "Shikinen Sengu and the Ontology of Architecture in Japan,"
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65, no. 1 (2007).
537 Eric Voegelin, M. J. Hanak et al., Anamnesis on the theory of history and politics, 438 p.
vols. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002) pp. 69-70.
538 Ibid.
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been exhausted and does not match with the symbolised, civilization is in
crisis. He then legitimises the tabula rasa as something required to develop a
new symbolism. He states emphatically that “protesting against such a new
beginning in the name of tradition is nothing more than a symptom of spiritual
sterility.”539 This can be considered as a radical measure, however there may be
other paths of assimilation towards a more complete consideration of human
temporality.
FromMyth to Social Ontology
Before the Humanism of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment that
followed it, the mythical dimension of the explanation that Western civilization
had about its place and its time provided society with a more stable perception
of its architectural place in equilibrium and continuity. Changes and
transformations were slowly assimilated in periods of several generations with
the help of collective mechanisms such as the one described by Halbwachs.540
This situation helped consolidate the collective memory inherited through time.
Nevertheless, another implicit kind of knowledge is suggested that humans
develop on the grounds of their nature.
[t]he structure of tacit knowing [...] shows that all thought contains
components of which we are subsidiarily aware in the focal content of our
thinking, and that all thought dwells in its subsidiaries, as if they were part of
539 Ibid. pp. 81-2.
540 The importance of the incorporation of myths as part of the explanation of the architectural
reality and the privileged notion of science as the more adequate explanation has frequently
been highlighted. The intention here is not to give a historical account of that process of
concealment, but to speculate on the process in which this has happened in human
consciousness. For different perspectives on these matters, cfr. Alberto Pérez Gómez,
Architecture and the crisis of modern science, 400p + vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1990), Julia W. Robinson, "Architectural Research: Incorporating Myth and Science," Journal
of Architectural Education 44, no. 1 (1990), Dalibor. Vesely, Architecture in the age of divided
representation the question of creativity in the shadow of production, xviii, 506 p. vols.
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004).
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our body. [...] Thinking is not only necessarily intentional, as Brentano
thought: it is also necessarily fraught with the roots that it embodies.541
Polanyi sustained that “[t]hought can live only on grounds which we
adopt in the service of a reality to which we submit.”542 The knowledge that
human has of its architectural place is then acquired in the everydayness of the
interactions between life and architecture, as part of a natural process, and not
always as conscious activity.543 Polanyi explains how different levels of tacit
knowing exist in which “[...] operations of a higher level cannot be accounted
for by the laws governing its particulars forming the lower levels.”544 An
instance of this chain in the context of CSA is the one that goes from
techniques to an architectural work of art, in which the technical and pragmatic
level of tectonics cannot explain the mimetic level of the distribution of the
building, and this mimetic level cannot explain the epiphany of the work of art.
This chain of ontological emergences from one level to another can also be
compared with the linking of different levels of social constructions that Searle
proposes.
541 Michael Polanyi, The tacit dimension., 108p. vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1967). p. x
542 Ibid. p. xi. This discussion seems comparable with the social ontology suggested by Searle
discussed further on, which he bases in the meaningful dimension of language. Cfr. Searle, The
construction of social reality. However, Polanyi includes a different aspect suggesting that
“[w]e know more than we can tell.” Polanyi, The tacit dimension. p. 4.
543 In this sense, his arguments seem consistent with the social ontology developed by Searle;
however, his notion of tacit knowledge seems more connected with Searle’s idea of the
background. Polanyi, The tacit dimension. p. 4. This background has features that allow
humans to interpret the structure of consciousness, motivate interest, facilitate readiness, and
dispose behaviours. Searle, The construction of social reality p. 139. On these grounds, he
defends external realism – the fact that there is an external reality independent from any
representation of it – as part of the necessary background to understand utterances, reality is
then an assumption that we take for granted. Searle, The construction of social reality p. 178.
Realism is the claim that “reality is radically nonepistemic.” Opposed to Putnam who says –
attacking realism – that “[t]ruth is supposed to be radically nonepistemic.” Searle, The
construction of social reality pp. 233-4. (Emphasis in the original)
544 Polanyi, The tacit dimension. p. 36.
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Searle builds up his theory to prove that all our presuppositions are
based in the tacit acceptation of external realism, where representation is
independent from the represented, establishing an ontology for social reality
founded on a sequence from the physical to the social. As suggested in Section
5.2, human society obtains this meaningful structure since childhood when
“[t]he complex structure of social reality is, so to speak, weightless and
invisible [,] [t]he child is brought up in a culture where he or she simply takes
social reality for granted.”545 Searle distinguishes two kinds of objective-
subjective opposition. One is given in the epistemic sense and the other in the
ontological sense. The epistemic is exemplified by opinions or judgments,
whilst the ontological is referring to entities and type of entities.546 The
epistemic notion of architecture as CSA is socially configured supported on
public opinion and by the ontological sense of architecture as part of the
material world, configuring the sensations that human perceives from it. These
two senses combine in the construction of social entities like monuments,
architectural heritage, World heritage, and so forth.
Searle explains the distinction between intrinsic and observer-relative
features of the world saying that,
Observer-relative features are always created by the intrinsic mental
phenomena of the users, observers, etc., of the objects in question. Those
mental phenomena are, like all mental phenomena, ontologically subjective;
and the observer-relative features inherit that ontological subjectivity.547
This ontological subjectivity is acquired from the experiences in the
first social environment – the family – and evolves as tacit knowledge in the
545 Searle, The construction of social reality p. 4.
546 This distinction is correlative with Ingarden’s modes of existence discussed in Section 4.1.
547 Searle, The construction of social reality pp. 12-3.
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system of signification. Since he founds this system in the capacity of language
to signify, he sustains that collective intentionality cannot be considered simply
the summation of individual intentionalities.548 For him, there should not be a
false problem in considering the existence of collective intentionality since
[...] it has seemed that anybody who recognizes collective intentionality as a
primitive form of mental life must be committed to the idea that there exists
some Hegelian world spirit, a collective consciousness, or something equally
implausible. [...] It has seemed [...] that we have to choose between
reductionism, on the one hand, or a supermind floating over individual minds
on the other.549
Significantly, and detaching from these two extremes, what seems to
emerge is a field where human creative intentionality is able to concretize CSA.
Collective intentionality works in accordance with precedent traditions, with
intimate and familiar perceptions, with public opinion, but also with individual
participation. Let us provisionally call this field cultivation and care.550 This
region of human life was filled in pre-modern times with myths, religions,
traditions, mores, and so on in a meaningful system that was more or less
stable. Nevertheless, modernity and later post-modernity brought rupture and
unbalance leaving that field to be filled with consumerism, fashion,
unprecedented mutation. Cultivation and care to create and preserve CSA as a
meaningful architectural place appeared delayed.
By claiming, “language is essentially constitutive of institutional
reality” the deduction is that to have institutional facts society needs language
548 Ibid. pp. 24-5.
549 Ibid. p. 25.
550 We introduce the terms of cultivation and care, not in exactly the same meaning given by
Heidegger to care. We detail the sense we give to these notions in Chapter 6. Instead we call
this region according to Heidegger’s definition of the “[...] ‘whither,’ which makes it possible
for equipment to belong somewhere, and which we circumspectively keep in view ahead of us
in our concernful dealings [.]” Heidegger, Being and time p. 136.
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and each institution needs linguistic elements.551 Even if it could be argued
that, this is not the only way to produce social facts, as Brandi would suggest
for the phenomena that fall out of the sphere of flagrance and signification, that
is to say the work of art. Those institutional facts require language also because
language is epistemologically indispensable; these facts need to be
communicable; they are extremely complex so they need to be represented; and
they resist in time independently of the participants.552 For us, the relevance of
Searle’s theory is the establishment of a structure of the socially constructed
reality in relation to the ontological apparatus that builds up the notion of CSA
and its conservation as an institutional fact. Social reality results in values that
give some kind of power to other social objects or actors that acquire hierarchy.
The nature of the power that is given in this way to CSA seems related directly
to temporal intentionalities in the form of memories, perceptions and
expectations. So far, CSA as social object has focused on both the pastness of
memories and the patrimonial of heritage. However, humankind does not only
need to remember or to possess, it needs an architectural place to live in. The
inclusion of this possible social reality within the aspectual shape of the
manifold of CSA seems imminently indispensable. Creative collective
intentionality in the identified region of cultivation and care seems to be a
plausible option.
551 Searle, The construction of social reality pp. 59-60.
552 In fact, he presumes that “[t]he Y status can be imposed on several different ontological
categories of phenomena: people [...]; objects [...]; and events.” Ibid. p. 97. This refers back to
the same categories established by Ingarden in his ontology. Methodologically he tries to
simplify saying that “we have nothing but the ability to impose a status, and with it [also]
function, by collective agreement or acceptance” demonstrating that institutions need: initial
creation, continued existence and official representation. Searle, The construction of social
reality pp. 112, 15. However, it would be a radical understanding of this theory of social
ontology to suppose that everything that is shared in collectivity is the result of a possible
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Changing Fulcrum
The need to conciliate conservation of CSA with the existential
architectural place has been emerging in the form of the illustrated conflict
between new and existent since even before the consolidation of the Modern
era.553 We have argued, at the beginning of Section 4.1, that all architecture is
necessarily in some way assimilation of new into the existent; however, this
process is all the more apparent nowadays when the threat to socially
established cultural environment is immediate. The question arises as, how
would it be possible to reconciliate at least these two aspects of the
architectural manifold, let alone the significant issue of the manifestation of
architecture as art? How does conservation intentionality need to evolve to
accept changes and transformations in the architectural place in a better way?
Moreover, when the architectural artistic object may constitute an integral part
of the human dwelling place the reduction of the perception of architecture to
mere knowledge, historical data, or intellectual information makes of it not
only an alien object but also an obstacle to future cultural evolution. Modernity
demanded distance from the past; nevertheless, it also implied a degree of
negation of it. The past became, then, the object of study and not the blurring
origin of a process that continues. The complete rationalisation of the relation
human will to change. Cfr. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning
cannot convey, xvii, 180 p. vols. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004) p. 60.
553 Alberti complained about that kind of phenomena when he wrote: “I call Heaven to
Witness, that I am often filled with the highest Indignation when I see Buildings demolished
and going to Ruin by the Carelessness, not to say abominable Avarice of the Owners, Buildings
whose Majesty has saved them from the Fury of the most barbarous and enraged Enemies, and
which Time himself, that perverse and obstinate Destroyer, seems to have destined to Eternity.”
Leone Battista Alberti, L'Architettura (De re aedificatoria) (Milano: Edizioni il Polifilo, 1966)
p. 869-70. Quoted and translated in Jokilehto, "A history of architectural conservation. The
contribution of English, French, German and Italian thought towards an international approach
to the conservation of cultural property" p. 18.
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of society with its heritage has been until very recently the main agenda of the
modern approach in conservation.
At this point, the correlation of how Ingarden conceives architecture
seems relevant to suggest conservation as theoretically consistent with the
assumed CSA at its basis. He finds the concrete architectural work as the
resultant of different factors and perspectives stating that
The architectural as such is based on this unitary coherence in a transparently
clear disposition of all the visible moments of various origins that participate
in the work, the moments connected with the spatial form constituting the
foundation of every architectural construction. An architectural work of art in
the pure sense of the term thus forms something like the only possible
solution of an equation with a certain number of ‘unknowns’ (in the
mathematical sense), so that all details of the form unequivocally result from
the selection of these unknowns and of the equations formulated, which
determine the reciprocal relations of the unknowns.554
Ingarden proposes this definition of architecture as a work of art;
nevertheless, if we associate the architectural work of art with CSA, the
purpose of its conservation should be to regain this coherence of moments. It
seems consequent that, since time continues to flow, the historical, social and
cultural conditions change and therefore the equation has to be constantly
reformulated to find the possible solution to the transformed system. These
conditions imposed in a first moment on architecture by society, are sought
after in the form of values linked to collective memories. These memories
change but never in a definitive way.
Scepticism and fear are ingredients of the new conditions of post-
modernity. The importance of certain forms of art for the construction of
memory and the confrontation of man with time has been underlined, stating
554 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work,
the film p. 291.
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that, “[...] visual arts confer perpetuity, as they come to preserve at least a
semblance of eternity [that] is part of their appeal: they help banish the terror of
time.”555 In this confrontation with the passing time, human being is obligated
to consider his physical end. Nevertheless, this burden has to be overcome with
a sense to be found outside of the perception of time as a destructive force.556
Therefore as pinpointed in Section 3.4, the receptor of CSA has started to be
considered the main fulcrum of conservation. The contemporary concern is
whether it is possible to preserve values, whether is it possible to conceive
values and meaning separately to the CSA that bears them. The intention
should be to conserve while recovering values without compromising others;
might there be conflicts between values the choice should be determined by the
cultural context.557 This cultural context cannot avoid considering receptors,
users, and stakeholders.
One of the threats of the shifting away from the extreme rationalisation
and objectification of CSA is the relativisation of its entire manifold. The
architectural manifold – as analysed in Chapter 4 – is subject of different
concretizations, however that does not imply its detachment from its
ontological support. An example of this risk is the idea that in contemporary
theory of conservation “[t]he authority that people have on heritage objects [...]
derives from, and is proportional to, two closely related factors: their
contribution to the overall significance of the object and their being affected by
the object’s alteration.”558 Although, this plausible position is based on the
555 Karsten. Harries, The ethical function of architecture, xiii, 403 p. vols. (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1997) p. 214.
556 Ibid. p. 226.
557 Fancelli, Il restauro dei monumenti. pp. 202-205.
558 Muñoz Viñas, Contemporary theory of conservation. pp. 158, 161.
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mislead notion that “truth is only desirable when and because stakeholders
desire it, not necessarily because it is an abstract moral imperative.”559
Although it is true that the interests of conservation of CSA on the dwellers
have to be taken into account, to discuss about truth seems delicate if we do not
consider the ontological constitution of the architectural place.
According to studies, the nature of the debates about assimilation varies
from acceptance to refusal and “[t]he greater the turmoil caused by
transformation, the greater the need for anchors to culture as a reaffirmation of
identity in the face of globalizing and homogenizing influences.”560 Scholars
have noted that assimilation does not necessarily mean conflict and loss of
identity, mainly if the big projects sponsored by big institutions or the state are
considered.561 As an example, the urban solutions presented in Berlin after the
reunification of Germany have been explored precisely in terms of spatial
memories and their social implications. Huyssen finds there a revaluation of
making history and its constructive consideration has underscored the shift
from the former importance given to the past to the significance with which
nowadays the present is considered. He states that “[s]ince the 1980s, it seems,
the focus has shifted from present futures to present pasts.”562 In general, the
postmodern condition in conservation is full of ambiguities. A complete
“pictoralisation of space and time” that hinders a reform of the social order has
559 Ibid. p. 192.
560 Mona Serageldin in Lowenthal, Throsby et al., "Values and Heritage Conservation.
Research Report," p. 51.
561 Erik Cohen in Ibid. p. 48.
562 Andreas Huyssen, Present pasts urban palimpsests and the politics of memory, xii, 177 p.
vols. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003). p. 11.
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been suggested.563 It has been argued that after the break of modernism in
architecture
contemporary reevaluations of ‘history’ have crushed any redeeming sense of
tradition. By now, traditions have been so thoroughly ‘invented’ or
homogenized, and ‘history’ so absolutely marked or commodified,
misrepresented, or rendered invisible, that any oppositional potential rooted in
collective memory has been eclipsed completely.564
Given these postmodern conditions in the theoretical debate of
conservation, in which the lack of mythical explanations that sustain identity
and the importance of the users, is it still attractive to keep conservation as a
temporal intentionality focused on memory? Does society really require the
pathos and the praxis of memory through conservation of CSA? An
interpretation of what actually means to dwell today could suggest some
answers.
Conclusions
Architectural perception in time apparently belongs to two different
worlds. The first is the one of matter and the other is the one of humanised
memory to be re-enacted. Architectural mnemonic power then is revealed
through the mimesis that inhabitation suggests with the variants that the
thickness of the present world demands. This memory is born from the body
memory that is always one with the architectural place. It offers shelter to
selfness because in confront with a past that “begins now and is always
becoming,” it remains humanly persistent; memory does not stop there in a past
563 Boyer, The city of collective memory its historical imagery and architectural
entertainments. p. 3.
564 Ibid. p. 5.
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event, it is always being built.565 The succession of architectural memories –
from the intimacy of the family home up to the shared space of the collectivity
– supports the social environment, which promotes cultivation and care. These
tacit memories of significant architecture have been gradually ignored in
conservation, giving preference to the determination of Objective time and
Cartesian space. This becomes problematic in conservation of CSA when
inhabitation is involved. Consequently, it seems that if memory is accepted
within the theoretical manifold of conservation, attitudes should evolve in order
to learn how to assimilate transformation. Individual and social constructions in
the form of values, memories, symbols, and so forth acquire relevance in the
constitution of a meaningful architectural place that conservation of CSA
should support. However, the post-modern conditions nowadays present
considerable challenges to actions of conservation given its plurality and the
rapidity of changes.
Conservation of CSA should not be an uncreative activity; it may
creatively develop an identity for a past anchored in the present. This identity is
plastic and malleable and recognises both extremes: a blurred and uncertain
beginning and the running present. Conceiving conservation detached from
memory would make it a rigid institution trying to solidify what is naturally
fluid. If instead memory is accepted, attitudes concerning assimilation should
evolve in order to learn to receive creatively the new. This does not imply
endorsing irreflexive postmodern trends of everything goes. It means that
565 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study p. 275.
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conservation has to be open to the transformation of the image that we have of
the past. It is our contention that memory has to remain an integral part of the
theoretical manifold of conservation. Nevertheless, this implies the acceptance
of the nature of memory and therefore asks that society – in particular
conservation theoreticians and practitioners – improves its understanding of
what and how we conserve. This effort has to be addressed for instance in the
social education about memory, heritage and the architectural place; in the
research about the conditions of collective memory of involved cultural groups;
and in the ontological analysis of the objects of conservation. If the past is not
an essential part of the present, the stable idea that society has about it is
challenged and society needs remembering creatively. This perennial effort has
to be considered under the light not only of objective determinants – as it has
been the case so far – but also taking into consideration the intersubjectivity
that a lived world implies, a world lived in society. The understanding of these
conceivable intentionalities starts to be evident in the gradual shift in some
recent trends of conservation attitudes. However, an interpretation of human
existence in its juncture of architectural place and existential time opens a
territory where pure phenomenology – à la Husserl – seems limited to deal with
the problems of memory, temporality and conservation of CSA and a
hermeneutic approach is required. Decisive concerns about the intersubjectivity
of being-in-the-world urge at this point our attention.
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Chapter 6: Architectural Hermeneutics: On the
Place and Time of Human Existence
Narrative and construction bring about a similar kind of inscription, the one in
the endurance of time, the other in the enduringness of materials. Each new
building is inscribed in urban space like a narrative within a setting of
intertextuality. And narrativity impregnates the architectural act even more
directly insofar as it is determined by a relationship to an established tradition
wherein it takes the risk of alternating innovation and repetition. It is on the
scale of urbanism that we best catch sight of the work of time in space. A city
brings together in the same space different ages, offering our gaze a sedimented
history of tastes and cultural forms. The city gives itself as both to be seen and
to be read. In it, narrated time and inhabited space are more closely associated
than they are in an isolated building.
Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 2004.566
It seems that the model suggested by Bergson – mentioned since
Chapter 2 in occasion of memory in matter as a form of mimesis, and later in
Chapter 4 supporting the embeddedness of the rememberer in the matter of the
world – in which consciousness is as one with the world that it navigates, is,
after the explored individual and collective phenomenologies, more pertinent
than expected. The Husserlian distinction between consciousness and object
has allowed us to suggest a setting for human beings within which they are
conscious of their constant becoming in time. Having a past, present and future
they are supposed to exist in Husserlian terms.567 However, for conservation of
architecture, the centre of gravity of temporality has been situated preferably in
the past, sometimes in the present but rarely in the future. Temporality as a
whole for human existence has been considered in that context. Probably more
importantly than any other philosopher, Heidegger started to question, not so
much the relation between human being’s consciousness and time, but the
existence of human being as temporality and, in a broader sense, Being as
566 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting. pp. 150-1.
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temporality. Thus, instead of recurring to the so far used generic term human
being, we employ in this chapter Heidegger’s concept of Dasein that supposes
human being as the place of disclosure of Being, as a being-in-the-world that
breaks with the paradigm subject-object to emphasise rather its
embeddedness.568 Thus, we attempt to illuminate the relation between Dasein’s
temporality and architecture considering also interpretations of this relationship
in the context of conservation.
The place where Dasein dwells is conformed by nature and architecture.
This all-embracing environment constitutes the only possible dwelling and the
only horizon that can be perceived. Gadamer has stated that “[...] a
hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices that we bring with us.
They constitute, then, the horizon of a particular present, for they represent that
beyond which it is impossible to see.”569 Thus, as a sort of trace or inscription –
as Ricoeur suggests in the epigram above – the architectural place discloses
readable structures as part of these prejudices that Dasein persistently carries.
567 Cfr. Husserl, The Phenomenology of internal time-consciousness.
568 Some scholars have already suggested alternative existential stances to Heidegger’s in
relation to existential space or place. Cfr. Sylvain De Bleeckere, "The transcendental origin of
architectural space" (paper presented at the Proceedings of the Conference: Architecture +
Phenomenology, Haifa, Israel, 2007). De Bleeckere contrasts the postures of Bollnow and
Heidegger, suggesting that the former engages in a more optimistic and creative way the
condition of existential spatiality than the one of the latter. Cfr. also Kolb, Postmodern
sophistications philosophy, architecture, and tradition. Kolb declares that “Heidegger did not
understand the need for travel and dialogue across places because his philosophical
commitments forced him to evaluate the contemporary multiplicity of discourses as a
degenerative rather than creative condition.” So according to him Heidegger prefers “to explore
our roots in depth rather than encounter the Other.” Kolb, Postmodern sophistications
philosophy, architecture, and tradition p. 152. Heidegger’s philosophy is also frequently
disqualified by some scholars due to his association with Nazi ideology. We would argue that
his way of approaching philosophy does not finish necessarily in fascism. Instead, his
existential philosophy is to be reconsidered under the light of that of other philosophers, such as
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur. The resurgence that Gadamer represents in order to
continue two nowadays un-privileged tasks is valuable for this thesis: the ontological project of
defining what being is – especially for us, the being of architectural place – although arguably
ideologically misleading in some Heideggerian manifestations; and the consideration of human
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These structures are neither static nor fixed. They evolve along with the
historicity of Dasein in a way that for each step it gives, the environment reacts.
The city, although not exclusively, is the paradigmatic place where this
happens. As previously described in Chapter 5, constant processes of memory
and assimilation incessantly take place and with them Dasein evolves in time in
a play of unveiling and concealing of its existential condition. Disclosedness
involves then an uninterrupted decoding of Dasein’s place in the world, whose
understanding is always merged with that of its constant temporalizing.
Heidegger has first suggested in Being and Time that temporality occupies this
ontological primacy. However, in his late writings he was preoccupied by the
issue of dwelling, as the form of Dasein being-in-the-world. Thus, scholars
have sustained the primacy of placeness for Dasein, starting with the analysis
of the word that is already stating a there before time.570
This chapter approaches an interpretation of the intentionality of the
conservation endeavour addressed to CSA in existential terms. Accordingly, an
hermeneutical approach to human being in its architectural place is engaged.
This interpretation of existence is correlative with the categories obtained from
the modes of being in Chapter 4 and some phenomenological temporal
standpoints concerning the architectural place, understood as Dasein’s
sheltering environment. As suggested before, the ontological project has been
somehow abandoned, or at least weakened, after postmodern thought. Theories,
as deconstruction on one side and the endorsed authority to Heideggerian
being’s existence as an interpretative endeavour, where existentialism still proves to be
significant. Cfr. Priest, Merleau-Ponty. pp. 237-8.
569 Gadamer, Truth and method. p. 306.
570 The problem is put apart as secondary from the present considerations.
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existential philosophy on the other, have limited alternative interpretations of
human existence.571 Thus, what here is proposed offers an understanding of
conservation intentionality in order to consider architectural place in its
constant becoming. The ontological outline of CSA in Chapter 4 and the
phenomenological approach to the assimilation of its transformation in Chapter
5 are taken as evidence of an existential and more fundamental condition for
conservation. The thesis departed from Ingarden’s ontological framework as a
still subject-object understanding; however, it proposes now a shift into a
relational hermeneutical approach. To finish the open dialogue with Brandi in
relation to conservation, in particular of architecture, it is also necessary to
engage again with the significant issue of architecture as inhabited art and the
correlative issue of his concept of astanza.
In section 6.1 “Bodily Primordiality of the Event as Image” the
architectural place is interpreted as an event in the presentation of an image
result from its sensual perception. In the context of conservation, the
paradigmatic condition of the architectural image is emphasised as part of the
modern gaze, the everydayness of Dasein and its dominance in Western
culture, because human may prefer not having it as absent.
Section 6.2 “History and Myth as Meaningful Processes” questions
whether conservation is authentically approaching architecture as a significant
process. Historical and mythical accounts relate together in architecture taken
as transformative processes in contrast with the situational condition of the
image. The risk of transformation of the stakeholder is at play in this
571 Heidegger proposed a particular interpretation, but he suggested also that it was not the only
one, neither a permanent one. Cfr. M. J. Inwood, Heidegger a very short introduction (Oxford:
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interpretation. The temporal identity in which Dasein is concerned is presented
as the origin of the notion of historical time.
A final excursus to the problem of architecture as work of art is the
main issue of section 6.3 “Unconcealing Object of Scinded Conservation.” As
Brandi conceives it, conservation of architecture is revealed as scinded from
Dasein’s existential character and focused only in architecture’s artistic
conditions. He had arrived to the deduction of the structure of art from a
Kantian path. This marked his approach as epistemological in contrast with the
existential deduction of Heidegger. The concept of truth in both is contrasted to
reveal the same meaningless and intemporal qualities of architecture as art.
Section 6.4 “Conservation of the Place Accompanying Dasein” presents
architecture not only as something to take care of, but as the privileged place
where cultivation and care may take place as a comprehensive conservation
intentionality. The architectural place constitutes importantly the in of Dasein’s
being-in-the-world originally founded in human inhabitation. In the last
discussion, architecture emerges as the previously intuited humanised entity
that, as a becoming character, accompanies human existence.
Oxford University Press, 2000).
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6.1 Bodily Primordiality of the Event as Image
Change presupposes a certain position which I take up and from which I see
things in procession before me: there are no events without someone to whom
they happen and whose finite perspective is the basis of their individuality.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, 1945.572
During her breakfast, a hypothetical bank executive listened to the radio
waiting for the weather forecast to decide if she needed to wear the raincoat.
Before escaping from home, she looked into her Ipod touch for instructions to
navigate to an important appointment in the city centre. She never looked out
of the window to check the weather or asked on the street for directions to her
destination. She trusted all the information received since, after all, the sky and
the city should not be so wrong. In contrast, in ancient times or in primitive
cultures, understanding and orientation about the world was an inherent ability
of human being. People knew with certain precision the weather conditions
according to the colour of the sky, the form of the clouds, and the humidity of
the air; they knew where they were according to the smells of the place, the
temperature of the seawater, or the position of the stars. Advances in modern
technology brought precision but at the cost of an abandonment of this
awareness of being in the world. The world resulted mediated, represented and
its experience weakened. The distancing of Dasein from its dwelling place and
from its world in general seems reinforced by modern technology. It seems to
be a common view that something was lost concerning the awareness of
572 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception.
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Dasein’s relation with its environment with the arrival of modernity. According
to Heidegger, such a separation of Dasein from the perception of its world is
not so much originated in the scientific revolution represented paradigmatically
by Descartes with his division of res extensa and res cogitans – that later
evolved into phenomenological considerations of the kind of the epigram above
– but from the initial steps of Western philosophy with the notion of a
separation between theoretical idea and a world-as-lived.573
How all this is connected with conservation? It seems that modern
conservation considers the architectural place where Dasein dwells, not as
somewhere with which Dasein belongs together, but as a separated something.
Architecture in its manifestations as image or as event is sometimes limited to
reveal itself to Dasein as its existential place. Modern conservation within the
paradigm of this separation between subject and object is but a way of Dasein
approaching the world while concealing its existential role there, hindering the
revelation of the world where Dasein is. In this explanation, the importance of
the body in the configuration of architectural space is only equalised by the
significance of memory. Body and memory are the two ingredients that seem
indispensable in the configuration of place, either by real presence and
experience, or by implication. The body can be implied in place intentionality,
573 De Beistegui describes this analysis of Heidegger. Cfr. “[...] the world can be envisaged
from the point of view of its ‘look’ (eidos), or ‘form’ (idea), in which case it becomes an object
of wonder and curiosity (curiositas). [...] At the most primordial level, though, the meaning of
the world is pre-theoretical: we do not understand and navigate the world as a result of its
theoretical representation, but of our pragmatic comportments towards it. [...] to the extent that
the movement of caring is a living inclination towards the world, life tends to lose itself in the
world, to be sucked into it. It takes the form of a propensity towards becoming absorbed in the
world, and ‘forgetting’ its own being [...] in this absorption. There is [...] a basic factical
tendency in life towards falling away from itself (Abfallen), a fall through which life detaches
itself from itself and falls into the world.” de Beistegui, The new Heidegger pp. 17-8.
Heidegger calls care to this inclination towards fallenness. It seems as if for him, Husserl
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but also memory can be implied. One can believe remembering; one can
evocate in the presence of a place. However, somehow in both cases
architecture is emerging in the form of an image, an image that is limited to
convey only the sensual parts of the architectural manifold.
Individual Sensual Experiences
A matrix of the elements constituting the existential determination of
Dasein, could be organised having on one side the individual and the collective
dimensions of being and in the other space and time. This way, the body and
the first environment that surrounds it constitute individual primordial space.
This first level of spatial awareness is conceived here in the way suggested by
Priest in his critique to Merleau-Ponty, when he suggests that
[t]he spatiality of the soul makes it intuitively more comprehensible how there
should obtain causal relations between mental and physical events. Both are
spatial so a mental event may act on a physical event by being where it is.
Finally, because the body-subject is located at the centre of subjective space,
the assumption of the Platonists that the soul is ‘in’ the body has to be given
up. The soul is not located in the body. The body is located in the soul.574
Priest calls soul that which needs to be understood as consciousness.
We correlate this idea of the body located in consciousness with the ontological
structure suggested by Bergson, in which the body is the interface that
communicates matter and time. Progressively, the collective space is
constituted by the architectural place, as the place of Dasein in its collective
manifestation in the form of buildings and cities. This is the place where CSA
and its possible conservation as temporal intentionality are located. The
possible individual time is constituted by the existential cone of life-time
transcendental phenomenology was but the last point of the journey of a phenomenological
evolution of Cartesianism.
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already used in our phenomenological approach to temporality in Chapter 5
that fixes its possible horizons of experience on the individual birth at one
extreme and on the own death at the other. However, “[m]etaphysically there is
no time that is not now. There is no time but the present. [...] the metaphysical
now is when all my thoughts and experiences happen. It is a subjective time
that is phenomenologically analogous to the subjective space [.]”575 The last
position of this matrix would be constituted by the historical and mythical
dimensions of the temporal narrative of Dasein, discussed in Chapter 5.
Perceiving architecture from each one of these positions involves the
emergence of different manifestations of architecture. This section deals with
the emergence of the body position in the matrix. (Figure 6-1)
Individual Collective
Space
Time
Body and
its immediate
environment
Architectural
Place
Individual
Life-time
Myth
and
History
CSA
Figure 6-1 Matrix of elements of existential determination of Dasein. (Own diagram)
We have made emphasis on the image as a perceptual feature of
experience in the constitution of CSA. However, the being of architecture is not
only perceived through the vision. In the perception of being, of architecture or
whatever entity that is, the body is “a kind of model of being. [...]because in
574 Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 235.
575 Ibid. p. 236.
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perception being qua being is absent.”576 The perception of architectural
objects then is partially present and partially absent and in consequence the
presence of the being of architecture as such emerges more from the absent
than from the present. This seems consistent with Brandi’s aesthetic theories in
which the interplay of the phenomena of astanza and flagrance is suggested as
the essential characteristic of the work of art.577
Bodily perceiving architecture as event means dealing with a static
image, an eikon that presents a constant now. It could be suggested that this is
one of the main noematic structures that architecture has offered after the
arrival of the modern gaze. However, the noematic apprehension of
architecture is not only so in its materiality, but in its temporality. In this sense,
an instant is individualised, selected and privileged among any other possible.
The existential attitude towards this singled out moment seems related to
nostalgia. The temporal gaze is localised in time as eternal, or as a-temporal,
and it looks at all the moments from that arbitrary moment, being usually an
equally de-localised present. This apprehension of architecture departs from the
present and is always looking at the past. When the moment of conservation
comes, what is being preserved is not an environment but an object, usually a
seen object. Image as event comes to be the optical givenness that Brandi
considers for architecture as a work of art and that constitutes the filling of
conservation intentionality at the expense of other elements of the architectural
576 Ibid. p. 219.
577 According to Merleau-Ponty, this paradox of being present and absent is not only human.
However, the difference between objects and the human body is the “exhibiting of the pour
soi/en soi distinction.” Ibid. p. 220. For Merleau-Ponty “Being is the presentation of an
absence. Being is invisible.” Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 223. On this grounds we can relate some
asseverations of Brandi and overcome them to say that other than the absence that astanza
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manifold. Architecture as event or image may be correlated with the
everydayness of Dasein because it offers a background to life. Dasein in the
state of fallenness, in Heidegger’s terms, would not be able to engage in
reflection about its architectural place and thus this possible relation of
embeddedness is concealed. That relation is latent only at sensual level with the
pre-eminence of the optical giveness fundamental for Brandi. Ricoeur describes
this primordial level of contact with the architectural place in its mnemonic
presentation saying that
[...] we have the corporeal and environmental spatiality inherent to the
evocation of a memory. [...] The memory of having inhabited some house in
some town or that of having traveled in some part of the world are particularly
eloquent and telling. They weave together an intimate memory and one shared
by those close to one. In memories of this type, corporeal space is
immediately linked with the surrounding space of the environment, some
fragment of inhabitable land, with its more or less accessible paths, its more
or less easy to cross obstacles.578
We have seen in Chapter 5 that awareness about the architectural place
starts since childhood and from the body. This seminal assimilation of the
architectural place through the senses originates its image in consciousness in
the form of memories and recollections. Thus, when it comes the moment of
objectivising architecture, the image of an event in time comes as one of the
basic ways to concretize it. In philosophy, the study of the sensual body
experiences has been focused in the visual. In his Phenomenology of
perception, Merleau-Ponty for instance privileges in his phenomenological
analysis the sense of sight.
represents in art, there is more than that absence in the revelation of being. This will prove
important in Section 6.3 when the relation with architecture as a work of art is retaken.
578 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 148.
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The Pervasiveness of the Image
The prevalence of the visual is evidenced in the commonness of the
image in Western culture and conservation is not an exception of this. We have
seen in Section 3.1 how in Brandi’s theory of restoration, image comes to be
the privileged locus of the manifestation of astanza. However, the image that
conservation privileges is not always support of art. Despite the privileged
character of the image, the body is existentially the first possible contact with
Dasein’s spatiality. The primordial space is the womb, the own body, the space
that occupies and the first atmosphere that surrounds it. At this primordial
level, we are as one with the environment. The air that we breathe belongs to us
when is inside and when it is expelled it detaches from us; nevertheless, the
limit is not sharply perceived. Food is ingested but, when is it already part of
our body? The vision of this embeddedness of the body in the medium is
concealed in the modern gaze and the architectural place does not manifest
itself as an environment but as alien material buildings and mathematically
definable spaces. In Heidegger’s philosophy, the body
[...] ‘remembers’ places and orients itself accordingly. The body, as it evolves
within specific surroundings [...] is itself constituted through a process of
sedimentation, each region and local situation leaving its mark in the body,
which by now has become the unconscious of existence, its ontological
memory. And throughout, it approaches the world with the depth and the
thickness of these accumulated strata, the world thus becoming the
continuation of its own body, its own body becoming world.579
This first memory of the body progressively constitutes within
consciousness the embedded pre-understanding of the world that is later
forgotten. In modern times, theoretical knowledge explains the world as alien
in a relation subject-object. The combination of these two kinds of
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apprehension of architectural place – as enveloping environment and as alien
object – combines together to form part of the manifold manifestation of CSA.
However, in modern conservation the elements of the manifold that belong to
that body memory of pre-theoretical understanding are usually disregarded.
These basic elements of the spatiality of memory and place have been
discussed by Ricoeur saying that
To be sure, my place is there where my body is. But placing and displacing
oneself are primordial activities that make place something to be sought out.
And it would be frightening not ever to find it. We ourselves would be
devastated. The feeling of uneasiness – Unheimlichkeit – joined to the feeling
of not being in one’s place, of not feeling at home, haunt us and this would be
the realm of emptiness.580
This feeling of the uncanny is one of the existential features of authentic
Dasein according to Heidegger. When Dasein is not in state of fallenness –
namely the state of being drawn in the everydayness of the they and the
forgetting of authentic self – Dasein is aware of the separation from its place;
its not being in a place cleared for it to dwell.581 Thus, authentic Dasein is
destined to look for its place during its existence, in a constant interplay of
unveiling and closure, of finding and losing. At individual level, Dasein is
looking for home, and at collective level is looking for the city, the polis. It is
in this context in which architecture demands to be conserved. It is there where
care, in the Heideggerian sense is concerned with architectural place.582
Ricoeur proposed the analogy between narrative and construction – as stated in
the epigram of this Chapter – suggesting that the city is more emotively
579 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger pp. 67-8. (Our emphasis).
580 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 149. (Our emphasis).
581 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p. 68.
582 Between these two levels of place-search, individual corporeality and collective public
space, Ricoeur suggests that geometric space is intercalated. Cfr. Ricoeur, Memory, history,
forgetting p. 150.
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complex than the house.583 He suggested that moving from the constructed
space of architecture to the one of inhabited land of geography deserves a
science to study it. However, we stop before, in the architectural place, where
concerns of conservation of CSA demand attention, although being aware of
this necessary connection with the whole inhabiting of Dasein.
We may distinguish possible incomplete apprehensions of architecture,
for instance, the one characterised by its closure to consider the event as part of
a complete temporality. An instance of analysis of this phenomenon is the
interpretation done by Vesely in his Architecture in the age of divided
representation the question of creativity in the shadow of production, who
suggests that “[...] the development of perspective into an illusionistic mode of
representation is the main source of modern relativism, beginning the process
of divided representation.”584 According to him, a paradox is generated
between the different visions of reality, “a source of an unprecedented freedom
to produce networks but also an overwhelming relativism, loss of meaning, and
narrowing range of common references – and, as a result of a general cultural
malaise.”585 This paradox and “the concentration on private experience,
imagination, and fantasy appears contradict the very nature of architecture,
which is always open to a shared public culture.”586 In conservation of CSA,
this discussion would support a conservative attitude toward transformations in
a way that can be correlated with the ways that Halbwachs suggests society
accepts changes in traditions, described in Chapter 5. It seems that
583 Ibid. p. 151.
584 Vesely, Architecture in the age of divided representation the question of creativity in the
shadow of production p. 173.
585 Ibid. p. 35.
586 Ibid. p. 37.
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transformations in CSA should be accepted by society in a progressive way
with attitudes that justify changes according to its also changing system of
updated values. Suddenness in change seems related with a perception of
architectural values preferably perceived in its manifestation as image.
The perception of architecture as image is not judged here in terms of
being better of worst than other kinds of perception, instead what is tried to be
exposed is the partial disclosure that such a perception arises. The primordiality
of this apprehension of architecture reconnects it with the temporal
primordiality of the body as rememberer of the architectural place. Differently
to what Brandi seems to suggest, the image is not reduced to the optical
givenness, but to any event of sensual perception of architecture. In this sense,
the importance of the haptic as an imaginary dimension – seeing as touching –
comes forth also. The level of experience of architecture as image emerges the
same from the performance of the sensual body than from the dimension of
meaning when perceiving image as representation. The collection of images of
the architectural place along life form a reservoir with which more complex
constitutions of architecture are built up, such as the mythical and the
historical. The image of the architectural place understood as its sensual
apprehension cannot be simply avoided; instead, it demands to be considered in
its adequate dimension in the problem of conservation of CSA, taking it as part
of the architectural manifold and not as an end in itself, such as in certain
myths and historical constructions as temporal concretizations.
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6.2 History and Myth as Meaningful Processes
If, in fact, the facts are ineffaceable, if one can no longer undo what has been
done, nor make it so that what has happened did not occur, on the other hand,
the sense of what has happened is not fixed once and for all. In addition to the
fact that events of the past can be recounted and interpreted otherwise, the
moral weight tied to the relation of debt with respect to the past can be
increased or lightened.
Paul Ricoeur, Memory History Forgetting, 2004.587
In English, the term theophagy comes defined as: “[...] the eating of
God (in the mass or communion rite); [or in anthropology] the eating of meals
at which the participants believe that they ingest a deity with the consecrated
food.”588 However, in the Diccionario de la Lengua Española, the equivalent
term teofagia is ignored. Peculiarly enough, in the Spanish dictionary the term
transustanciación (Spanish for transubstantiation) is defined as “conversion of
the substances of bread and wine into the body and blood of Jesus Christ,” as if
that was the case in reality.589 The point is not to discuss here the theological
doctrines behind it, but to highlight two different ways to approach the same
temporal commemoration. Discussing the dichotomy between material and
immaterial in the concept of Aristotelian sign, Gumbrecht has already
explained different conceptions of temporality through the transubstantiation of
the sacrament of the Eucharist in medieval culture in contrast with more recent
Protestant theology
It was only that the temporal distance that separated each individual mass
from the Last Supper as its point of reference began to turn into an
587 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 380.
588 The Oxford English Dictionary ([cited). (Our emphasis).
589 "transustanciación". Diccionario de la Lengua Española (Vigésima segunda edición) (Real
Academia Española, [cited 02 October 2008]); available from
http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/SrvltGUIBusUsual?TIPO_HTML=2&TIPO_BUS=3&LEMA=transu
stanciaci%F3n. “Conversión de las sustancias del pan y del vino en el cuerpo y sangre de
Jesucristo.” (Our translation and emphasis).
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unbridgeable ‘historical distance,’ and here we begin to understand that a
connection exists between the emerging, specifically modern conception of
signification and the dimension of historicity – as conquest of modernity. For
in modern understanding, signs at least potentially leave the substances that
they evoke at a temporal and spatial distance.590
Thus, whilst for Catholics the liturgy was an ontological productive
gesture in a sense that we further outline, for Protestants the gesture had
become a process of signification.591 Heidegger, in his attack to Western
metaphysics, substitutes the previous importance of the notion of truth, as a
correspondence of meaning, with the development of “the idea of an un-
concealment of Being (in which context the word Being always refers to
something substantial) [...].”592 The model that seems privileged by the
historical temporality is the one that was born after the Enlightenment and that
was transferred to conservation intentionality in its modern form. Brandi was
very aware of the flaws of what he called the historical search of meaning.593
For him art was not on the side of historical flagrance but on the one of artistic
astanza. In this sense, the apprehension of architecture as process such as the
mythical or the historical seems always more related in one way or another with
the search of meaning, significance and explanation.
If one then eliminates the metaphysical dimension, one of the
transcendental dimensions of Dasein emerges as the manifestation by its
capacity to inherit. Animals do not have inheritance as an attitude. Therefore,
Ricoeur has highlighted that
590 Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey p. 30.
591 Cfr. Lindsay Jones, The hermeneutics of sacred architecture experience, interpretation,
comparison. Monumental occasions : reflections on the eventfulness of religious architecture,
2 v. vols., vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Distributed by Harvard University Press for Harvard
University Center for the Study of World Religions, 2000).
592 Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey pp. 46-7.
593 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 8.
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humanity is to be defined as the speaking living being, which makes
genealogy a structure irreducible to the functions of reproduction. Genealogy
is the institution that makes life human life. In this sense, it is a component of
standing for, constitutive of historical intentionality.594
Echoing Ricoeur’s words of the epigram, we can say that conservation
as a temporal intentionality is characterised by its being in appearance
traditionalist and conservative, trying to keep truthfully the symbol or
representation of the past. Paradoxically, as Gadamer has suggested, these
kinds of attitudes are guided by the projection of values that are rationally and
freely accepted.
Even the most genuine and pure tradition does not persist because of inertia of
what once existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated. It is,
essentially, preservation, and it is active in all historical change. But
preservation is an act of reason, though inconspicuous one. For this reason,
only innovation and planning appear to be the result of reason. But this is an
illusion. Even where life changes violently, as in ages of revolution, far more
of the old is preserved in the supposed transformation of everything than
anyone knows, and it combines with the new to create a new value. At any
rate, preservation is as much a freely chosen action as are revolution and
renewal.595
If conservation takes care of what has been handed from the past,
however, the temporal distance between facts has not always been considered
as we do nowadays in Western culture. This latter has been so strongly
influenced by the scientific paradigm that any different way of temporal
intentionality – especially for conservation in the relation with architectural
place – seems unconceivable.
Open Transformative Processes
We mention in Section 6.1 a temporally incomplete apprehension of
architecture as sensual image for the purposes of its conservation. Other
594 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 379.
595 Gadamer, Truth and method pp. 281-2.
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possibilities of incomplete apprehensions of architecture seem open to take it as
part of a more comprehensive temporality of Dasein. The open interpretation of
architecture as event, as Jones presents it in his The Hermeneutics of Sacred
Architecture, is an instance of this. Although not being an event stricto sensu,
given its duration and its development through stages, we correlate it with the
manifestation of architecture as part of a process. He argues that architecture
creates architectural events that depend on the attitude of receptors and not only
on the building and its form. Thus, there should be an occasion for sacred
architecture. The simple viewer who is not involved cannot grasp the complete
experience without those events. Nevertheless, the relevant issue for us is that,
architecture is not only conceived as situational, as he says, but also as a
manifold of entities, as deduced in Chapter 4, which are apprehended according
with different concretizations.596 He argues that,
We must resist the still endemic modernist tendency to retreat from our
hermeneutical stance to objectivist (or subjectivist) modes of interpretation.
The really hard challenge is to hold all our interpretations up to the level of
architectural events [although, understood here as processes], not retreating to
the analysis of buildings.597
This seems to be the misleading attitude of modern conservation in
which buildings are interpreted as objects and not as places where life is
performed. The particular case of sacred architecture offers maybe one of the
extreme environments of transformation for Dasein. However, the rest of the
architectural place gives opportunities, although with less intensity and in
different ways, for Dasein to be gradually transformed. In the composition of
the ritual-architectural situation, Jones identifies three elements: interactivity,
596 Jones, The hermeneutics of sacred architecture experience, interpretation, comparison.
Monumental occasions : reflections on the eventfulness of religious architecture p. 43.
597 Ibid. p. 45.
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seriousness and transformation. Interactivity implies performativity of actors.
Seriousness implies what Ricoeur calls wager at stake; the participant has to
risk its own self.598 Transformation involves the change in the ontological
condition of the participant after the ritual-architecture. Certainly, the
architecture of the everydayness does not involve these same elements, at least
with the same intensity. Nevertheless, in the context of changes to CSA the
situation demands interactivity, seriousness and transformation from the
dweller. In the confrontation with transformed CSA, the dweller is challenged
to assimilate and as a result, he or she is transformed.
This hermeneutical situation has been characterised in two ways: the
indigenous experience of architecture and the academic reflection on those
experiences.599 Jones discussed the significance of tradition and history in the
architectural experience underlining the “transformative, potentially coercive,
power of ritual-architectural events, which enables such occasions to facilitate
changes that are profound though not always pleasant.”600 Accordingly with
this view, transformations of CSA are not perceived in the same way by
indigenous dwellers, more existentially involved in the architectural place, than
by academic critics. Consequently, architectural experiences of transformation,
innovation, or destruction of CSA, are considered in this context as
transformative events that in several occasions, as we have seen, may be
experienced as problematic, as the example in Chapter 5 illustrates.
598 Paul. Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Buchanan, Emerson (Boston: Beacon Press,
1967) p. 355.
599 Jones, The hermeneutics of sacred architecture experience, interpretation, comparison.
Monumental occasions : reflections on the eventfulness of religious architecture p. 56.
600 Ibid. p. 60.
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Analogously, the relation with novel architectural concepts can be taken
also as an increasing of being. In this sense this incorporation of the new is not
only physically transformative, as it is evident to the user, but in the ontological
root of the experience as experience. The experience can be transformative
even when it is not established in the form of ritual. Changes are considered
and incorporated as pleasant and uncanny at the same time in the architectural
experience. In this way, the experience of architecture passes through a series
of transformations that, along time, modifies and increases its essence, passing
from a period of strangeness to a period of assimilation until it reaches total
integration. Jones observes that,
deeply philosophical treatments in the Heideggerian tradition accentuate the
sense in which the experience of art and architecture is ontologically or
existentially productive. Gadamer, who maintains that ‘transformation is not
change, even a change that is especially far-reaching,’ is adamant that the
alterations effected by hermeneutical apprehensions of architecture are not
simply shifts in attitude or modifications in one’s state of mind. Alternatively,
for Gadamer, experiencing art and architecture facilitates actual
‘transformations in being,’ that is, transformations in the being, or ontological
status, of both the human beholders and the works of architecture.601
The productive being of the architectural place makes its meaning
constantly transformed and relived. Discussing about the loss and recovery of
the past, Jones states that architecture cannot freeze it. He says with Gadamer
that architecture as art in general is perpetually new, that a past world cannot be
brought back and be restored as it was. He quotes the words of Gadamer when
he says that “a hermeneutics that regarded understanding as the reconstruction
of the original would be no more than the recovery of a dead meaning.”602 This
seem consistent with Brandi’s idea of restoration as critique, analysed in
601 Ibid. p. 95.
602 Ibid. pp. 143-4.
290
Chapter 3, that considers even the presentation of the work of art as part of this
critical and interpretive approach.603
Mythical Memories
The previously suggested phenomena of productive processes that take
place in the encounter with CSA configure collective temporal identities for
architecture in the context of mythical and historical narratives. However,
already Eliade had noticed the difference between the archaic human and the
one of Western society contrasting the importance of the cosmos for the former
and of history for the latter. He observed how the sacred is born from different
forces that change the essence of some objects in their confrontation with man.
He explained that,
Among countless stones, one stone becomes sacred – and hence instantly
becomes saturated with being – because it constitutes a hierophany, or
possesses mana, or again because it commemorates a mythical act, and so on.
The object appears as a receptacle of an exterior force that differentiates it
from its milieu and gives it meaning and value. This force may reside in the
substance of the object or in its form; a rock reveals itself to be sacred
because its very existence is a hierophany: incompressible, invulnerable, it is
that which man is not. It resists time; its reality is coupled with perenniality.604
CSA performs its humanised lasting capacity in a similar fashion to the
mentioned rock that resists time, in the particular ways that have been
mentioned in Section 4.3, in the interplay of endurance and destruction. This
capacity opens for architecture a particular sense of sacredness that old
buildings disclose in the way of having-been-place for Dasein. Although,
Dasein in Eliade’s theory is connected with foundational and original acts that
generate significance. “Their meaning [of human acts], their value, are not
603 Cfr. Brandi, Carmine o della pittura p. 138.
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connected with their crude physical datum but with their property of
reproducing a primordial act, of repeating a mythical example.”605
This chain of gestures embedded in tradition is perceived as processes
in which Dasein is concerned. In that case, normal life is put between brackets
and transformation in participants occurs. In this way “[t]he memory of the
collectivity is anhistorical. [...] This reduction of events to categories and of
individuals to archetypes, carried out by the consciousness of the popular strata
in Europe almost down to our day, is performed in conformity with archaic
ontology.”606 Eliade observes how in order to avoid this process of
mythification witnessing is not enough.607 For archaic human, personal
memory is of little importance.608 The sense of history, then, is not present in
archaic cultures instead everything is constantly repeated in cycles related to
cosmic rhythms.609 Thus, in contrast with our actual contemporary condition
“[e]verything that we know about the mythical memories of paradise confronts
us, on the contrary, with the image of an ideal humanity enjoying a beatitude
and spiritual plenitude forever unrealizable in the present state of fallen
man.”610 In contrast, the idea of history as a source of knowledge for the
present life has been over exploited in Western culture leaving nothing to
expect today but rhetoric.611 The invention of historical time after
604 Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and history the myth of the eternal return. translated from the
French by Willard R.Trask., 176p vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1959) p. 4.
605 Ibid. p. 34.
606 Ibid. p. 44.
607 Ibid. p. 45.
608 Ibid. p. 47.
609 Ibid. p. 90. According to Eliade, Hegel as philosopher attempted to reconcile history and
myth. Cfr. Eliade, Cosmos and history the myth of the eternal return. translated from the
French by Willard R.Trask. p. 90.
610 Eliade, Cosmos and history the myth of the eternal return. translated from the French by
Willard R.Trask. p. 91.
611 Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey p. 118.
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Enlightenment, as a new concept of temporality, stimulated that attitude of
learning from the past trying to discover laws of historical development.
Between the past as reservoir of knowledge and the future of open
expectations, there is proposed a wider present whose blocked future
encourages “nostalgia cultures.”612 It has been suggested that “[...] by crossing
the life world threshold of our birth, we are turning away from the ever-
threatening and ever-present future of our own deaths.”613
Conservation of CSA nowadays seems trapped in the paradigm of this
bracketing out of the symbolic dimension of the architectural place in terms of
temporality. The emphasis has been so far put into the preservation of the
material traces as if they were able to keep memory alive. This concern is the
one manifested in historical observation of traces such as the ones that are
objects of study in archaeology.614 We have already described some of the
characteristics of historical knowledge in Chapter 3, in the context of Brandi’s
ideas and in Chapter 5, in the context of the analysis of temporality. For that
reason, we highlight here the accent that has been put in conservation of CSA
in order to offer scientific explanation and facilitate historical understanding. In
this sense, total conservation as an operation to preserve everything in the
expectation of an unknown future question seems the most radical position.
The problem we have underlined in this section is the one of the kind of
contract between conservator and receptor of CSA. If the receptor is compelled
to deal with conserved CSA as history, or as myth, these need to be authentic
612 Ibid. p. 119-21.
613 Ibid. Out of the cycles or linear temporal patterns of myths, history asks for an
objectification of temporality in the form of narrativity.
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and in such a case, historical or mythical representations, in the form of frozen
past time, would not be acceptable. We have already seen how matter cannot
guarantee memory, consequently architectural place should always be kept
alive, or become dead archaeology. Brandi’s theory of restoration, although
being theoretically informed about the nature of art in temporal terms, still
seem too permeated with the aim to keep the authentic evidence of the past,
without any concession to the existential dimension for the relation between
architecture and Dasein. For that temporal dimension, the dialectic between
recollection and image in historical representation through the architectural
place is solved by Ricoeur saying that,
The historian’s representation is indeed a present image of an absent thing;
[...] disappearance into and existence in the past. [...] absence as intended by
the present image [,] absence of past things as past in relation to their ‘having
been.’ [...] At this point the epistemology of history borders on the ontology
of being-in-the-world. I will call our ‘historical condition’ this realm of
existence placed under the sign of a past as being no longer and having been.
[...] the epistemology [...] reaches its internal limit [...] against the borders of
an ontology [.]615
Ricoeur reaches that limit of his epistemological interpretation of
memory and history suggesting a path of critical and hermeneutical ontology.
Although for us, this path demands previously a final excursus to conclude the
problem that was for Brandi the main concern, namely the one of the nature of
art in the context of the architectural place and the problem of forgetting being.
614 Ricoeur calls these remains and vestiges “unwritten testimonies.” Ricoeur, Memory, history,
forgetting pp. 170, 78.
615 Ibid. p. 280.
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6.3 Unconcealing Object of Scinded Conservation
A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing.
Martin Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art, 1950
A painting, a sculpture, a poem, a novel, a play, a work of art in general
seems to have its existential point of departure in its material manifestation to
the senses and to certain kind of consciousness. Thus, in Heidegger terms, art
appeals to Dasein’s being through art’s being but what it really offers is the
manifestation of an existence that it is not given in matter. As Ingarden would
suggest, art is supported on the matter of the work – through which it is
revealed – but the artistic quality is immaterial; it is pure presence, or in
Brandi’s terms pure reality: astanza. Brandi was an art scholar very
philosophically informed and, as this section illustrates supported mainly on
Heidegger’s existential analysis, he had understood some of the philosophical
problems at issue in art in the dialectics of flagrance and astanza; he ignored
other existential issues though. As presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the fact that
his theory has been frequently misunderstood as elitist and too focused on the
work of art is but evidence of the difficulties to understand it and locate it in
the big map of theoretical trends. However, his latest thought in Teoria
Generale della Critica, in which he developed issues of phenomenology,
structuralism and existentialism concerning art could have illuminated his
restoration theory with wider existential insights. For the case of architecture,
the inclusion of the existential dimension of Dasein would have been a
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significant achievement given its fundamental characteristics of dwelling in
contrast with other forms of art.
We call scinded conservation not to the conservation intentionality that
in limited form focuses in the scientific, meaningful or flagrant fact of the
architectural phenomena – which within its paradigm is instead very consistent
– but to the kind of attitude that we have described in which only art as pure
presence or astanza is considered. We describe it as scinded because, despite
arriving to a seemingly correct deduction of the structure of the work of art, it
does not consider the existential dimension that we consider as an enriching
condition to approach the conservation of the architectural place, which
participates of both a meaningful dimension and a presence one. This scinded
conservation intentionality is evidently coincident with Brandi’s notion of
restoration for the work of art as an intemporal and meaningless entity. In the
same way in which the intemporal quality of the work of art seems to be
accepted in phenomenology, already some scholars have placed emphasis in the
preconceptual or pre-meaning part of the aesthetic experience; Brandi has been
one of them.616 In this sense, it is our contention that meaning – including
language, signification, predicative thought, flagrance and so for – and
presence, understood as the meaningless astanza in Brandian terms, are both
but different aspects of the manifold condition of the architectural place, in
which the latter may offer the aesthetic intemporal dimension.
616 Cfr. Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey. and Martin Seel,
Aesthetics of appearing, trans. Farrell, John (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
2005).
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Meaningless Architectural Presence
According to Heidegger, in Western culture the notion of art seems
detached from its authentic origin. Let us explore how he and Brandi deduce its
same meaningless.617 Brandi, within the context of Teoria Generale della
Critica, seem to understand the original sense of meaning when he
distinguished the origin of what he call the referent, namely the possible
correlative to the linguistic sign that can be a non real being.618 However,
because of his understanding of sign was originated by the Kantian theory of
the schema, he detaches the language from any ontological compromise with
the notion of truth. This detachment is not done, as in the case of Heidegger, as
an interplay between concealment and unveiling of being, but as a false
problem “[...] the horizon to which one cannot ever be next, because we
ourselves are the horizon. The reality, as possession of the real, is a progressive
approach that leaves us always at the same distance.”619 In any case, from
different ways, Brandi arrives to the notion of art as detached from any possible
617 He explains that, the scission between a supposed core of the thing and the characteristics
that are composing the rest of the thing around this core is originated in a misleading translation
from the Greek terms to Latin. “Hypokeimenon [the already given core of things] becomes
subjectum; hypostasis [sensible matter] becomes substantia; symbebƝbekos [the characteristics
of the thing] becomes accidens. However, this translation of Greek names into Latin is in no
way the innocent process it is considered to this day, beneath the seemingly literal and thus
faithful translation there is concealed, rather, a translation of Greek experience into a different
way of thinking. Roman thought takes over the Greek words without a corresponding, equally
original experience of what they say [...]. The rootlessness of Western thought begins with this
translation.” Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Basic writings from Being
and time (1927) to The task of thinking (1964), ed. Farrell Krell, David (London: Routledge,
1993), pp. 153-4. Scholars have highlighted that the Aristotelian concept of sign “[...] brings
together a substance (i.e., that which is present because it demands space) and a form (i.e., that
through which a substance becomes perceptible), aspects that include a conception of
‘meaning’ unfamiliar to us.” Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey
p. 29.
618 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica pp. 52-3.
619 Ibid. p. 52. “In realtà il problema della verità è un falso problema: la verità è come
l’orizzonte a cui non ci si avvicina mai, perché noi stessi siamo l’orizzonte. La realtà, come
possesso del reale, è un progressivo avvicinamento che ci lascia sempre alla stessa distanza.”
(Our translation).
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significance as the manifestation of astanza. However as it is also suggested in
Section 6.1, Heidegger links aesthetics back to its sensual origins; he says that
[...] we do not need first to call or arrange for this situation in which we let
things encounter us without mediation. The situation always prevails. In what
the senses of sight, hearing, and touch convey, in the sensations of color,
sound, roughness, hardness, things move us bodily, in the literal meaning of
the world. The thing is the aisthƝton, that which is perceptible by sensations
in the senses belonging to sensibility. Hence the concept later becomes a
commonplace according to which a thing is nothing but the unity of a
manifold of what is given in the senses. Whether this unity is conceived as
sum or as totality or as Gestalt alters nothing in the standard character of this
thing-concept.620
He suggests that after that misunderstanding of identifying thing with
idea, truth also came to be understood as correspondence between, in Brandi’s
terms, sign and referent.
In Heidegger’s discussion about the peasant shoes in a Van Gogh’s
painting, he pinpointed that the disclosure of what equipment is in truth was
realised through the work of art. According to him “[t]he painting spoke. In the
nearness of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to
be [...]”621 Thus, the work of art brings forth the presence of something that
was not there before, that is what something is in truth. Heidegger calls to this
an unconcealedness of Being, what the Greeks called alƝtheia. With an
existential approach completely different to that epistemological of Brandi,
Heidegger suggests that truth happens in the work of art through the disclosing
of a particular being. “The essence of art would then be this: the truth of beings
setting itself to work [...]”622 From this point of view, while for Brandi the
620 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," p. 156.
621 Ibid., p. 164.
622 Ibid., pp. 164-5. Heidegger’s interpretation of art in existential terms is not at all exclusive.
For instance if for Heidegger the disclosure of being is done through Dasein as the privileged
place where being is unveiled, for Merleau-Ponty instead being is disclosed through the
invisible. Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 217. “The being that the invisible is the Being of is the
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astanza of architecture is manifested in the mutual and revealing opposition
between exterior and interior, for Heidegger architecture would constitute art in
the happening of truth of its inhabitation, in its allowance of dwelling. Brandi
does not ignore inhabitation, nevertheless it is only important as the way to
visualise architecture in the flagrance of the phenomena and detaching
architecture from the phenomena of signification: “[...] a house is not built in
order to communicate that it is a house, but to inhabit it.”623
Heidegger suggests that in the work of art there is strife between
lighting and concealing in which by “[s]etting up a world and setting forth the
earth [...] the unconcealedness of being as a whole, or truth, is won.” This
bringing forth of a being is done in a way never done before and never to be
repeated and we correlate it with the epiphany of the work of art to which
Brandi constantly appeals.624 In the case of architecture this effect is multiplied
by the plurality of Dasein’s inhabitation; inhabitation concealed or revealed
never stops. Heidegger explained that for the Greeks, craft and art were named
by the same word: technƝ that was a mode of knowing and not a mode of
world: what is.” Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 218. This can be related with the contrast between
astanza and flagrance in Brandi’s aesthetic theories. The notion of Merleau-Ponty has been
explained saying that “[w]hen one thinks of what is as not perceptually present one nevertheless
thinks of what is as existing. The disclosure of being requires the abstraction or mental
stripping away of empirical properties, but this process is already facilitated in the thinking of
the invisible.” Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 218. Merleau-Ponty gives the phenomena of painting as
example of the essence of being in the invisible in which by portraying something in visible
form is illustrated some invisible possible. “Visibility is revelatory of what is being what it is
but invisibility is revelatory of what is tout court.” Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 219. (Emphasis in
the original) Another interpretation from the existential point of view worth being explored is
the already mentioned of Sartre that influenced the concept of art in Brandi. Cfr. Cesare Brandi,
"Sulla filosofia di Sartre," L'Immagine (1947). Moreover he adds significantly that “[t]he
unconcealedness of beings – this is never a merely existent state, but a happening.
Unconcealedness (truth) is neither an attribute of factual things in the sense of beings, nor one
of propositions.” Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," p. 174.
623 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 308. “[...] non si costruisce una casa per comunicare
che è una casa, ma per abitarla.” (Our translation).
624 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," p. 181.
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making.625 Through technƝ then it was possible to reach alƝtheia. In contrast
with our present notion of art in Western culture, art was for the Greeks part of
the common knowledge of the essence of beings in everyday life. For Brandi
the implicit evidence of inhabitation was its being the result of a need.
However, the fact that architecture portrays nothing, as he constantly insists is
never related with mimesis as the suggestion of spatial behaviours, as a portrait
or depiction of architectural inhabitation. Architecture, Brandi sustains, is not a
mimetic art. TechnƝ would then, in the original Greek sense, allow ways of
inhabitation to emerge through legitimate architectural creation. Brandi did not
see this because of the predominance of the Kantian schematism on his
thought; for him “[...] before the primitive hut, there was no concept or image;
there was only – within the vital human consciousness – a vague intention of
that need for shelter from the inclement weather, the dangers of beasts and
other men, and who knows what else.”626
In the interplay between alƝtheia, as disclosure and concealedness,
Heidegger suggests that “[...] art is the preserving of truth in the work. Art then
is the becoming and happening of truth.”627 Conservation in this sense would
be subsumed in the notion of art and not considered an independent
intentionality. Brandi distinguished restoration from the rest of possible
activities that take care of architecture in that it was specifically dedicated to
deal with the artistic part of the work. This, in Heideggerian terms corresponds
to the misleading understanding of art as a quality and not as a happening.
625 Ibid., p. 180.
626 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica pp. 122-3. “[...] avanti che la capanna sorgese, non
esisteva né concetto né immagine, esisteva solo, interiormente alla coscienza vitale del’uomo,
una imprecisa intenzionalità, quel bisogno di riparo dalle intemperie, dai pericoli delle belve e
degli altri uomini e che so io.” (Our translation)
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Brandi correctly deduced a specific activity to deal with the artistic manifold
however; the existential dimension was never integrated in such an
intentionality for the case of architecture. For Heidegger, preservation would be
to inhabit – to dwell – in the way that architecture is asking Dasein to
participate in the unconcealing of truth. We explore this particular dimension
of inhabitation in Section 6.4. What is noteworthy here is that, preservation –
within which we include conservation – is not conceived as an independent
intentionality dedicated to take-care-of, in the way of a recognition in
architecture of an alien artistic object as in Brandi’s notion of restoration, but as
part of the primordial sense of temporality of Dasein that would be a non
deficient mode of care.628
Aesthetics, Truth and Language
According to Heidegger, aesthetics came to be treated as the
epistemological approach to sense, sensation, feeling and their determination,
especially in beauty.629 However, aesthetics derived into the reflection about
art. He attempted to explore art outside aesthetics in order to avoid its
consideration as an object produced for a subject in order to offer an
experience.630 Heidegger suggested that aesthetics as reflection on art was not
needed in Ancient classical Greece, because art was instead the way of
627 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," p. 183.
628 Cfr. M. J. Inwood, A Heidegger dictionary, xvi, 283 p. vols. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1999) pp. 35-7.
629 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p. 129.
630 Ibid. p. 130. According to recent interpretations “[...] if Heidegger is right in claiming that
that there is an essential – albeit unthought – connection between metaphysics and the question
of truth, and if he is also right in claiming that aesthetics is concerned with the question of art
from the point of view of the beautiful, then there must be a crucial link between truth and art.
This link, which runs through virtually the whole of metaphysical aesthetics, revolves almost
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knowledge itself; it was the way in which Dasein was related with its world
“integrated into a unified and meaningful totality.”631 It was later in the Greece
of Plato that beauty was understood as the manifestation of truth, in the eidos
of things. However, the eidos is more evident in the idea, the philosophical
concept of the concept. Thus,
[a]rt can provide an image (eikon) of truth, but in doing so it allows the idea
to show itself by appearing through something else. [...] Philosophy alone can
provide truth itself, truth as such. [...] we could say that whereas art can only
ever provide an imitation (mimesis), or a representation of truth (understood
as the manifestation and presence of a thing), philosophy can provide its
(direct) presentation. [...] This is how the birth of metaphysics, as the
transformation of the sense of truth, from truth as alƝtheia to truth as
correctness (orthotes) and correspondence (homoiosis), coincided with the
subordination of the artwork to the concept.632
This latter concept of truth reduces art to the role of imitation of the
idea and not as the privileged place of alƝtheia that Heidegger finds as its
essence. With this notion of art as alƝtheia or unconcealment of the work of art,
art itself would be the origin of the work of art and the artist.633 The
detachment between architecture and mimesis for Brandi was a difficult one,
because in contrast with other kinds of work of art, of which he says that
“given its figurative nature, exist in spatial autonomy that is the prerequisite of
pure reality [,]” it seemed obvious that architecture does not imitate any kind of
truth.634 However, what kind of imitation an eventual architectural mimesis
could suggest to Brandi in order to discard it? The key for his approach to
architecture as art can be found in his use of the Kantian schematism, which
still establishes an epistemological position and not an existential one.
exclusively around the question of imitation (mimesis).” de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p.
130. (Emphasis in the original).
631 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger pp. 130-1.
632 Ibid. pp. 132-3.
633 Ibid. p. 134.
634 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 78. (Emphasis in the original).
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It has been suggested that in the demand for universal assent in the
question of aesthetic taste, in the Kantian tradition, there may be an appeal to a
human community of sense as a possible destiny “perhaps never to be
realized.”635 According to this interpretation “through [Heidegger’s] detailed
discussion of the problem of presentation and representation, of what he calls
schematism and symbolism, Kant has problematized, and to certain extent
neutralized, the question of imitation.”636 It is on this epistemological loop that
Brandi falls in his establishment of architecture as art. As it has been analysed
in Chapter 3, he discusses about this since his Eliante and until Teoria
Generale della Critica. The approach of Brandi towards art, especially for
architecture, was mainly epistemological, for that reason his theory of
restoration is easily interpreted as suggestion for praxis. On his side, Heidegger
attempted then, to overcome the metaphysical concept of aesthetics that
highlighted the aspects of production and imitation and to bring art back to the
concept of alƝtheia. Thus for different reasons, mimesis was removed from the
notion of art in Brandi and Heidegger. Additionally for conservation in the
modern paradigm, architectural mimesis was destined to disappear because of
the incompleteness of the worlds that originated those architectures as art.
For Heidegger, language plays a primordial role in bringing forth the
essence of beings, clearing the concealment of Being itself. He calls poetry to
this unconcealing and projecting saying of language.637 In this thesis however,
we do not stress so much in the linguistical essence of the bringing forth of
635 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p. 136.
636 Ibid.
637 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," p. 185. Cfr. Inwood, A Heidegger dictionary
pp. 168-70.
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truth, but in the non linguistical manifestation of the unconcealedness of the
Being of beings. Heidegger has said
Art, as the setting-into-work of truth, is poetry. Not only the creation of the
work is poetic, but equally poetic, though in its own way, is the preserving of
the work; for a work is in actual effect as a work only when we remove
ourselves from our commonplace routine and move into what is disclosed by
the work, so as to bring our own essential nature itself to take a stand in the
truth of beings. The essence of art is poetry. The essence of poetry, in turn, is
the founding of truth. We understand founding here in a triple sense: founding
as bestowing, founding as grounding, and founding as beginning. Founding,
however, is actual only in preserving. Thus to each mode of founding there
corresponds a mode of preserving...”638
On this preserving, conservation finds its origin; it seems again a
preservation of truth as in the scientific model; however, it is not anymore an
epistemological or theoretical explanation about truth, but – in Heidegger’s
terms – its keeping it in the clear being the free Being of beings. Brandi did not
consider language in this originary sense that Heidegger assigns it; he instead
brought it back to be product and tool of the “gnoseological process.”639 In fact,
he seemed opposed to Heidegger when discussing about the union of word and
thing – the possession of the truth in the word – declaring that
There is identity or rather universality only in the gnoseological process, of
which the language is product and instrument at the same time. The truth was
not saved: ontology and gnosiology would not have met anymore... In the last
attempt, that of Heidegger, truth and being coincide up to constitute the
ultimate and supreme identity. It remains, however, that the truth is a
meaning, which referent is the existent, and the existent leads to being. The
problem of being cannot be extrapolated from that of language: truth as
meaning is not the same thing than being as the foundation of the referent.640
638 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," p. 186, Inwood, A Heidegger dictionary.
639 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 52.
640 Ibid. “L’identità o meglio l’universalità sta solo nel processo gnoseologico, di cui la lingua è
prodotto e strumento al tempo stesso. La verità non era salva: ontologia e gnoseologia non si
sarebbero più riunite... Nell’ultimo tentativo, quello di Heidegger, verità ed essere si fanno
collimare fino a costituire l’identità ultima e suprema. Resta tuttavia che la verità è un
significato, il cui referente è l’esistente, e l’esistente rimanda all’essere. Il problema dell’essere
non può estrapolarsi da quello del linguaggio: la verità come significato non è la stessa cosa
dell’essere come fondamento del referente.” (Our translation).
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This illustrates the fundamental difference between the conceptions of
truth of Brandi and Heidegger. Brandi would have never found the foundation
of conservation of the work of art of architecture in an existential matrix as
Heidegger did. His way was inspired in the epistemological and neutral Kantian
schematism and not in an ontological analysis. Conservation was a way of
recognising the artistic process as process developed in time. In terms of
temporality instead, Heidegger suggests that truth becomes historical through
art constituting the origin of creators and preservers.641
Heidegger made a subtle critic to the modern conditions of the art’s
notion in Western culture when he said that
[...] reflective knowledge is the preliminary and therefore indispensable
preparation for the becoming of art. Only such a knowledge prepares its space
for art, their way for the creators, their location for the preservers. In such a
knowledge, which can only grow slowly, the question is decided whether art
can be an origin and then must be a forward spring, or whether it is to remain
a mere appendix and then can only be carried along as a routine cultural
phenomenon.642
It is precisely at this underlined point where conservation as an activity
has been captured since its beginning as objectivising activity and not as an
existential performativity founded on care. Brandi’s theory of restoration was
not an exception, although being an outstanding example of philosophical
reflection. Theoretical reflective knowledge is not to be disregarded; however,
the choice that Heidegger presents would demand a change of attitudes not only
concerning architecture as a work of art, as privileged place of manifestation of
the truth of being, but as the first, last and only place where Dasein dwells.
641 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," p. 187.
642 Ibid.
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Intemporal Architectural Presence
It is with philosophical investigations about presence that we can
reconnect with some of the concepts intuited by Brandi in his theories,
especially in terms of art’s intemporal condition. For instance, attention has
been called about certain conditions of extreme temporality, which are
paramount in aesthetic experiences.643 The suddenness and the ephemeral
character of these conditions relate directly with Brandi’s aesthetic theory, as
already analysed in Chapter 3, in which art is characterised as intemporal.
Moreover, Brandi’s aesthetic theory seemed to agree with some of Gadamer’s
remarks about art, as when this latter explains that
[t]he fact that works stretch out of a past into the present as enduring
monuments still does not mean that their being is an object of aesthetic or
historical consciousness. As long as they still fulfil their function, they are
contemporaneous with every age.644
The theoretical issue in Brandi’s thought that allows considering this
possible insertion of the work of art in history is the double instantiation for the
purposes of conservation, namely the historical and the aesthetic. The historical
is implied in the existence of the architectural object in time and eventually in
its constant use; the aesthetic is given by the recognition of the work of art as
such and is given in exceptional moments. The first instance seems to be the
one in which temporality is manifested to the common sense; however,
Gadamer suggests that “[a]n entity that exists only by always being something
different is temporal in a more radical sense than everything that belongs to
history. It has its being only in becoming and return.”645 Gadamer has said that
643 Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey p. 58.
644 Gadamer, Truth and method p. 120.
645 Ibid. p. 123.
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[...] the being of art cannot be defined as an object of an aesthetic
consciousness because, on the contrary, the aesthetic attitude is more than it
knows of itself. What constitutes the characteristic feature of the work of art
is the thing that comes into existence in the work.646
Nevertheless, the problem persists for architecture in contrast with other
forms of art since architecture, as suggested in Heidegger’s epigram of this
section, portrays nothing. The capacity of architecture to shelter inhabitation is
limited.
Coincidently with the recent concept of aesthetics of appearance,
Brandi also distinguished in art the appearance that became meaning from the
appearance that revealed an intemporal absence in the work of art.647 The
hermeneutical relation with art concerning this dimension out of meaning,
demands the interpretation of the aspects of the work that impact in the
performance that the work produces.648 This is especially relevant for
architecture in which the implied performance of authentic inhabitation is at
play. Brandi had already highlighted this double conception of culture when he
distinguished between the aspects of flagrance in opposition to the aspects of
astanza. He did not disregard the meaningful dimension of art, however he
never lost the view that the essential originality of art was on the side of its
intemporal presence. Meaning arrived later on through cultural, social and
historical processes.649 In support of this, Gadamer recalled that monuments
bring into presence what they represent in the form of inscriptions of general
significance. However, when the monument is also a work of art, it brings into
646 Ibid. p. 117.
647 Cfr. Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey p. 63.
648 Grumbecht has highlighted that “Gadamer calls the nonhermeneutic dimension of the
literary text its ‘volume’ (Volumen), and he equates the tension between its semantic and its
nonsemantic components with the tension between ‘world’ and ‘earth’ that Heidegger develops
in his essay The Origin of the Work of Art.” Ibid. p. 64.
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existence something on its own, independent of the temporal occasion of the
monument.650 Architecture is for Gadamer the most privileged form of art,
since through satisfying its function and by adding something spatially to its
emplacement it presents an increase of being.651 He seems to agree with
Ingarden considering architecture as the “happy solution” to an “architectural
problem.”652 However, architecture comes to show also how aesthetic
differentiation is not primordial.
We know how difficult the relation between Brandi and the Modern
Movement was, moreover in the junction with the historical city, not so much
in terms of temporality – or historicity – but in terms of spatiality.653 In
contrast, Gadamer suggested negotiation between new modern buildings and
historical context. Against the historicism, he said that
[e]ven if historically-minded ages try to reconstruct the architecture of an
earlier age, they cannot turn back the wheel of history, but must mediate in a
new and better way between the past and the present. Even the restorer or the
preserver of ancient monuments remains an artist of his time.654
Here the difference between Gadamer and Brandi is definitive. Whilst
for the former the conservator is still an artist of his or her time, for the latter
the restorer of works of art is not an artist but a critic. Restoration is but a
methodological recognition of the work of art as a fact already given, not as
something to work with. Gadamer instead believes that preservation implies
649 Thus, we can understand the distinction established by Brandi between his concept of
history of art and iconography, à la Panofsky. Brandi, Teoria generale della critica pp. 119-20.
650 Gadamer, Truth and method p. 149.
651 Ibid. p. 156.
652 Ibid.
653 Cfr. Fidel Meraz, "Architecture and Temporality in Conservation Theory: The Modern
Movement and the Restoration Attitude in Cesare Brandi" (paper presented at the 10th
International Docomomo Conference. The Challenge of Change. Dealing with the Legacy of
the Modern Movement, Delft, Netherlands, 13-20 September 2008).
654 Gadamer, Truth and method pp. 156-7.
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artistic activity because for him architecture has the mission to spatially
mediate drawing the attention to itself and redirecting it to the world that it
accompanies.655 Architecture is not important as an atractive artistic object but
as the sanctuary of Dasein’s existence. Thus, the approach to the architectural
work of art is different. For Gadamer it seems to be correlated to Heidegger’s
notion of dwelling, whilst for Brandi it represents an exceptional artistic
epiphany.
For Gumbrecht, the epiphany – understood as the tension between
presence and meaning – of the aesthetic experience presents three
characteristics that constitute the interplay between presence and meaning. The
first is its suddenness, its coming from nothing; the second is its spatial
articulation; and the third is its temporal appearance as event.656 Brandi’s
notion of astanza as the pure reality of art can be described in a similar fashion.
We have already mentioned suddenness and eventfulness – “like a bolt of
lightning” – as characteristics of the artistic recognition in Brandian theory.657
Additionally, it seems worth noticing that for Brandi the spatiality of the work
of art is fundamental, not only for architecture in which it is more difficult to
distinguish between the phenomenic spatiality and the spatiality of astanza, but
also for the rest of the artistic expressions. Then, in the contrast established
between meaning-culture and presence-culture, for the latter the body and its
655 Ibid. p. 158.
656 Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey p. 111.
657 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 61. However, art’s epiphany seems to be a less
analytic phenomena than this recognition, more on the side of astanza than on the one of
flagrance.
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first environment is found as the primordial interface of negotiation between
Dasein and its world whilst for meaning, time is the primordial dimension.658
Architecture may have an undeniable dimension as art. However,
Brandi’s view of the art of architecture seems detached from the existential
considerations that architecture originally has. Heidegger’s existential approach
deduced the condition of art as a happening in the work of architecture, as an
act of revelation: alƝtheia. Both views agree in the meaningless and the
intemporal conditions of architecture as a work of art; however, the notions of
conservation that is possible to deduce from these positions could not be more
opposed. While Brandi’s notion of restoration isolates the artistic qualities in
its recognition, without concern for its condition as a place to dwell;
Heidegger’s concept of preservation seems comprehensive of both, disclosure
of the truth of being and care for Dasein’s place to dwell. The existential
approach to conservation intentionality should be a significant contribution that
can help conservation in its modern form, to overcome the impasse whose
crisis is starting to be evident in the change of fulcrum mentioned in Section
5.4. Overcoming this crisis would recover dwelling as the mission of
architecture.
6.4 Conservation of the Place Accompanying Dasein
The real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the
essence of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell. What if man’s
homelessness consisted in this, that man still does not even think of the real
658 Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey p. 83. The existentialist
relation of Dasein with its temporal intuition in terms of the horizon of expectation has been
explained saying that “[...] only our death, only the moment in which we become pure matter
(and nothing but matter), will truly fulfil our integration into the world of things. Only our death
will give us that perfect quiet for which – sometimes in our lives at least – we long.”
Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey p. 117.
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plight of dwelling as the plight? Yet as soon as man gives thought to his
homelessness, it is a misery no longer.
Martin Heidegger, Building Dwelling Thinking, 1954. 659
It could be suggested that in contemporary Western world, works of
architecture are every time more different to each other. They respond to a
myriad of factors that determine their form, uses, longevity and significance.
We have passed from a former historical architectural place, sometimes
misleadingly nostalgic, made of constancy and gradual changes to a hectic
context where the rule seems to be continuous and rapid transformation. In the
confrontation between new and old, the battles seem sometimes lost for the
conservationists and on the other side, new valid architectural projects are
frequently hindered. We suggested in Chapter 5, the emergence of cultivation
and care as the base of a common collective understanding in order to conserve
not only CSA but also the architectural place in general. We have seen how
conservation of the artistic part of the architectural manifold can be a
significant activity to protect certain objects. Nevertheless, architecture may
constitute not only an artistic object, or one that is simply present or merely
useful. Architecture participates in an inseparable way of Dasein’s existence.
The problem seems to be the disappearance of the world that supported the
emergence of certain architecture. Sometimes Dasein is forced to exist in a
world that is not there anymore.
We have seen that architecture is not only given to us in sensual
presentation, but also as constituent of an environment where our body exists.
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The delayed issue of the definition of the core of architecture finds in these
correlations its proposed answer in Dasein’s dwelling. The in of the being-in-
the-world starts with the body. For all the life of Dasein, the body is the first
and the only exclusively occupied space. After that first being there that the
body characterises, Heidegger would suggest that the spatiality of Dasein “[...]
is the point at which we need to return to the aroundness (das Umhafte) of the
environment (Umwelt) of Dasein as being-in-the-world [...]”660 Heidegger’s
notions of concern and care, relate with the region that we had provisionally
called cultivation and care. Some philosophical insights are finally
incorporated to attain an attitude that completes a notion of care pertinent to
our times. The influence in conservation as intentionality towards the
architectural place may shift from a fallen emphasis given to objects of the
past, towards a futural sense of the existence of being-among-others.
In-the-World
According to the interpretation of Heidegger, considering the
aroundness (das Umhafte) of its environment (Umwelt), and the in-ness of its
being-in-the-world both understood as dwelling is necessary to understand the
spatiality of Dasein. It has been suggested that the in-ness can be understood in
two senses, one of inclusion and one of dwelling, one of being and one of
understanding.661 Thus, the sense that Heidegger seems to privilege is the one
of dwelling.
659 Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," in Basic writings from Being and time
(1927) to The task of thinking (1964), ed. Farrell Krell, David (London: Routledge, 1993), p.
339.
660 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p. 64. (Emphasis in the original).
661 Ibid.
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The world to which Dasein relates by in-habiting it is precisely not an empty
container, pre-given and pre-constituted, awaiting to be filled up with things
and events. [...]Dasein is its world. And this must be understood transitively:
Dasein exists its world; its being is precisely its ‘worlding’. Between Dasein
and the world, then, there is a relation that is not one of indifference, but of
concern (Besorgen) and care (Sorge): in the very way in which Dasein is, or
exists its own existence, its own being is at issue for it. [...] To be in
something in such a way that we inhabit it or feel ‘at home’ in it thus
presupposes this relation of familiarity born of an impossibility not to be
concerned with, or to care for, that within which we find ourselves.662
Paradoxically, some preoccupation about something assimilable to a
comprehensive environment for human being is evident in Brandi’s theory of
restoration when he discusses about ruins, where the artistic essence has
disappeared. He sustains that some beautiful landscapes merit the treatment of
restoration or conservation in a similar way than the work of art.663 Brandi
recognises this possibility of conservation beyond the purity of the work of art
in the context of the historical instance of restoration; therefore, a theoretical
aim is behind his conservation intentionality. Heidegger instead approaches
care as a pre-theoretical attitude, a form of concern that never abandons Dasein.
We have seen in Chapter 5 how the world is given to Dasein not as a
Cartesian system of spatial coordinates but as a framework made out of the
things objectively present that help it to orientate within the world configuring
a particular spatiality. Heidegger has suggested that the way in which Dasein
sees the world is obtained from within it and consequently spatiality is pre-
objective, existential-ontological and not physical-mathematical.664
[...] we orient ourselves in this world on the basis of those pre-established
regions, those buildings and those places, those landscapes which we in-habit,
662 Ibid.
663 Nevertheless, he pinpoints that this is because that particular landscape aspires to be form in
consciousness. Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 67.
664 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p. 66.
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and which provide us with our sense of space, our sense of belonging to a
place, familiar or unfamiliar [...], close or distant [...].665
Brandi’s conservation intentionality instead is directed to acquire a
recognition, thus a cognitive apprehension of the work of art. Architecture as
work of art for his theory presented the challenge of being imbricated with an
existential dimension that he did not face, at least for the purpose of restoration.
He did not see architecture as the whole that constituted a human environment
to be conserved integrally with its artistic nature. The instances to conserve
were scinded in artistic and historical. Additional conservation was out of the
sphere of the architectural place. We are not saying that Brandi’s theory of
restoration is of no value for conservation as care and cultivation. All the
opposite, his aesthetic theories – including the notion of artistic restoration, but
not exclusively, as the exploration of his Teoria Generale della Critica
demonstrates – were steps ahead of previous attempts that did not approached
the artistic phenomena from the phenomenological perspective. What we are
suggesting is that the inclusion of an existential perspective – for the present
thesis in Heideggerian key – could have added an additional value for the
particularities that architecture presents as the place of dwelling of Dasein.
Architecture as a work of art cannot be purely considered as something
present-at-hand (such as mere things) or ready-to-hand (such as equipment);
however, it can be taken as both when its artistic nature is concealed. For
instance in terms of architecture’s utility for inhabitation it is revealed as
something ready-to-hand. Nevertheless, as soon as we perceive architecture we
665 Ibid.
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perceive the others of the world.666 However, as a work of art, architecture
would demand a different interpretation in Heidegger’s thought.667 Being a non
figurative art, architecture cannot but bring inhabitation as its revealing
happening, but inhabitation is about Dasein not about other objects. For
architecture, Brandi would ask for the restoration of its double spatiality;
Heidegger would claim for its allowance to dwell.668 This can establish a
difference between architecture as equipment and as a work of art. Brandi
seems trapped in between the flagrant conditions of the historical instance and
the astanza of the artistic pure presence. In the voice of Delano – the American
organicist architect character of his Eliante – Brandi has said that
The house is primarily shelter, a place where to live and to rest, and therefore
it is an internal space, a room of air and light, but also of welcoming shade
and siesta. One must shape it on the base of human’s life, and not only on
certain functions, isolated and geometrically met.669
Nevertheless these characteristics of human inhabitation are not
connected with the artistic conservation that his notion of restoration implies.
Architecture as art is scinded from Dasein’s being-in-the-world.
In his famous essay Building Dwelling Thinking, Heidegger emphasised
the roots of cultivation and care for the terms building and dwelling. He
666 “[b]y ‘Others’ we do not mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the ‘I’
stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself
– those among whom one is too.” Heidegger, Being and time p. 154.
667 For instance, in the case of the peasant shoes described by him in Van Gogh’s painting, he
finds that “equipment belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant
woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-
itself.” Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," p. 163.
668 This may prove being confusing since the reliability of a preserved architecture in Heidegger
terms should suggest “the repose of equipment resting within itself [...]. Only in this reliability
do we discern what equipment in truth is.” Ibid., p. 164.
669 Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura p. 111. “La
casa è prima di tutto un riparo, un luogo dove si viene per vivere e per riposarsi: e dunque è
uno spazio interno, una camera d’aria e di luce, ma anche di ombra accogliente e di siesta. Si
deve modellare sulla vita dell’uomo, e non solo su certe sue funzioni prese, isolate e soddisfatte
geometricamente.” (Our translation, emphasis in the original).
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discloses relations of the words with notions of cherish, protect, preserve and
care. Also, with modes of building such as cultivate or edify.670 When
Heidegger concludes with the epigram of this section, one can suggest
preservation of architecture as the privileged place for Dasein to dwell, and
consider the clearing of the space for it to be freed and safe. We suggest that
this ideal is constituted by the architectural place, of which CSA is a significant
part, but in no case the only one, and not always the most important for
inhabitation of the collectivity of Dasein. Whether it is still in need to dwell, in
Heidegger terms, or another existential interpretation is still a matter of
discussion. Nevertheless, the necessary recognition of being-in-the-world and
among-others for Dasein’s social existence seems to be an incontrovertible and
urgent necessity.
Being Temporalizing Beings
We suggested since Chapter 5, the existence of a region that we
characterised as of cultivation and care. We mentioned that this region of
Dasein’s life was a collective field where merged familiar perceptions, public
opinion and individual participation, that was filled in pre-modern times by the
670 Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," p. 325. His concept of dwelling is grounded in an
almost poetic fourfold that he deduces from the basis of care. Earth and sky, divinities and
mortals compose this fourfold. Thus, he says that Dasein preserves the fourfold by dwelling
among the things that it cultivates and builds. Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," p.
329. The things that are built to make some space (Raum) that receives the fourfold configure a
place. Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," p. 332. Heidegger suggests then that when
one says human, one is already stating its dwelling in the fourfold among things. Heidegger,
"Building Dwelling Thinking," p. 334. Nevertheless, building is only such if it brings forth the
fourfold into that construction. This is the sense of technƝ, to produce in order to let appear.
“TechnƝ thus conceived has been concealed in the tectonics of architecture since ancient
times.” Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," p. 337. In Heidegger’s thought, earth is
manifested in the powers of nature. The world of human production and activity is its
counterpart; architecture is located here. The divinities are manifested in the given things,
natural conditions, even Dasein’s concept of himself and its finitude is part of this awareness of
the divinities. Mortals are the human beings.
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traditional world and its slow evolution. Modernity and post-modernity broke
that balance leaving that field to be filled with what Heidegger would have
called the fallenness of the world. Fallenness is characterised as one of the
constituents of care in Heidegger’s thought, the one that puts its emphasis in
the present. Cultivation and care, as they used to happen in pre-modern times,
to create and preserve the architectural place were delayed; the present is now a
dominant concern.
However, at this point we must precise our use of the terms cultivation
and care. Although, they are motivated from an existential approach, we are
associating cultivation with Gadamer’s concept of Bildung, which he relates
with the one of Kultur, but without evocating the tradition that Bildung makes
of humans having in its spirit the image of God, which they cultivate within.
Bildung as the notion of formation “describes more the result of the process of
becoming than the process itself. [...] [It] grows out of an inner process of
formation and cultivation, and therefore constantly remains in a state of
continual Bildung.”671 Gadamer said: “what constitutes the essence of Bildung
is clearly not alienation as such, but the return to oneself – which presupposes
alienation, to be sure.”672 For Gadamer, and that is a fundamental point for us
the general characteristic of Bildung [is] keeping oneself open to what is other
– to other, more universal points of view. [...] To distance oneself from
oneself and from one’s private purposes means to look at these in the way that
others see them.673
Consequently, the idea of cultivation is the one of looking after the
environment from the most comprehensive horizon in the benefit of the others
671 Gadamer, Truth and method p. 11.
672 Ibid. p. 14.
673 Ibid. p. 17.
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that exist with oneself.674 Cultivation then implies a letting ourselves growing
in the opening towards the others.
The notion of care instead relates with some of the Heideggerian senses
of care in its fundamental connection with temporality. Heidegger first
conceived care (Sorge) as “the care-taker of beyng, such a care-taking
involving an irreducible operation of creation.”675 He understands the
primordial truth of existence as anticipatory, resolute disclosedness
(vorlaufende Entschlossenheit). It supposedly reveals existence on the basis of
itself and for him this means that Dasein’s existence is always and essentially
towards its own death.676 Dasein’s existence, as also suggested in our
description of temporal relations in Section 5.2, has death as the extreme of its
horizon. According to Heidegger, in resolute disclosedness Dasein does not
avoid its finite existence but anticipates it, changing its attitude in relation to its
surrounding world. This phenomena points to his notion of care.677
Dictated by death as the ultimate horizon of the existence, for
Heidegger, temporality is revealed in these three dimensions of care: the
facticity of being-already-in-a-world (past); the existentiality of being-ahead-
674 This notion is reminiscent of Ricoeur’s discovery of historical memory that he sustains is a
“genuine acculturation of externality [that is] a gradual familiarization with the unfamiliar, with
the uncanniness of the historical past.” Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 394.
675 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p. 57.
676 Ibid. p. 70.
677 “Care characterizes the various aspects of existence as involving three moments or
dimensions [...]: a dimension of throwness into the world (Geworfenheit), through which, each
time, existence finds itself disposed towards or attuned to it in a certain way; one of self-
projection towards a realm of possibilities (Entwurf), through which existence carries itself out
as freedom; and one of being-alongside other beings in the world. With the phenomenon of
anticipatory resoluteness, the fundamental existential phenomenon of care as Dasein’s being is
rooted ontically. [...] anticipatory resoluteness reveals Dasein as an essentially futural
(zukünftig) being [...]” Ibid. p. 71.
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of-itself (future); and the falling of being-alongside (present). “Temporality
reveals itself to be the sense of authentic care”678 It has been observed that
[w]hat we witness with Heidegger [...] is a decisive shift in the perception of
where time originates: the centre of gravity of temporality is no longer the
present, as was the case in the tradition, but the future (die Zukunft). [...] As a
result of [...] present-centrism, and as early as Plato and Aristotle, presence
(parousia) defined the underlying meaning of being (ousia): to be always
(implicitly) meant to be present.679
Heidegger’s revelation of the original sense of the being of Dasein
redefines it as futural, as always to come, always becoming.680 Seen under this
perspective all the notion of conservation demands to be redirected in its
temporal emphasis. To conceive his theory of restoration – understanding it
here as one conservation intentionality of Dasein – Brandi departed from the,
for him, impossible human intervention in the time of creation or during the
interval of time between creation and recognition. In the same way, he
discarded the internal temporality that the work of art has and that, in the case
of architecture, we suggest the coming forth of previous authentic inhabitation,
a sort of architectural mimesis, would constitute it. The reason of these
678 Heidegger, Being and time p. 374.
679 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p. 71.
680 Ibid. pp. 70-1. De Beistegui explains “[w]hat Aristotle called ousia (a substantive forged
after the present participle of the verb einai, to be, subsequently translated in Latin as essentia)
was the fundamental, primordial meaning of being, from which all the other meanings (or
‘categories’) of being were derived. And ousia was itself interpreted further as parousia, or
praesens. The task of exhibiting this basic presuposition of metaphysiscs, and of extracting its
unthought, is what Heidegger called ‘de(con)struction’.”de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p.
71. This means that “Dasein can be its past only insofar as it comes back to it on the basis of its
own future.” de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p. 72. This is the essence of what Heidegger
calls temporality (Zeitlichkeit), in which Dasein grasps the other beings of its world coming to
itself futurally. What is then the present in this existential essential approach to Dasein’s
temporality? It is the derivative and not essential result of the future and the having been. “The
‘alongside’ of the being-alongside, then, does not suggest immediately a temporal dimension,
but a spatial one. It is presence, more than the present, which is here emphasized.” de Beistegui,
The new Heidegger p. 73. Temporality then is established by Heidegger as a complete whole
that is not separated in past, present and future, but is the meaning of care while it temporalizes
itself. The present is only an ecstasies of temporality. de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p. 75.
In resolute disclosedness, Dasein is aware of its limited existence and understands temporality
as the unfolding of time as a whole and not separated in future, present and past, it needs to
understand itself as being as time.
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exclusions was based on a different understanding of temporality in which the
presence (as parousia) is equal with being present, being there. Brandi could
grasp that art was “parousia without ousia,” thus, presence without existence;
however, for him the centre of temporality was still located in the present.681
We suggest that, in the same way as Halbwachs considered individual
memory and collective memory merging together as described in Chapter 5, the
authentic temporalizing performance of Dasein does not distinguish between
the individual and the collective being-there. Care always presupposes the
others of the world.682 We have mentioned previously some criticism addressed
to Heidegger’s notions that could also assist in a renewed understanding of the
transformation of the architectural place. For instance, it has been observed that
some approaches of Bollnow may integrate an intimate dimension linked,
instead than to the limit horizon of death, to the horizon of the mother’s womb
as source of architectural understanding.683 Ricoeur expresses another criticism
that claims for an alternative to Heideggerian resolutness when he asks:
681 “parousia senza ousia” Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 133. (Our translation) This
present centrism with the view put in the past is at the origin of some of the polemical cases of
inclusion and assimilation of the new into the existent.
682 Some more recent critique to the privileged attention to Heidegger’s approach in contrast
with other thinkers such as Bollnow, has been arisen observing that, for instance, “Norberg-
Schulz suggests that Bollnow is too philosophical and not enough affiliated with the discipline
of architecture, while author’s central notion of ‘existential space’ is indebted to
phenomenological philosophy. This discrete rejection of Bollnow philosophical approach does
not, however, hinder Norberg-Schulz to refer systematically to Heidegger despite the fact that
he, neither, wrote explicity or concretely about architecture. This ignorance for Bollnow in the
architectural discourse became institutionalised.” According to De Bleeckere, Heidegger
emphasis is put on the abstraction of Dasein and the ontology of time, whilst Bollnow treats the
existential space, based on an exploration of the fundamental concept of moods. “Bollnow
argues that human existence is much richer than Heidegger’s reduction to fear. [in] [h]is Wesen
der Stimmungen, Bollnow opens the phenomenological analysis of the existential basic-moods
with regard to security. On that, he tops other moods, especially those of happiness, throwing a
different light on ‘man’” According to De Bleeckere “[f]rom Bollnow we learn that the secured
‘house’ of the womb constitutes the first living space of men.” Cfr. De Bleeckere, "The
transcendental origin of architectural space".
683 Further research seems very suggestive in this direction. Cfr. Ibid. Another example of
alternative interpretations of Dasein’s temporality is Ricoeur’s reluctance towards Heidegger’s
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Does not the jubilation produced by the vow [...] to remain alive until... and
not for death, put into relief by contrast the existentiell, partial and
unavoidably one-sided aspect of Heideggerian resolutness in the face of
dying? [...] it is only at the end of a long work on oneself that the entirely
factual necessity of dying can be converted, not to be sure into the
potentiality-of-dying but into the acceptance of having to die.684
Because of its humanised condition, already suggested in Chapter 4, the
architectural place in the form of particular buildings, complex of them, or
cities, participates of characteristics of the work of art, such as painting, music
or sculpture, but also of features that transform it into an almost animated
character. The authentic being a place to dwell of architecture connects it
intimately with Dasein’s existence. If Dasein temporalizes itself in its different
dimensions of care, architecture seems to mirror this effect. Architecture
emulates a being that temporalizes other beings. Architecture shelters
cultivation and provides care to Dasein, not only in Heideggerian but also in
possible alternative senses that other forms of art are not feasible to offer;
architecture performs as mother’s womb, as lovers’ bed, as final tomb. It
accompanies Daseins’s complete existence offering – when authentic dwelling
is given – an opening of clearness in which freedom to live and security to die
seem, at least philosophically, possible. The ethic responsibility of such a
mission does not only fall over architects and conservators. Echoing Heidegger,
the changes that human inhabitation demands through history invites Dasein to
learn how to dwell. However, Dasein needs to acquire positive existential
attitudes that – finding the “happy memory” that Ricoeur demanded from
memory, that “miracle of recognition,” in order to remember – help it to
doctrine of care because it “does not seem [...] to make room for the very particular existential
that is the flesh, the animate body, my own body, as Husserl had begun to develop this notion in
his last works [.]” Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 345.
684 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting pp. 357-8.
321
overcome the modern impasse of conservation and, because architecture is
never complete, to forget and forgive. Dasein’s uncanny fate seems to be in any
case – in the collective and the individual – the search of authentic polis, the
perennial search of home.
Conclusions
The suggested hermeneutical path started with the body and, passing
through temporal representations and art, arrived finally to the existential place
to dwell. The sensual perception of architecture as image is first exposed as one
partial disclosure. Its primordiality evidences the body as rememberer of
architecture. Thus, the image is not reduced to the optical givenness, but to any
event of sensual perception of architecture. The level of experience of
architecture as event emerges from bodily inhabitation and from the
significance in culture that demands to be considered as just one factor in
conservation. The receptor of conservation of CSA should deal with authentic
historical and mythical representations in which matter cannot guarantee
memory. Therefore, architecture should always imply life. However, Brandi’s
theory of restoration, despite considering architectural art as intemporal, still
aims for the evidence of the past. His notion of restoration of architecture
considered its artistic condition as a quality detached from any existential
consideration. Heidegger’s approach deduced its condition of being art as a
happening in the work of architecture. Both views agree about the meaningless
and the intemporal conditions of architecture as art; yet, the notions of
conservation originated on these views seem opposed. For Brandi, restoration
isolates the artistic qualities in its recognition, without concern for its condition
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as a place to dwell; Heidegger concept of preservation seems aware of alƝtheia
and care. We suggest that the existential approach to conservation could help
conservation to overcome its limited modern form. Being a dwelling place,
architecture connects intimately with Dasein as art and as an almost animated
character. As we have deduced, architecture temporalizes Dasein emulating a
being that temporalizes other beings. Architecture shelters cultivation and
provides care to Dasein offering place for freedom and security accompanying
its existence.
For architecture and its conservation, a philosophical compromise
seems here suggested, other than the merely practical accomplishment of
inhabitation and the transcendental dwelling. In the present world, since Dasein
dwells in a plurality of forms according to its particular existential conditions,
there arises the need to establish perpetual open dialogues between individuals
and between collectivities. The constant becoming of Dasein requires an
always-changing position, not only of itself, but also of the place of the other
on whose feet it needs to be able to stand up in order to encourage human
empathy. Dasein’s own conservation and care of its place to dwell should not
ignore that being-among-the-others that its existence imply. The call is for
cities and homes to be open and not to be closed. Many others have had this
uncanny dream before.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions: The Architectural
Habituating to the Constant Becoming
Time
The period of your life
can be divided into three parts; see, consider
Time past and see, ungrateful one,
see its rejection by the divine powers,
see your own mistake.
See the present, which dies at birth;
beyond, hidden behind a dense veil,
lies in the future.
See whether your eye cannot discover
the open road to hope and good works.
Beauty
I hoped to find in truth
the pleasure that I discern in it still.
Indeed my harsh destiny makes me grieved
at the sight of it,
and it fades and wastes away.
Benedetto Pamphili, La Bellezza Ravveduta nel Trionfo del Tempo e del
Disinganno, 1707.685
The conventional understanding of Dasein’s temporality – such as the
one exhibited in the words above from Handel’s oratorio – supposed the
dimensions of past, with all the traces of former inherited actions and their
consequences; present, with the ephemeral running perception of the here-now;
and future, with the infinite and open field of possibilities up to the horizon of
the final individual death. The objectification of time – and with it of temporal
objects, architecture among them – in which the present supposed to contain
the centre of gravity, is fruit of this theoretical understanding. The main
achievement of the research of this thesis is, as a conclusion, the finding of an
alternative possibility to approach time and architecture in the context of
conservation. This suggested understanding of the relationship between
architectural place and time, despite having as ontological point of departure a
685 Pamphili, La bellezza ravveduta nel trionfo del tempo e del disinganno. (Translation by
Rinaldo Alessandrini).
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theoretical phenomenological approach, concludes with the existential
awareness of architecture as part of Dasein’s world and not as a separable
object. This different temporality defines Dasein and its existential world as
manifold beings always in the process of becoming towards a future, finite for
the individual Dasein, grounded on the more fundamental attitudes of
cultivation and care.
The confirmation of some starting hypothesis revealed architecture as a
manifold being that shares humanised characteristics, given its ontological
origin. Architecture was taken in the thesis in two differentiated but related
senses. Firstly, CSA was ontologically defined – by correlating Ingarden’s
ontology for the work of art in analogical fashion – as a culturally significant
object, whose concretization is found in the building but is not necessarily
always coincident with it. Secondly, the concept of architecture was extended
to the place of human being since, as described in Chapters 4 and 5, there
would not be such a place that is not humanly relevant. We obtained then the
manifold presentation of architectural objects constituted by several other
objects. Some of these are physical and others are obtained from individual and
collective concretizations, including the significant aesthetic dimension of the
work of art. With the investigation developed mainly in Chapter 2 – through
the epistemological analysis of Brandi’s aesthetic theories – and Chapter 4 –
developing an ontological outline of CSA – we demonstrated
phenomenologically its manifold constitution as the architectural place to
conserve. This answers the first of the formulated questions in the
problematization of conservation, namely how are the meaning, structure
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and essence of architecture conceived in conservation theory? We offer the
conclusive answer to this ontological issue in Section 7.1 “Architecture’s
Changing Manifold.”
Consciousness of time is offered towards the architectural phenomena
as it is evidenced in conservation intentionality. This initial notion of
temporality has been proved as an incomplete form – after Chapter 3, in the
epistemological analysis of Brandi’s Theory of Restoration; and Chapter 5,
with the phenomenological account of memory and temporality – given its
detachment from a human existential dimension. Temporality in modern
conservation, then, has been focused on the past, as demonstrated with the
analysis of Brandi’s Theory of Restoration. The need to update conservation
was evidenced by the necessity of human being to assimilate change and due to
the exhibited constant becoming of memory. Conservation then was revealed as
a human intentionality towards change of its existential place in time. In this
way, an answer is offered for the second question: What does memory mean
for conservation of architecture? and for the second order of research
questions, namely: how memory – especially collective memory – and
conservation intentionality are correlated? How architectural memories
have projection towards the future? In Section 7.2 “Architectural Memory as
Future Assimilation” then, we present the conclusions about these temporal
issues.
An ontological definition for architecture was outlined as the human
place to exist; and a phenomenological description for conservation was
defined as temporal intentionality towards change. Subsequently, a
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hermeneutical approach towards conservation, as an epistemic manifestation of
a wider existential endeavour in Western culture since the arrival of
Enlightenment, was accomplished in Chapter 5 and especially in Chapter 6.
This interpretation was triggered by the questions: how is architecture
perceived as changing in time? In addition, how is conservation founded in
relation to the time and place of human being? The conclusions obtained by
an existential approach that gives answer to these questions are presented in
section 7.3 “Assimilating Place along Time, Encompassing Time around
Place.”
Thus, the thesis attempts to move the professional discussion on
conservation along towards a wider understanding in terms of human existence
and not only as the preservation of architectural objects. In the theoretical
perspective, it is expected that this research stimulate further developments
with similar approaches to conservation contributing to overcome the impasse
in which it seems trapped in its modern limited form. On the practical side
instead, the understanding of the existential dimension in the context of CSA
represents additional challenges that go beyond the mere solution of technical
problems in conservation of CSA, compelling stakeholders, institutions and
conservators to negotiate and consider these issues in future proposals.
With the epistemological, ontological and existential analysis offered,
we have responded to the research questions that we faced as the
problematisation of conservation of CSA. However to conclude the thesis, the
research revealed several areas worth of being explored as part of an interest to
enlarge the understanding of architecture as Dasein’s place to exist and the
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approach to its conservation as a more transcendent enterprise. These areas are
succinctly outlined in order to suggest future lines of investigation in section
7.4 “Beyond and Before Knowing.”
7.1 Architecture’s Changing Manifold
The first intention of this research was to suggest a phenomenological
ontology of CSA following Ingarden, suggesting its structure and essence as
phenomenon, as a theoretical precondition for any conservation intentionality.
The initial intuition of architecture as a manifold entity was
phenomenologically confirmed. Since the epistemological exploration of the
research, focused on the case of the Theory of Restoration of Brandi and the
rest of his aesthetical theory, architecture emerged as this manifold being.
During this analysis, this condition of the notion of architecture was detached
from the idealist influence and a phenomenological approach was privileged.
Architecture in Brandi’s thought exposed two main sides: the temporal facticity
that he called flagrance, and the intemporal pure presence that he called
astanza. Whilst flagrance deals with the material and factual features of
architecture, astanza has to do with the bringing forth to presence something
that was not previously there, before the constitution of the work of art.
In the mapping of Brandi’s journey in his approach to architecture in
particular, as a form of art, we have emphasised two significant consequences
from idealist notions that influenced him. One is the awareness of architecture
as being constituted by a manifold identity, one of whose elements is its
manifestation as art. The second was the sigificance of the notion of mimesis,
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which remained fixed in the notion of reproduction or copy. Brandi discarded
the duality between idealist spirit and factual sensuousness of the idealism. He
reinterpreted their presence distinguishing them in a manifold composed
primarily by flagrance and astanza. As made evident in the epistemological
analysis of an important part of Brandi’s theoretical corpus, developed in
Chapters 2 and 3, he overcame the Crocean idealism that preceded him with
subtle critical reactions. One of the main notions that he opposed was the
identity between intuition and expression arguing against the semiotical trends
of the age, which identified art with language considering it as a form of
communication. Thus, this detachment and the incorporation of new
approaches to the study of art – and in consequence of architecture as a form of
art – characterised his way of overcoming idealism in consonance with the
trends of the age, and although not being him a leading figure of this movement
his theoretical developments did not lack originality. However, we have
demonstrated how Brandi deduced the essence of the artistic phenomena,
particularly architecture, always bracketing out other realities that the artistic
phenomenon affects, at least for the purposes of restoration. He approached
architecture phenomenologically within the frame of Kantian schematism.
Nevertheless, flagrance and astanza revealed two manifold dimensions of
architecture implying consequences in relation to temporality and conservation.
We have approached conservation in the thesis as a temporal
intentionality. Within this phenomenological frame, the work of art was for
Brandi the fundamental focus of his restoration’s approach as a form of
conservation, as it has been explained in Chapter 3. He privileged the
manifestation of the work of art from two main points of view, which
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constituted the instances of application of his theory of restoration, namely, the
aesthetical and the historic. The phenomenological and existentialist influence,
mainly from philosophers such as Husserl and Sartre, played an important role
in his more evolved aesthetic thought. However, his aesthetic theory did not
reveal the issue, fundamental for us, of inhabitation as part of the architecture’s
manifold nature.
The epistemological analysis of conservation in Chapter 3 suggested
that architecture should be considered as an object with aesthetic, historic and
significant values as part of its manifold condition and additionally as part of
human dwelling in the dialectic of stasis and assimilation. In consequence,
from the perspective of the thesis, we suggest that social institutions protecting
monuments should evaluate the varied attitudes of stakeholders when dealing
with CSA. CSA needs to be approached at the same time as a manifold object
for the social sciences and as the place of collective life. As evidence of this
emerging need, organisations dealing with the protection of cultural heritage
have already started to shift towards a wider understanding of these collective
intentionalities as part of its manifold constitution. In consequence, additionally
to the consideration of architecture as a possible valuable work of art,
conservation depends on the nature of intentionalities with which architecture
as a manifold place to live is approached. This does not endorse with a
relativist outlook in the context of conservation but – all the opposite, as the
ontological proposal attempts to demonstrate – the necessity of keeping active
an ontological research is revealed in order to better define CSA when it is
subject of conservation.
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The phenomenological approach of Ingarden to the work of art helped
to structure an analogous ontological outline of CSA in order to locate
architecture within its different possible manifestations to human
consciousness. The aesthetic theories of Brandi seem to be in accord with some
of the most significant deductions of Ingarden. Brandi’s implicit
characterisation of architecture as a manifold being is done with an ontological
purpose that he explored more thoroughly in his Teoria Generale della Critica;
however, as evidenced in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, he did not connect his theory
with the existential dimension of architecture in relation with human
inhabitation. In consequence, the artistic condition of architecture resulted
isolated for the aims of conservation.
The ontological bases of Ingarden, adapted for the purpose of our
analysis in Chapter 4, in many senses demonstrated consistency with those of
Brandi’s notion of architecture as work of art. The different possibilities of
being in Ingarden’s theory, revealed ways in which architecture can be
delivered to consciousness. Whether architecture is given as event, process or
enduring object depends on particular ways of setting consciousness in order to
apprehend architecture. As outlined in Chapter 4, these ways of being of
architecture are more or less dense in noematic possibilities, being the object
enduring in time the one that offers richer nuances given its affinity with
human beings. This manifold way of being offers to consciousness different
sides of phenomenological profiles that depend on the attitudes with which
architecture is intended. The architectural object acts as a support for possible
concretizations of architecture configuring for CSA an identity that is flexible,
despite having an intimate core, whose concealed definition was existentially
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tackled in Chapter 6. The formal structures of CSA revealed an identity for
architecture that, for instance, cannot be only meaning, only function, or only
form. CSA appears constituted by a rich manifold existence that is revealed
according to attuned attitudes of groups of observers, depending on degrees and
nuances of their collective cultural interpretations. Within the controversial
notion of social constructions, the conservator comes to be a rooted agent with
unlimited possible approaches.
The deduced conclusions obtained in Chapter 4 for conservation as a
temporal intentionality from the ontological structure are significant for this
thesis. The first consequence is that instances of CSA are evidenced as
temporal manifolds, and consequently significant for conservation that
develops in time. This paradox suggests different ways to approach CSA in
conservation according with its apprehension as a mere work of art or as the
multifarious place to live within. The second consequence is that the
architectural work of art appears as a third order of concretization; therefore, it
is not only the result of an aesthetic attitude in relation to an object-building,
but also a special connection between creator and observer in different times
with no temporal continuity. Brandi saw this phenomena as well as a
connection with what he called universal consciousness. These conclusions are
relevant to conceive CSA as a manifold of moments of existence, which finds
its origins in the building – its events, processes and object-being related
presentations – but whose manifestation can be very varied. Architecture – as
building, as work of art, and as CSA – constitutes a manifold of elements that
amalgamate together forming part of the real world inhabited by humans,
created by them, by their techniques and against laws of nature.
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The manifold being of architecture is manifested, not only in its given
presentation to consciousness, but also in temporal terms, as the
phenomenological exploration of temporality suggested in Chapter 5. In this
sense, conservation of CSA should not be considered an uncreative activity; it
may imaginatively develop a manifold identity for a diverse past anchored in
the present. Architectural memory’s identity is varied, plastic and malleable
and recognises both extremes: a blurred and uncertain beginning in the past and
the lively running present.
The existential analysis of our hermeneutical layer presented sensual
perception of architecture as an image exposing a partial disclosure of its
manifold being. Its primordiality evidenced the body as rememberer of this
architectural manifold. Therefore, the notion of image is not reduced to the
mere optical givenness, but to any event of sensual perception of architecture.
The level of experience of architecture as event emerges from both, bodily
inhabitation and the significance in culture that demands to be considered as
just one factor in its varied constitution in order to conserve.
7.2 Architectural Memory as Future Assimilation
The second research intention was to find the origins of the lack of
existential understanding of temporality in recent conservation theory, focusing
in the interpretation of the outstanding case of restoration intentionality
proposed by Brandi. Memory was in this thesis one of the privileged access
doors towards the exploration of the main issue of temporality due to its
relation with conservation in its modern form. The contrast between the
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temporal approach of Brandi’s theories and the phenomenological description
of memory evidenced singular characteristics for conservation. Brandi
reinterpreted some of the problems of idealist notions and overcame a view that
was still attached to that paradigm. However, for the problem of conservation,
despite its lucid phenomenological approach to the phenomena of art creation
and reception, he did not conceive the architectural artistic nature merged with
the human existence that architecture shelters.
In the epistemological exploration of Chapters 2 and 3 through the
theories of Brandi, the issue of mimesis was an identified significant legacy
from idealism. If the image was for him a constant object of theoretical
reflection, the concept of mimesis instead remained fixed in the notion of mere
reproduction or copy. As stated before, the possibility of the notion of mimesis
encompassing cultural practices to be re-ennacted – within the theory that
Brandi established – could be promising of a positive evolution in the paradigm
of conservation. Brandi defined astanza as an intemporal form of presence for
the work of art, including architecture. However, to deal with architectural
conservation means to deal with human temporality. Then, we analysed
conservation as temporal intentionality. Art was for Brandi the fundamental
category of his approach to conservation and therefore the peak of culture. He
privileged it from two main points of view: the aesthetical and the historic. The
consideration of astanza granted this privilege to art of being the superior form
of human creation. For conservation in Brandi’s thought, memory as temporal
intentionality is supported through the object to restore. Architecture keeps the
record and the traces of past human ways to live, evidenced in the form, and
charged of meaning in both: astanza and flagrance, although with different
334
manifestations. However, the centre of gravity of his temporal intentionality is
situated in the present, to where the rest of the worldview confluences. If
cultural memory is relevant, it is so because of the permanence of matter.
Matter is for Brandi the vehicle of memory, constituting not only the artistic
monument, but also the historical and cultural ones. Architectural monuments,
then, are valuable not only as works of art but also as temporal portraits of
ways of being, of seeing, and of imagining the world. This mimetic dimension
of the monument finds relevance in the historical transmission of culture in two
ways: in the flagrance of reality and in the astanza of art. The monument
constitutes the link between an individual perception of particular architectural
experiences and the summation of collective intentionalities that integrates
cultural identities. Architecture as cultural monument finds a problematic
juncture, though. Thus, as suggested before, architectural place as cultural
heritage would need to either be approached as a separable object of analysis
for history, art history and the social sciences; or to be assimilated within the
flux of collective life. The shift towards this wider understanding of the
significance of CSA for those most involved is evident nowadays.
Architecture then is temporally presented as a being in a constant state
of becoming, in which it additionally offers the manifold condition that
characterises it. Architectural transformation is given in the context of the
dialectic interplay of tradition and innovation. The ontological analysis defined
an outline of CSA and the phenomenon of its temporality, mainly focused in
the paradigmatic case of memory. Memory itself was revealed as a creative
attitude that gives the past as different every time it presents it. The misleading
consideration of architecture as a form of materialised memory can instead find
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a solution in an interpretation of the concept of mimesis, that suggests former
ways of inhabitation to creatively be re-enacted. Some of these forms of
inhabitation constitute cultural constructions that are now challenged by the
conditions of post-modernity.
Significant conclusions for conservation are deduced from the
temporality of architecture’s ontological structure suggested in Chapter 4. Their
implications affect not only architecture as work of art but also the construction
of cultural and social objectivities, CSA being one of them. One of these
conclusions, as stated before in Section 7.1, is that instances of CSA are
temporal and thus significant for a conservation that develops in time, in
contrast with Ingarden’s deduction about the architectural work of art as
paradoxically extra-temporal. Another conclusion is that the work of art being
extra-temporal – consistently with Brandi’s aesthetics – cannot constitute a
form of memory as other socio-cultural concretizations can. Instead if memory,
or in a wider sense temporality, is in some way embedded in architecture, it is
because of its manifestation as CSA and not as a work of art, according to the
proposed ontology. Architecture then is perceived by society as representation
of different times in the present and mainly in the past, whose invented forms
are culturally significant forms constituting a fundamental part of cultural
memory.
Architectural perception in time, as described in Chapter 5, is revealed
as belonging to two different worlds. The first is the one of matter and the other
is the one of humanised memory to be re-enacted. Thus, the architectural
mnemonic power is exposed through the mimesis that inhabitation suggests
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with the variants that the thickness of the present world demands. This memory
is born from the body memory that is always as one with the architectural
place. It offers shelter to selfness because in confront with a past that “begins
now and is always becoming,” it remains humanly persistent; memory does not
stop there in a past event, it is always being built.686
We suggest as part of the conclusions that, conservation of CSA should
not be an uncreative activity; it may creatively develop an identity for a past
anchored in the present. This identity is plastic and malleable and recognises
both extremes: a blurred and uncertain beginning and the running present. In
consequence, conservation detached from memory would become a rigid
institution trying to solidify what is naturally fluid. If instead memory is
accepted with all its phenomenological implications, attitudes concerning
assimilation should evolve in order to learn to receive creatively the new. As
mentioned before, this does not imply endorsing irreflexive postmodern trends
of everything goes. It means that conservation of CSA has to be open to the
transformation of the image that we have of its past according with the
emergence of its varied manifold appearances. It is our contention that memory
has to remain an integral part of the theoretical elements of conservation.
Nevertheless, this implies the acceptance of the nature of memory and therefore
asks that society – in particular, conservation theoreticians and practitioners –
improves its understanding of what and how we conserve. We suggest that this
effort has to be addressed in social education about memory, heritage and the
686 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study p. 275.
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architectural place; in the research about the conditions of collective memory of
involved cultural groups; and in the ontological analysis of objects of
conservation. If the past is not an essential part of the present, the stable idea
that society has about it is challenged and society needs remembering
creatively.
As stated before, the suggested hermeneutical path of Chapter 6 started
with the body and, passing through temporal representations and art, arrived
finally to the existential place to dwell. The receptor of conservation of CSA
should deal with authentic historical and mythical representations in which, as
deduced in Chapter 5, matter cannot guarantee memory but constitutes one
among other appearances of architecture. Therefore, architecture should always
present the lively manifestations that inhabitation entails. However, Brandi’s
theory of restoration, despite considering architectural art as intemporal, still
aimed for the theoretical explanation of art concerning its temporality. His
notion of restoration of architecture considered its artistic condition as a quality
detached from existential considerations. The constant becoming of Dasein
requires an always-changing position, not only of itself, but also of the place of
the other in order to encourage human empathy.
7.3 Assimilating Place along Time, Encompassing Time
around Place
The last research intention was to suggest a reconnection of temporality
– memory included – with architecture and its conservation, proposing the
hermeneutical dimension for human existence within the relation of place with
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time. The main criticism presented in this thesis to the theory of restoration of
Brandi is the separation of the notion of art from the existential conditions of
architectural inhabitation. This scinded notion of conservation is considered as
deficient or incomplete, since architecture, as deduced in Chapters 4 and 5, is
not merely art, but it constitutes additionally the dwelling place of Dasein, in
Heidegger’s terms. The existential analysis brings forth the necessity of a more
comprehensive approach that considers inhabitation as part of the conservation
endeavour.
Along the epistemological discussion of Chapter 2 and 3, we have
suggested the significance of architectural values beyond the characteristics of
architecture’s presence in order to update Brandi’s theoretical frame. His
choice to continue towards the construction of an understanding of the
ontological structure of architecture, and in a wider sense the human world, is
significant for this thesis. As we have suggested his approach was
phenomenological in method and ontological in goals. This seemed to detach
his philosophy from the trends of Critical Theory and link it more to the neo-
Kantian and phenomenological enquiry, despite the criticism received from
structuralistic and semiotic commentators.
However, the ontological project was relevant for other strands of
philosophers discussing human existence. The fact that architecture is the
conformation of the human place – and its artistic condition – triggered the
question of what this human place is. Art, according to Brandi’s theories, is the
privileged manifestation of astanza. However, Brandi defines astanza as an
intemporal form of presence. Thus, architecture lingers in the middle, between
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the role of the dynamic and changing place of human dwelling and the one of
support of the intemporal work of art. To deal with its conservation means to
deal with human temporality, and this made us shift our investigation towards
conservation as a form of temporality.
As already stated, the existentialist influence seemed to play an
important role in Brandi’s more evolved aesthetic thought. However, his theory
did not propose paths of interpretation other than criticism and restoration, as
distinct from the privileged epiphany of art. Architecture, other than being art,
should be the human place to live that demands additional interpretation.
Brandi already had implied a moral dimension for restoration. This suggested
other possible dimensions of understanding of architecture, merging the factual
reality with the intemporal presence of astanza. Conservation intentionality, as
analysed here, merges these two attitudes: the temporal and intemporal.
As mentioned above, either, CSA is considered as an object with
exclusive aesthetic, historic and significant values, isolated from real life by a
musealisation, or it enters in the dynamic of the human dwelling in the dialectic
of stasis and assimilation. Social institutions protecting monuments need to
balance these views. Although the artistic dimension is fundamental for
architecture, for the focus of this thesis architecture needs to be situated
considering better its conflation as cultural heritage and as the architectural
place to live. Society has the option to consider it as an object to protect
separated from daily life, or as the meaningful place that evolves along with
time. The significance of the consequences of such a hermeneutical endeavour
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demanded, even if only as point of departure, an ontological outline that
considered the architectural phenomena in its constant becoming.
The ontological structure deduced from the theories of Ingarden
revealed the building as the paradigmatic architectural object. This object acts
as a support of possible concretizations of architecture configuring for CSA an
identity that is flexible, despite having an intimate core, whose existential
definition was finally approached in Chapter 6. This core is constituted by the
happening of truth in the form of a concerned human dwelling grounded in the
attitudes of cultivation and care. As mentioned before and as identified in
Chapter 4, a consequence of the ontological structure suggested is the being of
the work of art as an extra-temporal entity – consistently with Brandi’s
aesthetics. This is because art is revealing in its pure reality – astanza in
Brandi’s terms – an existence out of time: parousia without ousia.687 The
disentangling of the notion of presence as different from being present, that
Heidegger revealed, proves to be relevant for the integration of art as part of the
phenomena of dwelling, as explained in Chapter 6.
The succession of architectural memories – since the intimacy of the
family home, up to the shared space of the collectivity – supports the social
environment, which promotes cultivation and care, as already intuited in
Chapter 5. These tacit memories of significant architecture have been gradually
ignored in conservation, giving preference to the determination of Objective
time and Cartesian space. This becomes problematic in conservation of CSA
when inhabitation is involved. Consequently, it seems that if memory is
687 “parousia senza ousia” Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 133. (Our translation).
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accepted within the theoretical manifold of conservation, attitudes should
evolve in order to learn how to assimilate transformation. Individual and social
constructions in the form of values, memories, symbols, and so forth acquire
relevance in the constitution of a meaningful architectural place that
conservation of CSA seemingly supports. However, the post-modern
conditions nowadays present considerable challenges to actions of conservation
given its plurality and the rapidity of changes.
The perennial effort of understanding and interpretation of the
architectural place has to be considered under the light not only of objective
determinants – as it has been the case so far – but also taking into consideration
the intersubjectivity that a lived world implies, a world lived within the society.
This consideration of diverse and varied collective intentionalities is the cause
of the shift in some recent trends in conservation. However, the interpretation
of human existence in the juncture of architectural place and existential time
suggested a region where pure phenomenology – à la Husserl – was limited and
a hermeneutic approach was attempted. Significant concerns about the
intersubjectivity of being-in-the-world guided then the approach.
The hermeneutical path started with the body and, passing through
temporal representations and the peak of art, arrived finally to the existential
place to dwell. As already suggested, architecture should always imply human
life. Heidegger’s approach deduced its condition of being art as a happening of
truth in the work of lived architecture. Heidegger’s and Brandi’s views agree
about the meaningless and the intemporal conditions of architecture as art; yet,
the notions of conservation originated on these views seemed opposed. For
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Brandi, restoration isolates the artistic qualities in its recognition, without
concern for its condition as a place to dwell; Heidegger’s concept of
preservation demands awareness of alƝtheia and care. Accordingly, we suggest
that an existential approach helps conservation to overcome its limited modern
form. Being a dwelling place, architecture connects intimately with Dasein as
art and as an almost animated character. Architecture seems to temporalize
Dasein emulating a being that temporalizes other beings. Architecture shelters
cultivation and provides care to Dasein, accompanying its complete existence
offering a place where to find freedom and security.
For architecture and its conservation, we suggested a philosophical
compromise, other than the merely practical accomplishment of inhabitation
and the procurement of transcendental dwelling. In the present world, since
Dasein dwells in a plurality of forms according to its particular existential
conditions, there arises the need to establish perpetual open dialogues between
individuals and between collectivities. As already mentioned, the constant
becoming of Dasein requires an always-changing position in order to stimulate
human empathy. Dasein’s own conservation and care of its place to dwell
should not ignore that being-among-the-others that its existence imply.
Cultivation and care, in the different explained senses, emerge as the
fundamental attitudes behind conservation intentionality in the relation of
Dasein and its architectural place as the paradigmatic place to dwell, in the
form of the house in its intimate manifestation and in the form of the city in its
collective one. The approach to conservation from a non-theoretical point of
view, but an existential one, revealed the need to consider the architectural
place as a part of the world-environment and not as a separable object to care
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about. Architecture implies a place to live within. The condition of plurality of
the world demands to keep openness to integrate a diversity of horizons and not
closure that fossilise, freeze and hinder communication between Dasein.
7.4 Beyond and Before Knowing
During the development of the research that supports this thesis, some
issues emerged that merit lines of investigation in their own right and that can
constitute further research. The epistemological exploration of the Theory of
Restoration of Brandi and the rest of his aesthetic thought exhibits an important
theoretical reflection that has not been disseminated in philosophical studies
about conservation in the English spoken world. The relevance of such a
relevant theoretical corpus is correlated with charters and international
documents for the protection of heritage that are inspired on it. The awareness
and complete understanding of its philosophical origins can explain different
attitudes towards architectural heritage in particular, and artistic in general, that
are currently being applied in certain countries. The influence of the inheritance
from idealist trends in these theories explain some of the controversies that
hinder both: cultivated innovation and careful conservation.
The emergence of alternative approaches to theoretical research with
ontological focus was evidenced during the development of the thesis. This has
been developed with a point of departure inspired in an ontological theoretical
orientation. However, new post-ontological lines of investigation can also
illuminate the area of cultural studies, architectural conservation in particular.
In this sense, the analysis of collective intentionalities concretizing social
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constructions as a result of differences instead of identities, promises different
theoretical outcomes. As mentioned in the introduction, these proposals
sometimes risk being sophisticated in two senses: in the sense of being based in
naively or deliberately misleading sophisms; and sophisticated in the sense of
being highly developed and complicated, reaching a peak nowadays in the
proposals of a post-ontological age, where reality is described in terms of
differences. For us, as suggested before, the threat is to separate theoretical
explanation from authentic life; to explain, and then to suggest, practices that
are far from the essence of dwelling as authentic Dasein.
The existential approach comes forth also as a relevant alternative that,
despite its direct relevance with the human being-in-the-world, proposes new
ways to understand the architectural place in ways that have not been explored
by the current trends in conservation thought. In this sense, the Heideggerian
alternative chosen by us for the interpretation of the architectural place to live
is not suggested as definitive or the only one valid. As already indicated in
Chapter 6, alternative existential approaches have been suggested by
philosophers such as Bollnow, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and others whose lenses
of interpretation of what means to be in the world as human being can
illuminate the nature of architecture and its conservation. More recently,
scholars such as Seel and Gumbrecht have started to explore the pre-conceptual
reality of an aesthetic of appearances. They suggest that, more than obtaining
theoretical explanation from aesthetic experience, one can merely enjoy and get
advantage of the sense of immediate being-in-the-world in contrast with the
concealing unease of post modern chaos and anxiety.
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Another promising field of research is the phenomenological
constitution of values in relation with conservation. The plurality of cultural
identities and their rapid processes of transformation, evolution, hybridisation,
and so forth, demand analytical instruments for the social sciences in order to
relate philosophical research and conservation practice. The disentangling of
cultural identity seems a complex challenge, since the nature of these realities
presents complicated manifold identities that additionally are in constant
becoming. In this context of cultivation and care as fundamental notions at the
base of conservation of the human architectural place, one final suggestion is
the inclusion of themes such as issues of politics of democracy, discrimination
and gender that urge attention in an every time more changing, difficult and
contrasting condition of being-in-the-world.
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Epilogue
Temporal and intemporal traces of the intimate and unavoidable
connection between the worked stone – of a humble tomb or a sumptuous
palace – and the flesh and mind of human being are manifested to
consciousness as the uncanny personalised emanation that accompanies us
constantly in the form of architecture.
Stone is a forehead where dreams moan, / devoid of curved water, frozen
cypress. / Stone is a shoulder to carry time / with trees of tears and ribbons
and planets.688
The poem of García Lorca seems to suggest those absences with which
architecture is sometimes even more a presence for us than in its material
flagrance; it does not make too much difference whether it is to be born, to live,
or to die, such as the unfortunate bullfighter to whom the poem is dedicated.
Being there, if authentic Dasein, always will compel us to grow and to care
about our place.
688 Federico García Lorca, Federico García Lorca. Selected Poems with parallel Spanish text,
trans. Sorrell, Martin, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) pp.
164-65. The Body Laid Out (“Cuerpo presente” fragment) “La piedra es una frente donde los
sueños gimen / sin tener agua curva ni cipreses helados. / La piedra es una espalda para llevar
al tiempo / con árboles de lágrimas y cintas y planetas.”
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